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Abstract 
 
This thesis concerns the influential field of comparative political economy (CPE) and 
its leading approaches to labour relations ‘institutions’ and regimes in Europe. More 
specifically, this study offers both a critique and corrective of Varieties of Capitalism, 
Welfare State and Regulation approaches of CPE that have neglected the role of law, 
legal rules and legal systems in European labour relations. This thesis offers an 
alternative theoretical framework, a socio-legal political economy approach, 
developed principally out of existing CPE theory and contributions from legal 
studies. The thesis is organised according to a qualitative case study research design 
that sees two national examples of labour relations systems, Britain and Germany, 
compared using two areas of European Union law, acquired rights and posted 
workers, to develop this socio-legal political economy approach and draw conclusions. 
The four cases produce important findings in regards to specific aspects of labour 
relations concerning these two countries, collective bargaining and labour law. One 
broader theoretical argument stems from this comparative approach however. To 
theorise and compare evolving labour relations systems in Europe, the influence of 
law cannot be separated from emergence of neo-liberalism, its reforms, politics, 
practices and, crucially, its critically important legal characteristics. The result for 
CPE, is  neither holistic and self-referential national models nor a singular neo-liberal 
‘European’ model, but something much more complex and contested.  
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Chapter 1.1. 
Introduction to Comparative Political Economy, European 
labour relations and the role of law 
 
1.1.1. Introduction 
This thesis concerns an important theoretical problem within comparative 
political economy (thereafter ‘CPE’). More specifically, the problem exists 
within the approaches of CPE’s leading schools toward the subject of labour 
relations1 and the comparison of different national models of labour relations 
in Europe. These leading schools of CPE, represented in this thesis by the 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), Comparative Welfare Capitalism (CWC) 
and Regulation Theory (RT) approaches, have each placed national labour 
relations ‘models’ in a central and defining position in their respective 
theories and comparative typologies. The way in which CPE theories have 
approached labour relations regimes however have been undermined by a 
failure to address adequately, either empirically or theoretically, questions of 
law, legal regulation and legal influences within national labour 
relations systems in Europe. It is this problem of CPE that motivates this 
thesis and the development of an alternative approach and framework that 
seeks to provide a substantive role for empirical realities of law, such as legal 
rules, legal actors (such as courts) and legal systems (national and 
transnational), as well as theoretical innovations from legal studies. 
This alternative approach, thought of and referred to as the socio-legal 
political economy approach, is developed in this thesis through a qualitative and 
comparative case study research design where the various intricate 
                                               
1 Labour relations’ concerns the relationship between workers and employers and is defined here 
as interchangeable with commonly used terms industrial relations or employment relations 
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relationships between law and non-law are compared and theorised. These 
relationships however serve to highlight the interdisciplinarity of labour 
relations, CPE more broadly and the role of law itself, rather than relegating 
any of the hugely important political, economic and social factors that frame 
how law is given life and exercised in contemporary capitalist societies.  
This introductory chapter will proceed by detailing the different parts 
of CPE’s problem, but will also outline the field and present CPE’s strengths. 
The alternative approach above will also be outlined and accompanied by 
some key arguments that are drawn from its application. This is then 
followed by an outline of the research approach, methods and organisation 
of this thesis.  
 
1.1.1.i.   CPE, labour relations and the role of law 
CPE concerns the comparative analysis of usually, but not exclusively, 
nationally-defined capitalist societies and the political, economic and social 
conditions of these different regimes of capitalist governance. CPE is a broad, 
open and inherently interdisciplinary research field that brings together 
researchers from politics, economics, sociology and, importantly in regards 
to labour relations, business school-orientated industrial relations studies. 
Other sub-fields have been particularly influential upon CPE, including new 
economic sociology, institutional economics (old and new2), business school-
centred industrial relations, with important contributions from the fields of 
labour law and comparative law.  
These latter two introductions from legal studies present a crucial first 
step to addressing CPE shortcomings in this area. CPE’s ‘legal problem’ has 
                                               
2 Old institutional economics is associated with the work of Veblen and Commons, whilst new 
institutional economics is identified by Coase, Williamson and North. 
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been also raised by others from within CPE-aligned studies, namely Morgan 
and Quack (2010, p.281) in the 2010 edited volume Comparative Institutional 
Analysis (Morgan et al., 2010). These sorts of critiques are not however 
specifically directed toward labour relations as a subject and are more 
forgiving of some of CPE’s failings, particularly those of the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach. The first, and hugely influential, Varieties of Capitalism 
volume (Hall and Soskice, 2001) did in fact include chapters on capitalism’s 
relationship with law and legal systems, namely from prominent legal 
theorist Gunther Teubner (2001, p.417-441) and Steven Casper (2001, p.387-
416). These also however did not address concerns of labour relations, work 
and employment. Additionally, these contributions either tended to operate, 
as in Teubner’s case, at some distance from the ‘core’ VoC approach crafted 
by Hall and Soskice or, in Casper’s  case, exhibited some of the those same 
problems of the canonical VoC view of political economy (explained in detail 
in chapter 1.2).  
Beyond this, there is a small number of studies within CPE that 
address some aspects of legal analysis in the specific context of labour 
relations (as in intended by this thesis). These include promising 
contributions from lawyers Deakin et al., (2008). Deakin and Sarkar (2008) 
and Ahlering and Deakin (2007) and Deakin Pele and Siems 2007. These 
authors offer a reformed VoC-like institutionalist approach. In similarity 
with Teubner’s 2001 contribution, these operate at some distance from the 
canonical and original VoC framework with their stronger aspects in fact 
calling into question core aspects of the VoC approach. Contributions from 
the Regulation Theory (RT) (Heino, 2015) and Comparative Welfare 
Capitalism (CWC) (Bonoli, 2003) corners of CPE and offer more promising 
contributions. Although these two studies of Heino and Bonoli provide 
important contributions to this thesis, as do Deakin and Ahlering, they have 
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limitations either in how law is conceived or in the extent to which the subject 
of law is integrated into approaches to trade unions, employers, collective 
bargaining and labour market policy that dominate CPE. 
A detailed critique and review of CPE’s three schools (VoC, CWC, RT) 
is provided in the following review chapter (1.2).  To address the overarching 
problems of CPE here however, the problems of CPE’s approach to labour 
relations is evident in two key areas. First, most CPE studies direct their 
analytical focus overwhelmingly toward the institutions and social actors of 
collective bargaining, thus paying very little regard to either direct forms of 
legal influence, principally represented by labour law, or those indirect legal 
influences found in various bodies of economic law (e.g. company and 
contract law). This fundamental neglect of law’s multi-faceted role also 
produces an analytical neglect of national legal  and constitutional systems 
from CPE typologies. This is despite CPE approaches making efforts to map 
and weave together different welfare state, political and economic systems 
together in their approaches. Nearly all of the notable CPE typological 
schemes identify national regimes of labour relations and welfare states 
within them, making the absence of national legal systems in these CPE 
approaches particularly problematic. An attempt to theorise the complex mix 
and interaction between different sets of legal rules found in labour law, 
company law and aspects of national constitutional systems is entirely 
necessary. This theorisation also demands the incorporation of an analysis of 
the judicial state as well as its interaction with the governmental state (that is 
well covered in CPE work) in organising the relationship between the statute 
law and common law. This attempt also requires a theorising of those 
relationships between these facets of legal-constitutional systems on the hand 
and those of non-law found in politics, economic organisation and social-
setting and social relations on the other. Without these, an appropriate 
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understanding of the relationship between law and collective institutions like 
wage bargaining, trade unions, political and policy influences is not possible.  
The second shortcoming is represented in those CPE studies that do 
offer some treatment of law. These however only do so in a fleeting and 
superficial manner that usually manifest themselves in brief, blunt and 
limited references to legislative reforms of labour markets and labour 
relations. An understanding of law’s role must be much more substantive 
and comprehensive. These studies often present a very limited and 
formalistic understanding of law’s influence that, by implication, sees law as 
a given, as rigid and a mere external influence upon the actors, practices and 
institutions of labour relations. Law is not rigid, and has much of its character 
informed by politics, industrial practice and social relations. Law is 
simultaneously a flexible, malleable and mediating influence used to settle 
disputes and organise economic and social relationships as well as something 
that is itself sometimes mediated by the same social relations in seeks to regulate. 
This process of mediation often presents itself in the form of social and 
political conflict as imposed changes on legal rights of action provoke 
responses from social actors that have competing interests and claims on 
these rights. In other instances, these mediated responses will take a more 
subtle and negotiated form, shaping how legal changes take shape in existing 
practice. 
These abstractions are present at different points in labour relations, 
but the presence or threat of the first has particular relevance to a capitalist 
labour relations context where social interests of labour and capital are 
inherently in competition (Traxler et al., 2001, p.11; Offe 1985). The social 
complexity of law’s ‘impact’ becomes more important the more that law is 
forcibly imposed upon the social relationships to reorder rights of either 
capital or labour. In labour relations terms, this means that legal attempts to 
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influence labour relations will themselves be framed by the political and 
social interests this attempt affects. A key part of theorising law’s place in 
contemporary European labour relations is accepting the role neo-liberalism 
has played in renewed efforts to reorder labour and capitalist relations. This 
argument of law’s neglect in CPE is therefore inextricably tied to the 
emergence of neo-liberal politics, ideas and policy agendas; a subject well 
covered in CPE but without neo-liberalism’s legal character being addressed. 
 
1.1.1.ii   Neo-liberalism & law-driven change in European labour 
relations 
From approximately 1980 onwards, the intellectual, policy and political shifts 
associated with neo-liberalism presented serious demands for change from 
institutions of labour relations in Europe.  
These ‘changes’ often presented modest changes in labour relations 
regimes, and in other cases produced far more sweeping and destructive 
results. Changes driven by legislative reforms and associated shifts in 
business practice were clearly more significant in countries like Britain than 
in countries like Sweden and Denmark. In either sets of cases, whether 
substantive decline was witnessed or not, almost all national regimes of wage 
bargaining have seen the role of law become much more commonplace and 
prominent. Moreover, the imposition of neo-liberal reforms coming from the 
European level were felt very differently across Europe. This point presents 
a fertile line of comparative enquiry. 
The implications for neo-liberalism’s potent role require a recasting of 
CPE approaches to labour relations that have relied heavily upon collective 
bargaining and its actors, in different ways, as the core unit of analysis when 
defining, comparing and examining European labour relations systems. This 
reform needed to include the substantive introduction of legal theory and 
	 -	25	-	
legal analysis to understand both the legal characteristics of labour relations’ 
and the emergence of neo-liberalism which framed many new interventions 
from the realm of law. This entails CPE stepping beyond the overtly political 
and economic aspects of neo-liberalism that are of overwhelming focus in 
CPE accounts of the subject. This proposed theoretical reform of CPE’s 
approach to European labour relations, addresses the labour market effects of 
the post-1970s ‘neo-liberal revolution’ (S. Hall 2011) to illustrate this problem 
of CPE.  
The role of neo-liberal ideas and practices is identified as the central 
driver in legal change and associated reform agendas. These usually sought 
to promote the liberalisation of wage-setting practices and broader 
employment systems so that employers can reorganise production systems 
(Traxler 2002, 2003a). In different countries, the main institutional pillars of 
collective bargaining systems include strong membership organisations, 
trade unions and usually industry-based employer membership 
organisations, and the bargaining apparatus itself that places unions and 
employers on the opposite side of the wage bargain. In some countries, the 
power of trade unions was targeted by neo-liberal reforms in order to weaken 
unions’ ability to impose wage and job security demands upon employers. 
These were made more effective by the economic decline in those sectors 
where union membership was strongest. In other examples, the collective 
bargaining process was itself the target of ‘reform’ as well as (or rather than) 
the relative power of key actors such as trade unions. The goals were to allow 
employers to adjust wage levels and work systems if economic conditions 
demanded. Such reforms in some European countries included the creation 
of ‘opening clauses’ designed to enable employers to prise open and 
renegotiate collective agreements (Visser 2005, Eichhorst and Marx 2011). In 
some cases reforms also introduced heightened roles for court and quasi-
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judicial actors as part of more juridified and formal rule-based settings for 
labour relations.  
This final point above highlights to two specific and paradoxical 
developments of neo-liberalism. The first is broader and sees a contrast 
between the rhetoric and intention of neo-liberalism to de-regulate on the one 
hand, and the reality where legal rules in fact became commonplace. The 
modes of regulation and governance found in European labour relations are 
increasingly mixed. Trade union and wage bargaining forms decline, but do 
not disappear, the space for legal rules and frameworks and employer 
prerogative (HRM3) has correspondingly increased. This increase in legal 
influences, this has produced a shift from collective rights, providing trade 
union action and collective bargaining, to a greater emphasis on individual 
rights for individual workers. This is important, given the inherent imbalance 
of power between workers and employers attempts to de-collectivise worker 
power, force individual-level model of workplace negotiation with 
employers, increasing the power of employers. This was a central goal of 
different neo-liberal forms of labour market reform.  
In terms of wages specifically, the above has manifested itself notably 
in the creation of nationally-encompassing minimum wage laws for 
individual workers in many European countries. Placing laws guaranteeing a 
minimum salary in a content of neo-liberal legal change may sound odd, but 
three things should be considered. First, the existence of the legal minimum 
wage does not itself tell us about the level and purchasing power of this 
minimum wage. Secondly, its existence does not tell us how it is enforced. 
Thirdly, and more importantly, the level of the minimum wage is always 
lower than the minimum rate agreed in any collective agreement. If collective 
                                               
3 ‘Human Resource Management’ is both a theory and an agenda of corporate practice highlighting 
employer prerogative over its work force, hence ‘management’ rather than labour ‘relations’  
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bargaining is weakened or removed, the legal minimum wage is only partial 
compensation to the worker in material/wage terms. This places the creation 
of legal minimum wages into a labour market context of weakening collective 
bargaining  as part of a regime of neo-liberal change, even if compensatory 
in nature. 
 In Britain, a legal minimum wage was introduced in 1998 long after 
collectively-bargained minimum wage rates had become scarce given 
collective bargaining’s rapid post-1980s decline. In Germany, a similar legal 
and nationally encompassing minimum wage was created in 2015 as the 
declining coverage of collective bargaining left large portions of the German 
economy beset by serious low pay problems. Countries like Austria and 
those in Scandinavia still have very high collective bargaining coverage (80-
99%), so have not needed to produce legal minimum wages as collective 
bargaining provides these minimum wage rates  as part of broader wage 
scales. Again, the development of these individual legal rights to a minimum 
rate of pay can therefore be seen as part of the neo-liberal labour market and 
a vision of ‘neo-liberal legal change’. The reforms of individual and collective 
labour law4 have worked in tandem to craft such outcomes, but are still 
crucially mediated by the social, political and industrial factors acting in 
different ways in different industrial and national settings. 
Together, these legal interventions take the form of explicit attempts 
to reorder the legal rights that frame the balance of power between capital 
and labour and therefore define labour relations and the wage bargain labour 
relations contains. More explicitly, this sees the subordination of social rights 
beneath economic rights. Ostensibly this may appear to offer individual 
                                               
4 Labour lawyer Alan Bogg defines ‘Collectivist’ labour law as “that which encompasses a concern for collective 
or group rights, rather than rights for individuals; it affirms collective values; and the metric of legitimacy of a 
legal regime of freedom of association is the extent to which it supports collective bargaining through 
independent trade unions.” (Bogg 2017). 
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economic rights to workers as well, but again if workers lose legal rights for 
collective action, employers’ power resources are enhanced. The formation of 
new legal frameworks and rights systems is central to a neo-liberal re-
regulatory pattern and sits in contradiction to the central theoretical and 
rhetorical tenets of neo-liberalism that highlight the importance of de-
regulation. This assertion forms a key part of other prominent theories 
associated with neo-liberalism, and in particular ‘new public management’ 
(NPM), and the ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1994, Moran 2003) when theorising 
the state under neo-liberalism. These theories map and often promote the 
development of neo-liberal frameworks that advance efficiency, 
flexibilisation, rationalisation and the prising open public sector services for 
private interests. Identifying this theoretically interesting paradox between 
the de-regulatory intentions and the re-regulatory reality of neo-liberalism is 
only of secondary importance to this core point: the role of legal regulation 
and legal intervention in European labour relations has in fact increased.   
The neo-liberal vision of legal change in labour markets has come 
through these public policy reform attempts and through employer 
strategies. By segmenting workforces and undermining trade union power 
(by fragmenting cohesive bodies of trade union-organised workers (Schnabel 
2013)) business have been able to reform production to cater to market and 
profit needs. Neo-liberal reform therefore does not  merely manifest itself 
through changes in labour law, but also company law, contract law and other 
forms of economic law that enhance employer freedom to re-organise their 
businesses and workforces. Regulatory changes of this sort were 
accompanied by two shifts in the area of the judiciary. The first saw courts 
introduced to enforce legal rules concerning economic rights, the second saw 
the creation of new quasi-judicial regulatory bodies so that politics could be 
kept out of technical processes of ‘economic regulation’. These two 
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developments together were an important part of a process of de-
politicisation, so central to neo-liberal ‘regulatory state’ goals (Majone 1994).  
In the comparative European context however, these different sorts of 
reforms were evident in some national cases more than others, given their 
different legal systems and traditional roles for courts. In Britain, where 
courts were traditionally hostile to the impositions trade unions brought to 
employers, a prominent court role was re-introduced after 1979. Even in 
those countries where this form of legal change was not forthcoming to the 
same extent, the role of European law and the reach of its legal institutions 
into national economies, like the European Commission and Court of Justice, 
have had an increasingly potent effect on national labour markets.  
CPE has produced a number of important contributions to the 
comparative analysis of capitalist systems and to comparative social science 
more generally. It is for this reason that CPE’s shortcomings concerning the 
role of law in European labour relations must be understood and set within 
a reformed approach to neo-liberalism as well. As outlined above, one cannot 
be done without the other. CPE has placed labour relations and its core actors 
in centrally important positions in their respective theories, so its problems 
are unlikely to be limited to labour relations. In crafting a small-n case study 
research design, two national cases – Germany and Britain – are selected 
alongside two areas of EU law, acquired rights and posted workers law, to 
provide a comparative empirical basis from which to examine this alternative 
approach. The methodological details of this are outlined in the third section 
of this first chapter, following the second section immediately below that 
outlines this alternative framework. 
 
 
	 -	30	-	
1.1.2  An alternative framework: an outline of a socio-legal 
political economy approach 
 
This thesis follows a simple structure. It starts with the identification of a 
problem, CPE’s treatment of labour relations, which is used to prompt the 
creation of an alternative corrective framework. This is then applied to four case 
studies so that qualitative comparisons demonstrate and develop this new 
framework in the shadow of existing CPE theories.  
An important principle sits at the heart of this alternative framework: 
it is not sufficient to argue merely that law matters, but more importantly how 
law matters. A crucial part of grasping the different ways that law matters 
comes through the acceptance of the interdisciplinary nature of law and the 
different interdisciplinary contexts (social, industrial, political) within which 
law ‘happens’. Political, economic and social contexts provide different sorts 
of venues and actors for mediation and contestation that shape law’s 
creation, delivery and adoption into practice. With this in mind, this 
framework is developed from interdisciplinary mix of academic influences, 
including from labour law, economic sociology, institutional economics and 
both the critical and orthodox branches of CPE. The term ‘socio-legal’ is 
meant so as to situate law in its social context, therefore placing this 
alternative approach between existing CPE approaches to labour relations on 
the one hand and traditional/doctrinal law school approaches, often 
described as ‘black letter’ legal analysis, on the other.  
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Figure 1.1.a Positioning of an alternative approach 
 
“A theory is only a tool for investigating practice, like a spade for digging up facts 
and converting them into an understandable system”  
 
        John R. Commons in (1924, p.722) 
 
 
The purposes and objectives of theory can be directed towards either 
prediction or the framing and informing how a research process is conducted 
or both. Looking to Commons’ statement above, the framework provided 
below is set around tools used for generating material organising it in a 
particular way, but in doing so will also point to alternative conclusions from 
those of existing CPE approaches.  
This socio-legal political economy framework is presented in this section 
and is then followed by some key arguments as to what this framework will 
produce in the case studies selected for this thesis. This alternative approach 
consists of five parts: including: 1) a core operational definition, 2) the relationship 
between law and collective bargaining, 3) a holistic approach to legal systems, 4) 
conflict of rules, and 5) two conjoined methodological innovations.  
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1. A core operational definition of ‘labour relations’ builds upon 
Marginson and Sisson (2002) who define labour relations as that concerning 
‘the regulation and governance of the employment relationship’, but it offers 
here an equally prominent place for legal sources of ‘regulation and 
governance’. This sees labour relations, whether defined as that at the 
national or sub-national (industrial) level, as defined by two principal forms 
of regulation and governance: legal sources and collective institutional 
sources, the second provided by collective bargaining, its core actors and 
other similar institutions, such as co-determination5 bodies.  
This concept of ‘regulation and governance’ however should be 
considered more broadly beyond these two core labour law and collective 
forms found in labour relations systems. Labour law and collective 
bargaining are not the only forms of regulation and governance that affect 
labour relations. Labour relations are inserted into broader economic, 
political and legal systems through other rules, laws and governance 
systems. These include aspects of contract law, company law, and 
competition law as well as those non-legal and more informal sets of rules 
and governance regimes that impose themselves upon labour relations. Law 
however is essential to integrating labour relations into a broader economic 
and political system. The way this takes place however can produce any 
number of regulatory and governance problems, particularly when attempts 
at legal change are pursued by legislators, courts or social actors. This notion 
of regulatory and governance problems provides a useful analytical foil from 
which to examine case studies, such as the four cases offered in this thesis. 
2. A dynamic relationship between legal and collective institutional 
means of regulation and governance. Recognising the co-existence of these 
                                               
5 These are commonplace in European countries and are described in chapter 2.1 where German 
labour relations’ historical development is outlined. 
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two legal and collective institutional means of regulation and governance in defining 
‘labour relations’ leads naturally to the second part of this alternative 
approach. These two halves of labour relations systems must be understood 
in dynamic, interactive and relational terms. Employers and unions must 
interpret their legal environment and the legal rules that come with it. Legal 
interventions are not static and given and must be interpreted, mediated, 
contested and enacted. This is achieved with varying degrees of obedience 
by social partners as their interactive adjustments when applying law will 
often differ from that intended by the creators of a given legal rule. Clearly, 
as described in the first section, where unions are weak and collective 
bargaining is weak or not present, employers have a freer hand in 
interpreting legal rules and their own legal rights. Legal rules demanding 
rights for workers will be interpreted as narrowly as possible by employers. 
Indeed, most law demanding workers’ rights, whether collective (such as 
union recognition) or individual (such as working time and minimum wage), 
requires union shop stewards to police the enforcement of these.  
In a neo-liberal era of dense and complex interventions from different 
sorts of legal rules, the interpretive and activation role of labour actors 
(employers, unions) is analytically much more important. In broader terms, 
this demands a socio-legal approach to labour relations and its different legal 
and non-legal means of ‘regulation and governance’ and the social actors that 
operate within them.  
3. The heightened role and presence of legal rules, legal actors and 
legal frameworks in labour matters requires a holistic understanding of legal 
systems, the different legal characteristics these possess and, for labour 
relations or any aspect of a capitalist system, the direct and indirect forms of 
influence that are found in national legal systems.  
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This not only prompts an examination of those more direct aspects of 
legal rule found in labour law, but also requires this be placed in a broader 
legal context inclusive of bodies of constitutional law, economic law and 
other areas of law that may be relevant to labour matters in different contexts 
(e.g. human rights law). A provision found in labour law may, when read in 
black letter terms, point to particular desired outcomes, but may be 
subordinated or submerged beneath other legal rules and bodies of law.  For 
example, at different periods of British industrial history the law of contract, 
which  holds a very important constitutional place in the legal systems of all 
capitalist countries (MacNeil 1977; Williamson 1985), has had considerable 
influence over both the individual employment contracts and the in-effect 
collective ‘contract’ forged between management and trade unions in the form 
of collective agreements. This nation state-centred view of various labour law 
and non-labour law influences has become considerably more complicated 
in the European context due to two interrelated factors: the first is the 
emergence of neo-liberalism induced legal change of labour relations, the 
second is the emergence of European legal integration. As an operational 
concept, posing questions as to the direct and indirect influences of law 
allows for labour law to be contextualised against other law and non-law and 
engage in a mapping process to separate out different relevant legal rules.  
4. A conflict of rules concept is adapted from a conflict of laws concept 
found in legal theory (Everson and Joerges 2012; O’Hara and Ribstein 2009; 
Wilson 2007, p.88; Kramer 1991) and a working rules concept drawn from 
labour relations scholar J.R. Commons (19246).  
In a period in capitalist history that exhibits a rich variety of legal 
interventions into labour matters, the contested interactions of different 
kinds of rules needs to be central to the comparative study of labour matters. 
                                               
6 In Commons’ The Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924) 
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This conflict of rules concept provides a simple mechanism to observe both 
formal legal rules and less formal non-legal rules of a given regime of 
regulation or governance and to assess how these come together to either 
come into conflict or seamlessly converge and everything else in between. In 
labour relations terms, the role of labour and other law presents a number of 
possible points of interaction with the non-legal rules found in collective 
bargaining and other forms of employment rules and workplace norms 
(codes of practice, corporate culture etc.).  
In legal studies, the conflict of laws dominates international private 
law study and concerns a common legal problem where agents operate 
outside their own jurisdiction and a conundrum emerges where two sets of 
laws can be applied but not simultaneously. This would force social actors 
and regulators to make a ‘choice of laws’ decision. This is not however an 
exclusively legalistic concept. Lawyers Everson and Joerges (2012) 
demonstrate the prominence of the socio-legal considerations given that legal 
and jurisprudential forms of remedy (provided by courts or other regulators) 
are not the only modes of mediation available. This more sociological 
approach to conflict of laws, that Everson and Joerges draw from Dahrendorf 
(2008), identifies a paradox in law’s role: in seeking to regulate and mediate 
conflict, particularly ‘class conflict’ in labour relations terms, this role can 
find itself contributing to the conditions of conflict it is trying to settle. This 
means that the mediation role may itself provoke responses from social 
actors who themselves massage legal rules and legal influences into existing 
practice.  
In labour relations, the contractual venues of interaction between 
employers and labour, namely the employment contract and the collective 
agreement, can be left to regulate these disputes but can also be subject to 
external interference, placing the venue for rule interaction in the realms of 
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legislatures or courts. In truth, different combinations of these two realities 
operate at different times and with different sorts of labour dispute or issue 
(e.g. collective disputes like strikes, individual dismissal rights enforcement), 
complicating how labour relations is governed and regulated. In an era of 
expansive neo-liberal reforms of labour markets, legal interventions have 
forged increasingly conflicts of between different sets of rules, a complexity 
that requires a deeper theoretical understanding. 
5. The positioning and conceptual aspects of this alternative approach 
lead to two important methodological contributions of this framework. This 
framework cannot be employed without the substantive introduction of judicial 
actors into the CPE analysis of labour relations, a requirement that also 
necessitates the examination of the relationship between court actors and 
other actors. Importantly, in terms of methods and data, the introduction of 
court case law is necessary and offers a rich source of data not seen in most 
in CPE studies. Court case law not only opens a window onto the activities 
of  increasingly important judicial actors and how they interpret formal law, 
but its case law offers a wealth of qualitative empirical material into the 
realities of labour relations issues, practice and labour disputes and the 
conditions that created these. Case law data has played a part in political 
science-based European integration studies (Alter 1998, 2009; Martinsen 
2015), but not in non-labour law studies of labour relations within CPE. With 
one eye on point four of this framework above, such analysis of court 
decisions, alongside other legal texts like statutes, also provides an 
opportunity to assess different instances of the conflict of laws and conflict of 
rules scenarios. This is expanded upon in the following methodology based 
section. 
The second innovation sees this legal analysis part applied to approaches 
drawn from the qualitative corner of CPE research (Hall 2006; Mahoney 2007; 
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Kogut 2010). This is described in more detail in the next methodology 
focused section below. These studies argue for the strengths of in-depth 
analysis of a small number of case studies for the purposes of theory 
development. Theory-orientated research, argues Hall (2006), may be able to 
employ quantitative techniques of comparison to map broad patterns and 
has particular use for macro level and multivariate studies of phenomena 
such as employment.  
Applying this methodological form of comparison from CPE to legal 
questions and legal material (i.e. court case law text, legislative text) 
represents part of this theses’ surplus value, and is described in more detail 
in chapter 1.4. 
 
1.1.3. Key Arguments  
The above framework needs to produce and point to alternative arguments 
to those provided by existing CPE theories. A broad hypothesised argument 
is offered here in outline form and is applied to the four case studies of this 
thesis to produce four sets of comparable material to be used for theory 
development in Section III of this thesis. 
Given the earlier coverage of those shifts associated with the 
emergence of neo-liberalism, a key overarching claim is presented: the 
increased and multi-faceted influence of law in European labour relations (post-
1980) is inextricably linked to the emergence and dominance of neo-liberalism, its 
intellectual order and the policy agendas and patterns of corporate practice and 
reorganisation this brought. The forms this takes across different national regimes of 
labour relations and capitalist systems however produce different results that 
underline the importance of legal systems, labour law systems and political and 
economic characteristics of different countries. The comparable results however point 
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to various national forms of contested dissolution and decline, rather than 
functionally forming and parsimonious ‘models of capitalism’ defined by 
institutional coherence. 
 This linking of processes of legal change to neo-liberalism demands not 
just a reformed understanding of law and its different manifestations (courts, 
statutes, etc.), but also the legal character of neo-liberalism itself. CPE has given 
the subject of neo-liberalism plenty of coverage in examining patterns of 
institutional change (Hall and Soskice 2001, Thelen 2001, Scharpf 2011, 
Pierson 1996), but these have focused upon the political, welfare and 
industrial characteristics of neo-liberalism’s advance; the roles of law, legal 
systems, legal actors and forms of resolution on conflicts between economic 
and social legal rights however are conspicuously absent. Some exceptions to 
this broad statement (Bonoli 2003, Heino 2015) are examined in the review 
chapter that follows. When purposeful examinations of law and legal 
influence are properly integrated into the comparative analysis of capitalist 
systems, new themes such as national legal and constitutional systems, 
labour law systems, contractual law systems and broader doctrines of 
economic law become important.  
Labour relations systems’ sensitivity to neo-liberalism’s advance 
presents a number of comparative analytical issues. National labour relations 
systems may be subject to various change pressures. Different national 
regimes, even if possessing strong similarities, may develop in different ways 
and speeds. With this, some regimes adopt to reforms quicker and more 
seamlessly than others. Moreover, in the European context these comparative 
concerns also inevitably introduce a variety of very important legal (as well 
as market) influences stemming from Germany’s and Britain’s7 membership 
of the European Union. This Europeanisation element further complicates the 
                                               
7 Britain remained a member of the European Union up until the submission of this thesis.  
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cross-national comparison of countries in Europe, but law’s advance also 
introduces important factors into these countries’ increasing insertion into a 
broader European legal order.  
In directing attention toward the four cases selected for this thesis, 
including two countries and two areas of EU law, four different examples of 
EU institutions seeking to influence or change labour relations are offered. 
These case studies are examples of varying degrees of disruption and 
response to disruption. The findings of this two-country comparison produce 
two further claims that seriously challenge two existing totems of 
contemporary CPE: existing typological labelling and the concept of 
institutional complementarity. These case studies provide a mix of empirical 
evidence for why specific CPE approaches to these two countries’ labour 
relations as well as more abstract theoretical representations of broader 
problems and phenomena. For example, The decline of the Tarifautonomie 
model that defined German labour relations in the 20th Century is clearly 
displayed in these cases. In regards to Britain, such sweeping empirical 
demonstrations are not so important, but the abstract demonstrations of 
theoretically useful events such as strike action by trade unions as a response 
to neo-liberal legal change. 
With neo-liberalism’s comparatively varied corrosive influence in 
‘national models’, Europe instead is seeing varieties of dissolution due to neo-
liberalisation. This sees comparative models being developed based on 
different forms of dissolution rather than how they form and maintain themselves; 
in effect reversing the established logic of typology construction. This has 
clear implications for the concept of institutional complementarity that is 
central to VoC theories and some RT accounts of comparative capitalism.  
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1.1.4. Research approach and research methods 
Three main areas of the research approach are outlined: a comparative 
qualitative case study research design, and introduction to the selected cases, 
and data sources.   
As point five from the alternative framework outlined above 
indicates, a key part of this thesis’ added value comes from combining 
comparative qualitative analysis, that already has an established place in CPE 
and the social sciences, and approaches and methods from legal studies. 
Using a small number of cases allows for the in-depth analysis of them which 
has particular benefits for examining complex causal links and explanatory 
relationships between variables in a manner that more statistical-based 
quantitative methods are not well suited. The complications created by 
various legal factors (e.g. legal rules, interventions by legislators and courts) 
point to those approaches and methods appropriate for identifying and then 
separating out complex and different variables. The research design is given 
more detail in chapter 1.4. One key point is highlighted here however. In-
depth analysis of small numbers of case studies do not just provide empirical 
material to learn about a specific case, but importantly must provide findings 
to speak to broader phenomena, also known as generalizations or theoretical 
extensions (Hall 2006). Case selection must be done with care and be guided 
by theory, but must be done for these cases to be useful. In particular, the 
four cases selected for this thesis provide meaningful findings about British 
and German labour relations more broadly and the relationships with 
European legal order and the legal character of European neo-liberalism. 
Cases: Two national level cases – Germany and Britain – are selected 
and compared through an analysis of their adaptive responses to two 
selected areas of EU law – posted workers law and acquired rights law. Detailed 
reasoning for the selection of these cases is provided in chapter 1.4 and both 
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of these national level and European level case selections are the focus of two 
chapters at the start of section two of this thesis (2.1, 2.2). 
Data sources: Such comparisons traditionally rely on the methods 
found in social science such as interviews, surveys and other forms of 
contextual analysis. For this study, additional emphasis is placed upon legal 
texts produced by courts as well as legislators as well as supporting 
documentation as to how these affect non-legal actors like businesses and 
workers. The conjoined legal analysis of statute and court-made law is a key 
methodological part in this thesis’ four cases. Court case law in particular has 
been important in all four and some description as to their strengths is 
provided here. The decisions of courts clearly provide the doctrinal view of 
a court in regards to its application of formal law (in view of legislation or a 
constitution) to disputes. The texts of such decisions also however provide 
rich empirical data on these disputes and how law is applied to these disputes 
in search of legal remedy. Of course, the decisions of a court in one decision 
often only concerns the case itself and the parties involved, particularly when 
made by courts at the lower end of a hierarchical court system. When 
decisions are made by higher courts however, their implications stretch 
much further and can alter the legislative status quo or other dominant 
practice or practices in society or industry. It is the role of legal analysis to 
map both the body of a court’s case law and the legislative arrangements that 
are relevant to this area. In such scenarios, competing pieces of formal law 
found in different statutory texts or court decisions may come into conflict.  
The above invariably will also clash with dominant interpretations of 
a given area of law. The role of legal analysis, when directed to labour 
relations, ultimately sees law being applied to social reality. Methodological 
concerns of labour relations therefore must reflect this. This thesis 
complements the use of the analysis of legal texts with a number of 
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qualitative techniques including interviews, documentary analysis and 
secondary sources and data. The use of these methods varies across these 
cases. In some chapters, such as the Britain-Posted Workers case, no court 
decision is directly at issue, but certainly is indirectly. Here, qualitative data 
such as interviews and key documentary text have to be used to develop 
answers. The Germany-Acquired Rights case also requires the use of both 
interviews and documentary analysis and secondary data. In this German 
case study, industry-based examples drawn from existing literature were 
used to develop a picture of the Acquired Rights Directive’s lack of 
regulatory impact in Germany.  
This sort of analysis is again aided by the comparative qualitative 
analysis literature raised earlier in this section. Creating causal inferences is 
often challenging when different and incomplete data are being used. 
Therefore the researcher must recognise the inductive nature of this process 
and the limits of the data when examining causal mechanisms. The Germany-
Acquired Rights chapter was the most challenging in this regard, but 
theoretically very useful since it demonstrates how the complex mix of direct 
and indirect legal influences and conflict of laws problems mattered in 
determining outcomes. The remaining Germany-Posted Workers and Britain-
Acquired Rights chapters relied more however on legal analysis, but also used 
qualitative methods such as interviews and documentary data to provide an 
important aspect to how these were analysed. Importantly, these four 
chapters together, with the different mix of legal and social science forms of 
data sources, present a contrasting and comparative spread of 
methodological as well as theoretical lessons. The methodological discussion 
is provided in chapter 1.4. 
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1.1.5. Concluding comment and thesis organisation 
This introductory chapter sought to outline three main things: a problem 
identified with CPE studies of labour relations concerning its incorporation 
of questions of law, legal regulation and legal influence; an alternative 
approach to correct this, and the research and methodological approach to 
demonstrating this. The objectives are theoretical and intend to provide a 
reformed CPE approach to contemporary labour relations research.  
This thesis is organised into three broad sections. Following this 
introductory chapter, the first section produces a detailed critique of the three 
CPE schools raised above (Chapter 1.2). This is then followed by a fuller 
presentation of the methodological concerns of this thesis in Chapter 1.3. 
Section Two includes the four case study chapters but is preceded by two 
chapters dedicated to describing the national and European level aspects of 
the four selected cases. These two chapters include some description of these 
countries’ labour relations histories as well as the broader political, economic 
and legal systems these are set within (Chapter 2.1). These provide historical 
context to these cases as well as a preliminary demonstration of an approach 
inclusive of analytical concerns of law. The second of these two chapters 
describes and analyses European acquired rights law and posted workers 
law. This includes some contextual description of the EU legal system itself 
and how legislation and court-made law create and contribute to EU 
employment regulation like these two areas selected. The third section brings 
together the empirical and theoretical findings from the four case studies for 
the central purpose of theory development that motivates this thesis.  
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Chapter 1.2.  
An introduction to Comparative Political Economy, 
Labour Relations ‘institutions’ and the role of law: a 
critique of three CPE schools 
 
  
1.2.2. Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the two main aspects that organise this thesis: 
first, the identification of a central problem with comparative political 
economy (CPE) concerning its treatment of law within the study of labour 
relations systems, and second, an alternative framework to correct it. This 
chapter addresses the former and reviews three schools, the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC), Regulation Theory (RT) and Comparative Welfare Capitalism 
(CWC) approaches. This introduction first maps these three approaches and 
then outlines the manner in which they will be critiqued and compared. 
These three schools (VoC, CWC and RT) have engaged in some 
fruitful collaboration as well as heated disagreements, but do not always 
target the same subjects or, when they do, do so in the same manner. The 
CWC and VoC schools for example make good use of various and rather 
weighty theoretical concepts, but then direct these to different empirical 
subjects; VoC scholars concentrate on business interests, and CWC scholars 
on the state and trade unions. RT however, due in part to its Marxist 
traditions, reverses this and focuses upon quite weighty theoretical concepts 
first and integrates empirical questions afterwards. In regards to labour 
relations matters, this tendency is demonstrated clearly by ‘regulationists’ 
viewing labour matters through a conceptual guise of the ‘wage-labour 
nexus’, a concept with strong Marxist traditions. More importantly, these 
three schools start with different foci based partly upon their disciplinary 
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characteristics. The economist-dominated VoC and RT tend to favour a 
methodological industrialism and the role of business actors within this, 
whereas the welfarists within CWC favour sociological and political 
approaches and explanations and focus upon social dynamics and political 
actors.  RT sits neatly between the welfarist CWC and industrialist VoC 
schools in displaying a similar ‘economic sociology’ pedigree to CWC but 
being still dominated by economists.  
Each school focuses on the production, protection (welfare) and political 
regime aspects of capitalist systems in different ways. The Industrialist VoC 
school quite naturally focuses on production regimes first, and the firm as 
central to this, and comes to questions of protection and political factors 
afterwards. CWC scholar focus upon the provision of social protection 
provided by the state and by other means. Each of these three schools has 
importantly sought to encompass all three of these three production, protection 
(welfare) and political regime aspects of capitalist systems. These attempts 
have given rise to ambitious theoretical agendas to identify and test 
institutional linkages between these aspects and sub-realms within them 
such as skills regimes, pension systems, corporate governance and collective 
bargaining. The role of institutional complementarity for example has played a 
dominant role in VoC research and some RT and CWC research. CWC 
however has developed its own attempt at theorising system-wide 
institutional linkages courtesy of elective affinities and ideas of functional 
equivalents to the formal welfare state. This latter example is important in 
appreciating how formal state-provision of social welfare interacts with 
collective bargaining arrangements, which are not directly provided by the 
state, in achieving welfare goals. Fundamentally, to return to the leading 
argument of this thesis, these political, production and protection systems 
need to be combined with a permanent and integrated analytical 
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appreciation of legal systems, as the interactions and linkages under 
examination are inevitably affected by legal rules in a number of ways. 
       There are, it is noted, a number of discrete areas of literature that have 
made an attempt at this sort of correction.  One of these comes from the labour 
relations field, often placed in either business schools or sociology 
departments, and a second comes from ‘new economic sociology’. Work from 
the latter (Sutton et al. 1994) has argued that the increasing ‘legalisation’ and 
‘juridification’ of workplace relations has brought about two sets of 
developments: extensive interventions from courts, the state and quasi-state 
bodies in the employment relationship, as well as the development of 
formalised processes of work management at the company level, pursued to 
satisfy the demands of new and dense sets of statutory rules.  
Safford and Piore (2006) note a similar development in regards to 
American labour relations. Declaring ‘dead’ the collective bargaining system 
built as part of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, these authors cite a double 
shift where the decline of collective bargaining has been met by a 
concomitant rise of extensive legal rules, mandates and interventions, 
particularly in the form of individual legal rights (both labour law and 
human rights law). This shift away from wage bargaining as the primary 
means of governing labour relations to alternative modes of workplace 
regulation has clear, but varied, relevance in Europe. Safford and Piore 
importantly do not identify political neo-liberalism and associated reforms 
as the primary reason for this shift, but instead see a “shift in the axes of social 
mobilization” from mobilization set around “economic identities (class, 
industry, occupation) to […] those rooted outside the workplace (sex, race, 
ethnicity, age, disability)” (Safford and Piore 2006). This recognition of social 
context alongside that of politics is hugely important and points to a very 
simple understanding concerning the multi-faceted set of political, social, 
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economic and legal causal factors how they interact in different labour market 
contexts.  
The following reviews begin with the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
approach, followed by Regulation Theory (RT) and is completed by the 
Comparative Welfare Capitalism (CWC) school. 
 
1.2.3. Varieties of Capitalism 
 
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach represents the principal 
production system-focused contribution to CPE, but in truth has held such a 
dominant position in CPE studies since the early 2000s that most CPE has 
been forced to address its central claims. The original VoC volume, Soskice 
and Hall’s edited 2001 book, inspired an enormous amount of research as 
well as a huge amount of criticism (Korpi 2006; Boyer 2005; Jessop 2011; 
Ebenau et al., 2013; Pontusson 2005). The phrase ‘varieties of capitalism’ has 
been employed with varying degrees of commitment to the original ‘VoC’ 
approach devised by Hall and Soskice (2001) due to either explicit attempts 
at modification or simple lazy labelling. This VoC-focused section will begin 
with a mapping of its core themes and contribution. This is followed by a 
narrowing of focus to, firstly, how the role of law is addressed by VoC studies 
and, second, the labour relations-centred studies found in VoC work.  
 
  1.2.3.i. The original VoC approach  
Economist David Soskice and political scientist Peter Hall, edited the 2001 
‘VoC’ volume which brought together key theoretical themes from previous 
CPE works (Soskice 1990, Iversen et al. 2000). These themes formed a two-
pronged comparative taxonomy of ‘varieties of capitalism’ that were, 
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according to VoC scholars, left after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise 
of non-capitalist regimes associated with the USSR. The VoC approach broke 
decidedly with the neo-corporatist analysis that dominated post-War CPE 
which placed the state and trade unions in an analytically important position 
alongside that of organised business interests, seeing labour relations as 
various forms of a shared and tripartite governance system. The VoC 
approach instead placed its analytical emphasis upon business actors and 
interests as central to theories of capitalist change and the comparison of 
capitalist systems. Soskice and Hall were keen to not to neglect the role of the 
state and trade unions and described their approach to both as part of a 
‘relational’ approach vis-à-vis business actors. Unavoidably, this original 
VoC approach still relegated the analytical position of the state and trade 
unions beneath that of business actors. 
          It is from this business actor-centred starting point that VoC scholars 
adopt the concept of institutional complementarity. Complementarity can come 
in several different forms with recent literature coalescing around three 
definitions of the term (Crouch 2010):  complementarity as similarity, 
complementarity as compensation, and, in the economistic sense, 
complementarity as a process of positive or negative causal relationships 
governed by supply and demand. In the business actor-centred 
complementarity approach of Hall and Soskice however, this meant that 
broader events and changes within a capitalist system stemmed from the 
interests of firms. For example, other institutional domains (welfare states, 
collective bargaining, skills systems) would be bound by a shared 
complementarity logic as a result of business interests. 
           The institutional domains that Hall and Soskice identify as the most 
important include labour market regulation, corporate governance and 
education and training (Hall and Soskice 2001; p.4). VoC research however 
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is limited to the analysis of these domains. The way in which institutions are 
linked relies on the notion of ‘institutional logics’ which, according to VoC 
scholars, are defined by business interests and actions. From this micro-
analytic base represented by the individual firm, causal claims can be made 
as to how capitalism’s organisational institutions are created, are sustained 
and function. If individual firms rely on highly skilled labour to produce high 
quality products and services, capitalism will produce institutions of skills 
and wage formation, and welfare protection required to sustain it. 
Conversely, firms requiring only low skilled labour are in a position to access 
this labour easily, are less likely to invest in elaborate institutional 
arrangements of skills formation and wage-setting. Conversely, firms 
requiring high skill labour will need to invest in skills systems and the higher 
salaries for such labour. This will have knock-on effects for other institutional 
domains such as welfare states and collective bargaining.  
  Additionally, these labour relations, educational and welfare 
arrangements forged from these two opposing scenarios themselves have 
causal relationships with partisan politics as well as macroeconomic policy-
making. As such enables this same micro-analytic base presents a starting 
point for extrapolating broader macroeconomic outcomes, including a 
macro-national form, or ‘variety’, of capitalism. These holistic pictures of 
national varieties of capitalism come in two typological forms: coordinated 
market economies (CME) and liberal market economies (LME).  
         This original VoC approach produces a number of claims, some of 
which sit in clear contrast to other established CPE theories. In highlighting 
the role of business, rather than the state or unions, and the different 
institutional settings firms operate within, VoC scholars claim that business 
interests are not necessarily driven by opposition to welfare states, social 
policy, trade unions and collective bargaining as assumed by the ‘neo-liberal 
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convergence’ thesis. VoC scholars claim that firm interests are instead 
contextualised within an institutional environment governed by different 
kinds of complementarities, sometimes pushing firms to support such non-
market means of economic and social governance, and sometimes not. In 
Coordinated Market Economies (CME), firms set within high quality product-
based markets and industries are more likely to invest in such institutional 
arrangements, or at least if they already exist will demand that other 
employers obey the rules of these as well, so as to not lose any competitive 
advantage. In contrast, liberal market economies (LMEs) will see firms 
seeking to extend the liberalisation (if not dismantling) of welfare and wage-
setting systems in the absence of coordination mechanisms enjoyed in 
coordinated market economies (CMEs). This sees a part-rejection of the ‘neo-
liberal conversion thesis’8: LMEs will pursue the intellectual and policy 
implications of neo-liberalism as this (broadly) accords to the liberal market-
based patterns of economic development found in LMEs, whilst CMEs will 
resist the pressures of neo-liberal demands for change or at least adapt to 
these in a manner that does not disrupt the non-market forms of coordination 
that define these ‘varieties of capitalism’.  
        The commitment to this VoC typology varies considerably across 
VoC-aligned studies. Several explicit attempts to modify or augment the 
typology have also been offered. Hancké et al. (2007) present a third, and 
rather vague, ‘mixed market economy’ (MME) type which seeks to 
encapsulate those national VoCs that do not conform to either the CME or 
LME types. The problem this produces is that most of southern Europe and 
France ends up being placed under this MME label. The central criticism 
stemming from the introduction of this MME ‘variety’ is that the state is 
poorly theorised in the original VoC theory of Hall and Soskice. Vivien 
                                               
8 That claims all ‘varieties of capitalism’ are converging upon a neo-liberal model 
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Schmidt is more specific and demands that a third ‘state-influenced’ variety 
must be included into the European experience of comparative capitalism 
(Schmidt 2007, 2008) to pay due heed to the case of France, the archetype of 
a state-influenced if not state-dominated capitalism. This French case is 
particularly illustrative of the problems the VoC has with the role of the state 
in regards to labour relations. The state is not just a venue where government 
of various partisan complexions is subject to social pressures to maintain or 
reform particular aspects of the regime of economic governance. The state in 
France uses law in labour market management in ways traditionally far more 
extensive than the British and German cases. This needs to be understood 
and is not going to be if the state is theorised poorly. Another labour relations 
focused VoC advocate, Georg Menz, goes one step further and tacitly 
debunks the VoC typology altogether in favour of those well established in 
corporatist labour relations and, crucially, one that carves out space for a 
French archetypal ‘étatist’ model (Menz 2005, p.8-12). 
        The typology question is only one of three main areas of critique. 
These three areas are also interconnected. The other two are the firm/business 
actor-centrism of the VoC approach and the use of institutional 
complementarity to base the VoC’s causal claims when developing national 
varieties of capitalism. An excellent critique of VoC-like firm-centrism is 
offered by Walter Korpi and is raised in the comparative welfare capitalism  
review section that follows. The approach however bears a similar neglect of 
VoC studies on this question concerning law and legal institutions. By 
assuming that causal and complementary dynamics originate from the 
interests of business, VoC approaches automatically undermine the role of 
other actors whose interests or resources are different. In this case, firms can 
lobby and influence the governmental state, but their interactions and 
influence with courts is clearly very different. Courts will often buck the 
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policy desires of business, the government of the day and other actors if 
doctrine-framed interpretations of particular facts demand it. It is here where 
the role of courts and the dominant doctrines found in legal systems 
undermine both this firm centrism and the notion of complementarity as 
conceived in the VoC approach. 
  The problematic theme of complementarity features in CWC, RT 
and VoC approaches in some form. The VoC approach however is the most 
problematic due, in part, to the fact that complementarity is such a central 
feature of the VoC approach. There are some RT and CWC scholars who 
engage with the concept, but most in both schools do not. There are broad 
critiques aimed at complementarity based upon its inherent functionalism 
and, through this, implications for the success of particular forms of capitalist 
organisation. Those of a Marxist or radical persuasion naturally reject such 
functionalist theorising as ignorant of capitalism’s inherent contradictions 
and conditions of crisis. Other non-Marxist scholars of note, such as Crouch 
(2005, p.99), underline the importance of other dynamic processes at play 
such as complexity, incoherence and conflict. 
 
“We can therefore observe innovations of this kind only if our models of real-world 
institutions have allowed us to find elements of complexity and incoherence. This 
will not happen if a false interpretation of the law of parsimony requires us to simplify 
the cases we study so that they seem to be the embodiments of ideal types” 
 
               (Crouch 2005, p.99) 
 
This is not to deny that complementarity processes and outcomes might 
indeed exist in certain cases and setting. What the VoC approach does 
however is base its approach squarely upon complementarity and argue that 
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this take priority over non-functionalist processes found in conflict or various 
persistent examples of institutional incoherence. This thesis supports the 
arguments made RT scholars Boyer and Heino and CWC scholar Korpi that 
complexity, incoherence and conflict are inherent in capitalist systems and 
indeed more important in developing cross-national comparisons of them. 
This complexity inevitably presents a problem: it is much it harder to 
produce theories of clean, parsimonious and holistic national ‘systems’ if one 
claims that these are neither clean nor parsimonious nor defined by 
nationally encompassing functionalist logics. If we cannot identify simple 
conceptual logic that bring together different disparate aspects of a spatial 
phenomena, then how does CPE as a comparative enterprise exist as an 
academic endeavour?  
          This is no doubt a challenge, but part of the task of comparing 
regimes of labour relations, and the systemic forms of capitalist organisation 
within which they reside, does not have to be dominated by formulating 
comparative nation state ‘ideal types’. As is indicated in both the assessments 
of Kathleen Thelen’s 2014 work and that found in RT, it is now more helpful 
within an era of dominant neo-liberal politics to ask how national systems 
have been changed and disrupted rather than how they are built and maintained. 
In reversing the logic in terms of how we think of and use ‘national types’ 
and compared units, scholars do not have to be concerned with how national 
systems are formed and sustained, but can be more open to competing 
concepts of complexity and incoherence that precipitates their dissolution, 
partial or otherwise. In labour relations terms, this point is demonstrated by 
the complex array of legal rules that impose themselves upon labour 
relations whilst collective bargaining, that used to define ‘national systems’ 
of labour relations, has declined unevenly across Europe.  
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       As indicated previously in comments on the state, the degree to which 
the central concerns of law, legal influence and legal systems are introduced 
into the VoC approach is very limited. The next sub-section surveys those 
limited attempts to introduce law into the VoC approach. From here focus is 
narrowed onto specific assessments of labour relations found within VoC 
scholarship. 
   
  1.2.3.ii Varieties of Capitalism and the law   
Hall and Soskice’s edited 2001 VoC volume did in fact offer two dedicated 
chapters on the subjects of law and legal systems. These however were not 
well integrated into the broader VoC approach, into the field of research the 
volume inspired nor into labour relations-focused VoC studies.   
       These separate 2001 chapters, authored by legal theorist Gunther 
Teubner and Steven Casper, offer different prospects to remedy the VoC’s 
problem in this area. Casper conforms much more to the standard VoC 
approach given its commitment to a dual game-theoretic and business actor 
centred approach. Casper’s contribution places his analysis of business-court 
interactions within the ‘law and economics’ approach, developed from the 
new institutional economics (NIE) (Williamson 1985; North 1990), explicitly 
elevated by Hall and Soskice in the introduction of their 2001 edited VoC 
volume. This is also the only substantive attempt to link NIE and VoC work 
on questions of law and legal analysis. This sort of NIE approach also has 
strong ties with game theory based institutionalist approaches, the sort 
introduced into the VoC programme. Casper’s chapter, again, is very much 
set within this tradition.  
        Teubner’s chapter however is different and underlines an important 
role for an understanding of legal culture when viewing legal systems, an 
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orientation that has more in common with the socio-legal comparative law 
approach of Zweigert and Kötz (1998) and Simon Deakin (below) than the 
rational choice/game theoretic approach above. ‘Legal cultures’ are 
important so that the non-formal, codified and procedural aspects are not the 
only aspects of ‘the law’ that are examined, but the manner in which law is 
made, delivered and administered, applied and obeyed is placed in social 
context. Social context is critical to framing how law is made and enacted. 
The social backgrounds and education of judges, of civil servants and policy-
makers, not to mention citizens as ‘rule-takers’, are all important cultural 
prerequisites to how legal systems develop and evolve. In comparative terms 
this is important, as two separate legal systems may ostensibly be similar, but 
produce different legal or social outcomes because these different social 
priors forge different approaches to how the law is obeyed and enforced.  
     Teubner views this in a way relevant to the case studies of this thesis: 
by asking how certain aspects of EU law are transposed9 into national law 
and in how these affect national varieties of capitalism. More specifically, 
Teubner uses the example of European contract law and its apparent 
disruption to the British system of contract law. Instead of identifying 
European demands to alter UK contract law as a ‘legal irritant’ coming from 
Europe, Teubner sees British legal culture adapting to the imposition and 
transforming its meaning for the British experience. It is important to note 
however that this process of adaptation depends on the nature of the initial 
imposition, meaning whether law is being imposed by a court or by a 
legislator. In this thesis, four cases are offered giving different examples of 
the adaptive processes that offer some credence to Teubner’s and similar 
                                               
9 Transposed is the official legal term used in EU law parlance for EU law that is applied 
to/absorbed into national law. 
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legal cultures explanations but not to functionalist explanations of 
complementarity.  
        Teubner sets himself apart from Casper and the VoC approach proper 
by not featuring the theoretical tenets of the VoC approach (institutional 
complementarity business actor-centred). Teubner does however conform to 
the core VoC argument, namely that national VoC can and do adapt to these 
external pressures coming in the instance from the EU. However, this 
argument cannot be generalised beyond the example Teubner uses. In labour 
relations terms, the four cases of this thesis present contrasting examples of 
how well national legal systems, and non-legal institutional arrangements, 
adjust to interventions from EU law. These interventions themselves come in 
different forms and are not just defined by their legislative or judicial nature.  
      The four cases of this thesis show that competing sets of law and policy 
found in economic law (the single market) and social law (labour law) have 
to be navigated and mediated by both legal and non-legal actors at both the 
European and national levels.  
       Neither Casper’s nor Teubner’s insights have been carried forward and 
developed in the vast research agendas the 2001 VoC volume inspired. Their 
legal system-focused contributions are not directed to labour relations, 
unlike the VoC contributions of Thelen, Hancké and Soskice. These 
contributions are turned to below and are joined by the work of labour 
lawyer Simon Deakin. 
   
  1.2.3.iii. VoC and Labour relations   
The principal charge against the VoC approach to labour relations, which 
also holds in regards to CWC and RT, is the overwhelming focus on collective 
bargaining institutions and its actors. This may indicate a disciplinary bias in 
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favour of social factors, actors and institutions by the various social scientists 
(political scientists, economists, sociologists) that dominate VoC studies. A 
slightly superficial but simple numerical illustration makes this point: the 
terms ‘labo[u]r law’, ‘employment law’ or ‘legal rights’ only appear in the 
2001 Varieties of Capitalism volume on a total of ten occasions. The terms 
‘collective bargaining’ or ‘wage bargaining’ in contrast appear no fewer of 63 
times. More substantive demonstrations of this problem are made in this 
section courtesy of the contributions of Kathleen Thelen and labour lawyer 
Simon Deakin. Thelen is placed firmly within the ambit of the ‘core’ VoC 
approach and indeed features in the original VoC volume. Deakin however 
is somewhat removed from that scholarship that has dominated VoC 
research and does not feature in any VoC text of note.  
       There is a large number of important VoC studies directed toward the 
subject of labour relations. David Soskice and Bob Hancké, two central 
figures in developing the VoC approach. Both scholars address issues of 
wage-setting within the context of macroeconomic policy and those shifts in 
this area that has seen central banks emerge as an important actor in political 
economy since the 1970s. This is an important stream of CPE research and 
demonstrates a disciplinary flexibility to expand CPE to incorporate new 
theories (in this case, macroeconomics) and new actors (central banks). A 
similar innovation is however needed to incorporate the influences of legal 
rules, legal systems and courts. Deakin and colleagues offers much more on 
this front than existing VoC work, and attempts to place this in VoC 
framework. Thelen, despite exhibiting shortcomings that are typical VoC 
approach, has offered very important contributions nonetheless. 
       Thelen occupies a different area of labour relations-centred CPE given 
her political science background and one that favours qualitative case study 
analysis rather than quantitative analysis employed the macroeconomists 
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Soskice, Iversen and Hancké. Thelen has produced three iterations of her 
approch to comparative ‘labour politics’. As the author of the second chapter 
in the 2001 VoC volume, Thelen’s approach to comparing labour relations 
within compared political economies was placed firmly within the standard 
VoC approach10. Subsequently, Thelen stepped away from this ‘standard’ 
approach to modify it in important ways (with Wijnbergen 2003, with Streeck 
2005). In 2014 however, Thelen was to return to something much closer to the 
standard VoC approach she had aligned with in 2001. These are addressed 
in turn. 
        This ‘standard VoC approach’ is reiterated here in the context of how 
it relates to neo-liberalism. It forcefully claimed that globalizing markets 
would not force all capitalist systems to converge along neo-liberal lines. 
Firms in liberal (LME) countries would converge, but those coordinated (CME) 
countries would not. Thelen in 2000 in fact, in Unions, Employers and Central 
Banks (Iversen et al. 2000), sought to explain ‘why German employers cannot 
bring themselves to dismantle the German model’. The 2001 VoC volume 
underlines this same emphasis and argument. It also focuses on the interests 
of business as maintaining one of two sets of institutional outcomes: strong 
complementarities providing very coordinated political economies, or weaker 
institutional arrangements where firms will rely on low cost strategies 
(liberal). 
       The spectre of the neo-liberal threat to the celebrated CME models in 
Europe, which include Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Nordic 
countries, runs through most VoC studies. As early as 2003 (with 
Wijnbergen), Thelen plotted a different course to challenge the basis of this 
VoC typology and the regimes of complementarity that forges it. Thelen and 
                                               
10 As was her article in 2000 in Unions, Employers and Central Banks (Iversen 2000), where Thelen 
explains ‘why German employers cannot bring themselves to dismantle the German model’ 
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Wijnbergen (2003) criticised the VoC’s functionalist tendency “to see all 
feedback as operating to sustain and reproduce the existing system”, but did 
so without stepping away from Thelen’s long-standing commitment to path 
dependency explanations of ‘institutional change’.  
       Thelen and Wijnbergen’s 2003 article joins Thelen’s co-authored 
introduction to Beyond Continuity (2005) (with Streeck), saw Thelen further 
modify her own application of the VoC approach to labour relations. This 
modification, that focuses upon the destructive processes of liberalisation, 
came close to an in-effect rejection of the VoC approach as it seriously 
questioned its CME-LME typological framework and the resilience of CME’s 
‘coordinating’ institutions. As Schelkle notes, Thelen’s approach (with 
Wijnbergen 2003, and Streeck 2005) represents a clear departure as it would 
no longer assume the existence and recombinant maintenance of LMEs and 
CME regime types, but rather “their possible dissolution” (Schelkle 2008).  
      The implications for the VoC approach, modified or not, are serious. 
The approach relies on identifiable complementarities operating within and 
propping up national capitalist systems. Recognising the disruptive and 
often destructive role of liberalization undermines this complementarity-
based approach that predicates CME and LME typological depictions of 
national capitalism. In short: Thelen sees events in labour relations systems 
as evidence of the destruction of ‘varieties of capitalism’. 
           This is particularly relevant to this thesis for three reasons: the labour 
relations focus of Thelen (although again very collective bargaining focused), 
the focus upon Germany as a CME ‘variety of capitalism’, and the focus upon 
(neo-)liberalisation.  
        Thelen later draws focus upon the theme of liberalization as the 
principal force that undermines CMEs. Thelen then authored a book on 
Varieties of Liberalization in 2014. In Thelen’s 2014 Varieties of Liberalization 
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study however, Thelen appears to revert back to a more ‘classical’ (2001 form 
of) VoC approach but does so by theorising the destructive forces of 
liberalisation upon the coordination practices in Germany. Thelen also sees 
liberalisation taking different forms, with a process ‘dualization’ being a key 
feature of contemporary German labour markets and job creation and the 
weakening of German Tarifautonomie that defined its post-War labour 
relations system. Dualization sees, on the one hand, its core sectors that 
traditionally defined its ‘coordinated’ character successfully resist 
liberalization pressures whilst, on the other, other industrial sectors conform 
more to the liberal practice of low skill, low cost market activity rather than 
conform to the economic characteristics of CMEs.  
        The two German case studies produced in this thesis go further than 
Thelen and demonstrate that these traditional industries that, to VoC 
advocates, define the German CME are also being subjected to the 
destructive forces of liberalisation. Put another way, the CME model, and the 
principle of Tarifautonomie that represents this in terms of labour relations is 
being dismantled. This not only critically undermines the VoC approach to 
the German CME in broader terms, but also exposes its failures in accounting 
for the role of law and legal influences as key drivers of neo-liberalism-
induced change. More importantly, Thelen offers no more analysis of law’s 
various influences upon labour relations than that found elsewhere in VoC 
work. Labour relations is essentially seen as interchangeable with the term 
‘collective bargaining’. Even in this German case, where collective bargaining 
has been traditionally strong, this approach presents an entirely incomplete, 
limited and unsatisfactory understanding of labour relations’ different 
regulatory and governance characteristics. The contribution of Thelen is 
important as her post-2001 contributions offer a far more realistic appraisal 
of labour relations change vis-à-vis the influence of liberalisation. It still fails 
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however to move the VoC approach to a place where the role of law is 
introduced into understanding and comparing labour relations regimes.  
        The work of lawyer Simon Deakin and various colleagues is not 
introduced. The contributions of Deakin (2009; with Sarkar 2008; Ahlering 
2009). has not featured in VoC debates. Deakin, Ahlering and Sarkar are 
academic lawyers, a broader academic profession that has rarely featured in 
VoC studies (except for Teubner and Casper). They offer the only substantive 
inclusion of those aspects of legal rules, systems and legal cultures to labour 
relations within a form of VoC framework. Their work is very promising in 
that that they offer the best hope to redeem the VoC approach that, it is 
claimed in this chapter, needs it the most out of the three CPE schools 
selected in this thesis. Despite their contribution however, Deakin and 
colleagues’ VoC-like affinity for the functionalist institutional complementarity 
concept still bars any prospect for the salvation of the VoC approach. Three 
studies however from this collection of lawyers, Ahlering and Deakin (2007); 
Deakin et al. (2007); Deakin and Sarkar (2008); Deakin et al., (2015) are 
examined to demonstrate this claim.  
        There are two broad aspects of these studies: 1) first, they explicitly 
introduce labour law systems and national legal systems into the 
comparative analysis of both labour relations and capitalist organisation. 2), 
secondly, and similarly to Teubner above, Deakin and colleagues approach 
the nature of law as a social and endogenous process as supposed to one 
favoured in the VoC approach where law is approached in very formal terms 
and external in its influence and imposition upon labour relations. This is an 
important theoretical advance on the very limited VoC approach. Deakin and 
colleagues however place this within a VoC-like complementarity view of 
‘institutions’ that is not accepted in this thesis given its functionalism. 
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       Starting with the first of these points, Deakin et al. (2008) and Ahlering 
and Deakin’s (2007) treatment of labour law and national legal systems 
provides direct and explicit engagement with the study of comparative law. 
Ahlering and Deakin direct their institutionalist critique toward the well-
known ‘legal origins theory’, associated with ‘the Botero index’ (Botero et al. 
2004), concerning the effect of labour law upon economic performance. This 
theory contends that common law systems found in Britain and the United 
States are superior to civil law systems found in continental Europe given the 
presence of “stringent labour regulations” in the latter that constrains the 
processes of financial development and productivity that fuel better 
economic performance. Deakin et al. (2008) and Ahlering and Deakin (2007) 
take issue with the methodological basis and assumptions made with this 
line of argument. Botero et al., (2007) use a rigid set of indexed variables for 
employment protection legislation (EPL) and compare these across countries 
to draw their conclusions. Although they do not dismiss quantitative 
methods, Deakin and colleagues note the problems that arise when drawing 
conclusions across different variables as some of these will share important 
linkages or complementarities that are not captured when variables are 
separated out in the such rigid indices. With this, Deakin et al. see 
complementarity in distinctly qualitative terms where relationships between 
different areas of law and non-law exist and need to be understood. The 
qualitative nature of these relationships is not going to be well represented 
in statistical form.  
        As Deakin and Sarkar make clear “legal rules do not operate in a 
straightforward instrumental way”, meaning that no two sets of laws within 
countries will be brought to life in the same way, thus having implications 
for how these affect each other’s outcomes. Additionally, comparing these 
same two sets of laws across countries cannot be done cleanly when these are 
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exposed to different aspects of the social context that provide these functional 
linkages. These contributors are careful not to dismiss the importance of 
national legal systems and to make sure these are placed within a proper 
context where social factors are not ignored and national systems are not 
treated rigidly as singular blocs determined by singular logics. As underlined 
throughout the thesis’ first section, the overlapping and complex layering of 
legal and non-legal rules and governance makes such neat national holism 
unrealistic for such causal claims, like Botero’s, to hold water. 
          This points to important functional relationships between labour law 
and areas of non-labour law such as company law and contract law. Deakin, 
like Teubner above, argues that systems of contract law are centrally 
important when relating legal systems with national ‘varieties of capitalism’. 
This focus upon contract law provides a particularly interesting link with the 
work of institutional economists Williamson and MacNeil (1977). Williamson 
and MacNeil built upon the work of Coase (1960, 1996, 1998), in forging the 
law and economics stream of institutional economics that Ahlering and Deakin 
explicitly embrace. It is interesting to note that Hall and Soskice however do 
not integrate an explicit approach to contracting in the NIE tradition. The 
work of Deakin and colleagues does integrate this into a VoC-type 
complementarity-based framework in a way that also relates contract law to 
both labour law and the two contractual venues that are central to the 
employment relationship: the employment contract and collective 
agreements. Deakin and Sarkar identify the employment contract and the 
collective agreement as centrally important contracting “institutions” in 
advanced economies (Deakin and Sarkar 2008). The employment contract 
and collective agreements have important functional relationships with 
economic law, particularly contract law, as well as social security law and 
through the welfare state. This point is developed here briefly to define the 
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employment contract as an important nexus between individual labour law, 
termed as EPL by Botero and Deakin et al., and collective labour law, given that 
EPL will demand certain things of employment contracts as will collective 
agreements (where present).  
       Deakin and Sarkar see the development of “long-term contractual 
cooperation” as an important part of capitalist systems. This gives rise to the 
combined use of four institutionalist concepts in VoC-type research. These 
authors importantly identify labour law as a distinct institutional 
phenomenon that, despite having its own path dependent developmental 
characteristics, ‘co-evolves’ with those of collective bargaining. More 
specifically, this co-evolution of legal and non-legal contractual institutions 
like employment contracts and collective agreements is placed in a ‘layered’ 
form of path dependency.  
       Deakin and Sarkar’s treatment of the social nature of law joins the 
contributions made above, concerning the layered role of labour law and 
collective bargaining institutions, as the most promising contribution to VoC 
and CPE more broadly. Firstly, Deakin and Sarkar correctly assert that the 
economic effects of labour law are a priori indeterminate (2008). This operates 
as another critique, as intended by these authors, of the Botero index. It is 
extended here to underline the point above that labour law’s effect is indeed 
‘indeterminate’ in that it cannot necessarily be, from the outset, 
complementary given the clear scope for non-complementary outcomes (i.e. 
incoherence).  
        The complexity of the social settings law exists within mandates a 
more nuanced theoretical understanding than the functionalist 
complementarity concept can provide. With this, Deakin and colleagues 
argued for an endogenous interpretation of law’s place in capitalist societies, 
a view that plainly contradicts the VoC approach of law’s limited role as 
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exogenous. Law is not constructed far away from the social actors and 
activity to which it is applied. In labour relations terms, employers and trade 
unions influence the content of law in different ways, either both in terms of 
legislation or making litigations to courts who then must respond to these 
legal claims and interpretations of competing social rights. This makes law’s 
content inherently political and contested, particularly those laws that 
manage the relationship between capital and labour. These authors 
acknowledge this characteristic of law and the manner in which it is brought 
to life through mediation. Social actors must interpret law and do so in the 
labour relations context within employment contracts, collective bargaining, 
corporate codes of conduct, strikes, lobbying and court cases. All this clearly 
serves an argument pointing to law’s complexity and its scope for conflict 
and incoherence.  
   
   1.2.3.iv. Varieties of Capitalism: Concluding comment 
This sub-section is concluded here by pulling together the key findings from 
this review of the varieties of capitalism literature. Two main theoretical 
subjects, complementarity and liberalisation, are the subject of the main 
critique. As an overriding concern however, to repeat a point earlier, is much 
simpler than these conceptual problems: namely that the VoC school 
approaches labour relations as a subject that is defined purely by collective 
bargaining activities. In an era where legal rules and influences have become 
too prominent ignore, and where collective bargaining’s role is being 
challenged, this view of labour relations is not just limited, but substantively 
inadequate. 
        The VoC approach suffers from its commitment to theoretical 
concepts that cannot and do not theorise comparative patterns of capitalist 
development nor labour relations’ complex legal and wage bargaining parts. 
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More directly, and compared to the other two RT and CWC approaches to 
CPE, the VoC approach is inherently ill-equipped to remedy its problems. 
The details of this critique are directed to concepts of complementarity, the 
path dependency concept drawn from historical institutionalism favoured by 
both Deakin et al. and Thelen and the firm-centric approach to the actors of 
political economy.   
         The contributions of Ahlering and Deakin (2007), Deakin et al. (2008), 
Deakin et al. (2015) and Deakin and Sarkar (2008) offer some partial 
opportunities for the VoC approach to be reformed, particularly if combined 
with Thelen’s work theorising ‘varieties of liberalisation’ in the context of 
labour relations. Thelen’s typology of liberalization, as noted by Schelkle 
(2008), is an important innovation that reverts to usual logic in how 
typologies are used. This sees an approach whereby typological systems are 
viewed not by how they are formed but by how they are threatened with collapse. 
Liberalisation has indeed been identified throughout CPE literature as a 
threat to non-liberal forms of capitalism, welfare states and labour relations. 
Its threat to the CME model created in the two-pronged VOC schema, is 
particularly acute. Thelen provides important observations of this in regards 
to Germany and the splintering of its patterns of industrial development and 
the effect this has labour market institutions. It is unfortunate however that 
Thelen, whose own post-2001 work began to move away from the ‘classic’ 
2001 VoC approach, reverted to a more rigid path dependency VoC of 
institutional change by 2014 (when she authors her Varieties of Liberalization 
study).  
        A full and realistic understanding of liberalisation processes is hard to 
square with a VoC approach that cannot theorise how destructive neo-liberal 
reform agendas are to regimes of collective bargaining and is virtually 
impossible if the role of legal change is not adequately theorised within it. 
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Moreover, firms’ interests in liberalisation reforms do inevitably and 
critically undermine the fabled institutions of CMEs. Thelen in fact provides 
plenty of evidence of this in her post 2001 work (2003 with Wijnbergen, 2005 
with Streeck, 2014), but still tries to place this in a VoC framework that has 
rejected such arguments. Understanding ‘the neo-liberal revolution’ 
properly will of course see different national manifestations of liberalisation 
and firm responses to it. But firm interests will only vary in how much and 
how they favour liberalisation, not whether business favours liberalisation 
reforms at all.  
    
1.2.4. Régulation Theory 
 
Régulation Theory (RT) holds an important place in CPE as it provides the 
most prominent contribution from of Marxism to CPE. RT, sometimes called 
the ‘French’ or ‘Parisian Regulation school’, is distinguished from traditional 
Marxism as it focuses upon a modes of social regulation concept drawn from 
traditional Marxism. Modes of social regulation reinforce and recreate the 
regime of accumulation, a concept that as is central to all Marxist thought, that 
defines capitalist organisation and crisis. RT places and defines ‘modes of 
social regulation’ in temporal-historical context where these take different 
forms across different phases of capitalism’s development and inevitable 
collapse.   
The principal phasic/temporal form of regulation is Fordism: a 
capitalist mode of production based upon mechanisation and Taylorism and 
a ‘work-wage bargain’ that sustains capital-labour relations and governs 
labour’s insertion into the capitalist mode of production. This bargain frames 
a particular system of employment and labour relations that regulationists 
call the wage-labour nexus. This system was sustained as long as capitalists 
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extracted productivity gains from labour and labour received corresponding 
rise in its wage share. In line with its Marxist origins, RT does not see this 
regime as sustainable and in fact contains the conditions for its own collapse 
as capital inevitably seeks to extract more productive capacity from labour. 
RT in fact emerged in the 1970s by identifying the sources and processes of 
Fordism’s collapse, thus developing into theories of Fordism’s replacement 
(post-Fordism) (Boyer 2005, p.13, Dannreuther and Petit 2006, Lipietz 2013, 
Reynauld 2005).  
There is however considerable diversity within contemporary RT. 
Two broad camps are identified. One includes a traditional or ‘vintage’ 
régulation that engages far more with classical Marxist and neo-Gramscian 
thought (Aglietta 2000; Lipietz 1993; Jessop 1995, 2011, 2012). The second, and 
newer, variant interacts more with institutionalist CPE found in VoC and 
CWC approaches (May and Nölke 2015, p.83; Amable 2000, 2004; Boyer 2005; 
Basle 2005; p.21). Prominent contemporary regulationists, namely Boyer 
(2005), Amable (2003) have engaged substantively with neo-institutionalists 
found in CPE. This is particularly notable given the history of angry 
disagreement between Marxist and institutionalist scholars11 and lack of 
mutual engagement. In this section on RT, positive contributions are found 
form both camps.  
       This chapter is organised according to the same broad structure of the 
other two review sections (VoC, CWC). It starts by examining the broader 
theoretical contributions of RT including Fordism and post-Fordism, RT’s 
principal contribution to comparative study of capitalism, nationally-defined 
concept of social systems of innovation and production (SSIP), as well as RT’s 
treatment of institutional complementarity. This broad focus is then narrowed 
                                               
11 Marxist Richard Hyman for example took direct aim at the institutionalist approach of internal 
labour markets of Michael Piore, and institutionalist economist Oliver Williamson gave a serious 
rebuke to Braverman’s Marxist ‘labour process’ theory approach. 
	 -	70	-	
toward the specific concerns of labour relations that motivate this thesis and 
examines the regulationist concept of the wage-labour nexus.  
RT exhibits similar shortcomings of the VoC approach in regards to 
questions of law. It is also distinctly industrialist and economistic, despite the 
sociological pedigree of Marxist approaches from which RT stems. The 
contribution of Heino (2015) is the one notable exception as he addresses law 
in the context of labour relations. Moreover, Heino’s contribution is elevated 
as it situates the subject of changes to labour law within the conceptual 
context of a liberal productivist form of post-Fordist capitalist system. This 
places and relates the development of labour law and labour market change 
within the advance of post-1970s neo-liberalism. 
 
  1.2.4.i. Regulation, Fordism and its successors  
Central to RT’s raison d’être is a critique of neo-classical theories of economic 
development and the methodological individualism that came with it (Boyer 
2005; p.13) . It also sought to step away from the structuralism of traditional 
Marxist analysis (Boyer and Saillard 2005, p.36). RT also decisively steps 
away from traditional Marxism in one key respect: by accepting that 
capitalist development takes distinct national forms rather than taking a 
singular, globally holistic form. This presents an opportunity for RT scholars 
to offer their own approach to comparing nationally-defined political 
economies. The leading attempts, supported by Amable (2000, 2003) and 
Boyer (2005), sees a four-pronged typology of ‘social systems of innovation 
and production’ (‘SSIP’).  
The central role afforded to this typological offer and to historically-
sensitive theoretical concepts such as Fordism and post-Fordism, the 
regulationist school provides a dual comparative basis to approach the 
comparative study of capitalist systems. Both of these are examined in this 
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chapter. Firstly, basic definitions of ‘regulation’ are offered. From leading RT 
studies, regulation is defined according the following themes: 
 
“Regulation theory describes the social and economic patterns that enable 
accumulation to occur in the long term between two structural crises.” 
 
(Boyer and Saillard 2005, p.38) 
 
This purpose of regulation therefore is to act as a system of supports for a 
regime of accumulation. Modes of regulation dynamically sustain a regime of 
accumulation by managing the transitions and shifts that occur within it. It 
achieves this through adaptations and institutional fixes but not without 
absolving the regime’s inherent contradictions and conditions of its own 
collapse. RT therefore provides a middle way by recognising the ability of 
capitalist regulation to sustain itself, even if this is not permanent and still 
prone to inevitable collapse. 
 
“[Regulation theory concerns] the analysis of the way in which transformations of 
social relations create new economic and non-economic forms, organised in 
structures that reproduce a determining structure, the mode of production” 
 
(Aglietta 1979, cited in Boyer et al. 2005; p.1) 
 
The key operational term here is ‘transformations’. RT explicitly concerns 
itself with on-going processes of evolution and adaption of regimes of 
accumulation. RT is often critiqued as being functionalist, a critique also 
similarly directed at neo-institutionalist studies of comparative capitalism 
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such as the VoC approach. It is important however to reiterate one 
characteristic of RT that separates it from neo-institutionalism: RT does not 
make claims about capitalism’s success of permanence, only the resilience of its 
institutional ‘modes of regulation’ and its ability to adapt and reproduce 
itself. This is underlined by RT’s central claim that Fordism is prone to 
collapse as are the precarious capitalist forms that replace it. 
The transformation from Fordism to post-Fordism, in different countries 
and regions, is the central mission of RT. From this conceptual base, RT 
arguments concerning Fordism’s successor (‘post-Fordism’) have only 
partially coalesced around a concept called liberal productivism. Liberal 
productivism provides a form of regulation and wage-labour nexus where the 
capitalist no longer seeks a wage-work bargain with labour where it can 
successfully balance its drive for surplus value with productivity-backed 
rises in wages. This ‘bargain’ no longer exists as extraction from labour is 
driven more by control, a poorer material position for workers and the 
ingredients for conflict that results.  
In the 1970s, the exposure to rising and unstable oil prices meant a 
new mode of production had to emerge to replace the Fordist regime. Liberal 
productivism relies much more on high-quality production, high skill and 
specialised divisions of labour and financial service products rather than 
mechanistic mass produced (Fordist model) goods (Lipietz 2013). 
Technological advances gave this further reinforcement and allowed oil-
based manufacturing to move east and away from North America and 
Europe (ibid). Liberal productivist modes of wage-labour nexus suffers from 
even greater instability and contradiction than its Fordist predecessor 
however. The wage-labour nexus of the Fordist era could not provide the 
capitalist with its surplus value and means of ‘accumulation’ without 
extracting more from the (wage) share of workers. This meant either poverty 
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for the latter or, as is what occurred in post-1970s Europe and North America 
in different ways, allowing for workers’ easy (and unsustainable) access to 
credit and debt. This broader context is useful for the examination of actors 
such as trade unions and they behave in labour relations contexts such as 
bargaining for wages, to lobby for policy change, and to organise workers 
spread across diversified forms of work.  
Capitalists therefore must engage in a mode of production where 
labour cannot guarantee its own share of production through rises in its 
productivity, thus breaking down this wage-labour bargain that defined 
Fordism. This produces several new realities contested by different 
theoretical positions. Does labour meekly acquiesce to the capitalist who has 
greater control over the means of production? Or does labour challenge 
capitalist interests in regaining a desired share of production? The new 
grounds for conflict clearly compromise the sustainability of the new 
capitalist system, but will do so in different ways in different national and 
industrial settings. Those that did not adopt the Fordist model well in the 
first instance (like Britain) adopted the liberal productivist replacement more 
effectively than those where Fordism did take root (like Germany).  
 
1.2.4.ii. National SSIP and complementarity 
This final point above leads us to those comparative concerns raised by 
different capitalist forms exhibited in different countries. Fordism and its 
post-Fordist replacement take different (and historically contingent) national 
forms and types. 
 
“Vintage régulation of the late 1970s left little room for possible diversity among 
developed economies, being more concerned with finding a generic pattern that 
would fit all advanced capitalist countries for a given historical period.”  
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                   (Amable 2000.p.665) 
 
As with both the VoC and CWC approaches, the success of typological labels 
is not the important aspect of the typologies. How these are arrived at and 
developed is of interest however. The conceptualisation of ‘national 
capitalisms’ found in some RT work is presented in the form of four types of 
social systems of innovation and production (SSIP) (Amable 2000, 2003; Boyer 
2005). These come in the form of a market-based SSIP, a statist SSIP, a meso-
corporatist SSIP and social democratic SSIP. The SSIP typology, like the VoC 
attempt, provides cross-national categorisation based upon on the 
institutional features that define their modes of regulation and accumulation.  
There is not, however, a consensus as to how these institutional 
features are defined and how the linkages that bind them are theorised. Boyer 
defines these four SSIP according to institutional arrangements based around 
regimes of competition, money and finance, the state, the wage-labour nexus and 
insertion into an international regime (Boyer 2005). Amable on the other hand 
identifies five ‘fundamental institutional areas’ including corporate 
governance, product market competition, the ‘financial intermediation sector’, 
the wage-labour nexus and labour market institutions (2000, 2004; p.17). 
Amable’s separation of the latter two is problematic and poses questions for 
what constitutes the ‘wage-labour nexus’ in Amable’s ‘institutional’ terms if 
‘labour market institutions’ are not included in this definition. The wage-
labour nexus concept is understood differently by Boyer (2002) and is set 
broader so as to  incorporate labour relations and other labour matters within 
the wage-labour nexus concept. In much of Amable’s work on labour issues, 
this problem is side-stepped in that he addresses labour market institutions 
directly as ‘industrial relations’ and not through the ‘wage-labour nexus’ 
concept.  
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RT’s SSIP typological scheme does offer an interesting attempt, 
similarly to the CWC school that follows, that encompasses upon both 
national production as well as protection regimes. With this, the four SSIP 
models broadly follow the demarcation drawn between Nordic regimes and 
Germanic ones12 drawn in Esping-Andersen’s 1990 Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism typology (next section). This separation is not echoed in the two-
pronged VoC typology that places both Nordic and other former Mark-bloc 
centred economies (e.g. Benelux) under the same broad CME label. The 
distinction of these Nordic and Germanic models may follow, at least on 
welfare state grounds, but the separation of Germany and France on this 
welfare front diverges from Esping-Andersen’s conservative type which 
places these two together in a ‘Bismarckian’ welfare regime.  
Boyer and Amable, in producing typologies of this sort, operate much 
closer to neo-institutionalist approaches found CPE. Others like Jessop and 
Heino operate more closely to traditional Marxist and neo-Gramscian 
debates and are more committed to the theoretical concepts and language of 
traditional regulationism and Marxism. This SSIP and institutional 
complementarity concepts are rarely addressed by the latter traditional 
category of regulationist but prioritised by Amable and Boyer. There is a 
critical difference between how Boyer and Amable apply institutional 
complementarity. Boyer provides an approach that is more meaningfully 
distinct from the VoC form of complementarity than that of Amable. The 
difference is found in the how far complementarity’s functionalist intentions 
are taken. Boyer argues that capitalism successfully reproduces institutional 
forms and institutional fixes in a manner that demonstrates, as noted 
previously, the system’s resilience but not its permanence. Boyer still contends 
                                               
12 The Three Worlds and RT typologies attached the same ‘social democratic’ to describe national 
regimes in Nordic countries.  
	 -	76	-	
that capitalism’s inherent contradictions mean the ability of capitalist 
systems to reproduce forms of regulation and accumulation is finite and 
limited temporally, and these systemic contradictions will eventually result 
in systemic collapse.  
It is important therefore, following Boyer’s lesson, for RT to see the 
capitalist condition as one beset by institutional dis-equilibrium, versus the 
Amable and VoC accounts that favours, particularly in its game-theoretic 
rational choice guises (Aoki 2001), more equilibrium-based explanations. 
Amable et al. (2005) for example uses complementarity in a more 
functionalist manner to relate developments in the financial sector to 
outcomes in labour relations. This is done by relating differences between 
cooperative and conflictual labour relations with the various forms of 
business and finance sector interests favouring long-term investment (patient 
capital) or a more immediate return on investment (short-termist, ‘fast 
money’). This produces a binary CME-LME type outcome found in the VoC 
approach, meaning Amable et al., (2005) do not diverge in any substantive 
way from the VoC account of complementarity. The prospect of theoretical 
slippage into the sort functionalism is very real if this distinction between 
resilience and permanence is not maintained. 
Both Boyer and Amable have a similar problem however that is not 
answered in regards to labour relations, problems to prompt important 
questions: how does complementarity sit alongside explanations of incoherence, 
complexity and conflict? A key aspect of the argument outlined in the first 
chapter is that the interventions and influences coming from law deepen the 
problems of complexity and incoherence rather than sustaining 
complementarity relationships. There will of course be some limited 
examples where complementarity between law and non-law (e.g. collective 
labour law rules and collective bargaining), but if RT contends to focus on 
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the long-run and the macroeconomic level outcomes, complementarity 
cannot justifiably describe the processes and events of the neo-liberal (liberal 
productivist) era. 
 
1.2.4.iii. RT, labour relations and the ‘wage-labour nexus’ 
The final comment above points to the contribution of Heino in this labour 
relations-focused sub-section. This introduces a detailed assessment of a 
wage-labour nexus concept that sits at the heart of RT’s contribution to CPE 
and labour relations. The centrality of the wage-labour nexus that forms 
within a different regime of accumulation and mode of social regulation, 
stems from the central importance of social relations between capital and 
labour in all Marxist and neo-Marxist political economy. The breakdown of 
the Fordist wage-labour nexus brought about the breakdown of Fordism 
itself, giving rise to a new form of accumulation and extraction. The work of 
Boyer (2005), Bertrand (2005), Reynauld (2005)13 and Heino (2015) are given 
focus in this labour relations-focused section to map the RT attempts to 
explain how the Fordist wage-labour nexus collapsed and what the 
consequences are for CPE and labour relations.  
 
“A form of wage–labour nexus is defined by the set of legal and institutional 
conditions that govern the use of wage-earning labour as the workers’ mode of 
existence. The wage-earning class has developed dramatically because the wage–
labour nexus has constantly adapted itself to social conflicts and to the constraints 
imposed by accumulation.” 
 
                                               
13 Each of Boyer’s, Bertrand’s and Reynauld’s contributions are contained within the 2005 edited 
volume - Regulation Theory – the State of the Art (2005) 
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“[The wage–labour nexus consists of the] complementarity of the institutions 
framing the employment contract and their compatibility with the current mode of 
regulation”  
                Boyer, R. (2005; p.74) 
 
The “legal and institutional conditions that govern the use of wage-earning 
labour” is an clear and explicit recognition of law’s relevance, but the degree 
to which this is incorporated into RT is limited and open to a similar critique 
direct toward the VoC and CWC schools. The second passage more pointedly 
identified the employment contract as a venue where legal and institutional 
forces meet to regulate workers and work, an important point concurred 
with by Deakin in the VoC chapter and an important recognition of the role 
labour law can have in this area. 
The first quote also identifies the wage-labour nexus’ capacity to adapt 
to changing economic and social conditions in between crises. This does 
mean however that it must eventually collapse. In the Regulation Theory-State 
of the Art volume (Boyer 2005), Bertrand identifies labour relations as being 
an essential aspect of any wage-labour nexus and the importance of 
understanding the comparative differences across time and how different 
national expressions of the Fordist and post-Fordist wage-labour nexus take 
shape (Bertrand 2005, p.82). Bertrand identifies some crucial differences, for 
example, between the British and German expressions of the Fordist wage-
labour nexus (ibid.). The British variant does not, according to Bertrand, 
conform to a Fordist wage-labour nexus type due to the nature of its militant 
trade unionism that prevented the sort of wage-labour bargain taking shape 
(where workers’ productivity gains are rewarded through wage rises). 
Germany however is identified by Bertrand as an archetype of a classic 
Fordist wage-labour nexus given that this grand ‘social compromise’ did in 
fact take shape.   
	 -	79	-	
In the 1970s, both countries endured the effects of two oil price crises 
in different ways given the differences in the way production was organised 
(and exposure to global price shocks) in different countries after WWII. 
Thusly, the way in which Germany and Britain emerged out of the Fordist 
era also presented important differences, differences that are fertile ground 
for RT and broader debates within CPE.  
Many in RT have defined this post-Fordist era as liberal productivist 
(Lipietz 2013, Heino 2015), whilst other regulationists see the post-Fordism 
state as something merely modified, partially collapsed and partially 
retained version of ‘old Fordism’ (Reynauld 2005; p.91). In regards to the 
wage-labour nexus and labour relations, the role of neo-liberal policy reforms 
and ideas must be understood one way or another; either as part of a new 
historical form of accumulation and regulation (liberal productivism) or as 
something that falls in between; something incoherent, mixed and mongrel-
like comprising of half of the remnants of the old regime with 
underdeveloped aspects of a new one. Such a development is clearly too 
messy for the parsimonious, clean and functionalist depictions of much 
institutionalist CPE, and some RT scholars seem more comfortable with this 
reality than others. 
Heino identifies the same intellectual shift associated with neo-
liberalism that other regulationists do and argues that its effect had “armed 
capital with the resources to shape a new model of development” (Heino 
2015). For Heino, this did not only predicate a shift from a Fordist to a liberal 
productivist form of wage-labour nexus, but a key aspect of this was a shift 
in labour market policy agendas toward aiding flexibility for employers to 
re-organise work and production patterns so they could extract more from 
both of these sets of processes. Citing Lipietz (2013), the end-game of this 
shift brought “a more intensive accumulation regime that dissociates real 
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wages and productivity”. This link between real wages and productivity 
defined the Fordist wage-labour nexus. Reynauld, despite not using the 
liberal productivist label to approach a post-Fordist wage-labour nexus, does 
however describe similar policy shifts, including policies to abolish indexing 
that linked wages to living standards that exist in some European wage-
setting regimes (i.e. Belgium) (2005; p.91). With the collapse of the Fordist 
wage-labour nexus, something else had to emerge in terms of businesses 
extraction goals and the labour process required to achieve it. Heino 
develops an important RT observation whereby neo-liberal policy agendas 
forged a different work-wage bargain where employers could now extract 
from this without meeting wage demands that rose with worker 
productivity. Heino’s development is important as it introduces the subject 
of law and legal change into this discussion of post-Fordist neo-liberalism 
and its intellectual and policy agenda. 
 
“What is needed for a rigorous account of labour law development, and legal change 
more broadly, is a Marxist analysis that reconciles both the abstract and concrete 
functions and structures of law within the capitalist mode of production” 
                        Heino, B. (2015) 
 
      In defining a comparable ‘antipodean Fordism’ Heino also creates an 
opportunity to place “labour law systems and legal change” within a context 
where law becomes important to the dismantling of Fordism and 
engineering a transition to its liberal productivist successor. Connecting the 
intellectual shift associated with neo-liberalism to the policy use of labour 
law to generate new processes of capitalist regulation is hugely important. 
There are however aspects of Heino’s study that demand further questions. 
It is argued here that Heino’s paper is still based within the heavily abstracted 
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and macro-theoretical language of ‘vintage’ RT and does not address many 
of the complexities and contradictions found across different areas of law 
that that interact to define this neo-liberal shift (individual and collective 
labour law, economic law rights to contract etc.). Despite this, Heino’s paper 
present an important contribution that places labour law and legal change 
within a context of neo-liberal capitalist change.  
Heino’s approach to post-Fordist regulation is first examined.  Heino 
identifies labour law as central tool in the “commodification of labour-
power”.  This conflicts with the normative purpose of the term ‘labour law’ 
(at least in the Anglo-phone world) that is defined as based around workers 
rights and empowerment (Bogg et al., 2015, p.3); something that de-
commodifies labour through substantive and facilitative rights that would 
support collective institutions such as wage bargaining. Heino is however 
correct in identifying the role labour (and other) law in performing the 
opposite re-commodifying purpose under liberal productivism: to 
undermine workers’ rights and the power of collective institutions to restrict 
employer prerogative.  
Although not described explicitly in the way intended in this thesis, 
Heino does offer important insights into the way the relationship between 
law and collective bargaining is altered by neo-liberalism. He stops short of 
recognising the paradoxical existence of both de-commodifying and re-
commodifying tendencies found in different and competing aspects of law 
and non-legal regulation that mark labour relations systems. It is felt 
however, unlike the VoC approach, that this version of RT can incorporate 
this, even if other problems with the various versions of the RT approach 
remain.  
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       Heino’s description of Australian Fordism provides a wage-labour 
nexus inclusive of the following elements: “compulsory arbitration, the 
encouragement of moderate unionism, the unification of wage and social 
objectives, and the growth of administrative fixes to worker power”. The 
collapse of this regime of Fordism and transition to liberal productivism saw 
the relationship between productivity and real wage growth dismantled. 
Heino places this assertion correctly in a social context where these changes 
to a labour law regime can be understood at the level of the actors who 
interests and resources such changes are designed to alter. Notably, the 
decline of working class power greatly influences the content of labour law 
as delivered through new legislative reforms, reforms that have become 
much more sensitive to the wishes and political interests of business. If 
collective worker power is strong, the state is “compelled to resort to 
[administrative] fixes in order to continue the reproduction of wage labour”.  
In line with the crucial time-line component of RT’s core thesis (i.e. 
still historical, systemic pattern of crisis and collapse) such institutional fixes 
will only “achieve a provisional and temporary measure of success” before 
symptoms of contradiction and crisis remerge. Such fixes are very evident in 
the paradoxical use of labour law reform described in chapter one. On the 
one hand, law is used to prise open new rights and space in for employers, 
but on the other new legal rights are extended to workers to partially 
compensate for the loss of resources and rights previously provided by 
collective bargaining and trade union membership. Heino uses the 
Australian experience to describe something different: a state that has 
retreated from using such fixes as labour power has declined, but 
importantly identifies a court actor and a ‘juridification’ process that sees the 
labour-capital relationship as one conducted by two co-equal employer and 
employee partners “engaged in mutually beneficial exchange”. The 
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channelling of dispute management through judicial and tribunal avenues, 
and away from collective bargaining and state-led reconciliation, is a hugely 
important aspect of the Australian system that has traditionally marked it 
out from other advanced economies.  
This sort of tribunal system has become a key feature in national 
regimes such as Britain since the 1960s. Such systems are usually used in the 
area of individual labour law to police complaints made by individual 
employees against employers. Unions, being collective actors, have a role as 
long as the employee is a member of the union and can be represented. These 
tribunals are joined by conciliation bodies acting under the auspices of the 
state. This alone presents complicated linkages between different judicial 
(tribunal) and state actors as well as between employers and employees. With 
these different actors intervening to impose and police the assignment of 
legal rules, it is clear that labour relations in some systems is increasingly 
sensitive to labour law-based regulation. 
 
Liberal-productivism’s attack upon the precocious antipodean Fordist wage-labour 
nexus has fundamentally crippled the ability of this nexus to deliver wide-ranging 
policy goals. In its place, there has arisen a more functionally differentiated welfare 
system and a wage relationship that is increasingly sensitive to legal regulation 
outside of labour law narrowly construed. 
(Heino, B. 2015. Emphasis in original) 
 
       Heino’s quote makes the important point that it is not just these very 
direct legal influences found in labour law that labour relations is increasingly 
sensitive to. It is clearly very sensitive to non-labour law sources of law as 
well. These areas of law, such as contract law, have been touched upon in the 
VoC chapter and feature in the case study chapters also. These present 
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another area of complex interaction and overlap between different areas of 
law.   
When placed in a social setting these complexities deepen when you 
factor in the different forms of resistance coming from labour and some 
business interests. The organic relationships forged between the labour law 
regime and social, economic and political contexts is important to 
understanding Fordism’s decline and the arrival of its very unstable liberal 
productivism replacement. The paradoxical rise of individual labour law sees 
statutory protections for workers being met with a retreat of statutory 
supports for collective labour law is a key feature found across Europe and 
has become a central (and developing) feature in European Union law. Using 
Heino’s terms, these often competing forms of “institutional fixes” exist 
under a shroud of prevailing neo-liberalism, generating considerable 
uncertainty and complexity.  
These regulatory paradoxes of neo-liberalism do not lend themselves 
to stories of functionalist complementary. It therefore makes sense that Heino 
does not engage with such concepts. Nonetheless, the contention of “a wage 
relationship that is increasingly sensitive to legal regulation outside of labour 
law narrowly construed” also importantly introduces concerns of law that 
have become increasingly important to how wage-setting takes place. This 
point is relevant to most of the European experience, regardless as to whether 
concepts of institutional complementarity or SSIP are adopted in the process.  
 
1.2.4.iv Regulation Theory: Concluding comment 
Heino does not engage with the SSIP typological approach developed by 
Boyer and Amable as his work is more of the traditional or vintage 
regulationist type. To underline a point made previously, it is not of primary 
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concern to this thesis whether or not typological labels are ‘right or wrong’ 
or even used, but it is more the process used to arrive at these and their 
purpose that is important. In this regard, RT in fact shares some common 
theoretical ground with Thelen’s 2014 Varieties of Liberalization appraised in 
the preceding VoC review section: to develop typologies based more on their 
dissolution and collapse rather than their successful formation and resilience. 
Heino, again, integrates concerns of labour law far more substantively than 
Thelen and any other VoC scholar and does so without the baggage of 
complementarity concepts that cannot address the complexity and 
incoherence that defines neo-liberalism and neo-liberalisation. Heino does 
not however introduce any innovations from the realm of labour law and 
legal studies that are required, relying purely upon RT concepts and themes.  
The stipulations above concerning the paradoxical role of individual 
and collective labour law were in fact added into Heino’s analysis. They were 
however added quite neatly given the appropriateness of Heino’s 
framework. What Heino does successfully is appreciate substantively the 
role of neo-liberal legal change on both labour law and collective bargaining. 
His work does leave the following questions unanswered: How are courts 
theorised? Are they thought of as class actors in the same way the ‘capitalist 
state’, within which judiciaries are contained, is? How are cultural and 
normative differences in how law operates in different capitalist societies 
understood, particularly those that give rise to consensus or conflict based 
labour relations? 
 These comparisons are continued in the final chapter of this first section 
to prompt a further development of the theoretical arguments outlined in 
chapter 1.1. This chapter is followed by a similar assessment of comparative 
welfare capitalism that has its own shared aspects of approach with regulation 
theory.  
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1.2.5. Comparative Welfare Capitalism 
 
Comparative Welfare Capitalism (‘CWC’) represents the welfare state-focused 
corner of CPE where different national systems of social policy and social 
protection are compared. This ‘CWC’ label, in contrast with the VoC and RT 
schools addressed earlier, has been constructed specifically for the purposes 
of this thesis as CWC does not constitute a singular approach or body of 
research like the VoC or RT approaches. This is due in part to welfare state 
studies being much older and in many ways broader. Therefore, the 
Comparative Welfare Capitalism label is used to draw together more recent and 
relevant welfarist literature. 
There are four areas of CWC examined in this review of welfarist CPE 
studies. Two are broad and elevate the Comparing Welfare Capitalism volume 
(Ebbinghaus and Manow eds. 2004) and the renowned Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism volume of Esping-Andersen (1990) that dominate welfare state 
studies since its publication in 1990. Prominent in both of these, raising the 
third area of CWC, is the power resources approach (PRA) associated with 
Walter Korpi (1983, 2006). Korpi was particularly influential on Esping-
Andersen’s Three Worlds study, but is given some specific treatment in this 
section. The fourth is the one notable CWC contribution in regards to those 
questions of law in the labour relations context (Bonoli 2003) that motivate 
this thesis.  
CWC provides a rich variety of conceptual innovations that sets it 
apart from other CPE approaches. Those concepts that are of interest in this 
section centre upon the themes of de-commodification, social rights, power 
resources, stratification, and functional equivalence. It is argued that within these 
there is greater potential scope for CWC to correct its approach to labour 
relations, in comparison to the VoC approach, so as to account for both labour 
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relations’ legal and collective bargaining aspects that contribute to broader 
state systems of ‘worker welfare’ (Bonoli 2003). There are still shortcomings 
to this that are highlighted. First, a broader mapping of CWC and its 
approach to comparisons of ‘welfare capitalisms’ is provided. This is 
followed by the assessment of the four contributions of CWC outlined above. 
 
1.2.5.i. Welfare, economy and politics: Modelling welfare  
There exists some creative tension between the CWC contributions selected 
here. Importantly, each affords employment systems and labour relations a 
central role in the development of European welfare states therefore seeing 
these as central to their comparison. Welfarists do place a greater emphasis 
on socio-economic conflict as the basis of actor interests than VoC scholars 
who favour more functionalist explanations based on economic interests 
(industrialism). VoC and CWC however do share an affinity for 
institutionalist logics, with some CWC scholars embracing the institutional 
complementarity concept that is central to the VoC approach. 
This division between the more sociologically-minded welfarists and 
industrialist VoC scholars however should not be overstated. The focus they 
both have upon labour markets and labour actors provides a promising 
bridge between concerns of welfare and social protection, of focus in CWC, 
and those questions of economic production that dominate VoC and RT 
literatures. Ebbinghaus and Manow in particular sought explicit interaction 
with VoC work, and in fact employ the term Varieties of Welfare Capitalism in 
their edited 2004 volume. The tension that emerges is not necessarily a 
productive one however, particularly if the power resources approach of 
Korpi is still to be retained. Korpi angrily rejects the firm-centric 
industrialism of the VoC approach in favour of traditional social/political 
conflict explanations of welfare state development. Institutional 
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complementarity also presents a problem for theories like Korpi’s that 
emphasise conflict and contest rather than institutional functionalism. This is 
a challenge that speaks to the inherently interdisciplinary subject of labour 
relations where economic, social and political factors are hard to separate. 
Korpi and Esping-Andersen provide important conceptual advances 
to CWC and CPE and are addressed in the next sub-section. Their broader 
contribution to CWC is outlined here first.  
Esping-Andersen contribution to CWC come in a period where the 
theme of ‘welfare state retrenchment’ was occupying a great deal of space in 
welfare state studies in this post-1980 neo-liberal period (Clayton and 
Pontusson 1998, Pierson 1995). Welfare state retrenchment was being defined 
and measured in CWC in terms of state expenditure on social policy and 
welfare systems with cross-national differences in retrenchment (or lack 
thereof) being the focus of CWC work. A focus on social expenditure-based 
comparison had its limitations as it lent itself to narrow statistical time-series 
comparisons that do not yield much about the more complex social 
structures and histories that forge different welfare states and their different 
responses to neo-liberal policy intentions of policy-makers. Scholars Esping-
Andersen and Korpi were hugely important to CWC attempts to remedy this 
and introduced the concepts of stratification and social rights that needed a 
historically contextualised form of comparative analysis.  
Looking beyond mere state expenditure meant also looking beyond 
welfare provision that was only provided by the state itself. Esping-
Andersen also offers a celebrated typology of welfare states, identifying an 
Anglo-phone liberal model, a Germanic-Rhenish conservative-corporatist 
model and a Nordic-focused social democratic model.  Similarly to the VoC 
typological offering raised earlier, this three-way typological model has often 
been amended, usually with a southern or Mediterranean form of welfare 
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state raised as a ‘fourth world’ of welfare capitalism (Kleinman 2002; p.32, 
Abrahamson 1999, Leibfried 1993). Given the central place afforded to 
employment systems, labour-capital contests in both the political and wage 
bargaining realms, it is important to note the tensions between these 
typologies and the realities of both collective bargaining systems and legal 
systems in different countries. Similarly to the LME-CME classifications of 
the VoC approach, France and Germany are lumped together in the Three 
Worlds typology, despite very different roles for labour law in these two 
countries.  
The 2004 volume of Ebbinghaus and Manow does not offer any 
modified alternative typology or classification system. It does however 
reassert the role of politics from CWC studies in a new welfarist research 
agenda that sought to engage substantively with the VoC work published 
three years earlier. The was concluded by its editors with adjusted label – 
Varieties of Welfare Capitalism to underline this point, and had a number of 
contributions who were either active in VoC debates or in fact contributed to 
Hall and Soskice’s original book (Hassel, Estevez-Abe, Mares, Vitols). 
Comparing Welfare Capitalism took on one central objective of welfarist 
research inspired by the Three Worlds volume: theorising the linkages 
between protection systems and production systems. Several authors 
highlighted the centrally important role of employment systems and labour 
relations (Ebbinghaus and Manow 2004, p.7-13; Hassel 2004, p.146-155; 
Crouch 2004, p.105-124). The intent to form a bridge to VoC work was 
evident in Ebbinghaus and Manow’s Varieties of Welfare Capitalism work, 
specifically through the institutional complementarity critiqued in the 
previous VoC section.  
To reiterate, the purpose of institutional complementarity is to 
causally relate events in one institutional domain of the economy to another. 
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However, CWC already possessed the conceptual means to this courtesy of 
the concept elective affinities. As the name suggests, elective affinities is based 
on a political interest logic rather than on a functionalist and economistic one 
that the VoC complementarity concept is. The task of Ebbinghaus and 
Manow’s volume was therefore to reconcile the two. Despite commissioning 
renowned welfarist Michael Shalev for this task, this was not achieved as 
Shalev simply resorted a politics-centric version of elective affinities that sits 
closer to Korpi’s approach than that of the complementarity based-VoC. This 
politics-centred elective affinities brought the same emphasis on socio-
economic conflict emphasised by Korpi, and applies this (elevating Anke 
Hassel’s chapter from this same Ebbinghaus and Manow book) to a post-
1970s period where political parties on the left have seen their traditional 
labour union allies decline in strength (power resources).  
            It is stated that this power resources, and aligned elective affinities 
account of labour politics and labour relations, has much more value than the 
industrialist complementarity account of the VoC account. This becomes 
very clear in the German example developed in this thesis, despite this same 
German example being raised by VoC scholars such as Thelen who still 
contend that German employers are invested in welfare state and collective 
bargaining systems. Prior to the targeted case study chapters in section two, 
both the British and German cases are surveyed in broader terms inclusive 
of the historical development of their legal and labour relations systems. 
Albeit in different ways, it is clear the socio-economic conflict and unrest are 
critically influential in forcing employers and the state to acquiescing to the 
welfare demands of labour. These first two chapters of section two have their 
arguments then reinforced by the case study chapters in mapping the decline 
of these welfare institutions found in collective bargaining after the 1970s. 
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This identified a processes of re-commodification where power resources 
began to shift in capital’s favour. 
 
1.2.5.ii. Power resources, de-commodification and 
recommodification 
Esping-Andersen and Korpi were responsible for a renewed welfarist focus 
upon concepts of social rights, power resources and de-commodification. The 
exercise of social rights and power resources by labour would prompt the de-
commodification of their labour. It is this de-commodification process that 
would forge those concessions from the state to and state-provided or state-
sanctioned welfare for workers. This sees process of wage-formation 
(collective bargaining through unions) and welfare-guarantees (welfare 
state, labour law) tied together as part of the same de-commodification 
process. Formal and direct welfare state provision is found in some 
healthcare systems in Europe and some pension systems. Collective 
bargaining however is different in that this usually led by social partners 
(unions, employers) but is sanctioned by the state. Labour law plays an 
important role in this process of sanctioning collective bargaining and the 
trade unions role in this, but is not a central feature in CWC research. Bonoli 
is the one exception to this and is explored further on. 
In political terms, the power resources concept highlights the 
aggregation of power between workers and business and their partisan 
representations in government and legislatures at key points in time. This 
kind of claim itself promoted the role of path dependency explanations 
where key bargains were struck at key moments in time that prompted the 
formation of new welfare state institutions.  
This concept of power resources is now directed to a comparison with 
other CPE work. This positioned labour actors as demanding social policy to 
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de-commodify work and workers and employers as opposed to these 
attempts. This contrasts with VoC work, including notably that of Thelen, 
who see employer interests in certain countries (CMEs) as not necessarily 
opposed to the creation of welfare states and social policy. The notable VoC 
contribution is to highlight the state’s role in providing or facilitating the 
provision of workplace skills to aid employers’ productivity goals. This alters 
a bargaining dynamic where firms now will engage more with wage and 
welfare concerns of workers in exchange for skilled labour. Esping-Andersen 
and Korpi dispute this claim that employers would never choose to accept 
the regulatory and financial imposition of welfare policies as a matter of first 
preference. Korpi in 2006, in a firm rebuke of VoC style theorizing, developed 
this discussion of transitions from first to second order preferences of actors 
by placing power resource-based class struggles in a central analytical 
position. Korpi developed this PRA account to include variations of actor 
interests (whether political party, employer, or trade union). These variations 
are put in three camps: protagonists, consenters and antagonists (Korpi 
2006). Different actors at different points will see their preferences reflect 
their institutional environment, and in this case that provided by the welfare 
state, labour relations and skills systems labour and capital must operate 
within in.  
Over time, says Korpi, a firm’s preferences will change and potentially 
become more deferential to a stable welfare state and collective bargaining 
environment that embeds itself around them. Put another way, firms may 
indeed choose the status quo forged many years or decades prior in struggles 
with trade unions demanding de-commodification of labour through welfare 
and wage-bargaining. These actors would be consenters. But why are they 
consenting? For the VoC scholars, it is because these institutional 
environment satisfies their needs. To Korpi and PRA proponents, it is 
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because of either the state’s partisan colouration or union strength propping 
up the status quo in place. Moreover, some employers could also seek to keep 
in line other employers who may seek, opportunistically, to upset a given 
welfare settlement due to a weak union presence in their workplace. This 
latter set of employers are called dissenters, irrelevant as to whether they are 
successful or disrupting welfare state provision. In forging a middle way 
between the VoC and PRA accounts, Afonso (2011) sees cause to focus on this 
sort of power resource interaction between employers rather than between 
employers and unions. 
The power resources of actors flows logically into another theoretical 
innovation of CWC, the concept of ‘elective affinities’. This presented fruitful 
comparisons across countries of the political and partisan interests of actors 
the industrial and social prerequisites to these interests. Similarly to those 
business interests placed at the centre of the VoC approach, this sees politics 
and political interests of both union and business interests being used as the 
theoretical means to explain why welfare states are forged and how these 
protection systems interlock with systems of economic production. 
Following Korpi from above, this does place both sides of industry (firms, 
unions) in an equally important position. This makes sense in comparative 
terms, as different settings (national, industry-level, local) firms or unions 
will have the upper hand given a particular balance of power defined by their 
relative power resources exercised by social rights and economic rights given 
by law or by other means (usually organisational). 
These CWC concepts are placed together and placed into the historical 
context of neo-liberalism. The inversion of the de-commodification concept into 
a re-commodification is a particularly useful way of appreciating how social 
rights afforded to labour have been either reversed, weakened or 
subordinated to the economic rights of capital. Neo-liberal ideas are at the root 
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of labour market liberalisation agendas where these regimes of rights and 
power resources (derived from both law and non-law) have been altered. 
This same intellectual agenda has also promoted the prising open of the 
welfare state itself to ready it for the extraction and profiteering by and for 
private interest. This sees re-commodification process of labour power. This 
combination of social rights, re- and de-commodification and power 
resources is a very promising aspect of CWC to correct its problems 
concerning labour relations and the role of law.  
For Esping-Andersen, de-commodification was defined by the quality 
of the social rights citizens possessed and “the degree to which they permit 
people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces”. 
The concept of social rights, elevated by Esping-Andersen and Korpi, is not 
directed or expanded into a discussion about the legal character of these social 
rights. There is scope here to develop a power resource-type approach to 
understand how law imbues power in citizens, collective organisations like 
employers and unions as well as states. This does however also require an 
understanding of how the judicial arm of the state acts to police the 
allocations of social rights. This has some very clear comparative differences 
between countries but also, in the European context, demands the same 
attention be given to European level courts given their increasingly 
prominent role in regulating various individual rights, both economic and 
social. This is discussed later in this chapter and throughout the rest of this 
thesis.  
  
  1.2.5.iii. Labour relations as welfare provision for workers 
Labour and business are placed at the centre of welfare state studies, 
particularly that sort that seeks to relate social protection regimes (welfare 
states) to economic production regimes. These actors are also central to the 
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study of labour relations which act as a key bridge between both a country’s 
protection and production systems. This sees collective bargaining play a role 
as a key welfare institution, but one not directly provided by the state but 
one facilitated in two key ways by the state: through law or directly imposing 
bargaining of unions and employers (‘corporatism’)).  
This is the subject of Bonoli’s study that attempts to theorize the 
linkages between the formal welfare state and these “functional equivalents” 
found in the labour market, namely collective bargaining and the legal means 
used to facilitate particular welfare outcomes. Collective bargaining is forged 
and maintained by the two union and employer parties of the employment 
relationship, and only sees the state directly become involved in bargaining 
in corporatist regimes that were more common in parts of Nordic and 
Rhenish Europe in the decades after WWII. If the state does not take this more 
active role found in corporatist regimes, as is more typical in contemporary 
Europe, the state reverts to a sanctioning role provided in the main by 
providing legal rules and frameworks in which bargaining can operate. 
These rights afforded by the state provide the right to recognition to 
bargaining parties, the right to bargain and to strike (unions) as well as 
various judicial and quasi judicial means of dispute settlement (tribunals, 
conciliation bodies etc.). 
What Bonoli goes further than other CPE scholars (minus Heino) in 
the way he incorporates this labour law component of labour market based 
welfare arrangements. It is not just collective bargaining that takes on an 
important welfare role, but does this in conjunction with labour law. Bonoli, 
using the notion of ‘functional equivalents’ from CWC, focuses upon those 
“labour market-based means of providing worker welfare” that operate 
outside the boundaries of the formal welfare state. Bonoli then compares the 
different forms these take across Germany, Britain and France. Bonoli 
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conforms to the four-pronged “families of nations” typology of Castles (1993) 
rather than the three-fold typology of Esping-Andersen that separates France 
from Germany (both usually lumped together) and instead puts France into 
a southern European group of ‘families’. This is appropriate, given the 
substantive role has legal intervention traditionally seen in France than in 
Germany. France has a generous legal minimum wage as well as extensive 
erga omnes extension rules that extend collective agreements beyond their 
initial signatories to cover entire sectors. These do not exist in Britain and 
only in very limited form in Germany. This subject is a feature in the first case 
study chapter (2.3.) in the thesis’ second section. 
In this three way comparison, Bonoli appropriately emphasises 
different traditions of state-society relationships in these three countries, 
differences that are, again, reinforced by how labour law and collective 
bargaining institutions have been created. He suffers from a superficial and 
often incorrect appraisal of their developments however, particularly in 
regards to the 19th Century. Bonoli identifies France as more authoritarian in 
this period than Germany which given the emergence of imperial Germany 
in the latter half of the 19th Century is hard to argue. The German Imperial 
state was slow to acquiesce to organised labour demanding better welfare 
and working conditions and initially used police and even military actions to 
pacify militant worker revolts. As described in chapter 2.1, some German 
employers were however keen to build consensual relations with 
increasingly strong trade unions and built autonomous (non-state mandated) 
pension and co-determination bodies in their workplaces (McGaughey 2015). 
This eventually pushed the German Imperial state towards accepting these 
forms of workplace democracy and then extending, often at the behest of 
employer interests.  
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These struggles and shifts in 19th Century Germany were very 
influential in providing the building blocks for the Tarifautonomie model that 
was to emerge on both sides of WWII. This account also might seem to aid 
Bonoli’s historical comparison of Germany and France where, again, he sees 
the French state in this period as being more authoritarian than the German 
state and the causal factor behind the different form legal and collective 
bargaining pillars of labour relations that took shape hence.  
This points directly to Bonoli’s use of a state-society relationships 
concept, despite some historical inaccuracies. Firstly, he has focused more 
upon the state side of the state-society relationship, where elevating the role of 
societal interests that presents actors of capital and labour is just as important. 
In Germany, unlike in France, collective institutions of co-determination and 
pensions, and eventually wage setting, began to forge autonomously as 
employers acquiesced to rising worker power. The state then acquiesced to both 
employer and labour demands to extend these across Germany. It is for this 
reason why Germany is characterised as having more consensual labour 
relations traditions, whilst France and Britain are not (Feldmann 2006, 
Crouch 1993). In France’s case, similar to Britain, trade union militancy and 
authoritarian attitudes on the part of employers’, rather than the state, were 
responsible in forging different responses (Parsons 2007; p.114). In most of 
20th Century France, the state was in fact authoritarian as Bonoli suggests but 
in fact direct by political goals of reconciling industrial peace, social rights 
and economic success. This historical appraisal of France also echoes much 
of the British labour relations experience for much of the 20th Century up to 
1979. In this way, the introduction of France is a useful third compared case 
so as to identify cultural conditions that provided either consensual or more 
conflict based labour relations.  
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            Under this broader concept of state-society relationships, Bonoli 
employs CWC concepts of power resources, elective affinities and path 
dependency to compare the development of labour market-based welfare 
arrangements in these three countries.  As appraised in the previous VoC 
section, the prospects of path dependency’s use have serious shortcomings. 
Deakin’s use of path dependency, outlined in the previous section, is done so 
in a very legal analytic fashion to examine aspects of court behaviour and 
doctrinal traditions such as the ‘doctrine of precedent’. Bonoli, again, does 
not go this far in to law school based theories and uses path dependency in 
manner typical of CPE and CWC work.  
This form of path dependency sees Bonoli identify ‘key moments in 
time’ that are important in the formation of welfare states and functionally 
equivalent welfare institutions in the labour market. The role of courts here 
would seriously complicate this neat, functionalist picture of path 
dependency that Bonoli paints, but as he does not include an analysis of court 
actors, even for an analysis of labour law, then this functionalist path 
dependent view of labour market regimes in Germany, Britain and France 
remains undisturbed. The case studies in this thesis demonstrate this point. 
Court interventions occur in different ways in different national legal 
systems with some courts entitled to be more activist in some cases (Britain) 
than others (Germany). The spectre of European law however is another 
aspect of this ‘role of law discussion’ not addressed by Bonoli or other CPE 
scholars and needs to be. Interventions from European institutions like the 
Court of Justice and Commission are regular parts of the regulatory and 
governance arrangements of labour relations in European countries, 
meaning they must form a permanent part of theories understanding their 
effects. These ‘effects’ here present distinctly non-functionalist and 
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disruptive examples of institutional change, rather than neat reversions to 
path dependent practice. 
Important aspects of individual labour law are also raised in Bonoli’s 
contribution, but is limited to questions of legal minimum wages and going 
no further into other areas of individual labour law rights (working time, 
dismissal etc.). Despite this, the role of legal minimum wages in ‘neo-liberal 
labour markets’ is an important subject. A legal minimum wage had only 
existed in Britain since 1998, five years prior to the publication of this article. 
Germany only introduced its own federal minimum wage in 2015, leaving 
France as the only country out of these three with a long-standing and 
developed legal minimum wage. France also stands out in terms of the 
generosity of its minimum wage rate (‘le SMIC’) vis-à-vis these other two 
countries and indeed most of Europe (Salverda and Mayhew 2009). A key 
claim is made in the first chapter concerning the role of legal minimum 
wages, namely that these have been introduced in some countries as 
compensatory reforms in light of receding collective bargaining coverage 
(leaving workers unprotected by any minimum wage) that came about as a 
result of neo-liberal reforms. To reiterate in brief: legal minimum wages are 
in essence part of the neo-liberal vision of the labour market, albeit as a 
compensatory means of providing worker welfare, even if inferior to 
collectively bargained minimum wages. 
The subject of neo-liberalism is not addressed by Bonoli, which again 
would disturb the pretty picture of path dependent forms of functionally 
equivalent labour market based welfare arrangements. Bonoli does not go 
into detail with either individual and collective labour law.  
This approach still however lacks: 1) a sufficient and indeed systemic 
understanding of legal systems inclusive of judicial actors and an 
understanding of labour law systems beyond the isolated examples of 
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minimum wages  and some collective labour law 2) an approach to the nature 
of law and how doctrine and social context intersect in the manner that 
Deakin above, for example, has attempted. This means power resources, and 
indeed the ‘social rights’ concept found in CWC, can be adapted to 
understand how legal rights are deployed, shaped and indeed made by 
different actors based on their resources and power. ]3) the role of European 
integration and the European legal and market system has had enormous 
influence of these countries’ regimes of ‘labour market based social policy’. 
This must be factored in to any CPE appraisal of European labour relations 
and with this and understanding of how European legislation and court-
made law affects the legal systems of European countries labour markets and 
labour relations.  
 
  1.2.5.iv. Conclusions 
The contribution of CWC echoes that of RT in the previous section. CWC 
provides one notable contribution, like  RT, to those specific questions 
concerning law and labour relations. It also offers some fruitful conceptual 
offerings that aid a necessary approach to a neo-liberal context under which 
European labour relations now finds itself. These include the concepts of re-
commodification and de-commodification, power resources, social rights and 
state-society relationships. A combined use of Esping-Andersen’s and Walter 
Korpi’s power resources and social rights has particular promise in theorising 
how collective and individual labour law can alter the relational power 
dynamics between labour and capital.  It does not however provide any 
insight concerning judicial actors and these impose themselves on various 
welfare and labour market matters. Given the state-centric nature of welfare 
state studies, it would also be important for CWC to note the difference 
between the governmental state and the judicial state in formulating national 
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types. This poses questions for how CWC understanding the political 
interests (elective affinities) of key actors, as courts cannot be understood as 
political actors in the same way as trade unions, firms and policy-makers. In 
some cases, courts will be shielded from political influences, in others the role 
of tribunals and court discretion takes politics out of decisions concerning 
competing legal rights in the labour market. CWC does not have answers to 
these points. 
Bonoli, the one single contribution from CWC to introduce questions 
of labour law, does not however address these issues of courts and legal 
systems either. He does however use the functional equivalents concept to 
understand both labour law and collective bargaining as non-welfare state 
forms of labour market based welfare provision. This can be built on further 
to introduce collective and individual labour law rules to appreciate how 
state-society relationships forge labour relations systems over time. Within 
this, many concerns of labour law rather than policy can be subsumed, but not 
all given the role of courts that sees labour market rules very much become 
‘law’ rather than ‘policy’ created and driven by the governmental state. A 
central part of the argument of this thesis is that a historically contextualised 
appraisal of neo-liberalism must include this legal analytic part. In this, CWC 
joins the VOC approach in lacking what RT provides.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 -	102	-	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 -	103	-	
Chapter 1.3.  
Taking Stock: lessons from three reviews of CPE approaches 
and developing key arguments  
 
The previous chapter offered a critical review of the Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC), Comparative Welfare Capitalism (CWC) and Regulation Theory (RT) 
approaches. Besides pointed critiques of their treatment of questions of law 
and other aspects of capitalist system comparison, these reviews did also 
raise a number positive contributions from these three schools. With this in 
mind, this chapter provides two functions. It will first outline and compare 
those core critiques from these three schools. This will then be built upon 
through an attempt to refine those leading arguments that were outlined 
with the alternative framework in chapter 1.1.  
 
1.3.1. Three CPE schools 
The prominent points of critique are surveyed in this section. Firstly, one 
broad overarching conclusion of the three schools is presented: There is clear 
problem in how these schools approach the subject of labour relations and how 
they define it. Each of these three schools, in different ways, overwhelmingly 
commit their focus toward the institutions and actors of collective 
bargaining, neglecting important questions of labour law, the influence of 
economic law and broader legal systems. This problem is only mitigated by 
the occasional reference to aspects of legislative-statutory law-based legal 
aspects, with judicial sources of legal rules and influence dealt with only 
fleetingly. In a post-1970s period where legal change is a fundamental part 
of agendas to restructure labour market activity and reorder labour market 
relationships, it is necessary to have an approach to legal systems, legal 
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influences and legal change integrated into CPE theories of labour relations 
and comparative capitalism. Merely introducing these themes only 
infrequently and treating them as external and formal influences and is 
wholly inadequate.  
There are without doubt however, some noted exceptions to this 
broad critique found within the three schools. These do come however in two 
broad categories: an exception which is not well integrated within a core 
approach, and those which are incomplete but could potentially be 
developed. It is stated up front, that the VoC school comes off the worst, with 
some fertile areas of development from within RT and CWC approaches. 
Deakin (with Sarkar 2008, with Ahlering 2007, and with Pele and Siems 2007) 
provided a broad approach that acts as a possible exception to this claim 
concerning VoC’s shortcomings. The word ‘possible’ is used as these 
contributions diverge in important ways from the core and original VoC 
approach of Hall and Soskice (2001); a divergence that likely places their 
contributions outside of the scope of the VoC approach and, perhaps, within 
a broader ‘law and economics’ field with which it is aligned.  Deakin and 
colleagues do employ an institutional complementarity concept that is 
central to the VoC framework and combines this with a ‘co-evolution’ 
concept used to describe the dual and interlinked development of legal and 
non-legal institutions of contracting. At a descriptive level this is useful 
conceptualisation of legal and non-legal institutional dynamics, but the 
inherent functionalism that results from this use of  complementarity weighs 
it down with similar problems to VoC scholarship.  
The functionalism found in complementarity concepts and the 
typologies of national capitalism these provide cannot be reconciled with the 
‘paths’ that labour relations in Europe have taken. These ‘paths’, not meant 
in a path dependency sense, have produced increased complexity where 
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regimes of collective bargaining that used to dominate labour relations 
systems have been subject to competing dynamics of change and continuity, 
where complementary and non-complementarity processes have had to co-
exist dynamically and in competition. Complexity, rather than uniformity, is 
the result. 
This subject of complementarity, and the clear rebuke of it in this 
thesis, also directs a challenge to Regulation Theory. Unlike the VoC approach 
however, complementarity is a) only a feature in some RT work and b), in 
those RT studies where it features (Boyer 2005, Amable 2000, 2003), 
complementarity’s innate functionalism does not produce permanence, but 
only temporary resilience. Examples of institutional functionalism will still 
eventually fail and fall under the collapse of a capitalist system such 
complementarities once preserved. In this way, RT’s approach to 
complementarity is more realistic as it describes only a part of a capitalist 
system’s process of development. This is very important to this thesis as it 
forms part of a regulationist offer to properly address the subject of neo-
liberalism, and more specifically the threat it poses to different sorts of 
capitalist regime and the institutional formations that define them.  
The above sees the emergence of a two-pronged critique concerning 
the entangled link between questions of law and legal change on the one 
hand and those of neo-liberalism. Here, CWC contributions are introduced 
and sat next to those of RT as these provided much more promising 
conceptual propositions and lessons.  
Both CWC and RT addressed this question of neo-liberalism’s role and 
the role of law in labour relations. One offering from RT, that of Brett Heino, 
is the only one that did both simultaneously.  RT scholars have produced, as 
is typical for this approach, a distinct and macro-level concept called ‘liberal 
productivism’. CWC has not reverted from using the term ‘neo-liberalism’ 
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when examining, for example, debates surrounding neo-liberalism’s 
relationship with ‘welfare state retrenchment’ (Clayton and Pontusson 1998, 
Pierson 1995). In comparing the work of regulationist Heino and CWC’s 
Bonoli therefore, both of whom explicitly address labour law questions, it is 
Heino who explicitly links an analysis of labour market regimes with the 
emergence of an intellectual neo-liberal order.  
Crucially, Heino pursues this line of analysis so as to theorise neo-
liberalism’s legal character, and as possessing the machinery to drive legal 
change, as well as the political-ideological character and its manifestations in 
industrial practice and restructuring. An important criticism of this is that 
this does not move far beyond very broad and abstract theorizing, something 
that characterises an RT school more generally that commits itself to heavy 
conceptual devices such as a ‘wage-labour nexus’ and ‘regimes of 
accumulation’. There is some debate within RT whether the ‘wage-labour 
nexus’ concept, for example, can and should be applied beneath the 
macroeconomic level for which it was designed (see. du Tertre 2005; p. 204-
213).  This ‘criticism’ is raised more as an issue of crossed-purposes rather 
than a problem, but it is not typical in RT for the sort of multi-level analyses 
of labour relations, and especially of collective bargaining structures, that is 
evident in VoC work (Johnston and Hancké 2009) and other business school 
industrial relations studies (Marginson and Sisson 2002 & 2004, Katz and 
Darbishire 2000). It is argued that this sort of flexibility is important when 
examining collective bargaining systems within countries, and all the more 
so when examining the relationship different kinds of industry-level 
bargaining systems have with legal rules and the national legal systems they 
are encased within. The principal use of the wage-labour nexus concept 
however is its placement within a comparative historical context where its 
takes on a particular temporal form. The breakdown of the Fordist wage-
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labour nexus was critical to the collapse of Fordism itself and the ushering in 
of a neo-liberal order that, as Heino correctly asserts, to re-commodify wage 
labour and to dismantle those institutions of worker voice and wage 
management of a Fordist wage-labour nexus that was intended to do the 
opposite (de-commodify) as long as capitalist production goals were 
reached.  
Importantly, the lessons taken from this corner of RT from which 
Heino operates, that does not engage with a complementarity concept, sees 
its approach to neo-liberalism accepted for this thesis but without the 
adoption of all the conceptual burdens of RT. As with much of Marxist and 
neo-Marxist theorising, and as underlined by such scholars, a student cannot 
cherry pick these concepts without applying all of them as part of a holistic 
Marxian theory. The historical placement and understanding of Fordism and 
liberal productivism are however useful for contextualising the differences 
between the pre-1980s and post-1970s periods. With this, greater historical 
context is provided to those shifts in the interests and policy preferences of 
capital, labour and state actors and the consequences this presents for labour 
relations systems. The consequences have been profound and corrosive and 
far more so than the VoC accounts acknowledge, extending policy and legal 
changes into policy systems and institutional regimes and reversing their 
initial de-commodification purposes. 
A key component of this de-commodification and re-commodification 
dualism presents a shared lesson drawn from CWC and RT. Further 
collaboration here sees themes of power resources and competing social 
rights from CWC further aid a re-commodification account of neo-
liberalism’s advance that has had serious implications for welfare states and 
collective bargaining. Important social rights are enshrined in law, but will 
not necessarily be challenged by their removal by the state, but could find 
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themselves subordinated beneath economic rights that are usually directed 
toward individual notions of economic empowerment in market activity 
rather than collective rights to welfare. Such economic rights also see the 
rights of profit-interests prioritised over those seeking social rights to 
welfare. There are numerous examples of these social and economic rights 
competing and conflicting. Choices at this point must be made as to how to 
reconcile or police such conflicts. An adequate and complete understanding 
of neo-liberalism’s legal character sees such conflict of laws organised 
according to capital’s interests, not labour (welfare seekers).  
This leaves a hugely important question about the role of the state. 
How does the state approach these demands for re-commodification from 
capital versus competing demands from labour to maintain social rights to 
have their labour de-commodified? What role does the state play in attempts 
to re-order social rights and power resources of competing interests? 
Traditional Marxist approaches that favour the ‘state as hand-maiden to 
capital’, favoured in some corners of RT, is inadequate to understand the role 
of judicial actors, even if one excepts this Marxist description of the political-
governmental state’s role in capitalist societies. These leave considerable space 
to reinterpret the role of the state in CPE as well as that of neo-liberalism and 
labour relations. This is attempted in the following section.  
 
1.3.2. Developing key arguments 
The preceding reviews of leading CPE approaches, to reiterate, were pursued 
to both demonstrate its existing shortcomings, but also draw out the positive 
contributions from across the three schools. This second section of this 
chapter focuses upon the second and pursued through four key themes: neo-
liberalism; the state, concepts of complexity and incoherence versus those of 
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complementarity, and the analytical place of national typologies of capitalism 
with CPE studies.  
 
1.3.2.i. Neo-liberalism  
Neo-liberalism is understood as a distinct phase of capitalism demarcated 
from the ‘Fordist’ pattern of development which dominated in Europe for 
most of the 20th Century. This has emerged in different ways in different 
European countries, and has been directed and filtered in complex ways by 
the processes of European integration, making the comparative analysis 
found in CPE highly relevant. This distinct phase of capitalism is an 
‘ideologically expansionist’ intellectual order (Grewal and Purdy 2014, 
Heino 2015) that has greater resilience and deeper roots than those temporary 
fads in policy preferences of policy-making elites and is directed toward the 
re-commodification of labour with the serious consequences for welfare state 
and collective bargaining institutions this produces. Neo-liberalism does not 
merely concern its political ideational features and the industrial practices and 
reforms these prompt, but it includes a fundamentally legal character; a 
character that provides for distinct forms of legal change and reform, legal 
rights, legal frameworks and contractual relationships.  
 The creation of legal rights sees a two-pronged pattern of social rights 
being subordinated beneath economic rights, and the rights of employers 
prioritised over workers. It also provides for the creation of legal frameworks 
and modes of legal enforcement required to adjudicate any conflicting claims 
upon such legal social and economic rights and to do so in a manner that aids 
neo-liberal objectives. For the organisation of labour relations specifically, 
this does however also present the creation of individual rights for workers as 
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part-compensation for the loss of collective rights and institutions of worker 
power that neo-liberal reforms seek to weaken or destroy.  
 
  1.3.2.ii. The State  
The implications for role of the state from this above are profound and 
require its reconceptualization. This is done here in two ways. The first sees 
those shifts in both the political and judicial functions of the state to pursue 
the requirements of the neo-liberal order. The second demands a simple but 
important identification of both the state’s legal-judicial as well as political-
governmental organs which CPE focuses upon.  
 The first is dealt with as it follows immediately from the points above and 
is assisted by those contributions from CWC (Korpi 1983, Esping-Andersen 
1990) and Heino (2015) as well as from fellow RT proponents Peck and Tickell 
(2007, in Leitner et al. 2007). A useful contribution from lawyers Grewal and 
Purdy (2014), whom refer to Peck and Tickell in crafting their legalistic 
approach to neo-liberalism, are also leant upon. The ‘paradox’ identified in 
chapter 1.1. between the rhetoric and reality of neo-liberalism is developed 
here. Noting neo-liberalism’s legal character immediately begins to 
undermine its stated goal of de-regulation. As Peck and Tickell recognise, “ 
only rhetorically does neo-liberalism mean ‘less state’” and in reality is 
marked by paradoxical de-regulatory and re-regulatory moments, both of 
which come with a “thoroughgoing reorganisation of governmental systems 
and state-economy relations” (Peck and Tickell 2007; p.33). The reordering of 
its functions presented by privatisations, strict new rules and codes about the 
processes of market activity and the creation of new state bodies or 
regulatory enforcement, manifests itself in “significant extensions” of state 
power (ibid.) As new spaces are prised open for market and profit-making 
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activity, legal rights to the proceeds of this activity must be re-ordered also, 
and then enforced. This has occurred within welfare states, as parts are 
marketized or outright sold to private for-profit interests, and within labour 
markets as relationships between state and citizen and capital and labour are 
re-commodified.  
Lawyers Grewal and Purdy identify a similar de facto truth of the neo-
liberal state: neo-liberalism, which “has the consistent purpose of promoting 
capitalist imperatives” (Grewal and Purdy 2014), can never simply “win” 
because a the reified ‘pure market’ of the neo-liberal cannot never be absent 
of legal content. The functional and operational realities of markets need 
various forms of property rights and contract rights and their enforcement to 
be perpetually present. Any state, as Grewal and Purdy continue, that aspires 
to “any form of responsive governance faces perennial demands to depart 
from market discipline” (ibid. p7.). These contributions from Peck and Tickell 
and Grewal and Purdy tie in nicely with abstraction descriptions of the 
‘regulatory state’, although without Majone’s (1993) own celebratory 
embrace of it. As citizens and workers see social rights that are tied to their 
‘social citizenship’ dismantled or weakened, these demands only increase. 
This presents a contest between the remaining welfare state functions and the 
regulatory state functions advanced by neo-liberalism in a constant not-so-
creative tension, where attempts to re-distribute gains to capital are 
challenged by attempts to re-distribute away from capital.  
Noting these attempts to forge the ‘neo-liberal regulatory state’ are 
marked by other critical tensions, with the main one presented by the role of 
judicial actors. The more abstract discussion above about the contemporary 
state under neo-liberalism is contrasted by more basic recognitions of the 
state’s judicial arm. This is built upon however to place judicialisation within 
this multi-faceted approach to the state. 
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Not only do judicial actors play hugely important roles in European 
labour relations systems, albeit more in some than others, but these have 
become much more prominent in the neo-liberal period for two reasons: the 
first sees courts asked to intervene more as contests over competing social 
and economic rights become more commonplace (as a result of orchestrated 
attempts to reorder these rights in favour of capital). The second sees courts 
used to actively advance economic rights of profit-seekers and employers. The 
second sees neo-liberal legal change take a partly ‘juridified form’, but in a 
preliminary note of the issues of complexity addressed further on this 
section, courts cannot be necessarily relied upon to advance the objectives and 
causes of ‘doctrinaire neo-liberalism’ as their commitments to other doctrines 
and practices of law may diverge from this. Even in countries like Britain, 
often labelled a liberal and market-orientated economy with legal principles 
of ‘freedom to contract’ that aid employer prerogatives, expectations that 
these will conform to the outcomes demanded by neo-liberal goals are often 
unrealistic. Even when a court interprets the law in a way to satisfy such 
goals, these might have unexpected consequences in regards to how other 
courts, legislators and social actors might deal with these; legislation may be 
passed to nullify court decisions, courts may overturn another court’s 
decision etc.) The two UK-based case studies firmly demonstrate this point. 
With incorporating courts and judicial factors of legal systems into a 
reformed CPE theory of labour relations, it is important to recognise that this 
cannot be done neatly.  
This points, again, to perhaps unsatisfactory theoretical conclusions 
pointing to complexity over complementarity, but should be seen as part of the 
result of ‘expansionist’ and pervasive European neo-liberalism that demands 
the adherence of judicial actors but does not necessarily get it. In labour 
relations terms, courts have more to do as they must interpret not just greater 
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amounts of individual labour law rights as well as those found in weakened 
collective labour law, but the conflicts these have with enlarged bodies of 
economic legal rights must be policed. These ‘conflict of laws’ are often 
explicit and direct, as one piece of legislation or previous court case my 
contradict another. Sometimes these are indirect and the result of unforeseen 
consequences as bodies of legislation are made without regard or reference 
to another, only to find out these contradict also over time. Courts must 
decide how to award rights in these cases. In this European context this 
becomes even more complex when a powerful set of European institutions 
also produce large amounts of legislative text and court decisions, often 
without much regard for their compatibility with particular national 
arrangements. 
A conflict of rules concept is developed from this to capture another 
aspect. When dominant political agendas, that include part legal content and 
part non-legal (i.e. political, ideational) content, provide such a powerful 
context that black letter law is harder to apply. This underlines the 
importance of social-setting in which law is applied. This is particularly 
important in the Germany-Acquired Rights chapter and the Britain-Posted 
Workers chapter where different legislative and judicial legal interventions 
found themselves nullified by social actors’ ability to massage them into a 
desired context and alternative result than that required by law. In one case 
study, Britain-Posted Workers, this occurred to nullify the demands of a 
European court to impose rules that echoed neo-liberal goals. In Germany, 
the opposite was the case as  European legislation demanding social 
protection was massages into a context where neo-liberal objectives won the 
day.  
The role of courts have, therefore, been friend and foe to the ambitions 
of neo-liberal reformers and the interests that come with these. Attempts to 
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place their role neatly and cleanly in a CPE schema of labour relations is 
futile, as courts’ approach to the political arm of the state, social actors, and 
to social actors who make claims to them are framed by constitutional orders 
and aspects and legal practice that may at times conform to the desired 
outcomes of neo-liberalism, but at other times not. 
 
1.3.2.iii   Complexity not complementarity, and CPE’s national 
‘models’ 
Each of the four thematic parts of these arguments are connected, but the 
concepts of complexity and national models are addressed together here. 
This is due in the main to the rejection of complementarity made in the 
previous chapter and the role it plays in formulating theories of holistic 
national types, varieties or models of capitalism and labour relations. 
 This should not be understood as ruling out any existence of 
complementary dynamics and institutional formations, only that it cannot be 
used in such sweeping fashion so as to structure theories of national holism 
and completeness. Complementary institutional features may indeed be 
present in different systems, have increasingly had to co-exist in conflict and 
tension with non-complementary dynamics; especially those posed by neo-
liberal demands for ‘institutional change’. VoC scholars do say, to be fair, 
that these complementarities only exist with ‘ideal’ LME and CME types like 
Britain and Germany, and not for more ‘mixed’ types that sit in between these 
polar opposite national ‘varieties’. This thesis, by using these German and 
British case study examples in section II, clearly demonstrate that these 
national examples do not conform to these neat ideal types either. Instead, 
something more contested, disorderly and complex has emerged as uneven 
patterns of corrosion are evident in different ways in different national 
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regimes of labour relations. This has produced national ‘models’ that are far 
too mixed or mongrelised; stuck between ‘form’ and the singular neo-liberal 
global ‘one-type’ that a deterministic neo-liberal view of the politico-
economic world order desires.  
The effects upon collective bargaining, and the complementary 
arrangements found in labour law and welfare state provision, have been 
severe in some countries but not in others. In some countries, legal rules have 
had to ‘step in’ to correct, modify or supplement the role of bargaining that 
have begun to weaken. This can take the form of legal minimum wages filling 
in holes in the labour market where collective bargaining has receded, or 
extension laws pushing the scope of collective agreements out to cover 
similar gaps in the labour market where there is no wage floor. The 
complexity here places this emerging mix of legal and non-legal modes of 
labour relations ‘regulation and governance’ in a broader neo-liberal context; 
a context with powerful bodies of economic law designed to prise open 
market or profit-spaces in the public sector, or to enhance the power of 
employers in the private sector by giving them rights to reorganise 
production and workplaces.  
Each of the four case studies of this thesis present different versions of 
this interaction between law and non-law in labour relations. 
 
1.3.2.iv. Application to Germany and Britain 
The implications for Germany and Britain offer stiff rebuke to dominant CPE 
theories of these two countries labour relations systems and models of 
capitalism. Germany continues to be depicted as collective bargaining-
dominant, social partner-led form of labour relations with the labels ‘meso-
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corporatist’ or ‘coordinated’ attached to it as well as the label 
‘Tarifautonomie’ (‘bargaining autonomy’). The first chapter of section two 
provides a history of both German and British labour relations that discuss 
the development of such labels and depictions. The two Germany-based case 
study chapters in section two however make clear not only that German 
Tarifautonomie has been declining at a pace courtesy of on-going neo-liberal 
pressures, but that the influence has become a paradoxical element of this. 
On the hand, it has been a key driver of this decline alongside those aspects 
of politics and corporate practice associated with rising neo-liberalism. On 
the other, legal rules have provided some compensatory influence, such as 
minimum wages and laws extending collective agreements to non-
signatories, as part of this same context, presenting the sort of multi-faceted 
and complex legal influence argued above. The ‘neo-liberal revolution’, as 
labelled by British academic Stuart Hall, would ostensibly be a ‘good fit’ in 
traditionally ‘liberal’ Britain.  However, as with Germany, both the cases in 
question contradict the sort of institutionalist predictions as to how Britain 
would adjust to external pressures to change. In one case, Britain-Acquired 
Rights, legal logics and legal incoherence dictated how a ‘regulatory and 
governance problem’ was resolved, rather than through Britain’s inherent 
liberalism and doctrinal lean toward employer rights and business freedoms. 
In the other, adjustments to various legal rules, national and European, 
hostile to trade union action made sure these liberal, pro-market outcomes to 
which these legal rules pointed were nullified and not enacted.  
 
1.3.3 Conclusions 
The final and following chapter deals with matters of research process and 
methodological concerns. The five-point framework, that points to the 
arguments above, has a number important methodological implications and 
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offers an important bridge between this first section and the second section 
of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1.4. 
Research Process and Methods 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present in detail the research and 
methodological process that will guide this thesis.  First, the methodological 
aspects of the five-point socio-legal political economy framework is discussed. 
Second, a section titled comparative case study analysis and case study selections 
will follow this and describe the purposes of the comparative approach 
selected. Section 1.4.3. then outlined the data sources used.  
 
1.4.1 An alternative framework and its methodological 
implications  
The first chapter (1.1) outlined the five points of the socio-legal political 
economy framework crafted as the corrective to CPE approaches to labour 
relations and consisted of the following. 
 
1. Labour relations is defined by two principal forms of regulation and 
governance: legal sources and collective institutional sources 
2. A dynamic relationship between legal and collective institutional means of 
regulation and governance 
3. A conflict of rules approach to understand the complex interaction between 
legal and non-legal sources of rules 
4. A holistic understanding of legal systems inclusive of both direct and indirect 
legal influences 
5. A combination of two methodological innovations found in qualitative 
comparative political economy and legal studies  
 
Also in chapter 1.1, this new framework above was joined and contextualised 
by a quote of John R. Commons that defined theory as a set of tools designed 
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to ‘dig up’ empirical material so it can be used for theory building, or as 
Commons puts it to be used to organise “a generalizable and understandable 
system”. A theoretical framework therefore is directed to how a research 
process is conducted and, through this, provides hypothesised claims and 
arguments.  
Chapter 1.3 developed some the core arguments that this socio-legal 
political economy framework will produce. This section will briefly present the 
methodological characteristics of the alternative framework above. Point five 
of the framework is explicitly methodological as it points to the combined 
use of qualitative comparative analysis and legal analysis with particular 
reference to legal texts produced by courts as well as legislation. This is 
examined in detail below in sub-section 1.4.2.i. There are however 
methodological characteristics to the four preceding points of the framework. 
The first, for example, highlights the dual concept of ‘regulation and 
governance’ and is designed to push the researcher towards examination of 
the regulatory and governance aspects found in law as well as collective 
bargaining, trade unions and business. This does not only require the 
researcher to identify and examine the different regulatory and governance 
aspects of the case in front of them, but also requires the detection of 
‘regulatory and governance problems’ in a given case. The process of 
identifying such problems prompts examinations as to how such problems 
arise and how they are resolved. This important analytical process, in the 
context of labour relations, directs analysis of labour actors (business, 
unions), legislators and courts. What is the initial regulatory and governance 
problem? For whom is this a problem for (unions, employers, the state?)? what 
steps are taken by key actors to resolve these problems? What interests, 
power resources and conflicts of rules guide resolutions to these problems? 
The four cases selected for this thesis each have complex regulatory and 
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governance ‘problems’ with different legal and non-legal regulatory sources 
and solutions to these. This includes, but is not limited to, changing 
relationships between labour law and collective bargaining that represent the 
direct forms of ‘regulation of governance’ in labour relations. These problems 
will also include regulatory and governance aspects  found outside of these, 
including contract law and company law. 
The complexity of such different legal and non-legal forms of 
regulation and governance are where these problems are found, but depend 
upon the competing interpretations of these of business or union actors. Such 
scenarios, also create the sort of conflict of rules issues raised in point three of 
the framework. Such conflicts create a contest between competing claims to 
particular social or economic rights that are either provided in law or non-
legal rules. Placing these problems in a conflict of rules context is appropriate 
for a labour relationship defined by an inherent conflict of interests between 
labour and capital.  
This framework is applied to the four case studies in section two and 
produces four sets of findings that are then taken forward to the third section 
of this thesis. The process details of this section two are provided below. 
 
1.4.2 Comparative case study analysis and case study 
selections 
This section comes in four parts. This first provides some background and 
review of existing approaches in qualitative comparative analysis (1.4.2.i). 
The second and third detail the national level (Germany and Britain) and 
European level (EU acquired rights law and posted workers law) case studies 
that dominate the second section of this thesis the follows immediately after 
this chapter. The fourth provides some detail to the organisation aspects of 
these individual case study chapters.  
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1.4.2.i Qualitative comparative analysis  
The goals of this thesis are theoretical and conceptual rather than empirical. 
The approach employed however has an empirical basis, presented by the 
use of four empirical case studies and their comparison to produce empirical 
material that is then compared and examined for the purpose of theory 
development. New empirical insights are not the motivating factor behind 
this thesis. Nonetheless, some are produced as a by-product and some of 
these could be later directed toward publishable ends outside this thesis. An 
in-depth engagement with the empirical detail of these cases however is 
necessary, but the commitment of this thesis is to their theoretical value. 
The alternatives to a qualitative case study approach includes a more 
abstract theoretical approach based on abstract and broader analysis of 
particular conceptual themes, presented by conceptually based thematic 
chapters, and a quantitative approach. The latter is deemed is inappropriate, 
given the lack of available data to address the questions of the sort that define 
this thesis and the innately qualitative nature of these. The former has some 
merit and is pursed in the third and final section of this thesis, but an 
empirically-set comparative case study is far more appropriate as it provides 
the means to develop theory using empirical examples but this also more 
common in CPE, enabling debate with existing CPE. It is indeed the intention 
to address existing CPE theories in each of the four case studies of this study 
and provide an opportunity for those existing theories from CPE approaches 
to offer their own answers.   
Some detail is now provided of existing literature concerning 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA has held a prominent place in 
CPE and broader social science (Mahoney 2007; Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 
2003; Hall 2006), but has not been developed using legal methods and legal 
theory in the manner proposed in this thesis. The way in which this is 
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developed in this thesis is outlined in this section, in line with the proposed 
alternative framework provided, but includes a detailed mapping and 
presentation of the cases selected, its organisation and rationale for their 
selection. These organisational and structural matters are then followed by 
details of data sources and data analysis in the following section.  
Qualitative case studies highlight in-depth, context-specific and 
historically-specific analysis of causal relationships and important contextual 
features of the cases that provide them (Hall 2006, Ragin 1987; p.35). It also 
demands in-depth knowledge of cases and the development of causal 
inferences from incomplete data. These methods are appropriate for 
developing theory and have a long established place in CPE, ‘comparative 
institutional analysis (CIA)’ and broader comparative social sciences (Ragin 
1987, p.34-52; Kogut 2010, p.139-182; Hall 2006; King et al., 1994, p.43-46, 
Mahoney 2007). The 2006 work of Peter Hall14 particular useful arguments in 
favour  of theory-centred small-n qualitative case study research. This sort is 
the appropriate methodological approach to examine the complex relationships 
and causal connections between legal and non-legal aspects of labour relations 
in the framework presented in the preceding section.  
The in-depth analysis of the complex causal mechanics within cases is 
what sets qualitative comparative analysis apart from quantitative analysis 
that, using a large number of case studies, can produce and present broader 
patterns and suggest causal links through correlation, but not empirically 
prove them causally. In-depth analyses of small numbers cases can also 
uncover causal relationships that are neither numerical nor quantifiable in 
nature, and therefore present them appropriately (without presentation with 
number). Moreover, as Hall again points out, not only do attempts to 
                                               
14 Who happens to be the same renowned co-author of the Varieties of Capitalism volume 
critiqued in chapter 1.2 (Hall and Soskice 2001) 
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quantify certain things often produce over simplification, but some 
compared cases will also present certain causal processes of relevant 
developments in some cases but not in others (Hall 2006). Even if quantitative 
analysis of these relationships was, in the abstract, feasible, no data exists to 
perform this task. If it did, by implication this ‘problem’ identified in CPE 
probably would not exist. Comparing qualitative case studies enables the 
examination of innately qualitative causal processes. It enables an emphasis 
to be placed upon those inherently qualitative linkages and relationships 
between law and non-law and their different manifestations in different 
compared contexts. 
Hall argues that theory development in case study analysis, to be of 
any use, must see the selected cases cannot be merely ‘cases of themselves’ 
and must have a generalizable quality so as to provide lessons to broader 
phenomena. This process of theoretical extension and generalization must 
clearly be undertaken with caution, but must be pursued otherwise the 
research is simply engaging in a process of describing the contents of those 
cases in front of them (Hall 2006). This relies on a high degree of 
contextualised knowledge of these cases and the applicability to broader 
phenomena. In this thesis, the examination of the European acquired rights 
and posted workers law gives rise to specific processes, events and outcomes 
and particular economic sectors and policy areas. These examinations 
however clearly provide lessons for German and British labour relations 
more broadly, and do so to challenge dominant CPE approaches and 
understanding of these national labour relations regimes and European 
labour relations more generally.  
The strengths of selecting these two countries as exemplar cases are 
addressed in the next sub-section. Importantly however a key point is 
underlined: The two case studies of these two countries’ experiences of two 
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discreet areas of EU law must be able to tell us something fundamental about 
both of these national cases and about European labour relations more 
broadly. It is asserted that they both do so and will be demonstrated 
throughout this thesis. 
 
1.4.2.ii The national cases: Germany and Britain 
This kind qualitative and comparative analysis occupies an important place 
within CPE research and broader comparative social science, but has not 
been directed to specific sets of law-orientated questions. This is modified for 
the theoretical and operational purposes of this thesis with innovations 
introduced, both methodological and conceptual, from legal studies as 
described in the previous section. As outlined earlier in this chapter, the 
identification of regulatory and governance problems are useful tools in each of 
the four case study chapters offered. The nature of these problems is 
described in each chapter and in brief below. 
These four cases include the selection of two areas of European Union 
law that concern labour relations (EU posted workers and acquired rights law15) 
and two national case studies: Germany and Britain. The two national cases 
are selected for two main reasons based on their comparative pedigree. The 
first is that both countries occupy a role as opposing archetypes in CPE 
theories. In each of the CPE schools identified here, British capitalism is 
characterised as a liberal market economy (LME) (VoC), or, similarly, as market-
orientated (RT), or a liberal model of welfare capitalism (CWC). Likewise, 
Germany’s corporatist traditions have seen given provided it with the label’s 
meso-corporatist (RT), conservative-corporatist (CWC) and coordinated market 
economy (VoC). In Germany, the development of advanced and consensual 
                                               
15 Also known under the label ‘transfer of undertakings’ 
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collective bargaining institutions in the 20th Century (Tarifautonomie) has been 
placed at the centre of Germany’s typological positioning in CPE theories. In 
Britain, the principle of an employer’s ‘right to manage’ has been a strong 
guiding principle to how labour relations has been organised, although much 
more so in the post-1979 British experience and 19th Century Britain and less 
in between these periods. This is discussed more in the following chapter 
(2.1). 
The contrast between these two countries is also found in the 
comparisons of their legal systems and systems of labour law. Britain is 
mostly characterised as a common law legal system with a stronger role for 
judicial independence and a doctrine of precedent that comes with it. 
Germany is typically considered as a form of civic law system inclusive of 
Roman law traditions that provides for a stronger role for formal codes of 
public law and constraints on judicial power. There is however further 
typological distinctions within these broader types and are addressed in 
comparative legal studies (Zweigert and Kötz 1998) that separates the 
Germanic legal tradition and a Romanistic one found by French-Napoleonic 
systems (1998, p.73) despite sharing some roman law traditions. France is 
much more centralised and uses public law more expansively than the more 
decentralised, federal Germany.  
This broad distinction between common law and civic law systems 
masks a rather simple reality where all national legal systems comprise both 
civic statutory codes defined by legislative forms of law and judicial elements 
where legislation and constitutional rules are interpreted; the critical 
question is the balance between these which differs in important ways 
between common law and civic law systems. These are important however 
when asking how the German and British legal systems are inserted into a 
European legal order (pre-March 2019). As the four case studies illustrate, 
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how different countries deal with the impositions of EU law, whether in legal 
terms or in terms of everyday practice, differs according to legal, political and 
cultural factors. Courts are more interventionist in some countries than 
others, and legislation is more likely to be reached for to affirm social rights 
than in countries with strong non-legal arrangements such as collective 
bargaining, trade unions, employer associations or others. Britain represents 
a strong example of judicial independence whilst Germany of judicial 
acquiescence to established legal or cultural norms. 
 
1.4.2.iii The European cases 
These two national cases are brought together and compared courtesy of the 
selection of two areas of EU policy and law: European posted workers and 
acquired rights law as defined by the directive texts (directive 96/71, directive 
2001/23 respectively) that introduced these into EU law. Both of these 
however, importantly, bring with them the interpretations enforcement by 
national governments, who must transpose these into national law, and 
European and national courts. Both of these selected areas of EU law also sit 
at a theoretically interesting regulatory nexus, and conflict, between social 
rights and the economic rights that are at the centre of the single market. With 
this normative clash between the economic and the social goals, the four case 
studies present opportunities to test explanations of complementarity or 
conflict of rules that might result. In some of the cases, examples of de jure 
complementarity emerge in the abstract but can then be contradicted by the 
de facto reality presented by the events and facts of the case. One pertinent 
example of this is raised in the Britain-Posted Workers chapter (2.4), where 
shifts in EU law appeared to match with existing labour law arrangements in 
Britain in terms of furnishing employers, not workers, with empowering 
legal rights. The events on the ground, chiefly by striking on-site workers, 
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however produced a radically different outcome. 
It is worth addressing this question: why pick areas of law as part of 
these case study selections, and in this case European law, as these would 
clearly demonstrate law’s perhaps rather obvious role. Two important points 
are made in addressing this concern. Firstly, the arguments of this thesis are 
directed more toward demonstrating the nature of law’s influence and the multi-
faceted (comparable) nature of it, rather than whether its influence is ex ante 
important at all. CPE theories of course do not dispute its importance, but 
take law’s presence as a given and do not examine how and when it is 
important in comparative context. Secondly, CPE approaches, particularly of 
the neo-institutionalist sort, would contend that these external pressures 
coming from EU law would be massaged into dominant national practice 
and would not fundamentally disrupt existing complementarities. This is 
rebutted to differing extents across the four cases. Thirdly, and stemming 
from this second point, in offering four sets of contrasting findings, these four 
cases do provide some scope  and opportunity for CPE theories to be applied 
and offer counter arguments to those of this thesis in each case. For example, 
the Germany-Acquired Rights case (chapter 2.5) offers some important scope 
for institutional-type CPE approaches to rebut the claims made in this thesis. 
On both the appraisals of change in Germany labour relations and on the role 
of law and neo-liberalism, these fail and will be demonstrated in this chapter. 
The research process undertaken will be as follows: Each of these four 
chapters in section two of this thesis will be each divided into two main parts: 
an empirical section where the subject matter of the cases will be examined 
and, following this, an attempt to apply the five-pronged framework 
outlined in chapter 1.1 and above.  
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1.4.3 Data sources 
There are four principal sources of data used, in different ways, across the 
four chapters: legal texts, documentary sources, interview data and secondary data 
sourced from existing academic work. The original intention was to use a 
balanced mix of these. As the research was carried out, the use of interviews 
took on a more secondary and supplementary role, although important in 
two chapters (Britain-posted workers, Germany-Acquired rights). As is usual, 
some interview data was difficult to source, but in most instances it became 
clear that appropriately knowledgeable interviewees simply did not exist 
and that piecing together data had to be done another way. This produced a 
greater reliance on legal texts, documentary sources as well as secondary 
source data from academic literature that addressed parts of a given case 
study (i.e. industrial case studies of outsourcing in Germany for the 
Germany-Acquired Rights chapter). 
These four sources listed here do, in some ways, overlap. Their use 
however is described below in separate sections with their areas of overlap 
touched upon where appropriate.  
 
1.4.3.i Legal texts  
The role of legal texts is an important methodological aspect of added value 
to this thesis. Legal texts refer to several sources, with the main two 
consisting of legislative texts and judicial decisions. CPE and comparative 
politics is already very familiar with the first of these and usually identify 
these under the label of ‘public policy’ and expressions of political will, and 
the end result of aggregated and competing political interests, rather than as 
‘legal’ texts.  
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Court case law has formed a key part of important non-legal studies 
literatures that have had some necessary interaction with CPE. These include 
European integration studies (Martinsen 2008, 2015; Burley and Mattli 1993; 
Scharpf 2002, 2010) new economic sociology (Stryker 2003; Edelman and 
Suchman 1997) and new institutional economics (Hadfield 2005, p.175-204) 
Rubin 2005, p.205-228, Arruñada and Andonova 2005; p.229-250). Despite 
CPE’s occasional interactions with these fields of study, substantive 
interaction has been rare, minus those exceptions raised in chapter 1.2. It is 
important that the role of courts are introduced in a manner that enables a 
contextualised understanding of legislative texts as well as and how social 
actors interpret and apply such legislation, both with and without judicial 
intervention. To be more explicit on this last point, as is demonstrated across 
the four case studies, actors often have considerable leeway (for various 
reasons) to interpret theirs’ and others’ legal rights, so often require policing 
by legislators, courts and other state regulators.  
Legislation is nearly always shaped by courts as the latter must often 
police disputes concerning legislative changes and how particular legal 
rights are organised or reorganised among social actors. This space where 
new law is made and enforced however is not merely decided by legal actors 
like legislators and courts, as social actors often contest shifts in legal rights. 
The interactions this creates between social actors and legal actors is often 
present in legislation and associated documents (e.g. consultation 
documents), but also in court decisions presenting in judgement texts. This 
judgements present the facts of a case as well as doctrinal approaches, and 
therefore represent a very fertile source of empirical information about the 
dispute itself and the contextual factors around it. 
The role of court made law is represented primarily in the four cases 
by the decisions of the European Court of Justice (CJEU), but national courts 
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also feature very prominently. This is more so the case in the two British cases 
as the national courts in these examples were more expansive in seeking to 
police such conflicts themselves rather, as in the German case, of referring 
cases straight to the European Court without examining the case itself. This 
relatively passive role for German court vis-à-vis UK courts, is still 
analytically very important.  A total of exactly 50 cases have been sourced in 
this thesis comprising both national and European court decisions, and, 
using a simple core-periphery logic, much greater emphasis placed on 
smaller numbers of cases within specific cases.  For example, the two Laval 
and Rüffert cases are especially prominent in both the posted workers 
chapters, whereby the Süzen case features much more than most in the 
British-Acquired Rights chapter.  
A key part of this kind of analysis however is to read these core 
judgements alongside those decisions and relevant legislation that preceded 
them. These provide important contextual value to a core landmark case and 
offers a guide to future developments in law and in the social practice it 
inspires. For example, the Laval case raised above requires an understanding 
of EU free movement law within posted workers law is framed and guided 
by. This means that landmark decisions of the Court of Justice of EU free 
movement law, such as Van gend en Loos, Gebhard and Dassonville (see List of 
Legislation and Cases in the Appendix) also need to be grasped. This also 
requires the researcher to engage with the legal scholarship in this area that 
includes ‘case notes’ shorter judicial decision-focused notes found in legal 
studies journals. 
These raw numbers concerning the numbers of court cases cited 
however mask the fact that particular court cases are more prominent than 
others. A key skill in any legal analysis of court case law is to identify cases 
and parts of cases of central interest and those decisions, or legislation, that 
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are of peripheral or secondary relevance or importance to these core cases. 
This core-periphery mapping exercise is pursued in each chapter. Two of the 
case study chapters rely much more upon case law (2.2.3, Germany-Posted 
Workers, 2.2.6, Britain-Acquired Rights) as a source of data than the other 
sources listed in below. As a point of methodological comparison, this 
comparatively different reliance upon judicial decisions in the different case 
study chapters is indicative of the role that courts hold in each case. The 
German-Acquired Rights (2.2.5) chapter for example, the use of secondary 
sources found in existing literature, and in particular of in-case industry-set 
case study examples, is used alongside the analysis of some court cases and 
legislation, but less than the British- Acquired Rights case and the German-
Posted Workers case. The Britain-Posted Workers chapter however sees court 
case law take a very secondary and indeed distant explanatory role in the 
events of this case study. Here, documentary evidence found in a collective 
agreement and other documentary sources are very prominent. These other 
sources of data are outlined below.  
Important similar points are now made about the legislation element 
of this data plan. The European legislation selected starts with those 
directives that provide European posted workers and acquired rights law, 
but are not limited to these as they have relationships with other areas of 
European legislation. The posted workers directive (PWD) for example has 
unavoidable overlap with European public procurement directives and the 
directive for public works contracts in particular16. The acquired rights 
directive (ARD) in fact has very explicit relationships with other EU 
employment legislation including the Information and Consultation 
directive (2002/14) and the Collective Redundancies Directive (98/59). 
                                               
16 Directive 2004/18 concerning procurement contracts for public works was what was in force 
during the events that are of focus in the two posted workers chapters. This was replaced by 
directive 2014/24 in 2016 across the EU however. 
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Moreover, the PWD and ARD also interact with various aspects of national 
legislation. The ARD, given its focus on business transfers and its clear 
relevance to questions of corporate governance, bumps into questions of 
company law. For the reason, this is an interesting example of where labour 
law and company law, or social rights and economic rights, can come into 
contact. In presents the sort of potential conflict of rules scenario that can 
either produce complementary and functional outcomes or conflict and 
complexity.  
 
1.4.3.ii  Documentary sources and secondary data 
‘Documentary’ sources of data can be primary, secondary or tertiary in 
nature (Burnham et al 2004; p.187, Lichtman and French 1978, Burnham 
2008), although for the purposes of this thesis come in the form of reports, 
consultation documents and explanatory reports and memoranda that 
accompany legislation and judicial decisions. Such documentary evidence 
include governmental sources, like national governments and the European 
Union’s institutions, reports and consultation responses provided by labour 
actors and aligned representative organisations.  
These sorts of documentary materials are useful sources as they 
provide greater light upon the policy-making intentions behind legislative 
change and how consultations on those changes have influenced how such 
legislative change has been presented. The consultation processes mentioned 
here also provides an opportunity to identify the interests of employers and 
workers to proposed legislative change when these actors submit responses 
to consultations. This becomes a factor in the Britain-Acquired Rights chapter 
where court-induced disruption to established legal frameworks required 
the government to carefully factor in the interests of business and unions to 
craft a new settlement that provided legal certainty. Proposed legislative 
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changes are also often provoked by the decisions of courts interpreting or 
striking down a piece or portion of an existing statute. This is also addressed 
in both government reports and consultations and is factor in each of the four 
case study chapters. 
 Another useful source of documentary material includes the text of 
collective agreements put together and enforced by employers and unions. 
Details of relevant collective agreement texts and of disputes related to them 
could be found across a variety of sources as well as from the collective 
agreement text itself. Effort was made to find these agreements themselves 
but this was not always necessary or possible. In the Britain-Posted Workers 
chapter (2.4), a collective agreement for one specific sector was centrally 
important in solving a regulatory and governance problem, so was sourced and 
analysed. In the Germany-Posted Workers case however an attempt to the 
regulatory problem in question was made outside of a collective bargaining 
process by legislators and courts (the CJEU), with key sections of a collective 
agreement sourced from within CJEU decisions (the Rüffert and RegioPost 
cases). In the Germany-Acquired Rights chapter (2.5), in contrast to the two 
posted workers chapters that raised one key sector, a broad lens was cast over 
a number of industrial sectors making targeted examinations of individual 
collective agreements less necessary. Secondary literature was also available 
making lots of observations and assessments of a broader collective 
bargaining context possible.  
This chapter (2.5) in fact used secondary literature to build a set of in-
case sectoral/industrial case studies of changes to the collective bargaining 
pillar of German labour relations. More specifically, this included a study of 
the German hospital sector (Greer et al. 2013), the manufacturing sector 
(Schulten 1998) and the privatised telecommunications sector (Jackson and 
Sako 2006).  Judicial decisions were also useful in this Germany-Acquired 
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Rights chapter in providing the necessary details of those aspects of collective 
agreements that were affected. As elaborated upon below, these alternative 
sources of data had to be found for this chapter as interview data became 
either inappropriate or difficult to source. In the case of this Germany-
Acquired Rights chapter however, a broad and useful mapping of different 
industry-set examples provided an excellent source of information from 
which to make causal inferences and conclusions. 
 
1.4.3.iii Interview data 
Similarly with the case of collective agreement text mentioned above, the 
intention was originally to use much more interview data. Two sets of issues 
presented themselves: the question as to how appropriate or useful 
interviews would be for a given case, and the typical challenge of finding 
willing interviewees.  
 Interview data was not necessary for the British Acquired Rights and 
Germany-Posted Workers chapters, although was sourced for the latter 
anyway, but were potentially of much more promising for use in the British-
Posted Workers and Germany-Acquired Rights chapters. The British-Posted 
Workers chapter benefited from two especially useful interviews from the 
side of labour and one from an important intermediary body charged with 
managing the collective agreement process. These were illuminating to both 
how a central event in 2009 at the centre of this case and how this event 
prompted changes to a centrally important collective agreement. The hope to 
obtain an interview from employer interests in this case was disappointing 
but not at all unexpected as the particularly controversial aspects of this case, 
namely the Lindsey dispute in 2009, meant it was highly unlikely these 
would be forthcoming.  
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The Germany-Acquired Rights chapter however had a different set of 
concerns attached to its process of research. Like the British-Posted Workers 
chapter, it needed to piece together different data sources as none of these on 
their own provided all the necessary answers. It was thought from outset that 
the Germany-Acquired Rights chapter could have benefited from targeted 
interviews of unions and employers that sought to ascertain why the 
European acquired rights directive had such little affect in Germany despite, 
in the abstract, the presence of collective bargaining and co-determination 
institutions that would aid the directive’s goals. However, there were very 
few respondents from labour, business or government actors that either 
seemed informed on the broader subject or, again, willing to provide a 
substantive interview. Court case law and legislative texts, at both the 
national and European levels, could only provide so much information. It 
was at this point that the use of secondary data described above found in 
academic studies were used to piece together a set of findings. This did not 
diminish the use of the chapter to the broader arguments of this thesis. On 
the contrary, the empirical puzzle of the Germany-Acquired Rights 
demonstrated some enormously important points concerning how law is 
enacted and actioned in complex labour relations contexts. This and the 
Britain-Posted Workers chapter were both excellent demonstrations of 
important theoretical arguments of this thesis concerning the contested 
nature of law driven of competing interests and conflicting areas of legal and 
non-legal rules. 
 
1.4.4. Concluding comments 
The purpose of this final chapter of this first section was to detail and map 
the methodological and research process of this thesis. Looking forward to 
the following chapters in section two, it is important that the purpose of the 
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four compared case study chapters is clearly made. The purpose of 
comparative analysis of a small number of cases allows for the in-depth 
analysis of these cases and complex causal mechanics and processes that exist 
within them. Despite a small number of compared cases, the findings from 
these can still be used, and in fact must be, directed towards careful 
generalisations and observations of broader phenomena. In this thesis, the 
findings developed present different forms of relationship between law and 
non-law in defining European labour relations, and make pointed 
generalizations about the relationship between European labour relations 
systems and European neo-liberalism, inclusive of the latter’s own, rarely 
theorised, legal character.  
Before these four case study chapters however, further detail and 
context is given to the four case studies as stand-alone areas, beginning with 
a historical mapping of both German and British labour relations followed 
by a similar historical mapping of the two areas of EU law selected. 
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Chapter 2.1. 
Two national level case studies: An introduction to German 
and British Labour Relations 
 
  
2.1.1. Introduction 
The principal goal of this chapter is to provide a substantive introduction to 
the national level case studies of this thesis. This will include three things: 
firstly, a rationale for the selection of the two countries chosen; to provide a 
preliminary demonstration of the importance of integrating legal analysis 
into a CPE account of labour relations, and to provide important descriptive 
context of these two countries’ political, legal and economic systems.  
Both Germany and Britain have received ample coverage in CPE 
studies. This presents the justifiable question: why select these two countries 
once again for another comparative study? The leading answer is simple. A 
demonstration of the importance of legal analysis in CPE accounts of labour 
relations will be more credibly made if compared to existing studies. With 
there being so many available of Britain and Germany, such illustrative 
comparisons can be made. This is a key purpose of this chapter. 
As illustrated at the start of chapter 1.2, the basis for the existing CPE 
work on these countries is spread across a number of factors. This includes 
economic organisation (regimes of production), comparing for example the 
prevalence of particular industries (services vs. manufacturing), the form and 
size of welfare states (regimes of protection), and the nature of political 
systems (consensus systems v. majoritarian ones) (regimes of politics). 
Germany and Britain have been given key positions as ‘ideal types’ in each 
of the three VoC, CWC, and RT schools appraised in Chapter 1.2. In the VoC 
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offering, Britain is depicted as Europe’s most prominent Liberal Market 
Economy (LME) ‘variety’, whilst Germany represents a similar archetype 
example of a Coordinated Market Economy (CME) model. In Esping-
Andersen’s three-pronged welfare capitalism taxonomy, Britain’s welfare 
model is again identified as liberal, whilst Germany as conservative-corporatist. 
In RT, and the SSIP taxonomic model developed by Boyer (2005) and Amable 
(2000), Britain is again identified as ‘market-orientated’ whilst Germany is 
identified as ‘meso-corporatist’. The themes running through each of the 
three schools are similar, inclusive of identified sets of ‘institutions’ defined 
by their functional relationships.  
As Chapter 1.2 made clear, the role of legal systems, labour law and 
other legal influences have not been integrated adequately. These points 
above are developed briefly here by connected discussions in CPE to 
comparative legal studies. Firstly, both countries’ labour relations regimes 
are often characterised, in different ways, as ‘law-light’, where law’s 
involvement in the regulation and governance of labour relations is minimal. 
Germany has traditionally been defined by a social partner-led model with 
the state adopting an arms-length approach to labour relations. The German 
model has been depicted in German as Tarifautonomie, meaning ‘autonomous 
collective bargaining’. Britain however has been defined by a more unstable 
and conflictual model defined by a ‘right to manage’ approach to legal rights 
that favour employers meaning these actors can rely on recourse in the courts 
as they see fit. For this reason, ‘voluntarist’ traditions in Britain have seen 
trade unions keen to keep their relations with employers outside the reach of 
law as much as possible.  
Both countries have their origins in the respective designations in 
comparative law. Germany represents an example of a civic law legal system 
and Britain as a common law system, but formal distinctions of this sort need 
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to be placed in a social and historical context where the differences in legal 
traditions or ‘legal styles’ are introduced (Zweigert and Kötz 1998). The 
distinction between civic and common law regimes also should not be 
overstated, as court-made law and statute made law are indelibly key 
features in European legal system and differences in how courts and 
legislators act have differences that are not based on these distinctions.  
In regards to Germany, a brief comparison is made with France. These 
two countries responded differently to the invasion of Roman law that is seen 
as definitive to European ‘civil law’  legal systems, so much so that in 
comparative law circles, namely Zweigert and Kötz (1998), these two 
countries are separated into different ‘Romanistic’ (France) and ‘Germanic’ 
types (1998, p. 74 & p.132). French constitutional and governmental tradition 
has produced a very centralised system of politico-legal authority (Ibid, 
p.133), a feature that bears closer resemblance to Britain. This translates into 
a labour law regime which is not just centralised by provides for a very 
prominent role for the state. This manifests itself in regards to collective 
bargaining and wages, where the French state routinely extends collective 
agreements to employers who are not signatories to these agreements; a 
feature that is prominent in case study chapters 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6. Germany 
was, pre-unification, divided between different city and regional states, 
meaning its different geo-political parts applied Roman law differently in 
response to different social and political conditions (Bavaria was majority 
catholic, Prussia was much larger, Imperialist etc.). The results in Germany 
are a mixture of hierarchy and decentralisation and provides an important 
political and constitutional role for the regional state (Land) in German 
politics (the Länder). This framed the model of German federalism that 
emerged in the 20th Century, particularly after 1945, and the regionally 
fragmented labour law and collective bargaining systems created after 
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WWII. Britain on the other hand has an uncodified constitution with a 
prominent role for common law doctrine and parliamentary sovereignty. 
This centralised model however is challenged by a number of factors, 
including that of devolved, quasi-federal entities. This however does not 
apply to questions of labour law, which are centralised UK-wide.  
Such characterisations of these countries’ law-light character, compared 
to France for example, can encourage the sort of analytical neglect of legal 
factors that provides for the failings in CPE detailed in chapter 1.2. This last 
point is important for a nearly 40-year period where both legal rules and 
judicial interventions have become much more prominent in the regulation 
and governance of labour market affairs. Given the different legal and non-
legal traditions and histories of both these countries, how they respond to the 
different forms of legal influence and legal intervention will present 
important differences and theoretical findings.  
  
2.1.2. Germany 
This section on Germany focuses primarily on the principle of Tarifautonomie 
that has been the principal focus for CPE and other studies directed at 
German labour relations.  
As described earlier, the Tarifautonomie model is one based upon an 
autonomous social partner-led means of governing the employment 
relationship, ‘social partners’ being trade unions and employers,  rather than 
one that provides a leading role for the state. The model is built on the twin 
pillars of sectoral collective bargaining and co-determination institutions 
(Lehndorff 2010) and it is upon these two sets of arrangements that this 
section will focus.  
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Firstly, and abstractly, co-determination comes in two forms: co-
determination from above, ‘supervisory councils’17(Aufsichtsrat), and co-
determination from below, called ‘works councils’ (Betriebsrat), with works 
councils being the more commonly used and the rules governing these being 
tied to German company law designations for different sorts of company18. 
Both collective bargaining and co-determination institutions however have 
received ample treatment in CPE studies, albeit with those limitations 
described in Chapter 1.2. Secondly, raising a time-line problem, CPE for the 
most part focuses overwhelmingly upon German labour relations and 
broader capitalist development in a post-World War II period. Linking these 
two together, this section on German labour relations finds that much of 
German collective bargaining and co-determination traditions have 
important legacies dating back before both World War II and World War I.  
As with the British section that follows, there are three main 
chronologically organised segments. The first extends from 19th Century, that 
saw the emergence of the unified and Imperial German state, to the first half 
the 20th Century. The second focuses upon the post-1945 era and a third 
mapping a post-1970s era where Tarifautonomie began to face serious 
challenges associated with neo-liberalism and economic change. 
 
2.1.2.i   The 19th and 20th Century: From the Imperial state to the  
 Weimar Republic 
To repeat a point made above, the roots of sectoral collective bargaining and co-
determination institutions in fact reach as far back as the 19th Century period in 
                                               
17 Of which companies with 500 employees or more must create, with a third of its composition 
being (non-management) workers (Kirchner et al. 2010) 
18 E.g. limited liability company, publicly listed company etc.  
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Germany. The early stages of their development were also very much 
interconnected.  
Their emergence came despite numerous countervailing foces from 
the state, fledgling expressions of trade union collectivism and worker voice 
and competing visions of corporate governance (Owen-Smith 1994; p.273). 
Germany is often depicted as a country with more consensual labour 
relations rather than conflict-based (Feldmann 2006, Jacobi et al. 1998, p.191-
193). In comparison to Britain, whose labour relations traditions are 
characterised as being more conflictual than consensual, the mid-19th 
Century period in Germany was marked by a great deal of industrial unrest; 
unrest that would have considerable formative impact upon the labour law 
and collective institutions that would define German labour relations in the 
coming century.  
In 1848, as McGaughey describes (2015), the revolution in France 
inspired and stirred unrest and revolutionary sentiment in Germany (and 
elsewhere in Europe). The response of most pre-Imperial/pre-unification 
German states was very authoritarian, wary of  the potential revolutionary 
threat such strikes might pose to the established order. Employer interests in 
Germany were more divided however, with some seeking more conciliatory 
responses to rising union activism and unrest. In one city state, Frankfurt, 
one newly elected parliamentarian and textile owner, Carl Degenkolb, had 
already become famous for forging his own institutions of worker welfare 
and worker voice in his business, and sought these arrangements to be 
replicated elsewhere to engender broader industrial peace (McGaughey 
2015). Degenkolb’s proposal sought to create a form of works council where 
employers would hold a two-thirds controlling stake in the councils’ 
representation. This was not sanctioned by fellow parliamentarians, the 
aristocracy nor by the state, and it would still be 60-years until the first co-
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determination legislation was passed (ibid.). In some places, such as 
Frankfurt, the results to strife were different and saw political rights of 
association created, whilst in other areas of Germany the authorities 
continued to be heavy handed. Frankfurt’s Degenkolb was the only 
industrialist to create and extend working rights within their enterprises, 
even as the state sought to crush demands for industrial democracy 
(McGaughey 2015). These two seemingly contradictory trends of employer 
acquiescence and state authoritarianism would later come to a head. 
With the creation of the German state in 1871, the now Imperial German 
state would not allow any space for trade union activity in economic life. This 
was despite some attempts made to enhance the conditions of the worker in 
some places like Frankfurt. Despite these rare examples, workers were not 
afforded any role in this process and trade unions’ criminalisation status was 
to continue.  
This was to change gradually. Von Bismarck’s health reforms 
(Krankenversicherungsgesetz) of 1883 created rules stating that managers of 
companies’ health coverage programmes must be elected by workers. As 
McGaughey explains, these rules were formed on the back of knowledge that 
many companies had already provided these sorts of participatory (worker 
voice) arrangements. Otto Kahn-Freund, German-turned-British citizen and 
forefather of British labour law studies, called this system the most advanced 
social insurance regime in the world as it covered workplace accidents, 
disability, old-age pensions as well as health (Kahn-Freund 1981; p.20-21).  
Once the age of Bismarck ended in 1888, Kaiser Wilhelm II became 
Emperor. Only a year later, Kaiser Wilhelm had to manage a strike in the coal 
industry. The Kaiser did however shift from a zero-tolerance disciplinarian 
position to allow some concessions to unions demanding further democratic 
rights in the workplace. This came despite the Kaiser’s own dim view of 
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industrial action. This shift of the Kaiser was seen in other areas of labour 
policy. In 1890, the Kaiser produced new legislation to provide Germany’s 
first works councils systems. The bill was passed as the Arbeiterschutzgesetz 
(Worker Protection Act) of 1891 and demanded that employers create a 
works council so workers could participate in workplace decision-making. 
This long-term process saw a shift from antipathy to pragmatism on the part 
of the state toward workers’ rights and interests. This shift to a pragmatic 
approach was important however in order to quell persistent and worsening 
industrial unrest and militant trade unionism. This was reinforced by some 
employers’ own willingness to negotiate with unions and create new welfare 
arrangements in their own businesses (McGaughey 2015).  
As Germany edged nearer to WWI, two key political developments 
emerged that were to embed this delicate but emerging industrial consensus. 
The first was the merging of the SPD and the trade union movement both 
ideologically and organisationally (Kahn-Freund 1981; p.21-23). The second 
saw the General Commission German Trade Unions’ (ADGB19) decision to 
give its full support to the war effort in 1914. During WW1, trade unions 
obtained further gains on recognition and pay bargaining, yet “unofficial 
bodies and organisations” were increasingly employed in a clandestine 
fashion at workplaces to suppress workers’ rights and organising (Kahn-
Freund 1981; p.24).  
As the political situation became worse and more unsettled (that led 
to the revolution in 1918), trade union leaders met with leading industrialists 
to plan for a peacetime economy (ibid.) This was important. Once the Kaiser 
had abdicated in November 1918, the main trade unions and employer 
assocations concluded an agreement for a post-War ‘workplace community’ 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft) and, as McGaughey calls it, “the most important 
                                               
19 Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 
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collective agreement in history” – the Stinnes-Legien Agreement (Stinnes-
Legien Abkommen) (McGaughey 2015; Kahn-Freund 1981; p.25). This hugely 
important advance for German collective bargaining was followed shortly 
after by the first Works Councils Act (Betriebsrätsgesetz) of 1920. The trade 
union movement was now firmly placed (with alongside employers) within 
a national apparatus of labour market policy-making (Owen-Smith 2012; 
p.274).  
This union position was aided, from 1913 to 1919, by an explosion in 
trade union membership, more than doubling from three to 6.5 million in this 
six-year period (ibid.). In a nine-year period, from 1913 to 1922, the number 
of workers covered by collective agreements jumped from around two 
million to 14 million (Kahn-Freund 1981; p.27). This period also saw 
productivity rises that empowered unions to demand wage gains. A pattern 
that is repeated in the post-WWII era later. Before economic turmoil hit in 
1929, the German Imperial labour courts, ‘Reichsarbeitsgericht’, were still not 
willing to cede any ground to this new emerging labour relations status quo, 
and interpreted the new laws on co-determination (Betreibgesetze) so 
restrictively so as to render their legal rights qualities (for workers) useless 
(McGaughey 2015). In 1929, the year of the Wall Street Crash, the approach 
of the Reichsarbeitsgericht became even more hostile and demanded that any 
laws be interpreted as to put ‘business first’ (ibid.). This judicial factor was 
however to change after WWII, a shift that was to be important in the post-
WWII settlement. 
The back half of the Weimar era saw both the Great Crash and the rise 
of the Nazi party. The economic problems that emerged from the Great Crash 
brought further industrial unrest as the trade union movement could not 
control unruly elements as Germany turned into 1930s. Here, the impressive 
rise of the trade union movement, witnessed before and after 1920, was 
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however blemished by serious and stubborn ideological and organisational 
division (Owen-Smith 2012; p.273). Unemployment led to the system of 
social insurance built by Bismarck to collapse, and wage bargaining and 
workplace democracy became less relevant as unemployment rose. Hitler’s 
rise to power saw the trade union movement banned, despite his successful 
appeals to the angry sentiments among millions of Germany’s workers.  
To follow into the following post-1945 segment, some discussion is 
pursued concerning the implications of these important contributions from 
Kahn-Freund and McGaughey. The relationship between socio-economic, 
political and legal factors is important. The role of law is often treated as an 
afterthought or even too distant in regards the development of collective 
bargaining and co-determination in Germany. The stance of the 
governmental state was hostile to trade unions and the institutions unions 
wanted created, although through a mix of pragmatism and fear of further 
social unrest the state eventually relented to the wishes of unions and 
employers. Once the political character of Weimar state changed after the fall 
of the Kaiser, this pragmatism toward industrial and workplace democracy 
began to look more like full throated support. The judicial arm of state 
however retained its conservative employer-interest doctrinal approach.  
Labour lawyer McGaughey is relied upon for much of the above 
addressing 19th Century Germany. His historical account comes with a 
critical purpose: to critique the assertions of ‘law and economics’ scholars 
who claim that these institutions of co-determination, because they engender 
economic inefficiency, would not exist without them being legally imposed 
upon employers by the state. This is explored with an eye cast to some of 
those debates mapped in chapter 1.2. McGaughey’s argument can be viewed 
with competing VoC and CWC type arguments found in power resources 
(PRA) and state-society relationships and in particular a debate concerning 
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employer preferences for the creation of co-determination and collective 
bargaining institutions.  
PRA scholars would contend that the formation of employer 
preferences was not based on employers’ first order preferences, but due to 
rising worker militancy that needed pragmatic response. VoC scholars 
however would claim that the creation of such institutions would be 
engender skilled workforce and increased production. It is clear from 
McGaughey’s account that employers did not bow to union demands en 
masse, but those that did only did so in large part to stave off further 
disruption brought by strike action. This points to a PRA account to the form 
of institutional formation at issue here (co-determination and collective 
bargaining). It should be noted, as stated earlier, that VoC accounts have not 
covered this period in German history and the nature of employer interests 
that sits at the centre of the approach (versus those of trade unions or the 
state) would be very different now. As chapter 1.2 makes clear, these co--
determination and collective bargaining institutions feature heavily in VoC 
work and an accurate appraisal of how they were formed is important. 
Employer preferences may have been important in persuading the state to 
accept these institutional arrangements, but these employer preferences were 
responsible for these in the first instance.  
This is an important theoretical discussion given a socio-legal 
approach to political economy developed in this thesis. It is important 
however that the discussion of ‘actors’ and their interests also includes that 
of courts. During the period examined in this section, German courts were 
not willing to accept the new labour market arrangements, even though the 
governmental state had done. An important shift in German judicial approach 
came later after WWII and features in the following section below. 
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2.1.2.ii Post-1945 to 1970s: the rise of Tarifautonomie  
The settlements forged at the end of WWI, and leading up to 1914, possessed 
remarkable yet not always acknowledged durability given that they were 
partially destroyed during the Great Crash and WWII. These remerged after 
WWII and were given powerful legal reinforcement through legislation and 
the approach of the reformed German judiciary.  
Within the considerable CPE coverage of Germany’s capitalist 
development, and of its celebrated post-WWII model of labour relations, this 
legal scaffolding has received little coverage. This post-1945 segment will 
look at some CPE work to demonstrate this point. Much of CPE coverage of 
Tarifautonomie and change to German labour relations (Streeck 2009; p.93, 
Mares 2003, Thelen 2001; p.71, Hassel 2006) has also been confined to a post-
World War Two time-line. The previous sub-section underlined the 
importance of pre-1939 and pre-WWI legacies to post-WWII Tarifautonomie. 
This advanced system of sectoral collective bargaining that emerged after 
WWII was built upon institutionalised roles of employer membership 
organisations and those of trade unions.  
The functional purpose of these membership organisations was to 
create intra-class enforcement mechanisms so that members who honoured 
wage agreements were not undercut by any opportunistic fellow members 
who did not. For this to work employer membership organisations, and the 
Confederation of German Employers (BDA) formed in 1950, needed to be 
strong and cohesive. The strength of these employer organisations that 
emerged after WWII was identified in CPE was a key determinant of 
Tarifautonomie’s success as well as its later demise as the cohesion of these 
organisations started wither in the 1990s and 2000s (Mares 2003).  
Despite the growth of German trade unions and the ADGB in the 
1920s, they were not able to match the organisational strength of employers’ 
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organisations (Owen-Smith 2012; p.274), a reality was to persist well into the 
20th Century. After WWII however, trade union interests were aided by 
legislation underpinning Tarifautonomie as well as the creation of the 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), a national umbrella union-interest 
organisation with similarities to the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in Britain, 
the country whose occupation over the north western sector of the country 
was influential on the creation of the DGB (ibid., Mares 2003; p.129). This 
unifying union body (Einheitsgewerkschaft) consisted of 16 industrial unions 
inclusive of IG Metall, the biggest union in Germany, and both the Christian 
democratic and socialist unions whose division created the problematic 
disunity of the 1920s (Owen-Smith 2012; p.274). The DGB also had to 
reconcile divisions between manual workers and white collar workers 
(Beamte).  
These two actors, with some justification, have received a lot of 
coverage within CPE and associated literatures as well as specific industrial 
sectors. This sector based collective bargaining did not emerge evenly across 
Germany’s post-War industries, but instead developed to encompass the 
country’s economy from one core, key sector –  the metal industry. This core 
sector sat at the centre of a ‘pattern-bargaining’ wage bargaining system 
(Traxler et al. 2008) where social partners (unions, employers) in adjacent 
sectors and sub-sectors would orientate their wage-setting to this core 
collective agreement, even if they are not contractually or legally obliged to 
in the first instance.  
Although the new post-1945 constitution did not affirm co-
determination or collective bargaining rights, unlike under the Weimar 
constitution, the legislation produced was very important. This legislation 
regulating collective agreements (Tarifvertragsgesetze, ‘TVG’) and the 1949 
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‘Works Constitution Act’ (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, ‘BetrVG’)20 mandating 
the formation of workplace co-determination institutions, did however 
provide powerful public law (if not constitutional law) means of forging the 
Tarifautonomie model and to advance those arrangements that existed before 
1933. The role of trade unions was also given a number of institutional 
supports and responsibilities with new strike rules stating that industrial 
action will not be illegal unless supported by the recognised trade union. 
Collective agreements were given legal force and direct effect (Kirchner et al. 
2010; p.192) whilst the Works Constitution Act provided rules for works 
councils (Betriebsrat) to be formed at the workplace level and supervisory 
boards (Aufsichtsräte) at the management level in different sorts of company 
(limited, publicly listed etc.). This two-level structure was designed to 
provide co-determination rights from below and form above.  
How this new statutory regime was to operate depended on two sets 
of relationships, those concerning unions and business and the other 
concerning the state and these actors. The latter has seen plenty of attention 
given to the governmental state, in its federal form, but not to courts. The 
refusal of the Imperial courts to defer to the labour relations regime in the 
1920s was an important hindrance to its development. The shift in the courts’ 
stance after WWII was therefore important for the new regime to become 
established after 1945. The nature of this shift needs to be understood. 
Although affirming the principle of Tarifautonomie in law, courts did 
intervene in the crucial area of industrial action (Jacobi et al. 1998, p.191-193).  
The threat of strikes was still present as Germany moved into the 
1950s, often demanding a response from courts. As economic growth started 
to accelerate through the 1950s, bringing with it wage and job growth, the 
                                               
20  Substantially reformed through amendments in 1972 and 2001 (Fetzer 2011) 
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threat of industrial unrest was minimal. Once the 1968 recession hit, the 
spectre of strikes remerged and the Federal Labour Court 
(Bundesarbeitsgericht) had to again intervene and demanded that any strike 
must be preceded by a conciliation process (Owen-Smith 2012; p.295). Both 
sides of industry, the BDA and DGB, would broker a conciliation agreement. 
From this, no-strike clauses and ‘peace clauses’ were also to become key 
features in German collective bargaining and received the support of the 
courts (Kirchner and Mittelhamm 2010, p.201, 207; Jacobi et al. 1998, p.199). 
German courts therefore provided reinforcement for Tarifautonomie with 
some key decisions regarding strikes, pushing unions toward the 
conciliatory approach to labour relations with which German capitalism 
became closely associated (also, Nordic labour relations). Most strike clauses 
included as agreed provisions in collective agreements, partly as a result of 
judicial nudging (ibid.).  
As the economic turbulence of the late 1960s grew worse in the 1970s, 
bringing heightened inflationary pressures, the German Bundesbank 
established a powerful role in macro-level (nationwide) wage-setting that 
was designed to preclude any union attempts to make excessive or 
inflationary wage demands (Jacobi et al. 1998, p.193). This is an important 
development in the story of post-WWII German labour relations and was an 
early major sign of the rise of neo-liberal ideas on economic policy that was 
to rub hard against the grain of German Tarifautonomie. This should not 
undermine the realities of a 1970s decade that was marred, by German 
standards, by considerable industrial unrest, as was evident elsewhere in 
Europe.  
The emergence of neo-liberal politics was delivered in a number of 
ways, including in macroeconomic policy theory associated with 
monetarism. This role of the central bank is analytically pertinent in this 
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regard, as CPE work has provided plenty of useful research of independent 
central banks, and the macroeconomic management apparatus that came 
with it. The Bundesbank’s central place in the European neo-liberal and 
monetarist order saw it described as ‘the fourth branch of government’ in 
Germany for good reason (Kennedy 1991; p.3 cited in Dyson and Marcussen 
2009; p.131). This rise of the Bundesbank, of neo-liberal policy ideas (such as 
monetarism and flexible labour markets) and the decline of collective 
bargaining are all related. The role of legal factors, again, is only addressed 
in the context of statutory reforms that were deemed necessary to push 
liberalisation further.  
A role for courts and the broader legal-constitutional system however 
has been offered far less treatment, despite the important roles they have 
played. A simple comparison is made between central banks and courts as 
these both represent two important actors in German, and European, 
political economy since 1970. 
 
2.1.2.iii  Post-1980: the rise of neo-liberal industrial politics & the  
slow demise of Tarifautonomie 
The re-emergence of liberal economic ideas imposed itself not only upon 
emerging macroeconomic policy agendas, driven principally by the arch-
monetarist Bundesbank, but also in shifts in labour market policy advanced 
by German governments after 1980.  
The 1980s saw the rise of Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl and the 
passing of the EU’s Single European Act in 1985, the EC Treaty that 
demanded economic liberalisation in order to give new life to the EU’s single 
market programme. The economic reorganisation pursued throughout 
continental Europe was not as dramatic as that seen in Britain. A process of 
reform however gathered pace after 1990. In retrospect, this rise ‘neo-liberal 
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revolution’ in Europe can clearly be linked to the steady but clear decline in 
the coverage of collective bargaining from 1980 to 2015 (from 79% to 54%) as 
well as trade union membership rates (35% down to 17%) (ICTWSS 2016). As 
illustrated in the German-Acquired Rights chapter (2.5), the privatisation of 
(formerly public sector) industries altered both the works council and 
collective bargaining structures that existed before these reforms. This has 
been shaped by agendas coming from both Berlin and Brussels and pitted the 
social protection ethos of collective bargaining, co-determination rights and 
the Acquired Rights Directive (ARD) against this neo-liberal drive for 
‘reform’. This reform agenda had significant change-effect on the (non-
privatised) private sector too. Such changes, in both the private and public 
sectors, created changes in the company law designation of many companies. 
This is very important in Germany where company law has very formal and 
explicit connection with the type of co-determination and collective 
bargaining obligations that operates in different types of company.  
Restructuring in core German industries was increasingly encouraged 
by policy-makers in Germany and at the European level. Plus, the 
development of new private service industries where collective bargaining, 
works councils and trade unions were not present nor strong, fostered rapid 
changes to Germany’s economic landscape. This meant these institutions 
were being eroded in two interconnected ways: one, the express alteration of 
collective bargaining through policy and legal change, and the second seeing 
the economic base for existing bargaining being subject to change. The focus 
of these changes included both the weakening of individual collective 
agreements (in employers’ favour), and their shift downward from the 
sectoral level (where wage bargaining traditionally took place under 
Tarifautonomie) to the company level (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 
2013; Bispinck and Schulten 2011, Bispinck et al. 2010, Thelen 2001).  
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There is a mix however of partisan as well as industrial politics that 
contributed to these developments. Firstly, in terms of industrial politics, 
unions had agreed, in exchange for new rules on working time, to agreeing 
and organising the specific of these changes at the company level instead of 
the traditional sector/industrial level. As Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 
described (2013, p.109), this “set in train a sustained process of devolution”. 
As Germany moved into the 1990s, neo-liberal reform agendas were 
becoming more popular, even with German trade unions’ traditional 
partisan allies, the SPD.  In 2003, the Hartz IV reforms of the social democratic 
Schröder government, although ostensibly motivated by job creation goals, 
conformed to neo-liberal reform prescriptions to liberalise collective 
bargaining (Menz 2005b). This also crucially brought reforms of German 
collective bargaining through the use of ‘opening clauses’ (‘Öffnungsklauseln’) 
to enable collective agreements to be renegotiated if given economic 
conditions demand (Visser 2005, Eichhorst and Marx 2011, Eichhorst 2014, 
Addison et al. 2007). More importantly, the introduction of these ‘opening 
clauses’ cannot be laid at the feet of the centre-left SPD. These were not only 
unveiled for the first time in the early 1990s, but unions in fact agreed to their 
introduction under the threat of more serious legal reforms to collective 
bargaining. The 2004 Pforzheim Accord represented the primary example 
after 2000 (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2013; Bispinck and Schulten 
2011). These shifts, and threatened changes, ran contrary to the abstention 
role of the state under Tarifautonomie, with the role of law, both actual and 
threatened, playing a key role in forging new incentives and power resources 
for employers and labour. 
For many, these reforms were seen as successful in reducing German 
unemployment by creating space for low wage industries to prosper, 
particularly in the services industry rather than the manufacturing industry 
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that drove German economic growth after WWII. In combination with 
receding collective bargaining coverage, where companies exited employer 
associations central to sectoral collective bargaining or outsourced their 
operations, this period did see some very serious low pay problem develop 
in Germany (Bosch and Weinkopf 2008, Salverda and Mayhew 2009). This 
prompted yet a further new intervention by the state into wage-setting: the 
creation for the first time of a German minimum wage. The fact that Germany 
had to introduce this has powerful symbolic meaning as it confirms that the 
decline of collective bargaining is unlikely to be reversed quickly as trade 
unions likely accept. Even IG Metall, the metal sector union that for a long 
time were opposed to the idea of a federal minimum wage, reluctantly 
accepted the creation of federal minimum wage in 2015.  
The roles of greater legal influence and neo-liberalism in labour 
relations in Germany therefore have not merely acted to slowly erode the 
German Tarifautonomie model, but with it has made the ‘model’ less ‘German’ 
as defined by the distinct German institutions that CPE had long fixated. The 
two Germany-based case study chapters in this second section demonstrate 
how German labour relations has been defined by competing tendencies of 
neo-liberal practice and legal change as well as the vestiges of a declining ‘old 
regime’ of Tarifautonomie.  
 
2.1.3. Britain 
The experience of British labour relations shares some similar historical 
features and themes with that of Germany. It is the differences however that 
stand out. The role of industrial conflict has a far more prominent and 
permanent role in Britain than it does in Germany, even if the Germans 
experienced plenty of industrial unrest and strife themselves as part of those 
social conditions that forged the settlements creating collective bargaining, 
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co-determination, welfare state institutons in the 19th Century.  The role of 
liberal principles are also more prominent in the political and legal traditions 
in Britain. Even when Germany appeared to engage with liberal, market-
orientated ideals in the post-1970s period, these have still manifested 
themselves differently in regards to changes in labour law and collective 
bargaining outcomes.  
Attempts at creating conciliatory collective institutions were notable 
in Britain in between the Wars, as they were in the period just after it (1945-
70). Again, however, these were the exception to a broadly liberal rule in 
Britain that has existed since the industrial revolution and did not take root 
like they did in Germany. 
This section is organised in a similar manner to the previous German 
sub-section above inclusive of three chronologically ordered sections. It starts 
in the 19th Century where serious social conflict was quickly met with a 
conciliatory state response as Britain entered the 20th Century. 
 
2.1.3.i The late 19th Century: from industrial strife to reconciliation  
Britain’s rapid industrialisation in the mid-19th Century was of enormous 
formative importance for both the British legal system at large and the shape 
and form of labour relations that was to emerged. The legacies of this 19th 
Century period and the bearing it had on labour relations in Britain cannot 
be underestimated. In this sense, Britain stands apart from other European 
countries whose experience with various revolutions provided opportunities 
for cathartic and sweeping reform. In Britain, evolution, rather than revolution, 
is the appropriate thematic depiction of its legal and politico-economic 
development. With this, Britain’s socio-economic elites, minus a few key 
concessions and moments of serious conflict, have not been subject to a 
violent revolutionary overthrow. Social conflict and violent unrest, despite 
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not producing the sort of revolution seen in France for example, have still 
been a notable presence in British industrial and social history. More 
specifically, key moments of strife in the 1860s, 70s and 80s had a strong 
formative influence upon the forms of industrial capitalism and labour 
relations that Britain took into the 20th Century. 
These influences had important bearing on the development of a 
distinctive British model of economic constitution, particularly upon its 
contract law system. The doctrine of Laissez faire capitalism relied particularly 
upon the ‘master-servant model’ that framed labour relations and a 
allocation of rights in these relations (Deakin and Morris 2009,p.19-21; 
Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2013, p.25). Although no longer in place, 
the ‘master-servant model’ included the ‘freedom of contract’ principle that 
still laces modern British contract law and the concept of the employment 
‘contract’ to this day. A central irony exists at the centre of this apparent 
‘freedom to contract’: the freedom is distinctly unequal in the way it affords 
rights of action upon employers on the one hand and employees on the other. 
This principle is blind to the de facto reality of labour relations that gives 
employers an inherently stronger position in the employment relationship as 
owners of the means of production (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2013, 
p.25). The principle is based on the premise that the freedom is an individual 
one, creating a doctrinal bias against collective means of organising labour 
matters as these could act to restrict the individual freedom to contract. The 
embedding of this principle into Britain’s common law, meaning it has been 
reinforced as a matter of doctrine repeatedly by Britain’s courts, has meant 
that statutory remedy has been needed to compensate for its harsh effects vis-
á-vis the interests of workers. This common law-statute law interaction itself 
became a central dynamic feature of the organisation of British labour law 
well into the 20th Century. It is also a centrally important historical feature of 
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a complex and contested relationship between legal and collective means of 
regulation and governance.  
These doctrines, developed by British courts during this crucial period 
of the 19th Century have, again, been influential on a labour law system that 
has persisted, in different forms, up to the current day. The hostility of courts 
toward state (labour law) or non-state collective means (collective bargaining 
or collective action) of labour relations of regulation and governance has 
manifested itself, over time, in the two main ways: the criminalisation of 
unions and union activity, and the use of non-criminal civil sanctions 
through economic torts, making unions financially liable for any economic loss 
suffered by the employer in the event of a strike (Deakin and Morris 2009, p. 
7-11; Dickens and Hall 2010, p.298-299). Even in instances in the late 19th 
Century  where criminal sanctions were removed, the civic law sanctions (of 
tort) remained, as did the ‘freedom of contract’ and its adjunct the ‘right to 
manage’ principle that furnished employers with greater rights vis-à-vis 
labour.  
The details of these abstract descriptions are provided here. The 
Master and Servants Acts of 1823 and 1867 still enshrined principles 
criminalisation, although this was more limited in the latter 1867 statute. 1867 
was in fact an important year in the history of British labour law, one that 
saw the beginning of the retreat of a ‘master-servant’ model and legal rights 
that gave employers considerable control over their workforce (Deakin and 
Morris 2009; p.7-8).  
Courts, a key part in this system, still displayed considerable creativity 
and intent in challenging trade union activity, and used criminal law sanction 
rather than just civil law sanction to do so. In the 1867 Hornby vs. Close case, a 
court decided that trade unions were inherently unlawful organisations 
whose ability to set wages above market rates constituted an unreasonable 
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restriction on trade (Deakin and Morris 2009; p.7-9). This decision, in essence, 
cast union activity as not only liable in terms of economic tort (civil liabilty), 
but also criminal. This saw competing tensions emerge where the 
governmental state was beginning to soften its approach to trade unionism, 
whilst the judicial state that was not. That same year, the state buckled under 
pressure from a sharp rise in industrial unrest and created the 1867 Royal 
Commission (ibid.). The Commission, led by Sir William Erle, produced a 
number of remedies that effectively annulled the Hornby vs. Close decision 
and paved the way for the decriminalisation of trade union activity. This was 
an important step in a process that produced important further reforms in 
1871 and 1906 (Deakin and Morris 2009; p.7-9.).  
There are two observations of the 1867 Royal Commission’s 
conclusions that have remained key features of British labour law. The first 
is the use of statute law to provide statutory immunities to unions and 
workers from the harsh effects of court-made law (as noted earlier). The 
second is the use of statutory arrangements to engineer greater distance 
between courts and an emergent form of consensual labour relations where 
collective regulation of labour relations was to be encouraged (Kahn-Freund 
1969; p.84). The Campbell Bannerman government of 1906 continued and 
built upon much of what the 1867 Commission proposed and its approach 
formed part of the basis for a model of voluntaristic “collective laissez faire” 
that came to define British labour relations in the first half of the 20th Century 
(Deakin and Morris 2009, p.5; Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2013, p.25).  
 
2.1.3.ii  The turn of the 20th Century: a concerted turn toward 
industrial peace 
The approach adopted by the Bannerman government to granting 
immunities and negative rights (as supposed to positive rights giving explicit 
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rights for collective action) was important, as it served to push the threat of 
judicial intervention away from collective regulation of labour relations (ibid. 
Deakin and Morris 2009; p.9).   
The model ‘collective laissez faire’ was coined as such by Otto Kahn-
Freund (Deakin and Morris 2012; p. 12). The 1906 ‘settlement’ that embodied 
collective laissez faire was defined by the state taking arms-length approach 
to labour relations yet still quietly promoting bargaining of the governmental 
state. This engineered this desired distance between collective labour 
relations and the courts alongside something much more explicit on the right 
to strike. This did not go so far as to push employers into bargaining against 
their will, but rights to industrial action for workers and unions did end the 
state-sanctioned sanction against unions for forcing employers to bargain 
through striking either through civil or criminal law means. 
Later, government reforms sought to more actively promote collective 
bargaining, although this did not include proposals to give legal 
underpinning and enforcement to collectively bargained agreements (as is 
typical in most of Europe). This last point is important as it formed part of 
that broader strategy to keep law and the courts out of labour relations. This 
did not however go as far as to give collective agreements that ability to be 
legally enforced as other forms of contracts governing economic transactions 
would. Legal underpinning is an important part of making collective 
agreements enforceable in the absence of strong unions and has existed in 
most of Europe throughout the 20th Century. Without it, the onus on unions 
and employer organisations to give collective agreements a binding quality 
upon all intended parties is increased. The Whitley Committee Reports, that 
predicated a 1918 Act of Parliament, came very close to recommending the 
legal underpinning of wage agreements, but instead conferred the right of 
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trade boards to set minimum rates of pay and terms and conditions within 
their trades (industries) (Deakin and Morris 2009; p.16).   
As we find out further on in this British section, the Thatcher 
government sought to destroy most of these institutions of collective 
governance, and the principles that formed them, established on both sides 
of WWII. Some of these arrangements, and key features of them, however 
persisted (however reformed, incomplete or altered), providing important 
legal and institutional legacies from these different periods examined here. 
One of those remaining features comes in the form of National Joint Councils 
(NJC), the other was the tribunal system.  
The Trade Boards Act of 1918 created ‘Joint Industrial Councils’ (JICs). 
These JICs, now called national joint councils (NJCs) where they still exist, 
are intermediary bodies that govern collective bargaining processes in 
individual industries. The lofty ambitions the Trade Boards Act looked to 
create a form of labour relations that would promote industrial peace. This 
was met however with little follow-through in later years and decades. A 
lack of enforcement and incentives for multi-employer bargaining, that 
jarred against employers’ wishes, meant this fledgling regime did not lay 
down deep enough roots. This sits in contrast to countries like Germany with 
corporatist traditions that developed very strong industry-set multi-
employer organisations that scaffolded its model of Tarifautonomie. Such 
employer organisations successfully reinforced coordinated industrial wage-
setting systems in Germany alongside those trade union means of providing 
this same function (to discipline members to adhere to collective bargaining).  
Britain had to wait until after the next World War before new impetus 
from the state could be provided to such a system. Wage councils, created 
through legislation in 1945, extended the presence of trade boards into new 
sectors and a revival of those JICs that had become dormant in the decades 
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prior to WWII (Deakin and Morris 2009; p.17). The rise of active JICs rose 
from 56 in 1946 to 200 in 1960 (ibid.) As both of the UK case chapters show, 
the place of NJCs differs between the public sector and private sector, but 
they are still very much operational in many sectors but are absent in others. 
In the public sector, the ‘employers’ are in essence an emanation of the state. 
This complicates the relationship between the state and the collective 
bargaining activities in these areas. In the private sector, as we will see in the 
chapter concerning the UK and posted workers, the role of the state is 
minimal and operated at some distance from disputes and their causes. The 
role of ACAS, the state body that in different guises has intervened in 
industrial disputes since 1896, is perhaps the most relevant arm of the state 
when it comes to industrial action outside of the Tribunal and judicial 
system.  
The 1960 to 1970 period that followed saw renewed state activism in 
wage-setting as a result of increased numbers of strikes in the 1960s and 
deepening macroeconomic problems concerning inflation, productivity and 
unemployment in the 1970s. The 1960s was in fact a hugely important decade 
in creating the conditions for that which occurred in the three decades, and 
beyond, after. The mid-to-late 1960s in particular is perhaps as important a 
five-year period in understanding British labour relations history as that in 
the late 1860s. Strikes were on the rise and after the 1964 Rookes v. Barnard 
House of Lords case, political pressure for labour relations reform reached a 
critical point (Turner 1969; Dickens and Hall 2010, p.299). The Rookes v. 
Barnard case rudely inserted judicial opinion into industrial concerns in a 
way that the 1906 and 1945 settlements specifically did not want. In 1965 the 
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations (aka’ the 
Donovan Report’) was published. The Donovan Report sat astride two 
proposals for reform that defined the politics of labour relations of the 1960s 
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and 70s. The two other proposals came in 1968 from the Labour government 
of the day, a white paper called In Place of Strife (1968), and the Conservative 
proposals called A Fair Deal at Work (1968). It is with a comparison of these 
three proposals that the tensions and incongruences of British labour 
relations can be understood. There are two sets of tensions: the first concerns 
the relationship between law and legal sanction in labour relations matters 
and the second concerns the ‘settlements’ of 1906 and 1945 versus the 
economic and labour relations reality of the time (1960s).  
The Donovan report, led by academic Hugh Clegg21,  did not seek a 
return to collective laissez faire endorsed in the 1906 and 1945 reforms, but 
did not want the sweeping introduction of legal interventions either, but 
rather reforms of the a collective bargaining-led system (Turner 1969). It 
sought modest but appropriate forms of state intervention, but essentially 
thought that the problems in wage-setting between ‘factory level’ and the 
macro/national level needed to be corrected within the framework of the 
current system (Turner 1969, Tyler 2006). It also sought to create ‘labour 
tribunals’, to reduce strikes, and were in fact later adopted in the 
Conservatives 1971 Industrial Relations Act. These Tribunals remain in place 
(in different form) today as Employment Tribunals (ETs) (and Appeals 
Tribunals (EATs)) (Deakin and Morris, 2009, p. 25), and feature in the Britain-
Acquired Rights chapter (chapter 2.6). 
An important part of Donovan Report’s context was Hugh Clegg’s 
rejection of American style legal sanction of trade union strike activity. This 
contrasted with the Conservative’s own proposals, in a A Fair Deal at Work, 
that sought to introduce precisely this kind of punitive legal intervention22. 
                                               
21 Hugh Clegg was a pioneering labour law and labour relations scholar alongside Otto Kahn-Fruend  
who led the research for the Donovan Report.  
22 And was a key pillar of the Conservative’s 1971 Industrial Relations Act after  they returned to 
power in 1970 (Dickens and Hall 2010, p.299)  
	 -	168	-	
The Labour government’s response, led by Minister of State Barbara Castle, 
came in the report called In Place of Strife. Castle had to address a difficult 
balancing act in order to deal with the political pressures of the time (strikes, 
the Conservative proposals, the Labour party’s trade union allies) as well as 
the recommendations of the Donovan Report that they could not easily 
ignore (Turner 1969, Tyler 2006). The tensions Castle faced again speak 
directly to the tensions between legal and collective means of regulation and 
governance and those incongruences and pressures that could not make this 
relationship work. In plotting a middle way, In Place of Strife afforded 
considerable powers to the secretary of state to involve the government in 
industrial disputes, instead of formal legal rules demanding particular rights 
and remedies (Turner 1969). This included, in contrast to the Donovan 
Report, a proposal to make collective agreements legally binding. It also 
sought to create ‘peace clauses’ that would legally prevent strike action 
before all mediation options had been exhausted (ibid., Deakin and Morris 
2009, p.25).  
The proposals failed, partly as a result of Britain’s trade unions 
rejecting it in favour of the voluntarist collective laissez faire status quo 
(Turner 1969, Tyler 2006). The perceived failure of these arrangements of the 
60s and 70s were to be used as a pretext for the Conservative governments 
after 1970 (although short-lived) and post-1979, the latter of which to 
completely recast Britain’s labour relations and the role of legal and collective 
means of regulation and governance. However, key aspects did remain 
beyond the destructive period of neo-liberal Thatcherism. 
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2.1.3.iii   1979-to the present: renewed English liberalism as  Neo-
liberalism 
The various attempts from the late 19th Century to create consensus-based 
labour relations did not embed themselves in the visions and practices of 
labour relations in the way these equivalent forms did in Germany and other 
European countries. For this reason, collective laissez faire lacked the 
permanence necessary to weather political and economic upheavals in 
Britain.  
Margaret Thatcher’s 1979-1990 government, and those governments 
which succeeded it, took an ambitious and multi-pronged approach to 
radically reforming labour relations, and specifically liberalising it. This 
comprised of dramatic changes to the legal rules as well as the economic and 
industrial structures within which labour relations took place. Trade unions 
were targeted directly by restrictive new legal rules on balloting and 
recognition, and collective bargaining was to be critically undermined by 
both legal restrictions and the destruction of the industries where it, and 
trade unions, were strongest. The ‘right to manage’ principle of the mid-19th 
Century was to a see a forceful re-emergence, formally connecting the 
‘Master-Servants act’ era with labour law with the modern present. All these 
changes formed a pincer movement against trade unions and included the 
reintroduction of Britain’s courts into labour matters, still directed by a 
doctrinal bias against trade union action. Some of the changes made post-
1906 however were still in place (in some form) such as the role of Joint 
Industrial Councils (JICs, now NJCs), Employment Tribunals and individual 
legal employment protection rights (Deakin and Morris 2009, p.22), although 
wage councils were abolished23 (Dickens et al. 1993). 
                                               
23 Over time from 1980 to 1993. 
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The effect of these reforms over time was destructive and widespread. 
Collective bargaining coverage in Britain was reduced by more than half 
between 1980 and 2013 (69% to 25%) while union density (membership) 
followed a similar trend in this period (52% to 25% of the UK work force) 
(source: ICTWSS, Visser 2016). This did however forcefully confirm the end 
of any governmental support for collective laissez faire, even if some parts of 
the old regime remained in place.  
Britain’s courts were able to re-establish a prominent role in labour 
relations and were still armed with a doctrinal commitment to a firm’s ‘right 
to manage’. The nature of this judicial actor however had however changed, 
not least of as now they had to respond to their place within a broader, and 
developing, European legal order and a system of tribunals and individual 
legal rights that did not exist before either World War. Statutory immunities 
for unions in the area of economic torts were repealed and new 
administrative burdens on union recognition and industrial action imposed 
(Edwards et al. 1997, p.12-15; Dickens and Hall 2010, p.300-301; Deakin and 
Morris 2009, p.29). The 1982 Employment Act removed the protection for 
unions’ from economic tort litigation, and a raft of further collective labour 
law reforms targeted trade unions internal organisation by imposing ballots 
and new rules on union finances (Deakin and Morris 2009; p.29). The first of 
these was directed at increasing the costs of industrial action for unions and 
therefore increasing firms’ room to manoeuvre to discourage or break strikes 
(Deakin and Morris 2009; p.35). De-recognition was also part of this attempt 
to empower the position of business in the 1980s, but it was not until the 
following decade where sweeping withdrawals of union collective 
bargaining rights started to take place.  
With unions seriously weakened, they had no choice but to bargain 
with employers from a position of serious weakness, if at all, knowing that 
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both common law and statute law was far from helpful to them. This, in a 
sense, encouraged a new form of voluntarism where incentives meant actors 
wanted law kept out of labour matters.  
There were some important differences between this Conservative era 
of labour market policy and the policies pursued by New Labour after 1997, 
notably a legal and nationally encompassing minimum wage and the 
creation of the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) that provided unions a 
new route to statutory recognition. These features notwithstanding however, 
the labour market model inherited from the Thatcher era was largely retained 
(McKay and Moore 2015, p.107; Dickens and Hall 2010, p. 309; Heyes and 
Nolan 2010, p.111).  
Again, and despite the destruction of the unsettled collective laissez 
faire regime that existed prior to 1979, some of its institutional aspects 
remained, creating a complex set of arrangements that was neither a pure 
liberal model of the labour market desired by Britain’s conservatives nor one 
devoid of collective institutions and state-sanctioned means of providing 
these.  
Two features are raised here. The first is the role of European law and 
the EU’s Court of Justice; a factor addressed throughout this second section 
of this thesis. The second includes the employment tribunal system used to 
settle employment law disputes. Industrial Tribunals, renamed Employment 
Tribunals (ETs)24 in 1998, were established initially in 1964 to settle 
employment disputes and to minimise the caseload of higher courts (Deakin 
and Morris 2009, p.67). This latter point is one key reason why these were 
retained in the 1980s when other aspects of the ‘old’ pre-1979 labour relations 
                                               
24 Now ETs are formed of a panel of three including an established official from employer interests 
and one from trade unions and chaired by a legal professional (judge, senior employment lawyer 
like a QC) 
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regime were being dismantled. ETs comprise of a panel of three officials with 
one drawn from employer interests, one from trade unions and a legal 
professional (judge or senior employment lawyer like a QC) acts as chair. 
These tribunals are not technically ‘courts’ in the strictest sense, despite 
forming part of the British legal system and do not form binding precedent 
for later decisions (meaning the decision of an ET only applies to the parties 
and facts of the case before them) (Deakin and Morris 2009, p.69). ET and 
Appeals Tribunals (EAT) have become an important feature in British labour 
relations and, as intended by the Donovan Commission that first proposed 
them, are meant to be inexpensive and inaccessible form of dispute 
resolution (ibid.). ETs and EATs play a key role the British Acquired Rights 
chapter (2.6).  
The history of British labour relations sees an often very prominent role 
for legal intervention coming from both the governmental state as well as the 
judicial state. Importantly, both critically important aspects of law and non-
legal institutional factors were important in the shifts from a 19th Century 
Master-Servant model, to a collective laissez faire model, to the post-1979 
neo-liberal regime and saw aspects of each of these eras in some way 
retained, whether by choice or simply as a result of their path dependent 
qualities.  
 
2.1.4. Concluding comparisons 
Even if the exceptionalism of German and British ideal type regimes was not 
already well highlighted in contemporary CPE, conceptualising the role of 
legal institutions and the relationships they share with non-legal phenomena 
still tells us important things about where these regimes have come from and 
how they respond to various and multi-faceted pressures to change (e.g. neo-
liberalism, European integration, economic). This latter is addressed more in 
	 -	173	-	
the next chapter and throughout this thesis, although it is important that the 
analysis of these two ‘national models’ be understood in complex and 
shifting spatial context of European market and legal de-nationalising 
influences.  
Three themes stand out however in comparing the histories of these two 
countries, themes that offer an alternative to understanding these two countries’ 
histories. The role of courts, the role of the state and the place of legal rules, 
especially collective labour law as an expression of the governmental state’s 
approach to organising labour relations.  
Despite being regarded as different archetypes of labour relations and 
‘models of capitalism’, these German and British labour relations histories 
share some similarities in regards to the themes above. First a broader 
observation is made about the different regimes that existed at different 
points across the time lines under observation. The different types of 
relationship between these three factors produced different sorts of labour 
relation regime. Importantly however there were no neat demarcations 
between these eras and the legacies of each had an imprint on those that 
followed.  
Germany saw two revolutionary type events after both World Wars, 
but the Tarifautonomie system that made the German model of capitalism 
famous (with its two core sectoral wage bargaining and co-determination 
parts) had its origins established slowly in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. 
Similarly the British case, German courts held long-standing doctrinal bias 
against trade unions. This was to change however after WWII however as 
German courts found their mandate heavily framed by statute law rules 
reinforcing Tarifautonomie. From this moment in 1945, the role of courts is 
rarely discussed in CPE coverage of German capitalism, but Otto Kahn 
Freund’s observation of the German courts’ rejection of fledgling co-
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determination rights in the 1920s raised an important point: the tacit, arms-
length form of acceptance of Tarifautonomie by courts (and the governmental 
state) is an important but often ignored feature of Tarifautonomie’s successful 
establishment.  
In Britain, courts were more aggressively opposed as a matter of 
doctrine to labour rights and collective means of regulation and governance. 
Unlike in Germany however, this was not to substantively change. The 
purposeful removal of the judiciary from labour matters after 1900 served to 
firmly settle the kind of relationship law and collective bargaining were to 
share, something that would not be possible (it was felt) if courts still had a 
potent tole.  
A broad comparison is made here of the regime of British collective 
laissez faire and Tarifautonomie. These regimes share similarities in terms of 
objectives: give social partners a key shared role in organising labour 
relations in order to achieve industrial and social peace. After WWII both 
countries attempted to develop these further. Britain, as it failed to do in the 
1920s, did not provide firm enough foundations. The Conservative 
governments that dominated the 1950s did not build on these and the 
economic problems of the 1960s and 70s provided the context for the regime’s 
eventual destruction (however partial). In Germany, the economic problems 
of the 1960s were not present or at least not so pronounced, and the success 
of the 1950s appeared to merely affirm Tarifautonomie’s place within a 
narrative of the ‘German miracle’.  
The 1970s provided the basis of a new neo-liberal compact that 
effected these two countries in very different ways. The European part of this 
neo-liberal shift would also present itself differently across these two 
countries as the four case study chapters of this second section illustrate. 
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Both the Germany-focused case studies see the core relationships 
between law and collective institutions that defined Tarifautonomie 
fundamentally change and engage with a European regulatory and market 
system as on on-going process. This on-going process is unlikely to be 
reversed with the new governance regime for EMU providing further 
intervention of European rules and institutions like the ECB.  
 This chapter not only represented an opportunity to offer some 
descriptive mapping for these two selected case study countries, but also 
offered an analytical attempt to understand these countries’ labour relations 
in the manner outlined in the first chapter. Both countries exhibit different 
sorts of relationships between legal and collective institutions as determined 
by different political, social and economic conditions. The specificities of this 
claim become clearer across the four case study chapters that follow in this 
second section. Before this however, a chapter similar to this one maps out 
the other two case study selections from EU law.  
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Chapter 2.2. 
Two European level case studies: European posted workers 
law and acquired rights law 
 
  
2.2.1. Introduction 
Following on from the previous chapter covering the national level case 
studies, this chapter does two things. The first comes with the intention to 
provide a reasoned basis for the selection of these two areas of EU law. The 
second intention is to provide preliminary context and detail to these two 
cases to avoid repetition when relying on the same material in the four 
empirical chapters that follow this chapter. 
  There are several intertwined reasons for selecting these cases and 
for selecting areas of European law. Selecting areas of law itself my seem 
inappropriate given the claim concerning law’s role in labour relations. To 
repeat again a key point, it is the nature of law’s role, rather than its mere 
existence, that is important (how law matters, not if law matters). Moreover, 
these two areas of law addressed in detail in this chapter also share important 
connections and interactions with other law as well as broader political and 
economic factors (i.e. non-law). With this, these cases produce a spread of 
different features including legislative and judicial elements as well as 
different roles for trade unions, strike action, employers and different kinds 
of responses to law. Moreover, these different case studies offer different 
kinds of opportunities for existing CPE to offer some counter-claims made in 
this thesis: despite these, it is argued, still falling short.  
  Each section addressing posted workers and acquired rights law 
begins with some discussion about the main regulatory and normative 
concerns within these. This is done first by defining these ‘two areas of law’ 
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by the directive text that created them. From here, further discussion is 
provided mapping the role of the Court of Justice (CJEU), a key feature in the 
four empirical case studies that follow this chapter. 
    
2.2.2. European Acquired Rights Law 
 
European Acquired Rights law is presented courtesy of a European directive 
– currently Directive 2001/23 (ARD)25 and is also known in English as a 
‘transfer of undertakings’. The ARD was originally devised in the 1970s to 
ensure that the ‘acquired rights’ of workers (terms and conditions) were 
carried over when their employer was taken over by new employers (a 
‘transfer of undertaking’). With this, and save any valid ‘economic or 
technical reason’ (ETO) for a transfer, the directive intended to protect from 
being dismissed as a result of a ‘transfer of undertaking’ or to suffer any 
detriment to their pay and conditions under their new employer. In this way, 
a ‘transfer’ cannot be the sole reason for any dismissals or effects against the 
existing workforce.  
  The ARD also demanded that workers be consulted prior to any 
transfer. In regards to dismissal and consultation rights, the ARD also has 
very explicit and formal relationships with other European legislation, 
notably the Information and Consultation Directive (ICED) and the 
Collective Redundancies Directive (CRD) (98/59/EC 1998).  
  What the original ARD did not explicitly provide however, as well 
as not applying to 'share issue' based takeovers26, was a firm definition of a 
‘transfer’ or an exhaustive list of those sorts of transfer that were covered by 
                                               
25 This 2001 directive codified the previous Directive (77/187/EEC) which was amended by a third 
(98/50/EC). 
26 That occurred through the buying out of shares rather than a formal takeover of another 
company. 
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the ARD and were not. Is outsourcing covered? Is second generation 
outsourcing? insourcing27 The use of subsidiaries and down or upstream 
mergers within the same corporate group? Were public sector reorganisation 
programmes, that were commonplace in the 1990s in Europe, included? 
These questions were all left to the interpretation of the Court of Justice and 
national regulators. These issues of definition and scope are central to the ARD 
and the controversy that surrounded the directive over its 40-year life-span. 
It is the first of two areas of the ARD pinpointed for the two ARD chapters. 
The second concerns the role of collective agreements and how individual terms 
of employment drawn from collective agreements are transferred and for 
how long these must be imposed.  
   
  2.2.2.i. Definition and scope of the ARD 
There has been a key shift in both of these areas however in both how 
European institutions, especially the CJEU, and national stakeholders have 
applied and responded to the ARD. These shifts are of focus in the two British 
and German ARD chapters. These two areas are given some description here. 
In the previous paragraph, five questions were posed as to the potential 
forms of transfer that could or could not constitute a ‘transfer of 
undertaking’. The CJEU answered in the affirmative to each of these in the 
1980s, the directive’s first decade. Expanding the scope and definition of the 
ARD was part of a social policy-labour law approach to acquired rights of 
the Court that sought to enhance the social protection characteristics of the 
directive. The table below identifies some key cases and their implications in 
this area.  
 
                                               
27 This comes in two main forms. Firstly, a previously outsourced undertaking brought back ‘in-
house’ and the internal shifting of operations to a subsidiary within the same corporate group. 
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Table 2.2.i –key CJEU cases on the scope and definition of a ‘transfer of undertakings 
Case and No. Brief description of facts Key aspect of 
decision 
Allen and others 
v Amalgamated 
Construction Co 
Ltd case (1999) 
c-234/98 
 
A British case concerning 
the contracting ‘out’ of 
mining works to another 
company within the same 
corporate group 
(subsidiary). 
The ARD applies to 
internal contracting out 
involving two subsidiaries 
of the same group even if 
these legally distinct 
companies share the same 
management and work 
from the same premises. 
Vidal (1999) 
joined cases c-
127/96, c-229/96 
and  
c-74/97  
A Spanish company 
originally contracted out 
cleaning services sought 
to bring these back in 
house prompting a 
complaint of altered 
working conditions. 
Contracting-in is caught 
by the ARD, but the 
economic entity test must 
still be satisfied. 
Sanchez-
Hidalgo and 
Horst Ziemann 
(1998) - joined 
cases c-173/96 
and c-247/96  
A British case concerning 
the contracting out of 
cleaning services from the 
public sector to the private 
sector.  
Outsourcing, as caught 
under the ARD, of 
cleaning services applies to 
the public sector as well as 
the private sector. Like 
Suzen, concerned third 
party transfers. 
Oy Liikenne 
(2001) 
 c-172/99 
A Finnish case where a bus 
company took control of 
another, employing two 
drivers but refusing to 
employ them on their 
original working terms and 
conditions. 
Transfers pursued using 
intermediary bodies or 
subsidiaries for a phased 
transfer are also caught by 
the ARD. This also 
includes those done 
through a procurement 
process.  
Watson and 
Rask (1993) c-
209/91 
Danish case where 
contracting out of catering 
between companies 
Phillips and ISS.  
The transfer of 
ancillary (not just 
core) services of an 
undertaking also 
captured by the ARD 
Dr. Sophie 
Redmond (1992) 
c-29/91 
A Dutch case concerning 
the withdrawal of contract 
to the claimant, then 
offered to a new party, 
resulting in the 
termination of 
employment of the 
original awardee.  
This fell under the 
scope of the ARD, 
but only based on key 
facts. Issues of third 
parties in transfer 
depend on facts of the 
case.  
Daddy’s Dance 
Hall (1988) c-
324/86  
Danish case concerning 
leasing arrangements of a 
music venue where A 
leased to B, terminated 
this and leased to C. All 
such ‘transfers’ caught by 
the ARD. 
The transfer of 
ownership between a 
legal or natural of an 
undertaking and 
their capture under 
the ARD. 
 
The table above (2.2.i) is supplemented by a table below (2.2.ii) that 
details three core cases which are of particular significance. At the centre of 
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both sets of cases is a determination made by the CJEU whether a ‘transfer of 
undertaking’ in fact took place in a meaningful way so as to be caught by the 
directive. This was subject to abrupt change by the Court in the 1990s. The 
table below provides three key cases where the CJEU applied different 
interpretive logics. These shifts in the CJEU’s stance are important in both the 
German and British ARD chapters. 
 
Table 2.2.ii Core cases – ARD’s scope 
   Case and No. Brief description of 
facts 
Key aspect of 
decision 
   
Ayse Süzen 
(1997)  
c-13/95 
 
A German case: Mrs. Süzen 
was employed as cleaner at a 
school by a contractor. The 
school’s contract with the 
contractor ended, Mrs Süzen 
was dismissed.  
 
The ARD does not apply to a 
situation where a contract 
ends, ending someone’s 
employment, unless 
significant tangible and 
intangible assets have been 
transferred as a result (a 
single dismissal does not 
meet this standard).  
   
Schmidt (1994)  
c-392/92 
 
 
A German case: Mrs Schmidt 
brought an action challenging 
her dismissal, in which she 
was unsuccessful in the first 
instance by the German 
Higher Labour Court 
(Landesarbeitsgericht) who did 
not regard cleaning services 
as a part of the identity of the 
economic entity. The CJEU 
disagreed. 
 
The ARD does indeed apply 
to labour intensive 
undertakings, meaning such 
undertakings are caught by 
the directive.  
   
Spijkers (1986)  
c-24/85 
 
A Dutch case surrounding a 
disagreement over a 
company ceasing operation 
and the employment of 
employees under a new 
company without 
substantive changes to 
nature of the company and 
the work (an abattoir) 
 
Six-pointed definition of a 
transfer that be viewed 
flexibly by national courts 
based on the facts of the case 
in question. Flexible and 
expansive approach to 
defining a ‘transfer’. 
 
	 -	181	-	
The test has usually hinged on the more social protection-weighted 
entreprise-activité approach (pro-worker) or the more commercially-
orientated entreprise-organisation (pro-employer) interpretation (Barnard 
2006; p.637). In Spijkers (1986), the CJEU held it necessary that a business 
retain its identity in order to be caught by the directive. The CJEU stated that 
six factors could be weighed by national courts when looking at particular 
cases. Although offering some flexibility, this case did not shed much light 
as to whether labour intensive undertakings were caught by the ARD or if 
some form of asset transfer must take place first. In Schmidt (1994), the CJEU 
decided that undertakings dominated by labour intensive, human-capital 
means of economic activity, rather than tangible assets, were also caught by 
the ARD. This expanded the social protection-inclined interpretation of the 
ARD (ibid.).    
This developing but settled approach, to which national authorities 
had adjusted to or were in process of adjusting, was to receive a sharp jolt in 
the 1997 Süzen case. Here, the CJEU reversed its approach toward the 
commercial rights inclined entreprise-organisation interpretation. The Court 
stated that a substantive transfer of assets had to take place (ibid.), relegating the 
role of labour intensive work as the basis of determining the character of the 
business in question. As McMullen describes, the ‘harsh effects’ of Süzen 
essentially allowed new employers (transferees) to choose whether to take on 
existing workers, meaning they could in effect dismiss these workers in order 
to pursue a transfer. This logic was perverse given that the directive was 
expressly created to prevent companies from using a transfer process with 
the sole purpose of dismissing individual or groups of workers.  
This was a German case that posed serious challenges for all EU 
member states that had to absorb this abrupt, messy change to EU acquired 
rights law. Curiously, despite being a case concerning German labour actors, 
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this case was much more controversial in Britain than in Germany. In Britain 
however, it was for more challenging and provoked some responses from 
legal and political actors not foreseen by CPE theories or explanations. 
 
  2.2.2.ii. The ARD and collective bargaining 
The issue concerning the regulation and governance of collective agreements 
under the ARD is more complex and concerns two main issues:  
 
1) Whether a collective agreement in place at the time of a transfer should be 
transferred or not to the new post-transfer employer. 
2) should a new employer, to whom the business has been ‘transferred’ to, 
also have to abide by those collective agreements that succeed the one in place at 
transfer (once it expires)? 
 
The original social policy purpose of the ARD and the social policy/worker 
protection function of collective agreements should point to a 
complementary relationship between the ARD and collective bargaining 
institutions, with collective agreements providing a good source of ‘acquired 
rights’ for workers. 
In abstract terms, an individual employment contract must have its 
contents ‘transferred’ when a transfer of undertaking takes place as 
demanded by article 3(1) of the ARD itself. These individual employment 
contracts might however have a large degree of their content drawn from a 
collective agreement, making this employment contract stronger from the 
perspective of the employee and imposing greater labour costs on the part of 
the employer. Therefore, one can see an employer seeking to ‘re-organise’ its 
functions through an outsourcing or merger so as to absolve themselves from 
the burdens of a collective agreement.  German and UK labour law provide 
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for a type of linking or ‘bridging’ term to formally connect a collective 
agreement with an individual employment contract. On occasion however, 
employment contracts are populated with terms drawn from a collective 
agreement informally and without such explicit terms of linkage.  
The ARD, again, makes it clear that terms of a collective agreement in 
place at the time of a transfer must be transferred, but the question as to whether 
a ‘transferee’, the new employer an undertaking is transferred to, should 
adhere to later, successor collective agreements to the one transferred, is not 
addressed in the directive. This is important, as collective agreements at any 
given point in time will mandate certain wage levels and pay scales, but will 
also often agree the rate which these will increase over time. This second 
issue with collective agreements creates a serious regulatory concern of time-
line, as employers could be fine accepting a collective agreement at the time of 
transfer, as demanded by the ARD, knowing that this will one day expire and 
thus would not have to abide by this permanently. If an employer must abide 
by later collective agreements that succeed the transferred at the time of 
transfer, even if they have not signed this or a party to it, this implies that the 
collective bargaining process and apparatus itself is being transferred also. The 
question can be posed: how long is it reasonable for them to adhere to said 
bargaining process?  
To explain this further, an important aspect of the collective 
agreement process is described. Collective bargaining for a group of 
employees occurs over a multi-year cycle, but sometimes forming annual 
collective agreements rather than multi-annual agreements. The prevalence 
of such arrangements varies across countries, industries and companies. If a 
transfer happens within an industrial sector where all its employers are 
covered by a collective agreement (multi-employer sectoral collective 
bargaining), the point is null as a transfer to another company would see 
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these transferred workers covered by the same collective agreement. A 
problem arises when a new employer is not a member of a collective 
bargaining process (and attached employers’ association) which previously 
provided the employment terms for the new employer’s employees. This 
issue is pertinent in both the UK and German ARD cases. 
Unlike with questions concerning the ARD’s scope and definition, the 
CJEU case law is non-existent up until the turn of the Millennium.  With this, 
there are two different approaches to post-transfer collective agreements: The 
dynamic approach and static approach (McMullen 2006, Wynn-Davies 2013).  
 
Table 2.2.iii- Status of Collective Agreements post-transfer 
  Facts and decision  Approach 
Werhof 
(2006) 
Mr Werhof worked for company A 
which was eventually bought by 
Siemens (company B) and retained 
as a subsidiary until transferring 
part of this business to company C. 
Mr Werhof claimed the previous 
terms and conditions applied under 
the ARD as stated in Collino. 
Qualified Static interpretation, as the 
CJEU merely  pointed to Germany’s  
transposition of the optional article 3(2) of 
the ARD that imposed a one-year limit 
upon collective agreements’ post-transfer 
life. If 3(2) was not part of German law, 
the outcome may have been different. 
Scattalon    
(2010) 
Ivana Scattalon was transferred to 
work for the Italian Ministry and 
Education, Universities and 
Research from the municipality of 
Scorze. Article 2112 of Italian law 
that ratified the ARD  did not 
incorporate the optional article 3(2). 
Qualified dynamic interpretation. Where 
remuneration, determined by collective 
agreement is linked to length of service. 
ARD must protect against substantial loss 
of salary relative to current employees of 
transferee (new employer). 
Alemo-
Herron 
(2013) 
A London borough (A) contracted 
out leisure services to a private 
sector firm (B). B then sold this to C. 
Local government collective 
agreements applied to A and B but 
not C. C refused to accept the 
strictures of this collective 
agreement (not being a local or 
public body). 
Static interpretation. Once a collective 
agreement had expired, transferees are not 
to be bound to negotiate a new agreement 
for transferred employees. ’hard static 
interpretation’. 
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Asklepios-
Kliniken 
(2017) 
A case concerning German hospitals 
and two generations of transfers. In 
an initial transfer of two hospital 
employees from local government 
control to the private sector saw the 
municipal sector collective 
agreement transferred. A dynamic 
clause was contained in the transfer 
agreement demanding the retention 
of the terms of the municipal 
collective agreement. A later 
transfer to another private company 
prompted changes to the 
employment terms of the 
employees.  
Static interpretation. Even with the 
presence of an agreed ‘dynamic clause’ in 
the collective agreement giving it force in 
later years, the CJEU struck this down 
stipulating that the rights of new 
employers also had to be protected under 
the ARD, not just workers. 
 
The dynamic approach states that where collective agreements are 
central to the transferred employment relationship then the bargaining 
processes that formed these agreements must be transferred also. The static 
approach demands the opposite, interpreting it as unjust for employers to be 
bound to collective bargaining processes they never agreed to or were 
otherwise bound to (through an associational membership for example). 
Complaints of the latter sort usually are based upon a claim that a 
fundamental breach of the ‘freedom to contract’ principle has occurred and 
invoke the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Out of the four cases above, the Scattalon case is an exception. The static 
interpretation outlined in the German Werhof and Asklepios cases and the 
British case Alemo-Herron cases have now made this clear. In both Germany 
and Britain however, very different contexts and actors produced very 
different outcomes. In Germany, the ARD was oddly uncontroversial, 
despite the presence of a large number of ‘transfer of undertakings’ occurring 
across a lot of the country’s economy producing substantial job and wage 
cuts; two things the ARD was intended to prevent. In Britain, the ARD was 
much more controversial but on the issues of the ARD’s scope. The issues 
concerning collective agreements however did cause multiple litigations 
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where UK courts found themselves caught between different interpretations 
and doctrines of UK and European law. The results when comparing these 
two countries were surprising and present a challenge to CPE depictions of 
these two countries as ‘models of capitalism’. 
 
2.2.3. European Posted Workers Law 
The issue of posted workers has become very controversial in European 
politics in the 10-15 years. It also sits at the same troubled nexus between the 
European project’s social and economic dimensions. On the one hand, EU 
institutions want to expand and develop the single market in services, one of 
the four freedoms, that had been developed the least (prior to circa 1990)28. 
On the other, if this involves workers being transported by a service provider 
to a location in another member state. This leaves an important question: can 
this employer pay these workers according to the state they have gone to 
pursue work (host state rules) or their home state where they are established? 
National authorities are allowed to impose their labour standards on these 
foreign service providers, whether through labour law or collective 
agreements, then this might remove the economic incentive for firm seeking 
to go to another country to provide services. However, if the service 
providers are allowed to adhere to their own country’s regulations rather than 
those of the country they are operating in, this could undercut those social rules 
and institutions (in the country of operation) like collective bargaining and 
labour law if this practice proliferates and becomes widespread. Domestic 
firms might then engage in preferential hiring of foreign firms and workers 
because they are cheaper or business might rebase itself in other jurisdictions 
                                               
28 Services markets largely have a mobility problem in that the provider and buyer of said service 
usually need to be in the same location, unlike goods that are usually boxed up and sent across 
borders with greater freedom. 
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to take advantage of laxer rules. These different dynamics have been given 
several labels: ‘regime shopping’, ‘regime competition’, ‘wage dumping’, 
‘social dumping’ and ‘a race to the bottom’ (Scharpf 2002, Scharpf 2010, 
Streeck 1995, Höpner and Schäfer 2010).  
  These issues have set the scene conjoined normative and regulatory 
problems in European Union politics. Similarly to the ARD earlier, EU 
institutions have altered their approach to these questions over time to one 
that is far more liberal in nature and favours economic rights over social 
rights, market-making over social models.  
  This section will outline the law of the Posted Workers Directive 
(PWD) and the key case law of the CJEU in this areas of EU law. Within this, 
these issues will be well demonstrated. In our British and German chapters, 
we have a few particularly key cases of interest; including one Germany-
specific case.  
  
  2.2.3.i  The 1996 directive and key issues 
The PWD was first passed into law in 1996 (EC 96/71) to regulate the working 
terms and conditions of contracted foreign labour (“posted workers”). With 
various forms of labour law and collective bargaining systems in operation 
throughout the EU in the 1990s, the directive sought to provide a list of those 
rules and mechanisms in which member states could use to impose 
employment standards on foreign companies who brought their foreign 
labour with them to pursue (sub)contracts. The normative thrust of the 
directive was to balance this with the right of these companies to pursue their 
freedom to provide services in line with CJEU case law. 
  The posted workers directive (PWD) provides member states a 
‘hard nucleus’ of rules companies must adhere to when employing ‘posted 
workers’ (article 3(1)). This could be done through labour law (such as a 
	 -	188	-	
minimum wage or extension laws), or through collective agreements or 
arbitration awards (article 3(8)). The PWD in fact has a necessary functional 
overlap with EU public procurement law. European public procurement law 
is delivered through a number of directive texts regulating services and 
public works, utilities and (post-2016) concessions and forms an enormously 
important part of the single market agenda. For the purposes of posted 
workers issues, it is the directive regulating public contracting awards in 
services29 that is relevant given the role of this directive in a procurement 
heavy construction sector where the majority of postings take place. Posted 
workers are always employed through the award of sub-contracts that form 
part of often dense contracting supply chains for large building projects. 
Although much more common in the construction sector, the use of posted 
workers has become more prominent in other sectors like tourism, various 
delivery based services and manufacturing. The RegioPost case of 2015 
provides an important demonstration of this. First, controversial cases prior 
to this are outlined. 
  There are two sets of issues that are central to discussions 
concerning posted workers: one, the economic circumstances behind posting; 
and the other the legal issues presented the posted workers directive (PWD) 
and Court of Justice decisions in this area (below sub-section).  The economic 
circumstances themselves are placed into two ‘models of posting’ by Voss et 
al. (2016): those postings triggered by labour cost differences between 
member states with lower wages and those with higher wages. The second 
sees skills shortages and the need to acquire specialised labour as the 
rationale for posting workers. The first model is associated with ‘social 
dumping’ or ‘wage dumping’ practices. This is what has placed posted 
                                               
29 Directives 2004/18 up was applied and then replaced by the update version of the same 
directive (2014/24) in 2016. 
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workers issues at the heart of a renewed ‘social vs. liberal Europe’ divide in 
European politics.  
  These issues first reared their head during the tumultuous 
negotiations over the 2004 draft of the Services Directive, and in particular 
the directive’s controversial ‘country-of-origin-principle’ (CoOP). The CoOP 
in essence provided legal reinforcement of wage-dumping practices of 
mobile firms in a position to pursue off-shoring and noted a shift in EU free 
movement law from a ‘host-state rules’ logic to a ‘home-state’ rules logic. 
This offending provision was removed when the directive was finally agreed 
in 2006, but the debate concerning this regulatory conflict between economic 
free movement rights and national social policy institutions did not end 
there. The Court of Justice acted quickly to simply reinsert the country-of-
origin-principle into EU free movement law and posted workers law.  
 
  2.2.3.ii. CJEU case law: from Rush Portuguesa to Laval 
Before this interpretive turn of the Court, it was the Court’s own earlier case 
law – Rush Portuguesa (1990), Van der Elst (1994) and Evi v. Seco (1994) – that 
provided the basis for a PWD balanced between social policy and free 
movement considerations. Provision 3(8) of the PWD was in fact based on 
the Court’s statement in Rush Portuguesa case. 
 
“Community law does not preclude member states from extending their Legislation, 
or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to any person 
who was employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which 
country the employers established; nor does Community law prohibit member states 
from enforcing those rules by appropriate means” 
 
           CJEU in Rush Portuguesa (1990), paragraph 18. 
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The key regulatory point being that formal labour law is not the only place 
where wage and employment rules can be sourced by hosting authorities 
seeking to apply wage rules to foreign firms. Many such rules come from 
within collective agreements as well with considerable variation in how legal 
and non-legal sources of employment rules interact across different 
industries and member states. This subject of collective agreements and the 
labour standards they produce were also central in the later Laval, 
Luxembourg and Rüffert cases post-2007. In these cases, the CJEU decided to 
impose a severely restrictive interpretation of the PWD and the means it 
made available for member states to apply the various types of employment 
standards that might exist in their countries. Table 2.2.iv below illustrates the 
two generations of the CJEU’s posted workers case law. 
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Table 2.2.iv: Posted Workers cases of the Court of Justice 
  Pre-2007 case law 
         Post-2007 case law 
 
Collective agreements were the principal target in these Laval and Rüffert 
cases. This new line of case law essentially imposed a host state rules logic 
Case Description 
Rush 
Portuguesa 
(1990) 
CJEU declares that member states can impose their labour law or other non-
legal labour standards to foreign companies employing posted workers on 
their territory.     
Evi v. Seco 
(1994) 
Reaffirms Rush Portuguesa. 
Van der Elst 
(1994) 
Reaffirms Rush Portuguesa. 
Arblade 
(1999) 
Pay rules drawn from a collective agreement can be imposed upon foreign 
companies and their posted workers per article 3(1) and 3(8) of the PWD.  
Mazzoleni 
(2001) 
A national statute demanding adherence to collective agreements stipulating 
minimum pay rates can be imposed by a member states as it sees fit. 
Portugaia 
Construçoes 
(2002) 
Domestic authorities cannot demand that foreign companies abide by a 
collective agreement if domestic firms are not bound by such rules. 
Wolff v. 
Müller 
(2004) 
State regulation of liability systems across supply chains to ensure adherence 
to minimum wage rules is permitted under EU free movement law. 
Case  Description 
Laval (2007) Member states cannot impose wage rules derived from a collective agreement as 
these go beyond the ‘mandatory rules’ provided in article 3(1) PWD. Also, 
collective action designed to impose such rules are also in breach of EU free 
movement law. 
Rüffert 
(2008) 
Following Laval, wages drawn from a collective agreement cannot be imposed 
upon foreign companies and legislation demanding the adherence to such pay rules 
are also in breach in EU free movement law if these are not declared ‘universally 
applicable’. 
Luxembourg 
(2008) 
Following the Laval and Rüffert cases, posted workers must be subject to the 
‘mandatory rules’ provided in article 3(1) of the PWD and nothing more, and 
provisions in article 3(10) providing for public policy objectives also cannot be 
relied upon to reinforce non-mandatory wage standards. 
RegioPost 
(2015) 
A minimum wage provided by statutory provision (not a collective agreement) can 
be applied to posted workers under public procurement directives. 
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rather than a home state logic onto posted workers questions, the latter came 
to be known as the ‘country of origin’ principle’ raised earlier. Article 3(1) 
was made in essence into an exhaustive list of those rules that can be applied, 
meaning anything not in this list could not be applied to posted workers. 
Ironically, rules derived from collective agreements is in fact included in this 
list in article 3(1), but the CJEU in this new line of case law demanded that 
these rules be made ‘universally applicable’. This sets a very high bar for 
collectively agreed rules to be applied.  The logic of article 3(7), stipulating 
that member states can go beyond these rules and provide stronger 
protections for posted workers, was reversed. This meant that article 3(1) 
became a ceiling, from which no higher/better rules can be applied, rather 
than a floor from which standards could be then defined (ACL Davies 2008). 
The Laval30 case is given some description here given its importance to 
both of the posted workers chapters to avoid repetition (although indulged 
to a point in chapter 2.4).  
The case involved the subsidiary (Baltic) of Latvian company (Laval) 
being awarded a subcontract to build a school in the town of Laxholm, 
Sweden. A collective agreement in the Swedish construction sector set the 
rates of pay and pay scales for all workers in the sector, including a minimum 
wage rate (there is no legal minimum wage in Sweden as collective 
bargaining coverage has always encompassed the vast majority of Swedish 
workplaces). A dispute arose when the Latvian company was accused of only 
paying 40% of the minimum wage contained in this collective agreement. The 
trade union on site demanded a negotiated pay settlement for these posted 
workers, Baltic refused. The trade union then pursued not only a strike but 
                                               
30 The Viking case is often placed in this same discussion as it was decided jointly with the Laval case 
in December 2007 (ACL Davies 2008, Malmberg and Sigeman 2008). Viking also addresses a conflict 
between free movement rights and the right of collective action (strikes) as well as collective 
bargaining. The Viking case was not a posted workers case however, and is not addressed any 
further here. 
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also a blockade of the site. Baltic were not able to finish the contract and went 
into liquidation.  
There were two issues at hand in Laval: one, the right of host member 
states to impose collective agreed pay minima onto foreign contractors and their 
posted workers; the other the use of industrial action and a blockade of a 
worksite.  The Court of Justice decided Laval alongside a Viking case that only 
had one of these issues at hand (industrial action). The Court first broke with 
its Rush Portuguesa line of case law by overturning the principle that national 
authorities had the right to impose their laws and rules onto foreign 
contractors, even if these were sourced from a collective agreement. In 
striking down the right of Sweden to impose pay minima drawn from a 
collective agreement, stating that if such pay rules were not made 
‘universally applicable’ in law (much like a legal minimum would be) these 
would not be deemed acceptable, the Court effectively annulled section 3(8) 
of the PWD. Once the Court delivered this view of collectively agreed pay it 
was bound to find the strike and blockade enforcing them to obey this 
agreement to also be an unjustifiable breach of free movement law. 
The 2008 German Rüffert case did not concern any industrial action, 
but did entail the imposition of collectively agreed pay (like Laval) and a 
regional (land level) law demanding such adherence to these pay rules. More 
specifically, the Rüffert case concerned the imposition of labour standards by 
national authorities upon a foreign subcontractor who was not bound by the 
collective agreement that covered the construction sector in that region 
(Niedersachsen, north west Germany). The details are covered more in the 
Germany-Posted Workers chapter that follows this chapter. In brief, the 
implications of Rüffert for German collective bargaining in the construction 
sector, where posted workers are most commonly used, were serious in two 
important ways. Firstly, the role of regional labour law and a regional 
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collective agreement were critically undermined in the name of protecting 
the free movement rights of profit-seeking firms. Second, it undermined the 
legal integrity of the EU's own public procurement regime by voiding a part 
of a publicly procured contract. In effect, primary contractors were able to 
accept ‘binding’ contractual terms (in this case labour standards) in the first 
instance knowing that such terms would not be enforceable, thus 
subcontractors could simply ignore them.  
These cases concerned the imposition of minimum pay derived from 
collective agreements, not a legal minimum rate. It did however, unlike Laval, 
concern a legal rule that sought reinforce collective agreement. Either way, 
the CJEU drew a line: collectively agreed pay cannot be imposed on posted 
workers under free movement law (even if extended through law), but legal 
minimum wages, being 'universally applicable', can. These issues are 
returned to in the RegioPost case in the following chapter. 
 
2.2.4. Concluding comment 
These two case areas of law are applied to British and German labour 
relations in the following four chapters. The variations in the roles of 
different actors and regulatory arrangements provides great complexity and 
different sorts of outcomes. Some commonalities are noted: the role of neo-
liberalism remains, although in differentiated form across the European and 
national levels and how it is felt in different labour relations and industrial 
contexts. The embeddedness of law within collective institutions such as 
collective bargaining, works councils and trade union activities is 
analytically important; the complex multi-level dynamics that do not 
constitute a holistic ‘system’, but a part designed formal system and part not 
as ‘conflict of laws’ and conflicts between law and non-law create a host of 
complex, incongruent, incoherent dynamics that undermine national level 
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labour relations, but do not result in a ‘European model’ of labour relations 
result either.  
 Both cases also present important interconnections between collective 
bargaining and formal legal sources of rules. The acquired rights, collective 
bargaining issues are joined by issues specific ARD concerns of the scope and 
definition of a ‘transfer of undertakings’. In the posted workers chapters, 
collective bargaining issues come into complex and often conflicting contact 
with labour law and an important form of economic law: public 
procurement. The connections presented here between these legal and non-
legal sources of ‘labour market regulation and governance’ are of central 
theoretical interest in this study and reveal important features and dynamics 
of European labour relations’ relationship with neo-liberalism and European 
integration. 
 From these two chapters outlining the two national and European case 
studies, the four case studies are presented starting with Germany-Posted 
Workers, followed by the British half of this posted workers case, followed by 
the Germany-Acquired Rights and then Britain-Acquired Rights. 
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Chapter 2.3. 
German Labour Relations and European Posted Workers 
law 
 
 
2.3.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents a case study of a particularly direct and disruptive 
intervention from the realm of law, namely from a court. The judicial 
intervention in question, represented initially by the 2008 Rüffert decision of 
the European Court of Justice (CJEU), itself forms only part of the relevant 
aspects of this case study. This judgement also inspired adaptive responses 
by key actors in Germany, the country at the centre of the Rüffert decision, 
that sought to minimise the effects of the CJEU decision and preserve existing 
labour relations practices within this CJEU-inspired change in EU law. More 
specifically this case study demonstrates a distinct form of adaptive 
response, a political and legislative form, and will be compared with the other 
forms presented in the later three case study chapters. This case study 
chapter comes first out of the four as it provides useful context to the case 
study chapters that follow, particularly the posted workers case study 
concerning Britain that follows this (2.4). 
The response by German policy-makers to the Rüffert decision was 
pursued at the Länder (state) and not federal level and was later to be 
scrutinised by the CJEU again in 2015 in the RegioPost case. The eight-year-
long timeline of these two Rüffert and RegioPost cases of, and the process of 
adjustment that took place in between, provide the empirical material of this 
case study. The examination of this prompts findings concerning the on-
going decline of the once-celebrated German Tarifautonomie model of 
German labour relations and the emergence of increasing legal influences 
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upon this regime. These conclusions point a law-based re-ordering of rights 
and power resources of employers and unions (favouring the former) but 
with a greater reliance on legal minimum wages rather than collectively 
bargained minimum wages (which have receded in scope and strength).  
These empirical observations are directed to three leading theoretical 
arguments that go towards aiding the theoretical goals of this thesis. First, 
this case study highlights a form of court-imposed legal change that sees its 
desired outcome mediated by political interests in the form of legislation. 
This does not successfully reverse the effect of this intervention, but does 
modify it up to a point. Again, this mediated form of response to a regulatory 
and governance problem sees social partners take a back seat rather than the 
traditionally leading role they occupied in German Tarifautonomie. 
Second, CPE theories that highlight the strength of coordinating 
institutions like collective bargaining have been made to look, at best, 
outdated, as developments like those presented by the Rüffert case (and the 
responses to it) have not only undermined the pillars of ‘coordination’ that 
defined Tarifautonomie, but have exposed how much these had weakened 
and withered even before the Rüffert case was brought to court. 
Third, the conflict of rules concept is especially useful in this case as it 
allows for a mapping of: 1) a conflict of laws between EU posted workers law 
and German laws demanding adherence to minimum wages, 2) a conflicts of 
laws between European posted workers law and European public 
procurement law (in RegioPost), 3) a conflict of rules between law and non-
law represented by a conflict between collectively bargained minimum wages 
and legal minimum wages.  
The details of these arguments are developed in the second 
(theoretical) section of this thesis and throughout the (empirically-focused) 
first section.  
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2.3.2. Empirical section: From Rüffert to RegioPost   
This first section is dedicated to the examination of the legal interventions 
and the political and economic interests that determine how law is adjusted 
to, mediated and framed. Two judicial decisions, Rüffert and RegioPost, of the 
CJEU are examined but an important and complex legislative context is 
mapped first.  
 
2.3.2.i The legislative background to the 2008 Rüffert case 
This mapping exercise is important as it covers not only European posted 
workers law at the centre of this case study, but also unavoidably includes 
European public procurement law and German labour law at both the federal 
and state levels in Germany.  
This mix of legislative rules is complex, but must start with an 
appraisal of EU legislative texts. European posted workers law has an 
unavoidable overlap with European public procurement law as posted 
workers are usually sourced and employed through sub-contracts caught 
within large contracting projects themselves regulated by public 
procurement law. This presents clear grounds for conflict of laws problems 
(not rules, as this just refers the legal rules here) and with this potential 
regulatory and governance problems. Once the CJEU began to change its 
approach to posted workers law in 2007 and 2008, this conflict of laws 
problem was to become important. 
There are directive texts regulating public procurement at the 
European level as well as posted workers law and these are both given life in 
(federal) German legislation. This overlap between posted workers law and 
public procurement was, at the time31, only explicitly recognised however in 
                                               
31 The 2014 Enforcement Directive provides guidance on regulating liability chain issues that links 
posted workers and public procurement law explicitly for the first time in EU law. 
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German legislation and not in European public procurement legislation. The 
Posted Workers Directive (PWD) was enacted into German law courtesy of 
the Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz (AEntG) statute. Before 201632, the 
overarching regime regulating public procurement in the European Union 
was found in two 2004 directives (utilities: 2004/17 and public works 2004/18) 
that consolidated a large number of previous directive texts. Directive 
2004/18 regulating public works, often called the ‘public sector directive’, is 
the relevant legislative text here the role of public works contracts used to 
organise the construction sector that sees the regular use of ‘posted workers’. 
The place of public procurement in European law provides important 
regulatory as well as normative functions: regulatory in the sense that it 
provides many detailed rules as to how public contracting should take place, 
including advertising and award procedures for different types of contract 
(e.g. monetary value and size) and normative in that EU public procurement 
law is hugely important to the goals of the European single market and the 
single market in services in particular.  
Germany also has a long history of regulating public contracting and 
placing detailed rules within (or next to) these statutes that reconcile 
collective bargaining and pay issues with the goals of competitive 
contracting. The core statute in Germany is the Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) or ‘Act against Restraints on Competition’ 
(Schulten 2014, Sack 2012). Rules governing wages in this framework 
traditionally took two forms: clauses in public contracts demanding 
adherence to a collective agreement (Tariftreueklausel33) or more 
comprehensive statutes, Tariftreuegesetze34, that sat next to the GWB (Schulten 
                                               
32 From 2016, the 2014 regime of public procurement directives comes into force, providing new 
versions of the 2004/17 (2014/25) and 2004/18 (2014/24) directive plus a new third directive on 
concessions contracts (2014/23) 
33 Loosely translated as ‘collective agreement fidelity clause’ 
34 Loosely translated as ‘collective agreement fidelity law (statute)’ 
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2014, Sack 2012). In Germany’s federal system, different states would use 
different sorts of rules for different kinds of public contracts (construction, 
post, transport etc.), a theme returned to later on in this section. The GWB is 
placed under the EU’s public procurement regime35, but conflicts between 
EU law and German law on the issue of wages and that accompanied the 
GWB were not a problem until the CJEU engaged upon its ‘interpretive turn’ 
in the 2008 Rüffert. 
 
2.3.2. ii  The Rüffert judgement and the CJEU’s new posted workers 
case  law 
The 2008 Rüffert case is first placed in a context of an “interpretive turn” 
pursued by the CJEU on posted workers matters. The Rüffert decision came 
a little over three months after the CJEU delivered its conjoined Laval and 
Viking decisions, the first of which is a posted workers case and the second 
not, despite having a very similar fact pattern (mobile (‘posted’) workers, and 
a mobile company, strike action and a collective agreement).  
A distinction is made between the implications of the Laval case and 
the German Rüffert case. Laval raised the twinned issues of collectively agreed 
wages being extended to posted workers and industrial action (including a 
trade union-led blockade). The fact pattern in Rüffert was slightly different as 
there was no strike action at issue in this case, but, as in Laval, it did concern 
collectively-bargained minimum wages. It did however possess an 
additional factor not present in the Laval case: a statutory provision extending 
the pay rates in the collective agreement to cover posted workers.  
                                               
35 There are four main areas of federal law ratifying EU public procurement law: Award Rules for 
Public Contracts (Verordnung über die Vergabe öffentlicher. Aufträge, VgV), Building Work Award 
and Contract Code (Vergabe-und Vertragsordnungen für Bauleistungen, VOB/A), Award and 
Contract Code for Supplies and Services (Vergabe-und Vertragsordnungen für Leistungen, 
VOL/A), Award Rules for Professional Services (Vergabe- und Vertragsordnungen für 
freiberufliche Leistungen, VOF) (Schulten 2014). 
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Before continuing to outline with the details of these statutory 
provisions it is important to understand the characteristics of the ‘employer’ 
in this construction sector context. In short, in large public contracts that 
contain lots of sub-contracts within them, employer interests are split 
between a primary contractor and a series of sub-contractors; the latter of whom 
agree to the terms of the sub-contract which include terms of employment 
and wages. Additionally, although not pertinent in this case study, a ‘client’ 
contracted the primary contractor in the first instance, so sits atop a 
procurement contract ‘supply chain’. 
 
Figure 2.3.a contracting supply chains 
 
Facts of the case: The Rüffert case concerned the north-western state of 
Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen) and a litigation brought by Dirk Rüffert, the 
liquidator of the assets of the company Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co. 
KG. who acted as the primary contractor and signatory of a publicly 
procured works contract. Legislation in Lower Saxony concerning labour 
standards in public contracts (Landesvergabegesetz) mandated that all 
signatories of such a public contract must abide by the wage rules of a 
regional collective agreement (a form of Tariftreueklausel36) for the 
                                               
36 A clause demanding adherence to a collective agreement 
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construction sector. Paragraph 3(1) of the Landesvergabegesetz is provided 
below: 
 
 ‘Contracts for building services shall be awarded only to undertakings which, when 
lodging a tender, undertake in writing to pay their employees, when performing 
those services, at least the remuneration prescribed by the collective 
agreement at the place where those services are performed and at the time 
prescribed by the collective agreement.’ 
 
This provision constitutes the central means to impose collective 
bargaining rules and norms across this sector. The other important aspect of 
the case concerns legal rules demanding that this provision be enforced by 
primary contractors onto any selected sub-contractors. This raises the subject of 
liability in contracting supply chains that itself presents several different 
regulatory options to enforce such rules concerning wages and employment 
(Heinen et al. 2017). Paragraph 4.1. Below sees primary contractors given the 
primary responsibility to ensure that legal regulations are not just included 
in the terms of contract but that these are also enforced at the expense of a 
monetary fine.  
 
Paragraph 4(1): 
‘The contractor may assign to sub-contractors services for which his establishment 
is set up […] In so far as services are assigned to subcontractors, the contractor 
must also undertake to impose on the subcontractors the obligations laid 
down in Paragraphs 3, 4 and 7(2) applicable to contractors and to monitor 
compliance with these obligations by the subcontractors.’ 
 
As a regulatory enforcement issue, the above means that primary contractors 
must perform part of the state’s enforcement job instead of the state itself.  
	 -	204	-	
This form of liability regulation is understood as ‘joint several liability’ as 
supposed the ‘chain liability’ where risks and responsibility are shared more 
across sub-contractors (ibid.). 
The failure of primary contractors to apply and enforce minimum 
rates of pay throughout their procurement supply chains would incur a fine 
of 10% of the contract’s value. In Rüffert, Objekt und Bauregie sub-contracted 
some works to a Polish contractor who were later found to be paying 53 
workers only 46.5% of a minimum wage rate of the regional collective 
agreement. After an investigation, the state authorities revoked the contract 
from the primary contractor, Objekt und Bauregie, and levied the fine on the 
Polish sub-contractor. Objekt und Bauregie went into liquidation. The 
liquidator, Mr. Rüffert, took the case to the Higher regional court 
(Oberlandesgericht), only to be referred to the European Court. 
At this point prior to the dispute getting to the Oberlandesgericht, it is 
important to note that the only regulatory and governance problem is one of 
enforcement. A company has already at this point agreed to contractual terms 
that demand adherence to established labour relations practice, and another 
company is also bound by this contractual commitment courtesy of the primary 
contractor’s signing a contract demanding this. Mr Rüffert tried to impose 
economic law rules found in European free movement rights over these state-
level laws in Lower Saxony, and the contractual terms demanding such 
adherence, despite the company having already agreed to it. For the CJEU to 
find in his favour would create two serious conflict of rules problems: one, 
where the place of collective bargaining, and laws reinforcing it, become 
seriously undermined. This problem would leave workers in a potentially 
worse position in material terms as there would no longer be any mandated 
minimum wages in place.  Two, a regime of contract law would also be 
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seriously undermined if signatories can simply walk away from contractual 
terms they had already agreed to. 
The Rüffert decision, similar to the Laval decision in Sweden, was 
destructive in its effect on existing law and practice, but in one sense went 
further than the 2007 Laval decision. In Laval, no area of law existed that could 
extend, attach nor demand adherence to collectively-bargaining wage rates 
to non-signatories as this process of extension was achieved autonomously 
by well-organised trade unions and employer organisations in Sweden. In 
Rüffert a legal rule demanding adherence was present in Germany. The Court 
struck this down, declaring it illegal under EU free movement law, and 
preventing German authorities from relying on these to legally underpin pay 
clauses in public contracts.  
This is true in regards to four of the PWD’s provisions – article 3(7), 3(8) 
and 3(10). First, the CJEU deemed such laws to be in breach of article 3(7) of 
the PWD37, turning this feature of the PWD into a regulatory ceiling from 
which national regulators could operate from, rather than the floor that the 
original PWD intended it to be (A.C.L. Davies 2008, Novitz and Syrpis 2008, 
Kilpatrick 2009c). The normative thrust of the PWD, that originally sought to 
balance social and economic rights, was therefore reversed so as to place 
economic rights of free movement law above and superior to social rights of 
workers demanded by the original directive. The CJEU not only closed off 
article 3(7) to national authorities seeking to impose local wage rules, but it 
also closed off article 3(8) and 3(10) of the PWD. Article 3(10) of the PWD was 
meant to allow national authorities to impose local/national wage under 
justifiable ‘public policy’ considerations, including policy goals designed to 
avoid ‘wage dumping’ practices. This avenue for national authorities 
                                               
37 That states that national authorities must not be prevented from applying higher standards 
those detailed in articles 3(1) to 3(6) 
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however was curtailed in the Luxembourg case delivered shortly after the 
Rüffert case.  
With article 3(8), the Court stated that if minimum wages were not 
made ‘generally applicable’ in law, then these would not satisfy EU free 
movement rules. This is a hugely important aspect of the judgement that 
appeared to make legal minimum wages compatible with EU law but 
collectively agreed minimum wages incompatible. In deciding this, the court 
rendered pay clauses drawn from collective agreements as an unacceptable 
hindrance to the free movement rights of business. This illustrates the 
ambitions of a court actor clearly seeking to use law to close off space for 
collective bargaining to be imposed on mobile business.  
None of the text of the PWD has been altered since its creation in 1996. 
How this text has been interpreted and enforced has been subject to radical 
shifts courtesy of the CJEU’s own shift in approach38. The presence of three 
sets of rules provided by a piece of legislation, a public procurement contract 
and a collective agreement may appear complex, but the arrangement was 
not producing significant problems until the CJEU delivered its Laval and 
Rüffert decision. The CJEU created a very clear conflict of rules problem that 
undermined not only a German labour relations regime already in decline, 
but also the integrity of the EU’s own public procurement regime of the EU’s 
own making.  
In the sub-section below, the different attempts made at the state (Land) 
level to adjust to Rüffert are examined. The success of these attempts, and one 
in particular, will later find itself in front of the CJEU.  
 
 
                                               
38 Described earlier in this chapter and in chapter 2.2. 
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2.3.2. iii. The response to Rüffert 
The reaction to the 2008 Rüffert case from German trade unions and their 
political allies in the SPD was ferocious. The CJEU’s decision was deemed to 
be a serious affront to the principles of German labour relations and those 
associated with the European social model. Wage standards, German unions 
claimed, could only be maintained if foreign employers are subject to these 
same standards when they employed their (posted) workers on German soil. 
This country of operation principle (‘host state rules’) however clearly 
contradicted the country of origin principle (‘home state rules’) that was now 
being favoured by the Court in its posted workers case law and other 
jurisprudence described in chapter 2.2.  
Despite the anger this generated, the response did not take the form 
of a militant strike seen in Laval and in Britain in the next chapter, but instead 
saw an adjustment based in legislative change. Such reforms did partly correct 
the problem noted earlier where an industrial sector would be left without 
any form of minimum wage rate. These attempts at adjustment, again, took 
place at the state (Land) level after an attempt in 2002 to create a federal-wide 
Tariftreuegesetze had failed. This section draws on existing literature (Sack et 
al. 2015, Schulten 2014) to examine the responses of German states to Rüffert 
and map these responses to defending Tariftreuegesetze and Tariftreueklausel. 
Detlev Sack maps the German states by the presence and kind of 
Tariftreuegesetze or Tariftreueklausel that were in place before and after the 
Rüffert decision. At this point, the reader is referred to Sack’s 2012 paper for 
the finer details, and illustrative graphs, as these are not particularly relevant 
here. What is relevant are those states that did produce these legislative 
responses to Rüffert and why they did so. What is very clear form Sack’s work 
is the role of political-ideological interests of partisan coalitions at the state 
level in shaping these responses.   
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The economically conservative CDU and FDP parties, where they held 
positions in state-level coalitions, were usually influential in removing 
Tariftreuegesetze or Tariftreueklausel  or in these not being present even before 
the Rüffert decision in 2008 (making the point moot in these Länder). In total, 
eleven of Germany’s sixteen federal states produced amendments to existing 
legislation or produced entirely new statutes. Bavaria, Hessen and Saxony, 
quickly took the opportunity to remove legislation demanding adherence to 
collectively bargained wages. Other states, where social democrats were in 
control however (usually in a coalition), made these efforts to find a legal 
remedy to Rüffert so as to defend pay clauses in public procurement.  
The solutions developed by the latter set of states centred around 
European public procurement directives, per the advice of specialists and 
lawyers (Sack 2012, Interview GPWD1). As already described, the role of 
public procurement law is de facto already present in posted workers matters 
given its role in organising contracting-based construction industry where 
posted workers are mostly used. What some German states did however was 
to look beyond the economic law element of the directives, that try to foster 
competition and market access, so as to find some space to provide for social 
considerations such as those concerning wages.  Article 26 of the directive 
2004/18 provides for the imposition of non-economic ‘special conditions’ 
upon bidders and winners of public contracts.  
 
Contracting authorities may lay down special conditions (emphasis added) 
relating to the performance of a contract, provided that these are compatible with 
Community law and are indicated in the contract notice or in the specifications. The 
conditions governing the performance of a contract may, in particular, 
concern social and environmental considerations.’39  
                                               
39 In the new public procurement directives article 26 on special conditions is included under article 
70. 
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To attach ‘special conditions’ to public contracts, drafters needed to 
make sure these conditions, if guided by social considerations, were connected 
to the economic objectives of the contract. Of more encouragement to those 
German policy-makers was the existence of a specific ‘special conditions’ 
provision in recital 34 of the same directive: 
 
(34) “Directive [96/71] lays down the minimum conditions which must be observed 
by the host country in respect of such posted workers. If national law contains 
provisions to this effect, non-compliance with those obligations may be 
considered to be grave misconduct or an offence concerning the professional 
conduct of the economic operator concerned, liable to lead to the exclusion 
of that economic operator from the procedure for the award of a public 
contract”.      
   
  (part of) Recital 34, Directive 2004/18. 
 
The government of Rhineland-Palatinate (Rhineland Pfalz) was one state to 
employ the above provisions to try and adapt rules concerning pay clauses 
for the purposes of posted workers being employed in their state. The logic 
of this adjustment is a simple one: the CJEU dismantled the posted workers 
directive and closed it off as a meaningful avenue to apply national labour 
rules. Therefore national authorities would try and circumvent it and look 
for alternative options to do the same thing within EU law. The logic therefore 
is, in one sense, a gamble: will the CJEU blow holes in the EU’s own public 
procurement directives as well as its directive on the posting of workers? It 
was a risk, but in the absence of better options this legislative approach was 
an innovative to create a remedy. 
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 These questions were only partly answered by the RegioPost decision 
below, but are still important theoretically. For the purposes of this thesis’s 
theoretical goals, this RegioPost case represents the culmination of an eight-
year process where legal intervention is met by an adjustment response that 
is eventually tested in law and by the same CJEU that caused this regulatory 
and governance problem in the first instance (in Rüffert). Importantly, it sees 
German labour relations, instead of being led by the ‘social partners’ of 
collective bargaining, relying on public policy support and associated 
partisan allies in the face of a judicial actor intent on imposing economic law 
on regimes designed by rules demanding social protection. The role of law 
and the adjustment to it found in law and non-law became a central feature 
of a labour relations regime not traditionally defined by such features. 
 
2.3.2.iv The 2015 RegioPost case 
The use of these provisions in EU public procurement directives by state 
legislators of Rhineland-Palatinate was based on two goals: First, to continue 
imposing collectively bargained pay clauses, and two, a legal minimum wage 
rate if a collective agreement was absent. This response to the Rüffert case 
was put before the CJEU in the RegioPost case.  
The case facts are outlined here. The municipality of Landau issued a 
European Union-wide call for tender under an open procedure regulated by 
the EU public procurement law. The services in question were for 
various postal services (collection, parcels, letters, etc.). Attached to the 
advertised contract was the requirement to honour the provisions of the 
Tariftreuegesetze in Rhineland-Palatinate that would ensure compliance with 
the regional collective agreement and minimum wages in public contract 
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awards (thereafter the ‘LTTG’40).  The case was brought by the primary 
contractor - RegioPost GmbH - against the city of Landau over a dispute 
concerning the imposition of pay rules in a procurement contract that 
RegioPost had already been awarded. The sub-contractors had performed 
their administrative due diligence demonstrating their intention to comply, 
but RegioPost, the primary contractor, curiously had not done so, refusing to 
claiming that their free movement rights were being infringed.  
The Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Rhineland-Palatinate 
referred the case to the Court of Justice with questions addressing the PWD, 
the Public Procurement Directive for public works (2004/18), the GWB41 and 
the LTTG. As described in the CJEU’s judgment, “under point 4 of section III 
2.2 of the contract notice, under the heading ‘Economic and financial 
standing’, ‘the successful tenderer shall comply with the provisions of the 
LTTG”. The key passage in the LTTG is represented by its fourth paragraph 
entitled ‘Obligation to comply with collective agreements’: 
 
‘(1)      Public contracts […] may be awarded only to undertakings which undertake 
in writing, at the time of submitting their tender, to pay their staff, for performing 
the service, a remuneration which, in its amount and form, corresponds at least to 
the provisions of the collective agreement by which the undertaking is bound under 
[that Law]. 
Paragraph 4, the ‘LTTG’. 
 
This provision demands the undertakings can only be awarded 
contracts if they agree to pay their workers, posted or not, according to the 
collective agreement in place. This above provision raises a potential ‘Rüffert 
                                               
40 A version of a ‘Tariftreuegesetze’ Landesgesetz zur Gewährleistung von Tariftreue und 
Mindestentgelt bei öffentlichen Auftragsvergaben – thereafter ‘LTTG’. 
41 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen - federal legislation against restrictions to 
competition 
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problem’. Does the CJEU allow, this time, collectively agreed pay to be 
imposed on posted workers through the use of EU public procurement law?  
From this came a further demand providing for the joint several 
liability regulation raised earlier, meaning that the primary contractor must 
ensure that sub-contractors complied to these wage rules, thus becoming the 
primary enforcer of a statute demanding adherence to a collective agreement. 
 
 ‘Where contractual services are to be performed by subcontractors, the undertaking 
shall ensure that those subcontractors comply with the obligations referred to in 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 and shall provide the contracting authority with the 
subcontractors’ declarations regarding the minimum wage and compliance with 
collective agreements. …’ 
 
Paragraph 5(2) of the LTTG. 
 
RegioPost and its subcontractors had to provide written confirmation that 
would commit them to either the regional minimum wage laid down in 
paragraph 3(1) or the mandated rate. RegioPost refused to provide these 
commitments (although oddly, the subcontractors that RegioPost 
commissioned did), claiming that these demands to observe such minimum 
wages was in breach of their free movement rights guaranteed by EU law42.  
This prompts a question from Rüffert: did the company RegioPost 
agree to terms of the contract knowing that they would ignore any rules on wage 
standards later? It is possible, and if true would represent a clear attempt by a 
company to ignore its contractual obligations by exercising legal rights 
                                               
42 One might question the wisdom of the company RegioPost for objecting to a contractual term 
demanded in the originally advertised public contract that they had already agreed to.  
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(provided by a court) to do so. The Rüffert case very likely acted as a signal 
of sorts to this sort of opportunism.  
This prompted the legislative innovation outlined above concerning 
the use of hitherto unused provisions in EU public procurement law. The 
state government of Rhineland-Palatinate therefore successfully pushed the 
CJEU’s attention toward these provisions in EU public procurement law as 
the venue for managing conflicts between domestic labour regulation and 
free movement rights, rather than the PWD that was now full of holes 
courtesy of Laval, Rüffert and other cases of CJEU. Theoretically, the 
opportunistic interpretations of corporate actors to their legal rights and the 
interpretive adaptions of policy-makers pulled the direction of this area of 
EU law, that had clear normative intent behind it provided by the CJEU, into 
different directions. This underlines the malleable and mediated nature of 
law and legal rules. 
 
Article 26 of Directive 2004/18/EC […] must be interpreted as not precluding 
legislation of a regional entity of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, which requires tenderers and their subcontractors to undertake, by 
means of a written declaration to be enclosed with their tender, to pay staff who are 
called upon to perform the services covered by the public contract in question a 
minimum wage laid down in that legislation. 
            CJEU in RegioPost article 89(2) 
 
The Court’s judgement affirmed the use of this provision in EU public 
procurement law to defend wage standards but with important caveat. 
Despite the excitement in some quarters about this decision, its effect was 
limited in two ways. First, it only applied to the legal minimum wages 
defined by statute and not the rule demanding adherence to a collective 
agreement as there was none in place in this case. This does not aid a straight 
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RegioPost-Rüffert comparison given that the latter did have concerned this 
collective agreement present. Second, as the court was also silent on this issue 
concerning collectively bargained wages (using public procurement law as a 
prop), this problem is left unaddressed and we will likely have to wait until 
a new case is put before the court before knowing if the Court will EU public 
procurement law can be used to shield collective bargained minimum wage rates.   
 
2.3.2. v. Concluding comment to empirical section 
These empirical observations do produce a sort of anti-climax: a still 
incomplete set of outcomes where the role of collectively bargained 
minimum wages are left in a similar, but not quite the same, precarious 
position they were after the Laval and Rüffert cases. In theoretical terms 
however, the RegioPost case, despite its inability to settle the regulatory and 
governance problem of Rüffert, does produce a lot of interesting findings; 
namely those details of a legislative manoeuvre to nullify or mitigate the 
disruptive intervention of the CJEU in Rüffert. German collective bargaining 
institutions, the core defining part of German Tarifautonomie, were however 
already decline, as described in chapter 2.1 and demonstrated in chapter 2.5 
(Germany-Acquired Rights). This case presented an abrupt legal change that 
targeted an important legal support for collective bargaining. It also 
produced however the proliferation of new forms of ‘minimum wage only’ 
collective agreements43 that only adds another layer to a complicated set of 
wage-setting arrangements in modern Germany already weighed down by 
the fragmentation, decentralisation and erosion of collective bargaining in 
Germany as well as a post-2015 federal legal minimum wage. 
 
                                               
43 Interview GPWD1. 
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2.3.3. Theoretical findings  
The leading and broad empirical finding from this case study chapter centres 
around the claim that German Tarifautonomie has declined and has been 
displaced by the emergence of a complex entanglement between law and 
non-law. The institutions of Tarifautonomie however have not completely 
disappeared, leaving an inchoate and incomplete set of arrangements 
marked by competing yet co-existing tendencies. This case study saw 
regulatory and governance arrangements found in collective bargaining and 
labour law be joined forcefully by another body of law: public procurement 
law. This additional law-based feature will not be a factor in many other 
industries in Germany44, but the weakening of collective bargaining and 
trade unions does point to broader patterns of decline and deep complexity 
in German labour relations and law’s complicated, contradictory role within 
this. This chapter sees greater legal rule-making, neo-liberalism, and 
Europeanisation all come together to create this highly incomplete and 
complex emerging regime of German labour relations. 
This finding presents serious implications for CPE in regards to both 
its approach to German labour relations, which has featured so prominently 
and frequently in CPE studies, and European labour relations more broadly. 
The narrow collective bargaining-focused view of ‘labour relations’ that has 
dominated CPE is clearly inadequate. Not only did this case study represent 
a regulatory and governance problem created by a distinctly judicial actor (the 
CJEU), but more importantly this inspired a heavily politically 
contextualised law-based response rather than an adjustment led by the 
social partner actors of collective institutions that defined post-War 
Tarifautonomie. Tarifautonomie was based on the principles of minimal state 
                                               
44 The one useful interview pursued for this (GPWD1) did indicate that these issues were a feature 
in the meat-packing industry to go along side those of construction and post found in the Rüffert 
and RegioPost cases.  
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intervention, with German courts taking a purposively passive role thereby 
tacitly affirming place of the Tarifautonomie model but expressly reaffirming 
it when called upon. This approach of German courts, as detailed in chapter 
2.1, was in-effect a key doctrinal support for Tarifautonomie. German courts 
however, in this case and the following German case (2.5.), have had to adjust 
more and more over time to the demands of EU law and the European Court. 
This is demonstrated by German courts’ swift acquiescence to the European 
legal order by referring cases like Rüffert and RegioPost immediately to the 
CJEU.  
The importance of this process of referral is underlined with a 
comparison with the final chapter of this second section (2.6) where British 
courts do not simply refer cases up the European court, but pass their own 
judgement first, and then litigants can appeal the decision to the CJEU if they 
wish. In this German context, besides the greater role for legal rules and one 
judicial actor, the CJEU, German courts acquiescence to the EU legal order 
has in effect ended their previous doctrinal commitment to the legal 
principles of Tarifautonomie.  This is a key, and law-based, shift in the on-
going and slow process of German Tarifautonomie’s deconstruction.  
The terms mediation and contestation are used to understand how 
social actors, besides the legal actors like courts and the legislative state 
above, adapt and frame the legal demands placed before them. With the 
decline of Tarifautonomie has come the decline of German trade unions, 
whose weakened power resources and ability to enforce a desired regulatory 
and governance wage-setting regime is a key factor in the events in this case. 
A trade union’s role however can occur in a political or industrial context. In 
a political context, trade unions still had enough power to influence some 
state governments in adjusting to the Rüffert decision.  
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In a particular industrial setting however, again exhibited in the 
Rüffert case, companies felt they had the right and the opportunity to 
aggressively shape their own regulatory and governance environment 
assuming little push-back would come from unions on site (e.g. through a 
strike). In both Rüffert and RegioPost, companies agreed to conform to a local 
collective agreement only to later decide they would disregard it. To put it 
another way, in both cases the companies’ opportunism was particularly 
egregious as both refused to conform to a contract they had already signed. The 
difference being that in RegioPost the contract had not yet started and the 
company perceived it had the legal right to ignore the wage portions of the 
contract given the CJEU decisions in Rüffert and Laval.  
 The critical theoretical point is the nature of those rights and 
obligations provided in law and collective agreements are determined by the 
nature of their interpretation and their enforcement by key actors. In this 
case, companies pushed the envelope in regards to their perceived rights as 
they had the power resources to do so. These companies would not have 
ignored the obligations nailed down in a given contract, collective agreement 
or law if they thought these would be substantively challenged by either legal 
enforcement or by trade union action. This produces a clear comparison with 
those lessons drawn from the next chapter where it is trade unions who 
impose considerable power resources to expand their de facto rights of action 
in clear breach of their (and employer’s) de jure legal rights. 
The role of power resources was central to how the considerable 
conflict of rules problems in this chapter were addressed. These two modes of 
rights are organised into the table below before their interactions (and 
conflicts) in this case is mapped.  
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Table 2.3.b Conflicting rules: social rights and economic rights 
Social rights             Economic rights 
Collective Agreements European free movement law 
Laws extending collective 
bargained wages 
Public Procurement law 
Legal minimum wages Posted Workers law 
 
The CJEU, in its Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg decisions, essentially 
sought to reorder a complex regime of social and economic rights found from 
European and German law and institutions. Contextualising this ordering 
process sees EU free movement law placed at the top of a hierarchy that sees 
the economic rights of free movement law placed above and imposed upon those 
social rights provided by collective bargaining and those national laws used 
to support these. The one exception to this hierarchy, according to the CJEU, 
is that legal-statutory minimum wages are allowed to be imposed upon foreign 
companies and their posted workers and is therefore compatible with EU 
law.  
At the root of these conflict of rules is a basic conflict of normative 
principles. These can be managed and reconciled in different ways, usually 
involving a balancing process gauging trade-offs by legislators or courts. The 
German statute that governs public procurement, the GWB, sought to 
provide this sort of balance and not contradict state-level statutes reinforcing 
collective bargaining and the minimum wages contained within this 
(Tarifklausel, Tariftreuegesetze). This is also true, to an extent, of the EU’s public 
procurement directives that the GWB was created to enforce in Germany. 
Again, as reiterated above, the CJEU rejected this ‘balancing’ approach, 
where rights are seen as equal and reconciled, in favour of placing these 
competing rights into the hierarchy described above.  
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This theme of balancing rights may have been debunked in the Rüffert 
case (and Laval), but was to remerge when public procurement law was 
substantively introduced. Public procurement law provides a framework for 
economic rights to be exercised so as to increase competition for public 
contract awards, but both the German and European versions of public 
procurement law however did provide space for ‘social considerations’ to be 
exercised as well, as evidenced by the RegioPost case, thus seeking to assert 
this balancing act once more. This was a key part of the reasoning behind 
legislative adjustment strategy of some German states like Rhineland-
Palatinate that reached for public procurement as a remedy.   
This raised the prospect of a conflict between two areas of European 
law: public procurement, that allows ‘social considerations’ to form part of 
those rules and those governing posted workers, and the PWD (post-Laval 
and Rüffert) that did not. This conflict between European public procurement 
law and the CJEU’s posted workers case law, was at issue in the 2015 
RegioPost case. European public procurement law and posted workers law 
had considerable de facto overlap45, even if it had little de jure overlap in that 
very few specific and explicit provisions existed that connected them46. In 
Rüffert and Laval, the CJEU did not address this overlap. This became 
unavoidable however when German states starting reaching for European 
public procurement law to reframe the legal rules regulated posted workers 
and their pay. Theoretically this is important as it again sees the response, not 
the initial intervention, as just as important in formulating both legal 
frameworks, legal rights, and how these also interlock with non-legal 
                                               
45 To repeat an earlier point, posted workers are nearly always employed as part of publicly 
procured works contracts regulated (in when of a certain monetary size) by European public 
procurement law. 
46 Minus recital 34 of public procurement directive 2004/18 
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arrangements like collective bargaining. Shifts to the regulatory an 
governance regime is, again, heavily contested and mediated in this case.   
 The attempt of the CJEU to reject a balanced approach and to settle this 
conflict of rules by subordinating one (social rights) to the other (economic) in a 
hierarchy, purposively favoured the normative principles of economic rights 
of profit-seekers, competition and market-making. As a conflict of laws 
concept helps organise different rights into shifting and unstable hierarchies, 
this unveils important legal characteristics of European neo-liberalism.  
Germany’s further insertion into a European legal order is 
simultaneously seeing its on-going insertion into an increasingly neo-
liberalism-framed single European market. Although German legislative 
responses to the 2008 Rüffert case sought to mitigate or minimise the 
disruptive impact of this CJEU decision, instead they, in-effect, 
simultaneously furthered a process of German labour relations’ 
Europeanisation and juridification. This is a very important theoretical point 
for the broader goals of this thesis, as it sees a national regime of labour 
relations, and a German model that has long been seen as an archetype, 
increasingly having its borders blurred as its core components are weakened 
and become part of a broader European legal and market system. ‘European’ 
labour relations will never be purely transnational, but the national level 
aspects of EU members’ labour relations ‘models’ will cease to be purely 
‘national’.  
 This German experience will clearly not be mirrored in other European 
countries, as some will retain more of their labour relations regimes more 
than others. This case study, and the British cases that follow it, will however 
confirm that CPE theories of European labour relations are lacking a serious 
and credible account of legal factors and their connections to both European 
legal integration and neo-liberalism’s advance. The path dependencies that 
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defined German labour relations, and collective bargaining in particular, 
were already eroding and failing. The interests of employers were not as 
wedded to the preservation of collective bargaining and other coordination 
institutions as much as VoC scholars thought. More realistic appraisals of 
employers’ interests in an era of European neo-liberalism are more likely to 
be found in CWC and RT approaches. 
 
2.3.4. Conclusion 
 
“This case presented an abrupt legal change that targeted an important legal support 
for collective bargaining. It also produced however the proliferation of new forms of 
‘minimum wage only’ collective agreements47 that only adds another layer to a 
complicated set of wage-setting arrangements in modern Germany already weighed 
down by the fragmentation, decentralisation and erosion of collective bargaining in 
Germany as well as a post-2015 federal legal minimum wage.”  
 
This passage above was taken from the concluding paragraph of the 
empirical section of this chapter as it captures the complex set of problems 
this case study demonstrates from German labour relations at large. 
This case study, and the others that follow it, demonstrated that law 
is not a top-down, command-and-control drive process but one that is 
mediated and contested with interests defined by power resources and 
politics. Even in a case exhibiting a court-ordered change to legal rules.  
A doctrinaire and ‘black letter’ account no more useful to understand 
law’s role that the completely law-less accounts of most CPE. Law is often 
designed to mediate, but sometimes must have its attempts at mediation 
mediated itself. This case offered such an example: a court adjudicates in a 
                                               
47 Interview GPWD1. 
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case, but does so in such a disruptive and politically controversial manner 
that it provokes a new mediating response from social actors that have their 
claims, and resources to make claims, to different legal and non-legal rights. 
In this chapter, this response was itself distinctly legal (and legislative) in 
nature. In the following chapter, it is not. 
In the following posted workers chapter concerning Britain, the role 
of these same CJEU decisions is again at issue, but instead acts at a distance 
as no CJEU decision of this sort saw Britain’s labour relations practice put 
before the European Court. This sets up one neat comparison between two 
posted workers-based-case studies, where some aspects of industrial context 
and legal context are the same, but some aspects of law (namely the role of 
the CJEU) and the response by labour to pressures to change are very different. 
In this case study concerning Germany, a creative legislative route was used 
to mollify and respond to the CJEU’s decisions, with the ultimate outcome 
still uncertain. In Britain, the response was militant industrial action to a 
perceived threat of posted workers to a form of labour relations the workers 
wanted retained. 
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Chapter 2.4.  
British labour relations and European Posted Workers law 
 
2.4.1. Introduction 
This case study chapter, like the previous chapter, concerns the subject of 
European posted workers law. Two main differences however stand out: the 
first is that, unlike in the German case, no CJEU decision was directed toward 
Britain and the way it regulated posted workers issues, nor has there been 
any legislative implementation of the PWD at the national level in Britain 
(1996 to present day)48. Second, and despite the controversy surrounding 
posted workers issues in Britain in the 2000s, the response to these was very 
different from that in the German case. In the German case study, a legislative 
response was pursued to try to preserve as much of German wage-setting 
practice as possible. In Britain, the response was delivered through trade 
union-led strike action. This response was not pursued by the political state in 
this case and kept it within the industrial context where the dispute arose, 
and successfully forced employers to negotiate a settlement through a new 
collective agreement.  Theoretically, this creates pertinent comparisons with 
the other three case study chapters as it essentially sees the form of labour 
relations in this case successfully pulled away and separated from the 
reaches of law and the legal intervention that sought to change it manifested 
through employers attempts to activate legal rights in situ rather than in a 
court or through lobbying for legislation. 
                                               
48 It is usual and expected for EU member states to ‘transpose’ European directives into national 
law through statute. On some occasions when new directives are passed by the EU it will not be 
necessary for a member state to do this if national law already broadly conforms to EU law that 
area.  
	 -	225	-	
 With a CJEU decision being specifically directed at Germany in the 
previous chapter, that case study chapter revolved around that case (Rüffert) 
and everything that stemmed from it. In this British case, again, no CJEU 
posted workers judgement had been directed toward the UK, so the central 
unit of analysis of this British case study comes through hugely controversial 
set of events that occurred in 2009.  
These events began with and were led by one central dispute at an 
energy plant in Lincolnshire, eastern England. This is outlined briefly here 
but described in detail in the first section later. An Italian company employed 
posted workers on a subcontract it was awarded to perform at an energy 
depot in Lindsey, in Lincolnshire. The company was then to be accused of 
not applying the collective agreement of the British construction sector, 
sparking an unofficial (i.e. illegal49) strike at this Lincolnshire site. From this, 
a wave of disruptive solidarity50 actions spread across the British 
construction sector as well as adjacent (other construction) sectors. The 
disputes were given further political prominence by a context provided by 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown, whose quote from the Labour party 
conference in the previous year, ‘British Jobs for British Workers’, was 
adopted as ironic slogans by strikers on their strike placards. The strikes 
became serious enough to prompt a meeting of ‘Cobra’, the UK government’s 
cross-departmental emergency committee usually convened in the event of 
serious incidents such as terrorist attacks (Randall 2009).  
The dispute was ended by a settlement with the strikers, their trade 
unions and the contractors and sub-contractors involved. This was despite 
the striking workers and their unions being offered little in EU and UK law 
                                               
49 ‘Illegal’ here means that the strikers can be subject to sanction under civil law for breach of 
contract and tortious liability (economic damages of the employer) and not criminal law sanction. 
(TULRCA section 220, 241. Deakin and Morris 2009, p. 897-915) 
50 Also known as ‘secondary actions’ 
	 -	226	-	
that supported either their industrial action or the new collective agreement 
the strike helped forge. In fact, the state of the law (both European and British 
law) provided employers with a strong set of rights to bring the strikes to an 
end. Therefore, the empirical subjects of this case study prompt a clear 
question: if the legal rights at issue so clearly favour employers and not 
workers, how did the latter manage to forge a regulatory and governance 
outcome that clearly contradicted it? The answer is found in a contradiction 
between de jure rights of action de facto rights brought to bear by the power 
resources of unions; powers not evident in the other three case study 
chapters. 
These events of 2009, placed under the broad label the ‘BJBW dispute’, 
therefore provide the empirical basis of this case study. A further analytical 
line of enquiry is pursued using the arguments of labour lawyer Claire 
Kilpatrick as an operational hypothesis. Kilpatrick’s argument is as follows: 
the CJEU Laval and Rüffert decisions “contributed to the widespread social 
unrest in the UK” and […] created a ‘regulatory conundrum’ for member 
states as they were now unsure how to impose their own wage norms upon 
posted workers on their territory (Kilpatrick 2009b, 2009c). It is difficult to 
empirically validate Kilpatrick's the claim, ex ante, that CJEU decisions were 
responsible for provoking the dispute in the first instance. In examining this 
case, it is argued however that it is highly likely to have been the case in one 
key respect: employers identified and sought to exploit new legal rights 
found in the CJEU’s Laval and Rüffert line of case law. Moreover, it is argued 
in this chapter that these CJEU decisions were influential in the aftermath of 
the dispute, and framed a negotiated settlement that ended the dispute.  
Crucially and theoretically, this settlement acted to pull the regime of 
labour relations in question away from the reaches of legal encroachment. The text 
of the collective agreement that defines this ‘negotiated settlement’, other 
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documentary and interview data are used alongside the kind of analysis of 
legal texts seen in the previous chapter. 
This chapter, as with the other three case study chapters, is organised 
into two broad sections, an empirical section and a theoretical section. The 
first section (2.4.2) begins with a more detailed description and mapping of 
the BJBW dispute (2.4.2.i). This is then followed by a legal analysis section of 
this dispute and places it within a comparative context with the Laval and 
Rüffert cases (2.4.2.ii) which is important given the absence of any similar case 
concerning Britain. The section is completed by a dedicated section 
examining the new collective agreement forged as the settlement to the 
dispute (2.4.2.iii). 
 
2.4.2. Empirical section 
2.4.2.i Context: the 2009 Lindsey dispute  
This section provides a contextual mapping of the original BJBW dispute. 
Some aspects of industrial context are outlined first. These disputes occurred 
within the energy and power segment of the construction sector, but was 
covered by a collective agreement mentioned above for the engineering and 
construction sector (the NAECI). As witnessed in the other Britain-focused 
(acquired rights) chapter, collective bargaining institutions included a 
‘national joint council’ (NJC), a body that acts as an intermediary actor that 
governs the collective bargaining process for that sector. In this case 
concerning Britain constructions sector it was termed ‘NJCECI’51. The 
employers’ association was called the EICA52 but identifying ‘the employers’ 
and ‘employer interests’ in this sector is more complex as this actor is not 
                                               
51 NJC’s are the organisations set up by both sides of the pay bargaining relationship to manage 
collective agreement issues, as noted in the other UK focused chapter. 
52 Engineering and Construction Industry Association. 
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singular, but represented by a primary contractor and a series of 
subcontractors that are awarded contracts by this primary contractor. The 
figure from the previous chapter is used again to illustrate the multi-faceted 
and multi-level reality of 'employer interests'. 
 
Figure 2.4.a contracting supply chains 
 
 
To make things more complex, the primary contractor is often 
awarded the overarching contract by a ‘client’. In short, a major part of the 
‘regulatory and governance problem’ sees unions and the NJC not merely 
trying to get one employer actor to adhere to the collective agreement (the 
NAECI), but make sure it is adhered to throughout the primary contract’s sub-
contracted parts.  
The BJBW dispute arose because of the use of foreign ‘posted’ workers 
by a foreign subcontractor and had two connected issues at the centre of the 
dispute: one, the sensitive migration politics resulting from the use of posted 
workers over native workers; and two, the wages of the posted workers and how 
these compared to ‘native’ workers. The dispute centred around the building of 
a hydro de-sulphurisation facility at the Total oil refinery in Lindsey, 
Lincolnshire. An Italian sub-contractor, called IREM53, won an emergency 
tender to fill in a previously dropped subcontract as part of the project. 
                                               
53 Company website: https://www.irem.it/en/company/ 
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Crucially, IREM brought in 200 Italian and Portuguese ‘posted workers’ to 
perform the subcontract. As IREM carried out the contract, complaints from 
native British workers began to emerge around the two points earlier: the 
hiring of foreign workers in question and their pay. On January 28th, workers 
embarked on a walkout and then blockade of the site involving 3000 workers 
(Ince et al., 2015, Booth 200954). As the dispute at Lindsey became more 
serious, other solidarity or ‘sympathy’ actions arose at a large number of 
refineries and depots throughout the UK55. 
In the June of 2009, another unofficial strike was pursued by an initial 
180 workers that grew to over a thousand at Lindsey and solidarity strikes 
totalling 8000 workers across the UK (ibid.). In truth, the conditions of this 
dispute, with the use of foreign posted workers at their heart, were present 
in the years prior to the BJBW dispute at Lindsey. This sees the dispute of 
2009 act as the culminating event of on-going changes within a British 
construction industry that was becoming more transnational in terms of the 
companies bidding for contracts and the workers that were sourced to work 
on them56; these same developments were also evident in the Laval and 
Rüffert cases raised in the previous two chapters. 
The legal and political context in Britain at the time made this dispute, 
and its outcome, peculiar. The strikes in Lindsey and beyond were 
‘unofficial’ as no formal balloting process took place so were organic in 
nature and not the result of formal, top-down union organising that would 
have culminated in a strike ballot. Reforms in Britain after the 1980s had 
heavily restricted the right to strike and had completely banned 
secondary/solidarity actions. The organic nature of the strike, that elevated 
                                               
54 Booth, R. The Guardian (2009) ‘Mediators called in as wildcat strikes spread across the UK’. The 
Guardian 31/01/2009 
55 BBC News online (30/1/2009) ‘Refinery strikes spread across UK’ [accessed: April 2014] available 
from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7859968.stm  
56 Interview with NJC official (BPWD1) 
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rank-and-file union members rather than senior union officials, put the 
leadership of the trade unions in a difficult position.  
Despite being caught on the back foot, the trade union officials (not lay 
members who initiated the strike on site) were central to ending the dispute 
through a negotiated settlement involving the primary contractors and IREM 
and a reformed collective agreement (NAECI). The settlement with IREM 
brought 102 new jobs on the same offending subcontract, with most of these 
going to local workers (Gall 2012). IREM still did not reveal however, 
interestingly, what rate they were paying the posted workers57 in the original 
dispute. The new collective agreement is examined below. 
 
2.4.2.ii  The Settlement: collective bargaining and collective action 
 in the shadow law 
 
The ‘settlement’, as labelled above, comes in four parts: the resolution 
reached with IREM that saw new job offers for local/native workers; the 
rescinding of dismissals ordered for striking workers, and the reformed 
NAECI and a new pay audit58 regime where contractors must disclose their 
rates of pay.  The focus of this sub-section is on the new collective agreement 
and the pay audits.  This is pursued in data terms with the use of the text 
from this new NAECI, some accompanying documentary evidence in the 
form of these pay audits and interview data from the trade union side and 
from the NJC59. 
                                               
57 A year earlier, the Alstom dispute in Staythorpe, Nottinghamshire produced a similar set of facts 
concerning hiring preference and the rates of pay that undercut the NAECI. 
58 Documentary sources BPWDdocC1, BPWDdocC2, BPWDdocC3 (in Appendix) were provided 
important contextual information by interview BPWD2 
59 I was also allowed to attend a cross-union meeting of officials from Unite and the GMB unions 
which was extremely useful to provide practical context to the post-2009 NAECI’s application, 
seven years after the dispute. 
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There are two interconnected reasons why this new collective 
agreement is important: First, the contents of the new post-Lindsey NAECI 
came directly as a result of the 2009 BJBW dispute60. Second, with an eye on the 
contextualised legal analysis noted above, this new collective agreement and 
attached reforms were designed with full knowledge of the CJEU decisions 
in Laval. Third, despite the knowledge on the part of the authors of the 
current state of EU law, the new collective agreement at several points 
contravenes current EU law, including these CJEU decisions in Rüffert, Viking 
and in particular Laval. Fourth, and looking forward to the theoretical section 
of this chapter, as this new collective agreement provided an on-going 
‘settlement’, it constituted a reinforcement of the labour relations regime, at 
least for that in this sector. In doing so, it resolves a ‘conflict of rules’ problem 
between this collectively bargained settlement (the NAECI and pay audits) 
and set of legal rules found in UK and EU law.  It does however create a new 
conflict of rules problem given that this new agreement contravenes EU law 
as defined by the CJEU’s Laval and Rüffert decisions concerning collectively 
agreed pay. This conflict or rules however has been allowed to remain, at least 
up until Britain’s exit from the EU61. 
The new post-2009 NAECI62 was demonstrably different from that in 
place before 2009 because of the inclusion of a new provision called 
‘Appendix G’. The BJBW dispute was in fact the reason behind Appendix G’s 
inclusion in the NAECI and was confirmed in interviews with union 
(BPWD2) and industry officials (BPWD1). Appendix G specifically sought to 
regulate “non-UK contractors and non-UK labour”. The third paragraph 
                                               
60 Interviews confirmed this, but copies of three post-Lindsey NAECI’s were sourced (Appendix: 
BPWDdocA1, : BPWDdocA2, : BPWDdocA3) 
61 With this said, and by the time this thesis submitted, it is not clear if EU public procurement law, 
or other single market law, would apply to the UK as part of any EU exit or transition arrangment. 
No speculation is offered here on this point. 
62 For the period 2010-2012 period, and all the successor NAECI’s signed since. 
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(third bullet point) of provision G.2 states that ‘managing contractors’ must 
“ensure that the non-UK contractor is aware that the project requires all “in-
scope63 labour” to be directly employed under the terms of [the] NAECI”. 
This underlines a demand that all terms of the NAECI, including the pay 
scales, must be adhered to by non-UK contractors. The demands for foreign 
contractors to apply to the NAECI rates of pay to their posted workers, again, 
contravenes the CJEU decisions in Laval and Rüffert.  
Two important pieces of evidence from interviews were produced on 
this point concerning the NAECI rates of pay and EU law. The union official 
indicated that the CJEU decisions in this area were a concern and indicated 
that a number of lines of legal liability in UK and European law did weigh 
down this new post-2009 NAECI64. The interviewee from the NJC, well 
placed to speak to both the interests of unions and contractors (employers), 
also spoke to some of these issues, the important ones being why employers 
agreed to the NAECI. There was considerable tension in the points this 
interviewee made. On the one hand he indicated that Appendix G was 
merely “advisory” and “guidance based” and that EU public procurement 
law demanding EU-wide advertising of contracts could not be ignored65. On 
the other hand he clearly stated that that foreign contractors who enquired 
about bidding were told in no uncertain terms that they had to adhere to the 
NAECI collective agreement as they would be “in serious trouble” if they did 
not. In describing why this needed to be laid out to prospective foreign 
contractors, the NJC official said that the threat of union unrest hung heavy 
over these issues of work and pay and that any disruption would be 
profoundly serious from the client’s perspective66. He described in detail the 
                                               
63 In the scope of the NAECI 
64 Interview BPWD2 
65 Interview BPWD1 
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highly time-sensitive nature of construction sector contracts in that if work 
was completed late or was faulty, the client would claim ‘liquidated 
damages’ per terms agreed for such damages in the (sub-contract).  
This is an important point theoretically and speaks to this tension in 
the regulatory and governance regime crafted after 2009 and how it is 
applied in the shadow of law, particularly the demands of public 
procurement law. Clearly, both the union and employer side were highly 
conscious of the legal straitjacket raised by issues in UK and EU law, but 
employers were aware of union strength and of the costs of contracts not 
being performed or done on time. Thus, a meeting of interests, directed 
powerfully by workers’ power resources,  acted to create a wage settlement 
that could operate in the shadow of law. 
The interviewee from the NJC however did note that contractors were 
not 100% obedient to the regime, stating that they were often “quite cute” in 
how they observed the terms of the NAECI67. This statement leads neatly to 
an ancillary but important development concerning wages that arose from 
the BJBW dispute: the creation of pay audits used to probe a contractor’s 
finances to check if they were paying full NAECI rates of pay (NAECI 2010-
2012, pages 68-82).  
Importantly, the use of pay audits also saw the machinery of the NJC 
used to demand access to contractors’ finances to check that NAECI pay rates 
were being. These have been used as a powerful tool since 200968, yet there 
was still evidence of foreign employers (and in fact UK employers 
circumventing the NAECI pay rates69, with the result of enforcement drives 
still leaving open questions regarding how easily and quickly this was 
rectified. One unverified point was made by the union official that some 
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foreign contractors paid back their posted workers the wages they were 
owed, after the former failed the pay audit, only to have it taken off them 
again back home70. The account of one union official however noted the 
satisfaction with the pay audit operation as a means of enforcement (ibid.).  
The legality of these pay audits under the CJEU’s new interpretation 
of EU law is highly questionable, given CJEU decisions concerning 
‘unnecessary administrative burden’ in the Mazzoleni71 case. Again, this has 
not been tested in court and, unlike the pay demands in provision G.1, is less 
clear how the CJEU would decide. It is thought highly however likely that 
these ‘administrative burdens’ would be struck down as they concern pay 
and are attached to a collective agreement that would most certainly be 
struck down by the CJEU given the Laval and Rüffert decisions. 
The second issue, away from wages, concerned preferential hiring of 
native or non-UK labour and also raises this ‘administrative burdens’ 
problem of this Mazzoleni case. Here, EU law has been clear for a long time: 
free movement rights are fundamental and discriminatory hiring practices 
are illegal.  
The second paragraph of G.1. in Appendix G stipulates that employers 
(contractors) have the right to recruit workers from any part of the European 
Union as required by the project in question. This couches the Appendix G 
in language that conforms, broadly, with basic European free movement law. 
Provisions G.3 (‘Advance Notice’) and G.4 (‘Equality Opportunity for UK 
Workers’) exhibits a similar linguistic attempt to respect EU law yet 
simultaneously raising serious questions as to their legality in EU law. Clause 
G4 builds on this and skirts the edges of legality in EU law. G4 states that a 
“contractor should explore and consider the NAECI trades that are available 
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locally” and “should enter discussions with local job centres” to this end. The 
use of such equivocal language (‘should’, ‘consider’) suggests an awareness 
of EU law, but does again produce a two-pronged breach of EU law as it 
brings in the Mazzoleni problem in regards to administrative burdens and a 
breach of EU free movement of persons law with these measures that would 
discriminate against foreign labour. 
The CJEU’s 2001 Mazzoleni case is again relevant. In this case, the CJEU 
took a restrictive view on the ‘administrative burdens’ that could be imposed 
upon the use of posted workers. G.3 states clearly that managing contractors 
“must not allow a situation to occur whereby non-UK labour has already 
been mobilised to site before the trades unions have been formally advised 
in a reasonable timescale”. This is notable as it not only demands that efforts 
be made at local hiring , which has free movement and administrative burden 
based problems, but it also inserts trade unions into a position to regulate the 
use of UK labour over foreign contracted labour. This acts as an 
administrative hurdle for a foreign contractor looking to employ labour. 
These would almost certainly be deemed illegal by the CJEU if these issues 
were ever brought before it in a court case. It is not clear that the 
administrative issues raised in Mazzoleni were noted by union or NJC 
officials, but the free movement issues were. 
This ‘settlement’ did therefore bring an end to a serious dispute and 
provided a reformed labour relation regimes to this sector. The difficulty for 
unions to do this with a fragmented and multi-national employer interests to 
police presents an on-going struggle for its enforcement.  
Kilpatrick’s claim outlined in the introduction to this chapter is 
returned to. It is not possible to empirically verify whether the Laval and 
Rüffert line of case law contributed to or triggered the conditions and events 
in Britain in 2009 ex ante. The reasons for this are, firstly, the Italian company 
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or any employer interests could not be sourced for an interview to explore 
this point. Secondly, it is not likely that any testimony they give will be either 
reliable or useful. What was evident is that the reformed NAECI agreement 
was done with an awareness of EU law and these Laval and Rüffert cases 
above.  
It should however be noted that the rapidly increased 
internationalisation of the market for construction project contracts was 
clearly a key part of the conditions for the disputes in Germany (Rüffert), 
Sweden (Laval) and in this case concerning Britain. This market dynamic is 
clearly reinforced by the introduction of European public procurement law 
that frames how contracts of particular size are advertised and awarded in 
this transnational market place. The effect of EU posted workers law in 
Britain however is, again, clearly only indirect, as there was no transposing 
legislation in Britain of the 1996 PWD and no CJEU posted workers case 
concerning Britain. These CJEU cases however did have an indirect effect after 
the disputes of 2009 as it impacted how collectively bargained wage rules 
were reformed. This is not to dismiss Kilpatrick’s argument out of hand that 
the CJEU Laval-line of cases ex ante created the conditions for the BJBW 
dispute. It is highly probably that this was an important incentive factor 
within this broader internationalisation of the industry. 
The empirical niceties of this line of enquiry act as a foil to produce 
theoretically useful material for this thesis’ core purpose. The relationship 
between a range of legal rules (both national and European) and non-legal 
rules found in collective agreements and those concerning trade union action 
is theoretically significant. 
 
2.4.2.iii De facto versus de Jure state of legal rights 
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Some key aspects of the above are remapped before moving onto the 
theoretical second section of this chapter. The BJBW dispute concerned two 
main issues: wage rates of native and (foreign) posted workers and access to 
work of local workers and these same foreign posted workers. There is 
however another important legal question concerning industrial (strike) 
action. Given the similarities of the BJBW dispute to the Laval case, the is little 
doubt the CJEU would decide this strike action (both initial and secondary 
strikes) would be illegal obstructions of a company’s free movement rights 
under EU law. There is little doubt the British courts would find both the 
initial and secondary action to be illegal under UK labour law as the initial 
strikes were not called by a legally required ballot and the secondary actions 
are entirely illegal (ballot or not). With this context, unions and employers on 
site knew that the latter had a powerful set of legal rights available to them 
actionable in either European and UK courts.   
So why did the mix of employer interests (client, primary contractor, 
subcontractor (IREM)) negotiate with unions? The industrial context is 
important in this case. The requirement and pressure to finish these contracts 
on time was such that employers were desperate for this disruptive dispute 
to end and not be repeated. The loss of profits due to non-completion and 
fines provided a powerful incentive. This was confirmed by interviews with 
NJC official72 and contextually by employers rescinding the ordered 
dismissals of striking workers. Theoretically this is very important as, again, 
social partners acted to craft a new regulatory and governance arrangement 
for a labour relations regime so as to pull it far away from the reach of courts 
and legal sanction. At the time of writing (2018), some nine years after the 
dispute, this new arrangement has held, and with Britain’s expected exit 
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from the European Union will not live under threat of sanction by a European 
Court. 
An interesting hypothetical point is raised through this question what 
would occur if CJEU was asked to pass judgment on this dispute. In short, if 
the CJEU did produce a decision similar to Laval (as it would be expected) 
and strike down this new NAECI and the strike action. What would have then 
occurred if these illegal strikes continued regardless or had even escalated? 
the implications for the rule of law as an abstract ideal is serious. The 
implications for the rule of European law, and the supremacy doctrine, even 
more so.  
Britain has seen violent industrial unrest before, where trade unions 
engaged in illegal revolt against employers and the state (notably in the 19th 
Century as well as after WWII). The British government, courts and police 
may well be used to break a strike, however messy this might be. Would the 
British government and courts however sanction such a response at the order 
of the European Court to enforce economic rights of free movement? This 
would effectively see economic law being the legal prompt to the use of legal 
criminal sanction exercised by national police forces as the EU does not 
possess such policing powers. It would also see a politically unpopular use 
of the British police to break a strike in the name of EU law. The effective 
criminalisation of labour relations to impose economic rights for employers, 
and the EU ordering British police actions against a strike, would be very 
controversial. In Sweden however, the unions obeyed the decision and 
strikes were ended. It is an interesting consideration for the rest of Europe 
and labour relations regimes given that some member states have the sort of 
conflictual labour relations seen in Britain. 
The main reason why this is important, besides any interest in 
European integration and European political economy, is theoretical. With 
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an eye on the next theory-focused section of this chapter, this case underlines 
the importance of the social setting in question in which law is applied and 
responded to. This social setting in this case was marked by conflict, as 
internationalisation of the market for these contracts brought new 
competition for wages and jobs. The extent that law is applied as intended 
by its creators varies between different contexts. In Laval, the CJEU got its 
way. In this rather similar Laval-Like British case, the new rule established in 
the Laval and other cases was effectively annulled by the settlement and new 
NAECI. These points about social setting therefore underlines just how far 
‘the rule of law’ can be reframed or even have its desired effect nullified. A 
similar variety of this is raised in the next chapter.  
 
2.4.3. Theoretical Section 
This case study represented a different form of dynamic relationship 
between labour relations’ legal and collective bargaining components, and in 
essence saw the latter retain its dominant role in the regime of labour 
relations that existed in this industry. Moreover, this case study produced a 
prominent role for collective action in defending and reinforcing collective 
bargaining. Unlike the previous German posted workers case study, this did 
not involve a direct legal intervention by a court. The role of legal rights, 
found in the CJEU’s case law and UK legislation, was however still very 
prominent as these provided potent reinforcement for the power resources 
of employers. These legal rights however were delivered only in an limited 
and abortive attempt one segment of the employer ‘interests’ in this case 
(Italian contractor IREM) and were eventually nullified and made irrelevant 
to the labour relations and work-wage bargain that workers actively sought 
to preserve.  
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The nature of these attempted regulatory and governance changes in 
this model of labour relations are addressed first, followed by the important 
conflict of rules scenarios presented at both the beginning and the end of this 
case study’s time-line. Given the prominent role of industrial action in this 
case, important theoretical findings concerning the overlapping roles for 
mediation, negotiation and conflict are also examined. These points are then 
directed toward to some pointed observations in regards to CPE.  
 
2.4.3.i    Collective action, collective bargaining and comparative 
lessons for British labour relations 
 
Three interlinked and simple theoretical themes are identified and addressed 
in this sub-section. The first and leading category is the regulation and 
governance problem. The second is the response to this and the third is the 
outcome. In this case study, and unlike in the previous chapter (Germany-
Posted Workers) where the ‘outcome’ was decidedly incomplete73, a clear 
and discernible outcome was produced by a process marked by considerable 
conflict. Comparisons with the previous German posted workers case are 
joined by those from the Swedish posted workers example found in the Laval 
case to explore features concerning collective action and its relationship with 
collective bargaining.  
The principal ‘problem’ from the perspective of trade unions was a 
threat presented by business seeking to invoke new legal rights in EU law 
that would undermine a settled labour relations system and work-wage 
bargain. As Gregor Gall (2012) notes, the model of work organisation that 
defined this ‘work-wage bargain’ in the construction industry was temporary 
and project-based, but despite this was accepted by workers given the 
                                               
73 As defined by the RegioPost case. 
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expectations that once one project ends new work would become available 
(Gall 2012). The use of (foreign) posted workers, as was claimed, threatened 
native workers’ future access to work as well as their pay rates and a wage-
setting system being subject to downward pressure by posted workers being 
paid below wage norms set by this system.  
This provoked an organised and aggressive response by unionised 
workers on-site, rather than the union hierarchies promoting strike action 
through a formal ballot as required in UK law. This response grew to be 
national in scope and then prompted policy-makers to intervene by 
promoting conciliation (rather than legislation, as seen in Germany). This 
response was led however by social rather than political actors, unlike in the 
German-Posted Workers case. It was also clearly effective and successful as 
defined by the outcome defined by a labour relations regime, already defined 
in large part by collective bargaining institutions, being pulled further away 
from the reaches of unfriendly law. Theoretically speaking, this settlement 
did not as such recast the form of already collective bargaining-dominated 
labour relations, but saw this collective bargaining mode of regulation and 
governance take on an even greater role than it had previously. This is a very 
pertinent finding, as, in essence, the relationship between law and bargaining 
here became an even more distant one despite the intentions of employers to 
invoke new legal rights in EU law and to enhance the role of law and legal 
rights of business. More broadly, this is significant for contemporary efforts 
to understand European labour relations as it elevates the role of industrial 
action in forging alternative labour relations solutions and settlements. This 
also occurs in conflict with neo-liberal forces of change pursued by policy-
makers, courts and business actors. 
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This point concerning the relationship between collective bargaining, 
industrial action and legal rules is addressed in more detail, with a three way 
comparison of the Rüffert-Laval and BJBW examples. 
Unions in the Laval and BJBW examples possessed strong power 
resources and therefore could use a strike to force a concession from 
employers. It did not work in the Laval example as the dispute ended up in 
court and the strike action was struck down. The judicial outcome did not 
materialise in Britain as the offending company (IREM) did not seek litigation 
but negotiation, due in part the company in this British case was still solvent 
and able to operate the contract whereas the company in the Laval and 
German Rüffert examples went bust. In Germany, the unions were not the 
reason the company (Objekt, whose assets Mr Rüffert was liquidating) 
ceased trading, but the enforcement actions of the German state.  
Sweden, in the Laval case that bore considerable similarity with this 
British case, had not seen strike action such as that in this Laval case given 
that native employers had long accepted this ‘social partnership’ with trade 
unions in setting wages thus reducing the prospects of conflict and strikes. 
This emphasis on ‘social partnership’ defined Sweden’s ‘autonomous 
collective bargaining model’ (Malmberg and Sigeman 2008). Swedish unions 
in Laval were however forced to strike, similarly to the British case, as a result 
of the threat posed by a foreign company seeking to circumvent this long-
standing and accepted model of Swedish labour relations.  This relationship 
between industrial action and collective bargaining is important as the 
former prompts the latter if employers refuse to bargain with workers 
voluntarily. Sweden and Germany are identified in CPE as two countries 
that, after initial formative moments of industrial unrest in the 19th and early 
20th centuries, settled upon  an autonomous collective bargaining model that 
needed (and was) accepted by employers (Sweden: Malmberg and Sigeman 
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2008, Germany: the Tarifautonomie model described previously). In Britain, 
this has not been the case since the heyday of collective laissez faire, but the 
construction industry has performed the role of outlier in a post-1980 era in 
regards to as it has retained an industry-wide collective agreement, 
organised unions and an NJC. 
This three-way comparison of Sweden’s ‘autonomous collective 
bargaining model’, German Tarifautonomie and British collective laissez faire is 
engaged further to examine this relationship between collective action and 
collective bargaining. To reiterate, autonomous collective bargaining (where 
unions and employers lead a process of wage-setting with little interference 
by the state) has been far more successful in Sweden and Germany than it 
had in Britain where the governmental state has had to take a more active 
role (prior to 1980) to make such a system work. There were moments 
however in Britain’s past where collective laissez faire did take root with little 
interference from the state and this case study had clear echoes of these. 
There are also similarities however with earlier periods in Germany 
industrial history where collective action did force negotiations with the 
interests of capital and the state. It is not claimed from this that British labour 
relations in general will conform to this sort of process and outcome. The 
industrial specificities for one are too different from those other sectors that 
dominate Britain’s modern economy.  
What this case study does provide however is more of a theoretical 
abstract of the collective action-collective bargaining relationship and the 
relationship of this dual dynamic with law and legal interventions and 
particularly those aligned with ideals of neo-liberal legal change. The 
economic specificities are combined with sociological factors of power 
resources in this case study to produce a very simple collective action-
collective bargaining relationship, but one defined by contestation and 
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conflict and eventual cooperation. Strong demonstrations of collective action, 
borne of strong power resources form labour, will not and have not always 
produced the employer climb-down evidenced here. This scenario was a 
feature of British labour relations in the 1960s and 70s, as discussed in chapter 
2.1.  
The reasons why some countries produce more cooperative labour 
relations (like the Swedish and German historical cases) whilst some produce 
more conflictual labour relations (like Britain and France), are met with 
answers drawn from sociology or economics (Feldmann 2006). Sociological 
explanations point to cultural factors that exist within practices and 
characteristics of business, trade union actors, and broader societal contexts 
(e.g. religion) as well as power structures. Economic explanations point to 
factors that centre upon various concerns of economic production. For 
example, if labour productivity is not high enough (historically a problem in 
Britain) employers will be less inclined to agree to wage increases demanded 
by workers without increases in productivity. This productivity bargain 
defined the Fordist ‘wage-labour nexus’ discussed in chapter 1.2.  To raise 
another example, if employers know that the skilled labour they need for 
production requires offering higher wages to attract such labour, they will 
then be more likely to offer these.  
This case study forcefully demonstrates the combined importance 
both these sociological and economic explanations. Economic factors defined 
by the industrial specificities of the construction sector (contract-based, 
temporary project-based form of work organisation) were centrally 
important as workers could exploit the time-sensitive nature of this 
industry’s economic form of production to maximise the effect of their strike, 
thus introducing this sociological aspect of power and power resources with 
these economic factors.   
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Again, there is one main difference between the Rüffert, Laval and 
British Examples. In the Swedish and German examples, litigation was 
prompted in large part by companies going out of business (as there was no 
other recourse or position to negotiate from). Each case study told us 
something pertinent but slightly different about how labour relations 
systems change based not only on the nature of those market and legal 
drivers to change them, but also by the responses to these pressures. 
  
  2.4.3.ii  Conflict of rules, negotiation and contestation 
The thematic features of negotiation and contestation are inextricably connected 
to the conflict of rules concept. Two principal conflict of rules scenarios are 
present at both ends of the time-line that define this BJBW dispute. The first, 
at the front end where the dispute began, saw new legal rights found in the 
CJEU’s interpretation of the PWD being invoked by an employer actor (the 
Italian contractor, IREM) coming into conflict with the established collective 
bargaining-dominated regimes of labour relations in the British construction 
sector. This conflict of rules presents a neat ‘law versus collective bargaining’ 
contest as the first sought to undermine the latter by allowing employers the 
legal right to ignore the pay rules of the collective agreement they had signed.  
A conflict of rules of a similar, but importantly different sort, existed 
at the end of the time-line marked by the negotiated settlement. These new 
legal rights in EU free movement law, ostensibly, still existed ‘in law’, but 
because of the strike action and the settlement it produced were made 
irrelevant. This ‘settlement’ created new rules which were clearly in breach 
of the CJEU’s ruling in Laval and Rüffert concerning pay rules in collective 
agreements being imposed on posted workers. As illustrated in this and the 
previous posted workers chapter, ‘employer interests’ in the construction 
sector context are multi-faceted in nature. It is important to separate 
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domestically based employers, that make up most of the client and primary 
contractors, and many of the sub-contractors and foreign contractors whose 
presence in the sector is less permanent. This makes domestic contractors, 
and those with a more permanent presence, more invested in the pre-existing 
modes of regulation and governance and the relationships with labour this 
entails.  
This meant therefore that employers had greater incentive to negotiate 
this settlement besides the strike action (that coerced them to negotiate), 
despite the new rights available in EU law, and these would have to 
outweigh those of foreign contractors who were less invested in pre-existing 
relationships in Britain. IREM, the offending subcontractor from Italy, could 
not (predictably) be sourced for an interview or other data, but it would make 
sense that their interest in negotiating rather than litigating did not just come 
from pressure from their primary contractors (who gave them the 
subcontract), but also with the expectation of later contract awards or 
perhaps to protect their reputation (which was damaged with this dispute). 
This cannot be proven, but given the powerful legal rights available to IREM 
in UK and EU law it is likely the company were pushed towards the same 
negotiation strategy as main employer interests at Lindsey (the ECIA, the 
client).  
This is important, as it does not merely highlight the role of trade 
union actors and their militant strike action but also the strategic actions of 
employers to either concede or to contest this strike action. This highlights 
socio-economic relations the crucial aspect of social context where law is 
mediated, shaped and directed towards outcomes it may not have been made 
for. How law matters, and when, again is part of social reality as much as a 
doctrinal one. This appears far truer in this case study compared to the 
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preceding one concerning Germany, where the response by social actors was 
framed far more heavily by a judicial decision and legislative actors. 
 
2.4.3.iii CPE, Britain and labour relations 
Leading CPE theories are presented with some serious problems as a result 
of this case study like the German case that came before it. In regards to the 
VoC approach, Britain’s apparent liberal, market orientation, on its face, is 
contradicted by the findings of this case study, particularly the aspects of 
employer freedom to pursue flexible production strategies and use of a weak 
labour actor in the process. Employer prerogative was not the guiding 
principles here. Again, the purpose of this case study was not to demonstrate 
that aggressive strike action successfully forcing concession form business 
was that which defined British labour relations. More an abstract theoretical 
demonstration of how aggressive interventions of neo-liberalism inclined 
legal change are responded to. Even in ‘liberal’ Britain, the interventions of 
neo-liberal legal change to do not produce outcomes that align with this 
features that afford Britain this ‘liberal’ label. 
To repeat the point, an abstraction of a classical collective action-
collective bargaining relationship, that challenges attempts at neo-liberal re-
ordering of a labour relations regime, is the principal lesson drawn from this 
chapter. There is however some relevance to a broader British idea of labour 
relations particularly given Britain’s history with labour unrest and 
traditions of ‘collective laissez faire’. CWC and the power resources branch 
of CWC therefore has particular purchase when industrial action and labour 
conflict is central to the case. The different forms that legal intervention take 
however challenge how these power resources can be used. A direct judicial 
intervention (alla Laval and Rüffert) may well have ended this dispute in 
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employers’ favour, although it is, again, felt highly unlikely that striking 
workers would have ended their already illegal strike this way. 
VoC scholars may, based on that in the previous sub-section, highlight 
the role of employers in accepting a negotiated settlement, identifying their 
profit interests in reaching a settlement. Power resources scholars from 
within CWC would, correctly, highlight the pre-eminent role of organised 
labour in pushing employers to this position as employers’ ‘first order’ 
preferences were not to negotiate but to resist and punish striking workers74. 
For similar reasons concerning questions of power resources, Marxist-rooted 
RT has an interesting position with such a case study. As argued in the 
review chapter 1.2, Heino and other regulationists emphasise the destructive, 
incoherent and non-functionalist effects of social conflict that result from neo-
liberal reordering of the wage-work bargain that defines the ‘wage-labour 
nexus’ of this sector75.  Placing this in terms of thesis’ conceptual framework, 
a conflict between new imposed legal rights and the labour relations regime 
in place produced an incoherent and problematic regime of regulation and 
governance, one that required a response that reaffirmed this regime despite 
it not confirming with the ‘law of the land’ (EU law, in this case). In this, legal 
rules were governed by one logic and the non-legal rules found in the 
established collective agreement and mode of job access provided another; 
legal rights in EU law and the rules contained in the post-2009 NAECI sit in 
conflict. At the time writing, and nine years hence, this ‘settlement’ has not 
changed nor has been further threatened with Britain’s expected departure 
from the European Union in 2019 will therefore remain in place. 
 
                                               
74 Companies initially dismissed striking workers, only to rescind these later 
75 Marxist Gregor Gall, sourced in this chapter, describes this destruction of the wage-labour nexus 
in this way, although there is some debate in RT whether the concept can be applied below the 
macroeconomic level for which it was designed. 
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2.4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter presents some important points of comparison with the 
previous chapter. It also has an important place in a broader four-way 
comparison when sat next to each of the other case study chapters in this 
second section. 
Firstly, it demonstrated the power that workers and their unions have 
in shaping the regulatory and governance features of their relationship with 
employers in particular circumstances, even when their legal environment is 
not helpful to them. Theoretically speaking, this chapter represents a 
powerful example of how interventions from the realm of law, however 
distant, can provoke a response from the actors concerned that can result in 
a very different (if not opposing) outcome and in law being pushed away and 
minimised.  
This chapter is unique in regards to the other three case studies given 
this strong role of collective institutions. It is in fact the only pertinent 
example of industrial action out of the four case studies. It does however, 
bear greater similarity with the following case study concerning Germany 
and the acquired rights directive (ARD) given the complexity of the legal and 
labour market issues at hand. The German-ARD case also sees an attempt at 
legal intervention, from the legislation on acquired rights (the ‘ARD’), being 
completely nullified by the collective institutions in place as seen in this 
chapter. The difference however comes with the fact that is now workplace 
works councils in Germany that perform this responding role, and require 
ample assistance from policy-makers like in Germany PWD, and sees 
collective bargaining weakened; all this despite the ARD’s ostensible (and 
original) goals to enhance workers’ rights.  
This again is what gives this chapter its comparative value: 
demonstrating the role that collective bargaining and collective action can play 
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in adjusting to shifts in the legal aspects of labour relations’ regulation and 
governance if the right conditions are in place. 
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Chapter 2.5. 
German Labour Relations and European Acquired Rights 
law 
 
 
2.5.1. Introduction 
Unlike the previous chapters, where aspects of law either were (or threatened 
to be) a disruptive influence, this chapter sees the principal area of law under 
examination  – the Acquired Rights Directive (ARD) –  effectively annulled 
as its provisions were massaged into a pre-existing, yet still developing and 
changing, German labour relations context.  
This context was one defined by neo-liberal reform and restructuring 
agendas and their destructive influence upon collective bargaining and co-
determination institutions. The empirical subject matter of this case study 
represent something of puzzle. German collective bargaining and co-
determination institutions, that represent the twin pillars of German 
Tarifautonomie, should together provide mutually reinforcement for those 
provisions of ARD that are directed at shielded workers’ ‘acquired rights’ in 
the event of a ‘transfer of undertaking’. Collective agreements can act as a 
powerful source of ‘acquired rights’, and co-determination institutions 
provide a hugely useful venue for workers to impose their interests upon any 
workplace reorganisations defined as a ‘transfer of undertaking’. Instead, the 
ARD did not provide the worker protection function it was meant to. 
Increasingly dominant neo-liberal reform ideas, bringing new industrial 
practices and specific forms of legal change, instead triumphed seeing 
employers’ rights enhanced and substantive changes to labour relations 
pursued accordingly. The regulatory and governance problem therefore is one 
felt more by workers and their unions. The problem however is also one 
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exhibited by an increasingly complex form of labour relations where the 
influence of neo-liberal politics and neo-liberalism-framed legal rules 
become more prominent and operate alongside vestiges of the ‘old’ 
Tarifautonomie regime.  
This chapter bears some similarity to the previous chapter (Britain-
Posted Workers), in that labour relations actors and institutions took a 
leading role in adapting and responding to attempted changes to a labour 
relations regime. This chapter however presents far greater complexity as to 
how this adjustment process took place, and the implications and outcomes 
for workers and unions were distinctly worse in this case study. 
Additionally, when sat next to the first case study chapter, also concerning 
Germany (2.3), this case study produces some important findings for both 
German labour relations and for CPE more broadly. The decline of 
institutions of German collective bargaining are again evident, even with the 
existence of legal rules found in an ARD that could have reinforced these.  In 
contrast to the previous case study chapters, this case study does however 
present some opportunities for existing CPE approaches to offer alternative 
explanations to those at the centre of this thesis. The prominent role of neo-
liberal politics in this case study however acts to undermine pre-existing CPE 
accounts, and again points to an emerging German labour relations reality 
that challenges leading CPE approaches to German capitalism more broadly. 
 The theoretical contribution of this chapter elevates the role of conflict of 
rules problems.  The relationship between the ARD and neo-liberal agendas 
represented a clear conflict of rules, as the ARD represented an attempt to 
impose social rights for workers onto processes of restructuring that were 
usually pursued to further the economic rights for, and interests of, employers. A 
‘choice of rules’ needed to take place and did so with the ARD and collective 
agreements, and the ‘acquired rights’ these contained, being subordinated 
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below those rights of employers. This occurred even if it meant undercutting 
workers’ rights and wages in the way the ARD explicitly intended to outlaw. 
This process of subordination was a distinctly political one, defined by neo-
liberal political objectives, but had also some important reinforcement from 
courts and (supportive) legal approach to neo-liberal restructuring goals. 
The role of courts in this process of ordering legal rights is still very 
important and comes in two main forms: German courts’ willingness to refer 
cases to the European Court without passing judgement on them first 
themselves, and the European Court of Justice’s own approach to assigning 
legal rights and policing these conflict of laws problems. This was 
particularly important in the aspects of this ARD discussion concerning 
collective agreements. Here, German legislative reforms and the approach of 
the CJEU acted to complement each other as they adhered to a broadly 
similar neo-liberal approach to policing conflict of laws problems presented 
when social protection regulations conflicted with agendas to further 
employer rights and corporate restructuring agendas.  
  This chapter is organised according to the same two-part structure of the 
other case study chapters. The substantive empirical material of the case 
study comes in section 2.5.2. As indicated in chapter 2.2, two features of the 
ARD are focused on: the scope of the directive and the definition of a ‘transfer 
of undertaking’, and the ARD’s relationship with collective bargaining. The 
theoretical lessons drawn from this are provided in section 2.5.3. 
As indicated above, this chapter relies on both legal analysis and 
qualitative analysis to develop the case study and findings. This deductive 
two-pronged approach could not rely on legal analysis alone. The qualitative 
and deductive analysis employed means some reliance is been placed upon 
industry-level case studies drawn from existing studies as stakeholder 
interviews could not, as originally hoped, speak directly to the subjects of the 
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ARD. Legal analysis, provided mostly by judicial decisions, has again 
however been useful in building a body of evidence when pieced together 
and contextualised with these secondary-sourced industrial case studies and 
interview data.  
New empirical revelations are not leading the purpose of this thesis, 
but the complex empirical issues uncovered do produce some pertinent 
empirical as well as theoretical findings; particularly in regards to how 
politics and law interact in driving change in labour relations systems. 
 
2.5.2. Empirical section  
 2.5.2.i the ARD’s scope 
Industrial restructuring in Germany was politically controversial. Yet despite 
the ARD’s clear relevance to the various forms of restructuring to issues of 
workplace organisation and wages, the ARD itself was distinctly 
uncontroversial. In fact, most attempts to source interviews for this case 
study found little interest or knowledge in the ARD. More specifically in 
regards to the ARD’s scope and definition, it is stated clearly that much of 
restructuring that Germany had witnessed from roughly 1990 onwards was 
most certainly caught by the directive. It is therefore pertinent to ask why the 
ARD has been so ineffective in German restructuring. This sub-section will 
address this leading question resting upon one key judgement of the CJEU, 
Süzen (1997), and three industry-focused case studies. The rights available to 
workers in the ARD were not activated nor reached for. This was due to a 
mixture of reasons including union weakness and acquiescence within those 
negotiated settlements that took place at the industrial level within co-
determination institutions (works councils). 
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An introduction to German transposition of the ARD is outlined 
before moving onto to the 1997 Süzen case. From here, the three sector-based 
examples, from the hospital, telecommunications and manufacturing 
industries, are introduced. 
   Both the 1977 and 2003 versions of the ARD were transposed under 
section 613.a of the German civil code (the ‘BGB’76). The German 
transposition sought to achieve three things. First, business transfers should 
not alter the continued existence of the employment relationships of 
individual employees and must serve as an additional system of protection 
against wrongful dismissal. Second, it sought to ensure the continued 
existence of works councils. Third, the acquiring party and potential new 
owner (the ‘transferee’) assumes all rights and duties of the seller (transferor) 
arising from the employment relationship existing at the time of the business 
transfer (Kirchener and Magotsch 2006; p. 253). The scope of 613.a. is to apply 
to all employees whether they are full or part-time and is applied to those on 
temporary or permanent contracts. The above appears to mirror the social 
protection principles of the original intentions and language of the ARD text, 
rather than re-interpretation of these in the direction of greater commercial 
or employer rights.  
Again however, this black letter reading of the German law adopting 
the ARD did not translate into a reality where the ‘continued existence of the 
employment relationships’ was to be guaranteed; indeed, the opposite 
outcome was what transpired.  
This social protection vs. commercial rights conflict was also at the 
centre of the 1997 Süzen case. A number of different types of transfer had 
taken place across the German public and private sectors prior to 1997, so 
this decision had the potential to upset the process of neo-liberal reforms by 
                                               
76 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
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imposing and embedding existing labour relations arrangements that 
business wanted to reform.  The Süzen77 case of the CJEU appeared to restrict 
the ARD’s scope thus favouring employers wanting to pursue business 
transfers in order to cut labour costs. Süzen, despite originating in Germany, 
was in fact much more disruptive in other EU member states that had already 
developed settled law on transfer of undertakings regulation prior to 1997. 
In Germany, the decision was not particularly controversial.  
The use of the Süzen case in this chapter in fact acts to highlight the 
lack of significance and effect the directive had. It also demonstrated that 
restructuring was being pursued confidently by employers. Trade unions did 
not bring the case to court, but instead was brought by an individual litigant. 
This is also true in the Werhof case presented in the next sub-section on 
collective bargaining and the ARD. This is significant as its shows that unions 
were not interested in forcing the issue with the ARD to access the rights for 
workers it contained.  Given that neo-liberal restructuring was already in 
motion in many sectors, and union refusal or inability to resist it, the Süzen 
case acted to affirm and reinforce already in-train restructuring programmes, 
despite the impact it had upon labour standards and institutions.  
Similarly to the example of EU posted workers law however, this 
Süzen decision represented a reversal of the CJEU’s own previous approach 
that supported a social protection-based interpretation to these conflict of 
laws problems. In Redmond Stichting78  and Schmidt79 for example, the Court 
argued that disputes involving more than one transfer, thus three or more 
sets of parties involved over time, were indeed covered by the directive. 
                                               
77 The Süzen case was outlined in chapter 2.2, the outline of the case is briefly repeated: Mrs. 
Süzen was employed as cleaner at a school by a contractor. The school’s contract with the 
contractor ended, Mrs Süzen was dismissed from her job. The CJEU found in the employer’s 
favour, not Mrs Süzen. 
78  C-29/91 (1997) 
79  C-392/92 (1994) 
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These Redmond Stichting, Schmidt and Süzen cases, like so many ARD cases, 
concerned the work of cleaners and their work being transferred from one 
contractor to another and then, later, another. In Süzen, the CJEU decided that 
a mere change of contractor was not enough for the ARD to apply, moving 
away from the Redmond Stichting and Schmidt interpretations, thus 
attempting to shrink the scope of the ARD. This case presented two 
problems. First, the implications meant that workers could be laid off as a 
result of terminating one contractor and picking up a new one, thus 
incentivising the practice of pursuing a transfer in order to dismiss workers and 
decrease labour costs; a result completely at odds with the intentions of the 
ARD.  
Second, this pulling back of the ARD’s scope by the CJEU was not 
achieved at all cleanly or neatly, and in fact left a great deal of uncertainty 
about where exactly the new boundaries of the ARD lay. Importantly for this 
chapter, neither the pre- nor post- Süzen period (before or after 1997), saw the 
ARD being reached for by unions to try demand workers’ ‘acquired rights’ 
be maintained post-transfer. This discussion of regulatory uncertainty is 
curtailed here as it is less relevant to this German case, as uncertainty and 
controversy, again, were not at issue (although it is in the British-ARD 
chapter that follows). What is significant from the Süzen case to this German 
case study is, firstly, the apparent insignificance of the ARD to restructuring 
processes and trade union strategies even prior to Süzen.  
This case study from the hospital sector in Germany is provided by 
Greer et al. (2013). The hospital sector in the 1990s and 2000s had gone 
through dramatic organisational changes that saw many municipal hospitals 
transferred out to the private sector through multi-stage transfers. At the 
earlier stages these hospitals would have been transferred to ‘autonomous 
subsidiaries’ which were later subject to mergers and from here then 
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privatised (ibid.). The entities created and then transferred were often subject 
to changes at each stage of a transfer (subsidiary > merger > privatised/sold) with 
some parts chopped up and sold on with their workers attached and other 
parts not (Greer et al. 2013). As complex as these over-time, multi-stage 
restructurings were, the ARD was designed to account for these different 
manifestations of transfer, particularly with CJEU Redmond Stichting and 
Schmidt decisions in the 1980s and early 1990s, and to protect those workers 
from a) being dismissed and b) having ‘acquired rights’ found in 
employment contracts shielded from any alteration that might result from 
any transfer. In Süzen, these workers were effectively dismissed as a result of 
the transfer in question. In chapter 2.2, labour lawyer John McMullen was 
cited describing the ‘harsh effects’ of Süzen. This description is true in regards 
in both a regulatory sense (do practitioners know what the law is?) and in a 
worker protection sense, as workers could, again, be dismissed simply because 
the company they work for is being transferred to a new employer (in clear 
contradiction to the ARD).  
An example of privatisation as a form of transfer is raised to explore 
some of these question. In each of these industry-level examples three cases 
(hospitals, telecommunications, manufacturing) works councils were the 
important venues for unions to influence these transfer processes, albeit in a 
very limited way that could not prevent significant pay and job cuts. This is 
the strategy the unions, for the most part, pursued to effect restructuring. 
Only in rare circumstances were more muscular and aggressive strategies 
adopted. 
The example from telecommunications presents an example of a 
wholesale privatisation (not done as multi-stage transfers but all at once) of 
publicly-owned Deutsche Telekom (DT) (Sako and Jackson 2006). This 
brought with it a fragmentation of the company’s functions into divisions. 
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This restructuring also brought with it the new works council configurations 
and company-level collective agreements in each of these new divisions as 
the legal designation of DT changed80. Privatisations almost always fall under 
the scope of the ARD and the example of DT would be no different (before 
and after Süzen). The role of the state however was particularly important as 
it concerned a public sector company being opened up to private interests 
meaning the state could take a central role in organising this. As Sako and 
Jackson describe, part of the offer made to workers and unions was the 
prospect for job growth rather than cuts (seen elsewhere) as a result of 
privatisation. Additionally, with the fragmentation of DT, a divide and 
conquer strategy is employed by employers and the state resulting in better 
deals being offered to some workers (through works councils) in comparison 
to others (Sako and Jackson 2006). Also, as Sako and Jackson describe, the 
new collective agreements formed in some of the new privatised divisions of 
DT were again better than in others. Employers played the two big trade 
union players, IG Metall and (what later became) Ver.di, against each other. 
An important note however has to be made regarding time-line: the deals 
offered at the time of restructuring may not still be in place in later years. This 
strategy of employers in this example used more carrot than in other 
restructured industries, but the long-term effect would still see pay and 
working conditions weakened in some or all parts of this undertaking. This 
is a hugely important temporal aspect of the ARD discussion. 
Works councils were again the central venue for unions to shape, 
rather than stop, a process of reform and is primarily where the employer 
offer to workers was made. The ARD demanded ‘information and 
consultation’ for workers which works councils were tailor made for, but 
                                               
80 As described in chapter 2.1 (section 2.1.2 on Germany), German company law rules designating 
labels such as ‘limited liability’ or ‘publicly listed’ company changes the type of works council 
rules that apply to each of these types of company. 
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beyond providing such information and consultation the negotiated process 
that took place within them gave unions little power to seriously challenge 
employers from pursuing restructuring. In this complex context of 
competing legal rights for workers and unions found in co-determination 
law, collective bargaining, the ARD on the one hand and an ascendant 
political neo-liberalism on the other, it is important to ask why unions did 
not seek more aggressive or combative responses to defend the legal and 
institutional aspects of German labour relations. The answers are only partly 
based on their weak organisation and membership and the isolated attempts, 
as in the DT example above, to buy them off. 
In the German hospital sector, Greer et al. (2013) describe some 
isolated examples of more aggressive union action opposing restructuring. 
In Hamburg in 2001, the hospital firm Asklepios became the recipient of what 
these authors call the largest hospital privatisation in German history (Greer 
et al. 2013). Ver.di, a newly created super union for the services sector in 
Germany, decided to pursue civil society-based campaigns against 
privatisation, often placed under the label ‘social movement unionism’ 
(Greer 2008, Holgate 2015). This campaign produced a referendum in 
Hamburg that, despite winning the vote, did not stop privatisation from 
taking place (Ibid.). An 18-month long campaign was seemingly ended by a 
new agreement between Asklepios and workers that meant the linking of 
pay to the public sector pay framework (the TVD81). This would appear to be 
a victory of sorts for unions, but as addressed in the following sub-section on 
collective agreements, Asklepios used another transfer process for a hospital 
near Frankfurt to circumvent this same public sector agreement. This led to 
a dispute that reached the CJEU in 2017, with the Court finding in Asklepios’ 
favour (continued in the next sub-section). 
                                               
81 TVD - ‘Tarifvertrag für den öffentlichen Dienst’  
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In the case of the ARD’s scope and definition, the directive was of little 
relevance to how transfers were regulated and governed in regards to labour 
matters and unions did not reach for it. When interviews were sourced for 
this chapter, it became clear that the ARD was not a factor in how these 
processes were pursued and regulated. A context providing strong power 
resources on the part of employers and bi-partisan political support for 
restructuring meant that the idea of using the ARD to challenge transfers was 
not considered. Even when more aggressive attempts to challenge these were 
taken (e.g. Ver.di in Hamburg), these involved political campaigns and 
strikes. After 1997, given the implications of the Süzen case, it perhaps made 
more sense to pursue both political campaigning and strikes to curtail 
restructuring plans as the law, the ARD or anything else, would not assist 
unions and their workers. The general rule for union strategies however was 
not agitation, but negotiation and using works councils to limit the pain of 
restructuring. 
This example from the German hospital sector acts as a bridge to the 
following section that focuses on collective agreements and their relationship 
with the ARD. This bridge is built along two planks, a CJEU case concerning 
the company above, Asklepios, and the role of collective bargaining in 
transferred undertakings.  
 
2.5.2.ii the ARD and Collective Bargaining  
In the previous section, works councils, one of the two core pillars of German 
Tarifautonomie, were important in framing the effects of transfer processes. In 
this sub-section, collective bargaining becomes the subject of focus and that 
which is being altered. These transfers however did, again, have considerable 
effects upon collective bargaining structures in sectors where bargaining was 
once strong. Examples of these are introduced with important legislative and 
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judicial interventions in this sub-section, both of which were important in 
weakening the role collectively bargained ‘acquired rights’ that could be 
imposed upon the actors involved in transfers of undertakings. Many 
material rights that workers receive, such as wages, are provided in collective 
agreements and the employment contracts framed by these agreements. 
Work councils then flesh out some of the details such planned wage increases 
and holiday allowances and working time82. This makes concerns of 
collective bargaining unavoidably central to how workers’ ‘acquired rights’ 
are preserved in processes of economic restructuring when established 
workplaces transferred.  In regards to the ARD, two important technical 
concerns (outlined in chapter 2.2) are identified in the application of 
collective bargaining at particular points in time as well as over time.  
 
1) The content of a collective agreement, as attached to individual employment 
contracts, that exists at the time of transfer, but no rules exist as for later 
agreements on transferred undertakings (number 2). 
2) Whether successor agreements to the collective agreement that existed at 
the time of transfer are to be adhered to as well by new employers. This 
implies that the overarching collective bargaining apparatus, that created 
the original collective agreement, may be transferred as well thus binding 
employers to that apparatus and the later agreements it produces. 
 
There are important normative questions concerning these. Taking a 
workers’ rights (social protection) approach over an employer rights 
(commercial) approach, one can see employers accepting the employment 
terms and conditions of the current workforce, as laid down in a collective 
agreements, if these employers can simply change employment terms and 
conditions later after the collective agreement in place expires. This therefore 
                                               
82 Interview GARD1 
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presents a challenge to either unions or employers if the law demands one 
approach over the other, with workers wanting to have both the original 
collective agreement (at transfer) and successor collective agreements applied, 
if these are indeed stronger than the alternative arrangements favoured by 
the new post-transfer employer (and employers want only the first or 
neither). 
The ARD is clear in regards to the first point, but not so in regards to 
the second. The first is addressed explicitly in Article 3 of the ARD: a 
collective agreement in place at the time of transfer must be transferred also as 
this is a key formative part of employees’ ‘acquired’ employment rights. The 
second is not given any treatment in the 2001 version of the ARD so was 
therefore left as an open question. The onus has therefore been placed on 
national actors and the CJEU to interpret.  
The German Werhof and Asklepios cases are examined alongside the 
same use of industrial case studies provided earlier in regards the ARD’s 
scope. These two cases in fact are especially relevant in regards to hospital 
restructuring (Asklepios) and manufacturing (Werhof). The Werhof case in fact 
connects the two regulatory and governance concerns with transfers and 
collective agreements outlined above. For this reason, point one and its 
specific treatment in German legislation, is addressed first. 
In-line with policy preferences seeking to enhance employers 
freedom, German policy-makers adopted an optional passage of the ARD’s 
Article 3 (Art. 3 paragraph 2) of the ARD that states that collective 
agreements in place at the time of transfer can only continue for either one year 
after the transfer, or once that agreement expires. The translated text from 
German law, 613a of German public code) is as follows. 
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“Where those rights and obligations are governed by the provisions of a collective 
agreement or works agreement, they shall be incorporated into the employment 
relationship between the new owner and the employee and may not be amended to 
the employee's disadvantage for at least one year following the date of the 
transfer." 
 
  Translated from both the Werhof and Asklepios cases of 
the CJEU 613.a (1) of BGB83 
 
Article 3(2), as transposed into German law above, gives employers 
considerable incentive to pursue transfers to reduce labour costs over the 
longer term, or even after one year (as they cannot do it immediately after 
acquiring a company via transfer). This is despite the adopted provision 
clearly contravening the social protection purpose of the ARD, given the 
ability of collective agreements to enhance the social protection afforded to 
workers. Altering the incentives for employers and unions in this way could 
have had considerable bearing on strategic decisions made by these actors.  
There is a fruitful line of analytical enquiry. What efforts were made 
by employers or unions to get or change the version of Article 3(2) was 
transposed? There was little indication, again, that the ARD featured in the 
strategies or thinking of either employer or union interests. Two union-
aligned specialists were interviewed and both indicated a preference for a 
lengthening of the time period which collective agreements could apply after 
the date of a transfer (or to be removed completely84). It is notable that this 
was even raised, as most prospective subjects approached for interviews had 
little knowledge of the ARD, a fact that underlines just how uncontroversial 
the ARD was in Germany. These interviews did not yield much more on the 
                                               
83 BGB - ‘Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’ (German civil code). 
84 Interviews: GARD1, GARD2. 
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ARD itself, but did point to the significant influence of those neo-liberal 
policy agendas that dominated German industrial politics and the assistance 
employers had in reorganising their businesses85.  
Germany’s adoption of ARD 3(2) featured in both the court cases 
raised here – Werhof (2006) and Asklepios Kliniken (2017). German courts did 
not address the issue themselves but instead referred decisions to the CJEU 
for judgement. Again, both cases present individual workers seeking legal 
redress rather than their trade unions bringing litigation for them. Prior to 
the 2006 Werhof case, the CJEU had not been asked to provide guidance on 
the second concern raised by collective agreements. In 2000 Collino & 
Chiappero, the Court affirmed that the ARD must be interpreted so that 
collective agreements must be transferred in the cases of multiple stage 
transfers (second and third generation transfers), but did not address 
whether successor collective agreements must be adhered to by employers 
not party to the overarching bargaining process that produced in collective 
agreements.  The normative issues here, as outlined in chapter 2.2, are placed 
within the the dynamic-static debate: should successor collective agreements 
be imposed on new employers in the years after a transfer has taken place, 
even if this new employer is not a signatory to them (the dynamic view), or is 
this an unfair infringement on an employers’ ‘right to contract’ (the static 
view)? This choice of laws goes directly to the normative conflict between 
social protection or commercial rights principles at the heart of this debate. 
The Werhof case is the first notable case of this dynamic-static debate and 
sees a challenge to Germany’s adoption of the optional article 3(2) above. As 
Werhof is also a German case, the details of the case also illuminate how such 
transfer of undertakings practices had altered labour relations in Germany. 
                                               
85 Ibid.  
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This is placed next to the recent Asklepios case and some useful examples from 
across German industry. The core details of the Werhof case are outlined first.  
The case concerned the employment contracts of employees of a bus 
company (Mr Werhof being one), their relationship to sectoral collective 
agreements and the continuance of this relationship after the transfer of part 
of an undertaking. The claimant (Mr. Werhof) was hired in the 1985 by a 
publicly listed company (AG) called DUEWAG. The terms of employment 
were decided by a sectoral collective agreement for the metal industry, 
agreed by the Employers Federation for the Metal industry in Niedersachsen 
(AGV) and IG Metall, the trade union that has traditionally represented 
workers in the metal industry. In April 1999, the company DUEWAG AG 
was converted into Siemens DUEWAG GmbH. In the October of that year, 
Siemens DUEWAG transferred part of its business to Freeway Traffic 
Systems (the defendant) and took Mr. Werhof with it. Freeway was not party 
to the collective agreement covering the metal industry in Niedersachsen 
(nor any other). 
  
Image 2.5.a  chain of transfers in Werhof (2006) 
 
In August 2001, the works council agreed to a pay grade system in a 
works agreement for Freeway employees that was based on the same 
collective agreement that covered Siemens, even though Freeway itself was 
not a member of the employers association in question (AGV). Freeway and 
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the works council also agreed a one-off payment in exchange for waiving future 
claims to this collective agreement made by employees. This detail is significant 
as it acts as, in essence, a ‘static clause’ preventing future collective 
agreements from having any future (dynamic) affect. It also sees works 
councils sign away workers’ ‘acquired rights’ that would come in later 
collective agreements. IG Metall and AGV then concluded a new collective 
agreement for the sector in Niedersachsen in May 2002. Mr Werhof opened 
litigation claiming for the difference between the pay scale agreed between 
the works council and Freeway on the one hand and the original pay terms 
under his employment for the pre-transferred DUEWAG on the other (the 
pay differential would have occurred after 2002 when the new sectoral 
agreement was signed). 
Mr. Werhof based his argument on Collino & Chiappero (2000). The 
Labour Court in Niedersachsen disagreed with this argument, pointing to 
the works council agreement that waived future union claims to impose 
previously agreed collective agreements. Mr Werhof conflated the two issues 
concerning collective bargaining outlined above: 1) the question whether a 
collective agreement transferred at the time of the transfer be adhered to by new 
employers; and 2) whether the broader collective bargaining process that 
created these be transferred as well. The first is explicitly required in the ARD 
and was confirmed to apply in multi-stage transfer cases in Collino & 
Chiappero. This is limited in Germany however due to the 12-month limit on 
this rule provided in the optional article 3(2) of the ARD that Germany chose 
to adopt. Mr Werhof was effectively demanding that Germany’s adoption of 
this provision be struck down as well as the contents of a works agreement 
that waived any future claims to the collective agreement Mr Werhof’s pay 
would be based upon. On appeal, the Federal Labour Court 
(Bundesarbeitsgericht) stated that section 613.a of the BGB could not be 
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interpreted in this way, but referred the decision to the CJEU with two 
questions attached. The German government at the time also agreed with the 
German Labour Courts’ view86. The CJEU agreed and rejected Mr. Werhof’s 
claim. 
In legal scholarship on this subject this case is held up as the first 
indication that the CJEU preferred the static interpretation of collective 
agreements’ post-transfer life more favourably than the dynamic view. There 
are two factors that complicate this broad conclusion. The first is the presence 
in German legislation of the ARD’s optional provision, article 3(2). The 
second is the presence of the works agreement that itself imposed a static 
interpretation, on the part of the works council, onto the collective agreement 
at issue. It remained to be seen if the CJEU would uphold this static view in 
the absence of these conditions.  
The British Alemo-Herron case in 2013 then later confirmed this in the 
affirmative. The 2017 Asklepios case however is another German case that also 
affirms the static approach of the CJEU evident in Werhof. Namely, and 
notably, the presence of an explicit ‘dynamic clause’ in the collective 
agreement at issue that would force employers after two rounds of transfers 
to adhere to a collective agreement. In the Asklepios case, the CJEU rejected 
this. Therefore, not only did the CJEU decide that the dynamic clause will not 
be applied as a general rule, but even if the dynamic clause is contained 
within a collective agreement in the case in question the Court will strike this 
down as well.  
Similarly to the Werhof case, Asklepios Kliniken87 contained private 
litigation (from two claimants), rather than seeing trade unions litigating on 
behalf of workers. It also saw a referral from a German Labour Court and 
                                               
86 The Werhof case, paragraph 19. 
87 full name: ‘Asklepios Kliniken Langen-Seligenstadt GmbH’ 
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concerned, in part, an interrogation of the optional provision included in 
German law, article 3(2), of the ARD. It did however present one further 
transfer than in Werhof (transfer from A, to B, then to C) and included a fourth 
party (‘D’).  
The two workers and claimants were cleaners originally employed at 
a hospital controlled by a local authority. In 1995, their work was transferred 
to a newly formed limited liability company (a ‘GmbH’ in German company 
law) which was subsequently transferred, in 1997, to a company called ‘KLS 
Facility Management’.  In 2008, the work of these two workers was then 
transferred to private company Asklepios (Paragraph 7, Asklepios).  
 
Figure 2.5.b the chain of transfers in Asklepios 
 
The litigation concerned the application of a particular collective 
agreement, and the processes that formed it, and the use of a ‘dynamic clause’ 
that would have retained the terms and conditions of it in later transfers. The 
pay terms of the collective agreement that the claimants wanted enforced was 
the collective agreement in place in the local government sector in the 1990s. 
This collective agreement was replaced by a new collective agreement for the 
broader public sector (the ‘TVD’88). It was in this collective agreement that a 
dynamic clause referred to the old collective agreement that the claimants 
wanted retained. Another important agreement accompanied the TVD called 
the ‘agreement on the transition of staff employed by municipal employers 
                                               
88 ‘Tarifvertrag für den öffentlichen Dienst’  
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to the TVD and the regulation of the transitional law’ (Paragraph 10, 
Asklepios) which explicitly provided the link between an old collective 
agreement and the new one (TVD). Asklepios, as well as previous employer 
KLS FM, were not a party to any employers’ association that were party to 
these collective agreements. The normative question again concerns applying 
either a social protection based dynamic clause or a commercial (employer) 
based inclined static clause. 
To reiterate, the dynamic clause of the collective agreement in 
question sought to impose ‘acquired rights’ onto a company who had not 
agreed to them. This sits in contrast to that in the Werhof case where an agreed 
waiver to any claims to acquired rights contained to such successor collective 
agreements amounts, in effect, to a ‘static clause’. The company, Asklepios, 
argued that the demand to obey the ‘dynamic clause’ in the agreement was 
illegal and unjust in light of a) the ARD and the German transposition of 
article 3(2) of the directive, and b) it would undermine the company’s 
freedom of association and freedom to contract under article 16 of the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. The latter claim echoes that made in 
the earlier Alemo-Herron case, that features in the British-ARD chapter, as this 
would effectively force a company into an association created by a collective 
agreement.  
The CJEU found in favour of Asklepios and confirmed its Werhof and 
Alemo-Herron line of case law but built on it in one important respect by 
striking down a clause of a collective agreement, the ‘dynamic clause’, as it 
imposed constraints upon employers beyond which the Court thought was 
just. To be clear, it did not simply point to the legislative provisions in 
Germany enacting article 3(2) as it did in Werhof. The decision also came with 
an overarching normative argument, as in Alemo-Herron, in paragraphs 17, 
18 and 22 that the ARD had to be interpreted “to balance” the social rights of 
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the ARD with economic rights found in the European law regulating the 
single market.  In truth however, it favoured the latter.  
This effectively closed off the ARD from being used to retain collective 
bargaining regimes over time from employer to employer. Meaning, and in 
line with the Süzen decision of the CJEU, that transfers that happen over 
longer periods of time and include several employer actors (A>B>C>D), 
collective bargaining regimes cannot be taken with them, and can in fact be 
undermined deliberately by these transfers of corporate organisation and 
workplaces. 
 
2.5.2.iii Concluding comment for empirical section 
This empirical section consisted of two main parts: questions of the scope and 
definition of a ‘transfer of undertaking’ in the ARD, and the questions of 
collective bargaining and its relationship with the ARD. The stylised 
depiction of German labour relations, based on Tarifautonomie, would have 
pointed to the suggestion that the ARD would form a complementary 
relationship with its core wage bargaining and co-determination institutions. 
This did not in take place. Instead, the political goals of neo-liberalism were 
given life by specific forms of economic reorganisation and legal re-
engineering of economic contexts and rights.  
 
2.5.3. Theoretical findings: the political content of law 
This theoretical section comes in three parts. The first deals with the 
theoretical findings that concern German labour relations directly. The 
second addresses the role of neo-liberalism and neo-liberal legal change, and 
the third addresses the potent conflict of rules problems that defined the 
regulatory and governance problems of this case study chapter. 
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2.5.3.i  Tarifautonomie, its decline and emerging legal influence 
The relationship between the collective and legal institutions of German 
labour relations was becoming increasingly complex even without the ARD.  
In this sub-section the decline of German Tarifautonomie is addressed through 
four subjects that define its de-development: collective bargaining, works 
councils, courts and legal rules with some points raised here being developed 
in the following sub-sections.  
Collective bargaining and works councils are addressed together. The 
ARD could have provided meaningful law-based remedy to alter, or at least 
minimise, the decline of sectoral collective bargaining in Germany’s 
changing economy. Instead however, the legislative fix that was (quite 
deliberately) pursued did the very opposite, resulting in the ARD’s 
nullification on this question of collective agreements and its ability to 
provide ‘acquired rights’ for transferred workers.  
German co-determination institutions have not been subject to the 
same pressures in this case study, although have been subject to a similar sort 
of decline in coverage in Germany (Eurofound, Feb. 2015). In this case study, 
works councils were in fact centrally important venues organising and 
negotiating these restructuring reforms that weakened collective bargaining 
further. With these two once important sets of institutions of German labour 
relations now co-existing in an state of imbalance and on-going decline, 
German labour relations is defined by a regulatory and governance 
uncertainty. This complex regulatory and governance arrangement is 
defined by competing and incoherent yet co-existing forces found neo-liberal 
politics, practices, law on the one hand and the vestiges of Tarifautonomie on 
the other. 
The subject of neo-liberalism’s role is addressed in the next sub-
section. The process that saw works councils retain a prominent role in this 
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case study needs some discussion in regards to questions of legal rights and 
power resources. Legislative adjustments (through Germany’s transposition 
of the ARD), court cases (Asklepios, Werhof) and labour market institutions 
(works councils) each acted as the important venues that escorted the ARD 
toward its eventual irrelevance. The ARD did however, demand information 
and consultation rights89 for workers prior to any transfer of undertaking, 
something works councils were expressly designed for in Germany. How 
these legal rights are enacted however depended on the power resources 
dynamics between employers and unions.  
This case study illustrated a weak trade union actor that was unable 
to challenge restructuring and legal changes that threatened their interests. It 
was only through works councils where they could influence neo-liberal 
restructuring, and again this ‘influence’ was minimal. Theoretically this is 
important as the legal rights to ‘information and consultation’ are not the same 
as substantive rights that can alter the material position of (in this case) 
workers. What is the purpose of a right to information and consultation if 
employers can impose their intentions upon workers anyway and still results 
in workers being materially worse off? The answer lies in the difference 
between de jure rights and de facto rights and the power resources provided 
to workers and employers that give life to these rights. De facto rights for 
workers are provided, typically, by their unions and by the institutions of 
collective bargaining and (where they exist) co-determination. These can 
offer powerful reinforcement to de jure legal rights and conversely can be 
undermined by legal rights favouring employers.  
In the previous chapter (Britain-Posted Workers), workers developed 
formidable power resources through strike action. Here, unions did not 
pursue this option and instead relied on a damage limitation strategy 
                                               
89 In conjuncture with the information and consultation directive (ICED) 
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through works councils. A black letter reading of ‘the law’ in regards to 
works councils and the ARD pointed towards strong legal rights for workers 
to affect these sorts of restructuring processes in their favour. The 
relationship between these de jure and de facto sets of rights however depends 
on how they are actioned by workers and employers and the relative power 
resources they share. 
The first Germany-focused case study chapter presented some of these 
features found in this case study such as weak union role and resulting 
collective bargaining weakness. This second case study goes further than the 
case study in chapter 2.3 as it produces several industry-based examples of a 
similar but more complex process. This process, as well as seeing collective 
bargaining undermined by restructuring, also sees a strong role for works 
councils to minimise the effects of neo-liberal legal change.  
Besides these shifts in regimes of legal rights, ‘neo-liberal legal change’ 
also brought with it small but important legislative tweaks to narrowly-
defined legal frameworks. The example of this from this case study is found 
in the optional provision of the ARD that limited the post-transfer life of 
collective agreements.  These were complemented by judicial interpretations 
of both these rights and framework concerns made in the Asklepios and Werhof 
cases. Law is however also responsible for the legal framework providing for 
works councils and works agreements. This provides for very complex 
relationship between declining collective bargaining and numerous legal 
rules and frameworks made at the national and European level, but with 
some of the legal rights within them deliberately submerged and nullified in 
favour of others.  
Centrally important questions of law are now addressed, specifically 
those of both European and German courts. This chapter demonstrates that 
the governmental state increasingly intervened in wage bargaining matters 
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from the 1990s to further neo-liberal agendas that undermine these collective 
bargaining regimes. German courts have also seen their role change in an 
important way so as to undermine Tarifautonomie. Tarifautonomie’s literal 
meaning is based on the idea of ‘autonomous’ collective bargaining, where 
the state (both judicial and governmental) would purposefully sit at arms-
length from wage bargaining. This traditional position of deference toward 
the Tarifautonomie principle did not see German courts themselves intervene 
into collective bargaining, but instead adopt a new position of deference 
towards a court (the CJEU) that would intervene. German courts’ practice of 
referring decisions (with attached questions) to the CJEU rather than pass a 
judgement themselves itself constitutes a new doctrinal institution that, 
again, has contributed to a direct legal threat Tarifautonomie and to trade 
unions’ role within it.  
It should be noted that German Constitutional Law (article 23) 
demands adherence to the EU legal order and the CJEU’s decisions. This 
needs further explanation however. In reality, there has been considerable 
conflict between German courts and the European Court over the extent of 
EU law’s primacy over national law (Saurugger and Terpan 2016; p.108-109). 
Additionally, we are given several examples in the following British acquired 
rights chapter (2.6) of national courts adjudicating cases themselves rather 
than simply referring the case upwards to the CJEU judgement (ibid.). It is 
not demanded of courts to refer questions to the European court, especially 
if the appeals process will take a case to the highest court in many cases 
anyway.  
 
2.5.3.ii Neo-liberalism and increasingly complex German capitalism 
Neo-liberalism as industrial practice, rather than that represented in political 
and policy-based ‘reform agendas’, is given important illustration in this 
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chapter courtesy of the variety of restructuring programmes used in 
Germany. What this has produced is industrial fragmentation defined by 
outsourcing, divisionalisation and privatisation. Importantly, this has 
fragmented collective bargaining structures that used to operate in these 
industries. Regulating both the process of shifting to this fragmented 
arrangement and what happens after it has taken place have been pressing 
regulatory concerns for trade unions, works councillors and some policy-
makers.  This has involved shifts in legal and non-legal rights systems and 
claims to retain or change these systems of rights. The ARD was meant to be 
a key part of this, as has collective bargaining and works councils. In the 
restructuring and reordering process however, only works councils appear 
to have been spared, acting as a venue for employers to manage restructuring 
with workers but in their favour. This raises questions concerning both 
conflict of laws and the different modes of mediation to address them. These 
are raised later in this section.  
Before this however, some critique is directed toward CPE 
approaches. It was noted at the start of this chapter that CPE approaches, and 
particularly the VoC approach, have greater potential contribution to this 
chapter than the others. Kathleen Thelen, to name one VoC scholar, has 
focused much of her work on the subject of German labour relations and neo-
liberal restructuring (as critiqued in chapter 1.2). This case study does, in a 
broad sense, offer an example of national institutions adjusting self-
referentially to an external threat to a national variety of capitalism. This kind 
of ‘institutional resilience’ argument is central to VoC and institutional CPE 
accounts. The problem with this sort of path dependency-based argument is 
that the threat and destructive change-effect of neo-liberal reforms upon 
these institutions is not at all grasped. The industrial practices and policies 
and legal change advanced by neo-liberalism are central to the wholesale 
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degradation of collective bargaining institutions that are of definitive 
importance to German capitalism. Works councils, as already described, also 
hold a similarly important and symbolic role in German labour relations and 
capitalism. These co-determination institutions were not undermined 
directly in this case study and, again, were important venues for workers to 
impose some (very limited) influence upon business transfers. Dominant neo-
liberal policy agendas however turned works councils into venues where 
Tarifautonomie was negotiated. Neo-liberal goals also framed the incentives 
of a) policy-makers at the European level to a put in the optional provisions 
in the ARD to weaken its social protection principles, b) of German policy-
makers to use this provision, and c) the CJEU to impose an economic 
rights/liberal interpretation of the ARD so as to favour the rights of 
employers.  
The lack of institutional resilience is not the only problem that 
institutionalist CPE (VoC, some CWC) have with this case study. CPE 
theories that rely on institutional resilience accounts also tend to be 
functionalist in nature and also favour institutional complementarity 
arguments as these concepts of resilience and complementarity are tied 
together. This case study instead presents evidence of a more distinctly non-
functionalist and complex set of outcomes defined by institutional 
incoherence. Neo-liberal reforms certainly undermined institutions such as 
collective bargaining, but it has not had the same effect on works councils (in 
this case study) nor the coordinated employer membership organisations90. 
With the decline of fundamentally important sectoral wage bargaining 
coupled with the insertion of different and often competing legal rules, the 
result is a mongrel form of part neo-liberal market and part-coordination that 
belongs to none of the main typological camps of CPE (coordinated, liberal, 
                                               
90 Also identified as a key institution of coordinated German capitalism in VoC and similar work 
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meso-corporatist, etatist). Moreover, the insertion of European market and 
legal influences makes such this complex set of incoherent (and still-partly 
developing) regimes of regulation and governance far less ‘German’ and 
nationally contained. This raises pertinent questions for CPE and other 
comparative social science when trying to compare ostensibly national 
regime types in Europe. This subject is addressed in more detail in chapter 
3.2. 
The CPE accounts that have more conceptual use in this case study 
come from CWC (of the Walter Korpi-power resources kind) and non-
complementarity based RT. Imbalances in power resources clearly had an 
important bearing in employers pursuing restructuring and was felt in policy 
debates and in the industrial contexts (in direct interactions with unions). The 
context that enabled this (the neo-liberal policy and restructuring agenda) 
was more political than legal in terms of its initial impetus. For example, the 
legislative tweak to the ARD, concerning collective agreements’ role and life-
span after a transfer, was an important legal mechanism that altered how 
German law regulating transfers of undertakings affected employers’ ability 
to pursue restructuring. Such legal fixes have important bearing on how the 
balance of power resources is organised. 
 
2.5.3.iii   Conflict of rules: Neo-liberal politics and reordering of 
conflicting rights 
The conflict of rules problems of this case study are represented more 
correctly as conflicts of rights.  
‘Legal rights’ when understood as a social phenomenon are as a 
contested space where a conflict between two or more sets of laws are 
remedied (in part, or in whole) by an ordering process that elevates certain 
rules and relegates others. In the previous Germany-based chapter, a court, 
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in very formal terms, ordered the (social) rights of workers (to strike, to 
collective bargain) to be set below those (economic) free movement rights of 
business. Here, this process of ordering was much less formal, unclear and 
complex as the negotiation process that took place occurred partly in the 
legislative arena, in large part in works councils (the industrial arena), and in 
part in the courts.  
There is, again, potential to combine the conflict of rules concept with 
the power resources concept of CWC and in (some) RT. The fact that unions 
did not, or could not, resort to strike action is notable. Was this merely 
because they were too weak in terms of membership numbers? Or because 
of traditions and sentiment of members that favoured industrial peace? Or 
perhaps part of both. Nonetheless, if employers do not view strike action as 
likely, this provides space and opportunity to pursue a strategy that they 
might otherwise not. This point compares neatly with the lessons of the 
previous chapter (2.4). When coupled with the pro-business sentiment of 
successive governments, these power resources of business produced a 
resolution to a conflict between the ARD and existing labour relations 
arrangements on the one hand and the neo-liberal reforms business wanted 
on the other (in favour of the latter).  
To reiterate, the ARD was designed to impose the social rights of 
workers onto an economic restructuring process that usually requires the 
economic rights of employers to be exercised without restriction. The social 
rights of the ARD therefore sat in conflict with the neo-liberal reforms 
agendas that intended to give employers greater commercial freedoms to 
reorganise their companies and labour forces, and became increasingly 
prominent and potent in Europe from the 1980s. This ordering process to 
settle this conflict was complex, but was clearly governed by a neo-liberal 
ordering based relative power resources of labour, business and the state.  
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Legislative agendas were very clear in regards to collective bargaining 
and in promoting industrial restructuring. The normative thrust of German 
neo-liberal reforms, both in terms of legal change and emerging industrial 
practice, therefore sat in direct conflict with the demands of the ARD. The 
interests of partisan and corporate actors ensured that this conflict was partly 
reconciled in favour of their favoured restructuring reforms. Court actors 
could have challenged this in a meaningful way, but the CJEU was not 
brought in to intervene in the 1980s in the manner it was it Britain (next 
chapter). By the time the CJEU was brought into this ordering process, on 
questions of the ARD’s scope (Süzen in 1997) or collective agreements (Werhof 
2006), German reforms were already well advanced. This does not mean that 
German or European courts could not have delivered a decision to badly 
disrupt this, but again, German courts chose to defer to European courts, and 
European courts relied on liberal, commercial rights orientated doctrines to 
resolve conflict of laws problems. 
 
2.5.4   Conclusion 
This chapter shares a broad common feature with the previous chapter: the 
effect of the legal intervention under primary examination, the ARD was 
effectively nullified. There are two key differences however. First, in the 
previous chapter, the ‘legal intervention’ in question was more indirect, as 
no court case of the Laval or Rüffert sort was aimed at Britain’s labour 
relations regime. Here the legal interventions were very much direct and 
multi-faceted, coming through a piece of legislation as well as judicial 
decisions.  This chapter also, perhaps more than the other case study 
chapters, highlights the very legal character of neo-liberalism in both legislative 
as well as judicial forms, as well as the of the implications of the industrial 
restructuring reforms it demands. Unlike the previous two case study 
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chapters, that focused on one key industrial sector, this case study offered 
examples from a number of sectors.  
       This chapter reaffirmed the theoretical position that law exists as a 
contested social space, not merely as a formal and fixed sanctioning 
mechanism by a legal authority. This sees conflict of laws scenarios exist 
between two or more sets of laws or rules which then require an ordering 
process to take place to elevate certain rules and to relegate others. This 
contested process, in a labour relations context, is one marked by material-
economic interests and politics. The ARD had very clear formal ‘rules’ set out 
and its normative purpose was clear (workers should have their acquired 
rights protected). Yet this clearly did not materialise in this case as jobs were 
lost and pay was cut as collective agreements were replaced by weaker 
agreements. This took place because the ARD was conveniently pushed out 
of the way, with the tacit acceptance by European institutions who were 
becoming more committed themselves to neo-liberal agendas and concurrent 
legal interpretations. 
       There are some important implications for CPE in this chapter, a 
chapter that offered more space for existing CPE approaches to offer some 
alternative arguments to those offered here.  The challenges to CPE 
depictions of Germany as a coordinated or meso-corporatist economy from 
this case study are clear, but the complete destruction of coordinated 
institutions is not the outcome either. Instead, an on-going process of 
mongrelized complexity emerges from the traditionally coordinated model 
that also sees legal and market rules begin to dominate. 
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Chapter 2.6. 
British Labour Relations and European Acquired Rights law 
 
2.6.1. Introduction 
This case study presents a clear contrast to the previous chapter in regards to 
the controversies inspired by the ARD in Germany. In Germany, the merging 
and massaging of the ARD into a pre-existing but developing practice 
effectively nullified the directive, and did so in a negotiated political process 
supplemented by important legislative and judicial interventions. in stark 
contrast, the experience of ARD in Britain has been very controversial over a 
40-year period, both politically and in terms of its successful regulatory 
application.   
The ‘controversy’ inspired in Britain however came in two different 
forms at both ends of this long 40-year-plus time-line. At the front end of this 
40 years, not long after the ARD’s creation in 1977, the ARD and its worker 
protection thrust directly contravened the neo-liberal reform intentions of 
Britain’s Conservative government. The British government, in the 1990s, did 
reluctantly however accept European demands to conform to the social 
protection interpretation of the ARD. These same European institutions soon 
began to reverse their approach to the ARD (as they did in other areas of EU 
law like posted workers law) and started to impose a more liberal, market-
rights, neo-liberal reform orientated view.  
 This elaborate 40-year ‘roundabout’ process that describes Britain’s 
experience with the ARD should, according to assumptions found in most 
CPE, point to Britain being able to revert seamlessly back to organising 
labour relations in these matters according to the ‘liberal’ or ‘market-
orientated’ model with which Britain is associated. This outcome however is 
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not what transpired as CPE scholars might assume. The role and 
embeddedness of previous adjustments and adjustments to legal uncertainty 
were  instead the driving forces behind the outcomes in this case as industrial 
actors (employers, unions) and the governmental and judicial state coalesced 
around solutions to minimise legal uncertainty rather than satisfy politico-
economic goals associated with either social protection or employer rights. 
This broad description manifests different in the two areas of the ARD under 
examination, its scope and collective bargaining questions. This case study 
therefore sees considerable complexity and incoherence define it but with a 
prominent role for law-based logics centred upon principles of legal certainty 
and preservation of a status quo rather than politico-economic logics that 
point to neo-liberal or social protection principles.  
This chapter gives a very prominent role for two important law-based 
aspects. Firstly, national courts feature prominently as well as the European 
Court of Justice (CJEU). This prominent role for courts also produces key 
explanatory factors found in legal systems and aspects of legal culture in 
determining and shaping labour relations outcomes (Zweigert and Kötz 
1998, Deakin 2009). In substantive terms this means that factors of legal 
reasoning pursued by courts (‘jurisprudence’) provide a different logic from 
those defined by political goals or economic rights found in social protection or 
market rights principles that are prioritised in explanations found in political 
science and political economy. For example, the British judicial and doctrinal 
positions have traditionally been based around deference to an ‘employer’s 
right to manage’ and the ‘freedom to contract’, two principles that conform 
quite neatly to classical liberal and neo-liberal political goals. This case 
however, to repeat, sees other doctrinal commitments become prominent, 
particularly the approach of British courts to practical concerns of legal 
certainty, the remedies which do not necessarily conform to political goals 
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associated with neo-liberalism nor workers’ rights.  
Therefore, for this chapter, the regulatory and governance problem comes 
in two forms of legal uncertainty coming in both questions of, one, the ARD’s 
scope and, two, collective bargaining. Pronounced legal uncertainty was 
created on questions of the ARD’s scope when the CJEU attempted, 
aggressively, to pull back the scope of the ARD thus reversing its previous 
position in a single case (Süzen) from a firmly social protection approach to 
one more employer rights-centred. Here, legislative initiative was used in 
Britain to minimise the uncertainty this decision caused. The second stems 
from the lack of European level guidance (in the directive or by CJEU) on 
how some collective bargaining issues are regulated under the directive. 
Here, the CJEU did eventually settle matters but only after UK courts 
interpreted EU law in very conflicting ways for several years prior, with 
some courts applying a social protection ethic of the ARD to these questions 
and yet others a more employer rights approach. This created a jumbled 
jurisprudence and unsettled law. 
This poses more problems for existing CPE theories that attach some 
variation of the label ‘liberal’ to the British type of capitalism. Again, Britain’s 
common law, contract law and labour law traditions might, in the abstract, 
support the typological characterisation of Britain as a market-orientated or 
‘liberal market economy’. The responses of the domestic courts in this case 
however do not support such typological conclusions, nor do the responses 
of legislators. In both cases, on both the questions of scope and collective 
agreements, the emphasis was placed on providing legal certainty in the face of 
disruption delivered from Europe. This points to distinctly legal-jurisprudential 
logics determining outcomes, found in legal cultures that form part of legal 
systems, than purely politico-economic logics highlighted in CPE. 
This chapter follows a similar structure to the previous ARD chapter. 
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The empirical section is divided into the two aspects of the ARD selected in 
chapter 2.2: questions of the ARD’s scope and definition and collective bargaining 
concerns. This chapter relies much more than the previous chapters on legal 
texts as a result of this prominent role for national courts.  
 
2.6.2 Empirical Section 
The disruptive effect of the ARD is felt differently with questions of the 
directive’s defined scope versus those concerning collective bargaining’s 
relationship with the ARD. This bizarre ‘roundabout’ process mentioned 
above can very clearly be identified with those questions of the ARD’s scope. 
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, there were two discernible 
periods of the EU’s approach to definition and scope of a ‘transfer of 
undertaking’ across the ARD’s 40-year-plus life-span; a social protection 
approach in the first half of the ARD’s life, and a more commercial rights-
orientated approach in the latter half. With collective bargaining however, a 
discernible approach within the ARD to these questions is only made clear 
after 2000, whilst ambiguity and uncertainty existed in the earlier period of 
the ARD. 
 As in the previous chapter, we begin with those issues of the ARD’s scope 
and definition of a transfer. 
 
2.6.2.i The ARD’s scope 
Questions concerning the ARD’s scope and definition of ‘a transfer’ are the 
centrally important regulatory and governance challenge presented by the 
directive. This is especially true in the post-1970s era where such transfers 
became a key feature of industrial reorganisation, as made clear in the 
preceding German ARD case study, and were central to the 2006 and 2014 
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variants of Britain’s ‘TUPE’ regulations that transposed the ARD into UK 
law. 
Britain is a particularly interesting case in this regard as the 
restructuring agendas that were seen across Europe from the 1990s were 
rolled out much earlier (in the 1980s in Britain) and went much further in 
terms of industries affected. The attempts by the Conservative governments 
of the 1980s in Britain to liberalise its public sector included various 
privatisations, ‘Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT)’ policies and 
other ‘market testing’ frameworks (Adnett and Hardy 1999). The 1977 ARD, 
with its demands that workers’ rights be retained when ‘transfers of 
undertakings’ took place, would seriously hamper this public sector reform 
agenda, so in its first attempt at transposing the ARD in 1981 (the first 
‘TUPE’91 regulations) the British government limited the scope of the ARD to 
only covering ‘commercial’ activities. 
This was deemed an unacceptable attempt by the European 
Commission to circumvent the social protection goals of the ARD. In 1994, in 
the Commission vs. the UK92 case, the CJEU decided in favour of the 
Commission’s complaints and demanded the UK fall into line. The UK 
government in fact pre-empted the CJEU, seeing the writing on the wall, and 
modified the 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 
(TURERA) accordingly to extend its application of the ARD to public sector 
enterprises as well. This pre-emption was delivered as the CJEU had already 
made clear its position in preceding cases such as Dr. Sophie Redmond, Rask 
and Daddy’s Dance Hall (see chapter 2.2) and a UK case (Dines93) where the 
CJEU’s interpretation of the ARD was applied over the wishes of the British 
                                               
91 Transfer of Undertakings and Protection of Employment (TUPE) regulations 
92 CJEU c-382-92 
93 Dines and others v. Initial Health care services Ltd and Pall Mall services group Ltd. [IRLR 336, CA] 
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government. In view of this Commission-CJEU pincer, the UK government 
relented. Furthermore, In 1995 the UK government passed the 1995 
Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings regulations that 
merged the ARD with the Collective Redundancies directive (98/59) and 
made sure that Britain’s TUPE regulations conformed to EU law. A classic 
conflict of laws between the European and the national level was ‘resolved’ 
with EU actors enforcing the supremacy of the European legal order in very 
formal terms. 
As in the other chapters, disruptions from a legal source (usually the 
CJEU) are identifiable by singular events like a single court case. The 
disruption felt here in Britain however in the 1980s and 1990s was on-going, 
firstly due to the UK not interpreting the ARD in the manner European 
institutions wanted them to, and then with a spectacular reversal which itself 
was very disruptive.  
It was ironic and, from a British perspective, highly frustrating that 
only two years after the 1995 Collective Redundancies and Transfer of 
Undertakings regulations brought UK law into line with EU law, the 
European Court was to reverse this approach of EU law towards that which 
Britain had been ordered to remove. The 1997 Süzen case was addressed in 
the previous chapter, but, and despite coming from a German litigation, was 
far more disruptive in Britain so is addressed differently in this chapter. 
Süzen did two unhelpful things from a regulatory standpoint. First, it 
reduced the scope of ARD narrowing the scope of transfer scenarios  to which 
it could be applied. Second, it did so in a manner that was so unclear that 
practioners and regulators do not know precisely where the outer edges of 
this new defintion are (what is a ‘transfer’ and what is not) (McMullen 2014).  
From the standpoint of social protection principles, under which the 
ARD were designed, this pulling back of the ARD’s scope also reduced the 
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social protection quality of the ARD. This did so in a serious material way: 
by allowing a new employer to chose whether or not to take on existing staff 
if the undertaking being transferred was a labour intensive one (McMullen 
2014). Employers being able to chose whether to dismiss the entire workforce 
represents a plain contravention of both the social protection principles of the 
ARD and the EU’s own Collective Redundancies Directive. UK courts were 
very unimpressed due to the serious legal uncertainty the decision caused 
(ibid.). On the one hand, the reversal itself created uncertainty and disruption. 
On the other hand, the ‘harsh effects’ of Süzen, as described by McMullen,  
were so severe in their implications (described above) that some British 
tribunals were reluctant to enforce it (McMullen 2014).  
Some chose to ignore the Süzen decision, as what happened in ECM 
(Vehicle Delivery Systems) Ltd v Cox94 and the RCO Support Services v UNISON95 
cases (McMullen 2014). As McMullen notes however, this did not achieve 
any greater degree of legal certainty and did not offer a remedy to the 
dispute. Some courts developed new tests such as the ‘multi-factorial’ and 
‘motive’ tests offered in the RCO Support Services v UNISON case and were 
adopted by the Court of Appeal in ADI (UK) Ltd v Firm Security Group Ltd96. 
There were however court decisions that ignored these tests and attempted 
to honour the commercial logic of Süzen97. The uncertainty only deepened as 
different courts addressed the uncertainty of  Süzen in different ways. In an 
Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) case, Complete Clean Ltd v Savage98, the 
deciding judge stated that “...the law in the UK is in a state of critical 
uncertainty. It is almost impossible to give advice to [parties] involved in 
possible transfers with any degree of certainty”.   
                                               
94 1999, CoA 
95 2002, CoA 
96 2002, CoA, Civil Division 971 
97 2004, Astle v (1) Cheshire County Council (2) Ominisure Property Management Ltd. EAT 
98 2002, EAT 
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The conflicts of laws presented above here are organised according to 
their direct and indirect effects. Süzen was in fact one single direct and 
disruptive legal intervention that also had indirect and unintended 
consequences, namely causing such uncertainty where national courts had 
no idea what the state of EU law in this area was.   
This conflict of laws had to be settled by a choice of laws engineered by 
legislators. Recasts of the ARD in 1998 and 2001 did not provide this. So what 
occurred was that UK legislators had to provide it themselves. The attempt, 
in the 2006 TUPE regulations, was innovative and expansive as it defined the 
regulations to cover any ‘Service Provision Changes (SPC)’, a broad standard 
that went beyond the fuzzy but  reduced boundaries of the Süzen standard. 
This did three things: provided legal certainty for practioners, extended the 
social protection reach of TUPE and the ARD, and did so with the support, 
in the main, of practioners on both sides of industry (unions, employers). A 
government consultation document spelt this out: 
 
‘A more comprehensive coverage of ‘service provision changes’ (ie contracting-out 
and similar exercises involving business services) in order to achieve greater 
certainty in practice for all parties concerned, reducing unnecessary disputes and 
litigation and lowering transaction costs’99. 
 
Section 3 (1) of the TUPE regulations is provided below with sub-section 
(b) detailing the SPC (highlighted). 
3.—(1) These Regulations apply to—  
(a) a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or 
business situated immediately before the transfer in the United Kingdom to 
                                               
99 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Draft: Revised Transfer Regulations: Public Consultation 
(2005) (URN 05/926) 
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another person where there is a transfer of an economic entity which retains 
its identity;  
(b) a service provision change, that is a situation in which—  
(i) activities cease to be carried out by a person (“a client”) on his own 
behalf and are carried out instead by another person on the client’s 
behalf (“a contractor”);  
(ii) activities cease to be carried out by a contractor on a client’s 
behalf (whether or not those activities had previously been carried out 
by the client on his own behalf) and are carried out instead by another 
person (“a subsequent contractor”) on the client’s behalf; or  
(iii) activities cease to be carried out by a contractor or a subsequent 
contractor on a client’s behalf (whether or not those activities had 
previously been carried out by the client on his own behalf) and are 
carried out instead by the client on his own behalf.  
and in which the conditions set out in paragraph (3) are satisfied. 
 
The above is designed to capture a number of ownership change 
scenarios, including that found in the Süzen case in three ways. Covering all 
transfers where the public sector ‘contracts out’ to the private sector (a), 
where the public sector ‘re-contracts out’ by giving a contract to a new private 
contractor from an old one (b), and taking a contract back into to the public 
sector from the private sector (c). This presented three clear service-defined 
scenarios where transfers applied rather than complicated definitions based 
on whether an entity was ‘labour intensive’ or not.  
The responses of stakeholders to a 2013 consultation on reforming 
TUPE indicated, when asked whether or not to repeal the SPC, that it should 
be retained. This indicating that the SPC did, up to a point, provide some 
legal certainty. In fact, 67% of respondents, many of whom would have been 
trade unions, did not want it repealed and identified the legal certainty 
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problem as the reason why (BIS consultation 2013).   
In the process, there is also little doubt that a social protection 
approach to transfer of undertakings law in Britain had triumphed over the 
employer rights orientated commercial approach favoured by the CJEU.  
 
“Oddly, given the UK’s reputation for being a relatively unregulated market system, 
from an initial position of providing employees with scarcely any protections in the 
event of the sale of a business or outsourcing, the current law probably provides, at 
least on paper, the most intensive safeguards in Europe” 
Collins, H. (1992; p.202) 
 
“The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 
constitutes a major limitation to the freedom to contract and power of employers to 
arrange their commercial and corporate in such a way as minimise or fragment their 
employment law liabilities”  
                       Deakin and Morris (2012; p.196) 
 
The two quotes from legal scholars above point to the social protection thrust 
of the SPC that resulted from these entirely law-based concerns for 
regulatory certainty. There are however two conflict of rules problems that 
emerge. The first is the normative conflict between these social protection 
and commercial rights principles displayed by the Süzen and SPC logics. The 
second is the conflict of laws between EU law (defined by Süzen) and the 
national response to it (defined by the SPC) that sought to render the ‘harsh 
effects’ of Süzen moot. The SPC acts as a clear example of an indirect and 
unintended effect of Süzen.  
Süzen, contrary to the commercial rights logic through which the case 
was decided, therefore ended up enhancing, not hindering, the social 
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protection thrust of the ARD in liberal Britain. This sees a law-based logic 
emerge as the leading explanation as to how conflicts of law are resolved. 
This renders political or politico-economic forms of explanation of the 
processes and outcomes of this case study of secondary importance. More 
specifically, neither the institutionalist explanations (institutional resilience) 
nor the neo-liberal determinist (institutional erosion) type arguments are able 
to address the creation of the SPC. As the Collins quote above indicates, 
depictions of Britain’s liberal or market-orientated capitalist traditions were 
not on display in the way ARD was brought into EU law. Even when Britain 
returned a more committed Conservative government in 2010, the UK did 
not revert to its liberal traditions in this case of the ARD to repeal the SPC.  
This sub-section is concluded by reasserting why these problems 
concerning the ARD’s scope are important. In the introduction to this 
chapter, the process of British adherence to EU law is this area was described 
as a ‘roundabout’. More specifically, this tortuous journey British regulators 
were taken on was about a messy process of legal change and later (also messy) 
reversal. This process itself prompted extensive and ambitious legislative 
adjustments that critically altered the intentions of the initial intervention. 
This bears some similarity to the previous UK-based chapter, although the 
response to (a more direct) disruptive intervention here was based in law, not 
through strike action. This is similar to the example found in  the first chapter 
(2.3) where legislative readjustment was undertaken.  
The CJEU’s unhelpful and messy reversal of EU law may appear as a 
rare or unlikely event, but these kinds of regulatory and governance 
problems are remarkably common, prompting various kinds of adjustments 
and responses. A broader point is noted here: disruptive examples of neo-
liberal legal change will provoke responses that often will refer to dominant 
institutional logic, but not always. This chapter is the third such example 
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where the typological depictions and labels of these national ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ have not been borne in the identified outcomes. Below is the sub-
section dealing with collective bargaining and the ARD. Here, the outcome 
was much more in-line with the liberal traditions associated with Britain’s 
capitalist regime. How it got to these outcomes however, was again messy 
and did not support the claims of CPE theories. 
 
2.6.2.ii. Collective Agreements and the ARD 
The regulatory and governance problems presented by questions of the 
ARD’s scope were specifically identified as problems of legal uncertainty. 
Similar problems are also evident with those issues raised by collective 
bargaining and the role of collectively bargained ‘acquired rights’ of 
transferred workers. There is an important difference however in the nature 
of the uncertainty in the case of collective agreements under the ARD. With 
the ARD’s scope, there was a long list of CJEU cases outlining the position of 
EU law on the subject, with the legal uncertainty created when this position 
was reversed by new case law of the Court. With collective agreements 
however, the CJEU had not generated any significant case law. As outlined 
in the Germany-ARD case, the (2000) Collino & Chiappero case is the earliest 
significant case on the subject identified.  
At this point the two principal concerns of collective bargaining in the 
context of transfers of undertakings, already outlined in chapters 2.2 and 2.5, 
are once again outlined.  
 
1. The content of a collective agreement, as attached to individual employment 
contracts, that exists at the time of transfer, but no rules exist as for later 
agreements on transferred undertakings (number 2). 
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2. Whether successor agreements to the collective agreement that existed 
at the time of transfer are to be adhered to as well by new employers. 
This implies that the overarching collective bargaining apparatus, that 
created the original collective agreement, may be transferred as well thus 
binding employers to that apparatus and the later agreements it produces. 
 
    The directive clearly answers number one above in the affirmative 
(article 3(1)) and also states that this transferred collective agreement must 
be honoured up until the time of its expiry or replacement. This was also 
confirmed by the CJEU in Collino & Chiappero and also confirmed its 
application to multi-stage transfers. This latter point leads to the second 
regulatory concern of collective agreements: should a new employer, to 
whom the business has been ‘transferred’, also have to abide by those collective 
agreements that succeed the one in place at transfer (once it expires)?  
As raised in the previous chapter, this is an important question for any 
labour relations regime in a context of economic change and restructuring 
and for the following reason: employers can plan for long-term wage cost 
reductions if they know that when a (current) collective agreement expires, 
they do not need to abide by its replacement; thus providing a strong 
incentive to pursue some kind of transfer of undertaking. This debate is 
identified as the dynamic vs. static debate, with the dynamic interpretation 
stating that future/successor agreements must be adhered to as well, even if 
the employer is not a party or signatory to the agreement, and the static 
interpretation saying they do not (as described in chapter 2.2).  
  The CJEU partially resolved this uncertainty from 2006 with the 
German Werhof and the later Asklepios cases (2017). The Werhof case did 
however also inspire significant consternation within the UK court system.  
Unlike in Germany however, where domestic labour courts passively 
referred cases up the judicial hierarchy to the European court, British courts 
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sought to establish their own judgements on this question, some imposing 
the dynamic interpretation and others the static interpretation. Unlike with 
the matters concerning of the ARD’s scope however, the legal uncertainty on 
this question that existed prior to Werhof was not resolved by any legislative 
manoeuvre like the SPC provision in TUPE. British courts had to address this 
uncertainty themselves and in doing so, but served to create even more legal 
uncertainty. The lack of a legislative fix, of the SPC kind, at the UK level is 
notable.  The conflict of laws scenario created was eventually settled by the 
CJEU in the 2013 British case, Alemo-Herron100 and  in favour of a ‘freedom to 
contract’ principle where employer rights superseded those social rights of 
workers.  
 Placing complicated issues of collective bargaining within the ARD 
context demands that a key aspect of the relationship between law and 
collective bargaining is returned to. This key aspect also provides an 
important comparative difference between Britain and most other EU 
member states’ labour relations. This aspect concerns the lack of legal 
character that UK law affords collective agreements, meaning they are not 
enforceable as regular contracts are in the courts. This creates a problem 
when the ARD demands that collective agreements in place at the time of a 
transfer must, by law, be transferred as well. This does not overturn the 
general principle of collective agreements’ non-legal character, but does 
mean that in the event of a ‘transfer of undertaking’ that they do become so, 
courtesy of article 3(1) of the directive.  
As examined in the previous chapter concerning Germany’s 
experience with the ARD, the second question outlined at the top of this sub-
section as to what happens once this collective agreement transferred at the 
                                               
100100 Case C-426/11 Mark Alemo-Herron and others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd 
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time of transfer expires is not addressed. This question, again, sits within the 
dynamic or static debate raised in chapters 2.2 and 2.5 (Germany-Acquired 
Rights). In this British-Acquired Rights chapter, national courts were very 
involved in a debate that saw both the dynamic and static interpretations 
imposed at different points in different cases, creating the consternation 
described above. The CJEU again intervened here.  
  Some contextual points raised from UK law are first outlined. British 
contract law, a central doctrinal part of the British constitution, has been 
defined by the liberal principles of a ‘freedom to contract’ right assigned to 
all individuals (Deakin and Morris 2009; p.110-114). Labour lawyers however 
have usually criticised this doctrinal position from a normative basis as they 
approach the employment relationship as one set around a balance of power 
that is nearly always skewed in the employer’s favour (by the innate 
circumstances of any employment relationship), thus rendering this 
‘freedom’ as entirely unbalanced in the employer’s favour. Doctrinal 
impositions coming from the European level are muddied by traditions of 
both a ‘labour law’ view, emphasising social rights of workers, and a 
‘freedom to contract’ view which, by implication, favours employers. In this 
chapter, EU institutions have notably shifted from one (social protection) to 
the other (commercial), but how this shift was dealt with by UK courts 
produced more problems, requiring the CJEU to create its own settlement. 
UK courts, again, had applied both dynamic and static interpretations 
in different cases, creating a conflict of laws problem. Three main cases are 
addressed here develop this and include the Glendale Managed Services v 
Graham (2003)101 and Whent (1997)102 cases, the Alemo-Herron decision that 
actually reached the CJEU. This third case in fact settled the uncertainty 
                                               
101 Glendale Managed Services v Graham IRLR 465, Court of Appeal [2003] 
102 Whent v T Cartledge Ltd [1997] IRLR 153 (EAT). 
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around the dynamic-static debate in favour of the employer-friendly static 
approach. The German Werhof case, examined in the previous chapter, also 
features in this section as it was an influence on some of these UK cases. 
Two aspects of context are present in both the Glendale and Whent 
cases. First, these cases concerned outsourcing in the public sector and, 
second, a role for a National Joint Council (NJC), of the sort seen in the 
Britain-Posted Workers chapter, that governs the collective agreement for 
local government in Britain. Both the Glendale and Whent cases were decided 
in accordance with the dynamic interpretation, stating that it was logical 
from a legal standpoint that an established collective agreement for the sector 
be enforced  in a situation where transfers and multi-stage transfers were 
common. This has echoes of the ‘business case’  argument made with the SPC 
in the previous sub-section, but unavoidably also conforms to social rights 
interpretation of this question rather than an employers’ ‘right to contract’ 
principle. With this, it also has echoes with the ‘pattern bargaining’ logic seen 
in countries like Germany and Austria with stronger corporatist traditions 
rather than Britain. This does underline a key point of this chapter however: 
in order to achieve legal certainty, legal actors like courts or the governmental 
state will often look for practical solutions rather commit themselves to broad 
abstract principles found in doctrine or ideology (liberalism, freedom to 
contract, industrial peace etc.).  
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The graphic above displays 
the hierarchy of courts, or appeals 
chain, in Britain. Employment 
Tribunals (ET) (and Appeals 
Tribunals (EAT)) could not 
establish a common approach, 
with EATs overturning previous 
decisions in Whent and Alemo-
Herron. British courts, caught 
between different approaches, 
were not sure how to adjudicate 
these disputes.  
More space is provided to outline and analyse the 2013 Alemo-Herron 
case as this, again, settled this conflict of rules between the dynamic and static 
interpretations. This was a British case that finally reached the CJEU after a 
exhaustive appeals process and different levels of courts had been gone 
through, some applying the dynamic interpretation and others applying the 
static. 
 
Table 2.6.b UK and EU cases on the ‘static-dynamic’ interpretations 
Static interpretation  Dynamic Interpretation 
Werhof (2006) CJEU Glendale (2003), CoA  
Alemo-Herron (2013) (EU & UK) Whent (1997), UK EAT 
 Asklepios-Kliniken (2017) CJEU Scattalon (2010) CJEU 
 
The Alemo-Herron concerned a claim by employees to a collective 
Figure 2.6.a:  UK Court hierarchy  
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agreement agreed by the National Joint Council (NJC) and changes made to the 
collective agreement made at the NJC. The new owners of the undertaking 
in question (the transferee) were not signatories to this collective agreement.  
An initial transfer of undertaking from a local authority (Lewisham, 
South London) to a private sector firm, CCL Ltd, incorporated the terms of 
the collective agreement run by the NJC for the local government sector. 
These entailed the agreed pay increases for the transferred employees. When 
a further transfer occurred, to Parkwood Leisure Ltd. (the defendant), a 
dispute arose over Parkwood’s refusal to adhere to this collective agreement 
and the continued application of the pay increases this brought.  
 
Figure  2.6.b The transfers of the Alemo-Herron case 
 
The Employment Tribunal (ET) originally imposed the static 
interpretation arguing that the transferee company should not expect to have 
terms to a collective agreement imposed upon them that were created after 
the date of the transfer. The ARD might be meant to impose employment 
conditions at the point of transfer, but not all those subsequent changes that 
might occur later. On appeal, the EAT disagreed with the ET and imposed 
the dynamic interpretation. The Court of Appeal then disagreed with the 
EAT and agreed with the ET’s original decision, and re-imposed the static 
interpretation and did so by interpreting EU law through the CJEU’s 2006 
Werhof case.  
This decision came with a caveat (of sorts) from the Court of Appeal, 
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stating that the dynamic interpretation, if it were not for Werhof, would 
constitute the “conventional application of ordinary principles of contract 
law to the statutory consequences [of the ARD]” (Justice Rimer at paragraph 
46, sourced by Wynn-Evans 2010). This statement itself is interesting as it 
demonstrates just how far British courts had adjusted UK law over thirty 
years-plus of the ARD to a position where these courts would prioritise social 
protection principles rather than the employer’s ‘right to manage’ and ‘right to 
contract’ than sits more comfortably in British judicial and doctrinal 
traditions. When this case got to Luxembourg, the CJEU, again, concurred 
with the Court of Appeals decision and firmed up its jurisprudence 
providing the static interpretation. 
In this important sub-section, UK courts and social partners were 
caught with a serious regulatory and goverance problem and in fact a conflict 
among three options: a) adherence to traditional British approach to contract 
law as it relates to collective bargaining and employment contracts, b) the 
extended social policy approach of the old ARD, c) the new approach of the 
CJEU. This sets up a number of theoretical claims raised below.   
 
2.6.3. Theoretical findings 
  2.6.3.i. Law and collective bargaining inextricably entangled 
Unlike in the German-Acquired Rights chapter, there are no works councils 
or similar institutions of workplace ‘worker voice’ in place in Britain. This 
means that the ‘collective institutional’ half of the labour relations regime in 
Britain’s case is represented solely by collective bargaining103. Similarly to the 
                                               
103 To repeat some context on the difference between works councils and collective bargaining, the 
latter sets wages and pay scales (and can do so at a national, industrial or company level) whilst 
works councils in most guises where they exist in Europe do not set wages but deal with other 
‘local’ aspects of the employment relationship like holiday pay, grievance procedures and the 
details of pay-setting. 
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German case, British collective bargaining finds itself in a passive and 
defensive position when dealing with legal pressures to their institutions.  
There are however important differences in Britain concerning the 
relationship between law and bargaining. The important aspects of this law-
collective bargaining relationship in this case concerns the legal character and 
legal force of collective bargaining. As already noted in the previous sub-
section, in most of Europe collective agreements are legally enforceable in the 
same or similar way other contracts are. In Britain (and Ireland) these are not, 
but individual employment contracts, whose content are often provided by 
collective agreements, are legally enforceable meaning they can be enforced 
in law. Moreover, employment contracts are often endowed with a ‘bridging 
clause’ that formally recognises a collective agreement and its framing of the 
terms and conditions of that contract.  
As illustrated in the concluding section of chapter 2.1, the presence of 
legal character is hugely important as it indirectly provides rights of action 
for both unions or employers to have provisions enforced. Employers in 
Germany for example may seek to impose an agreed ‘peace clause’ contained 
in a collective agreement they feel unions are breaching by going on strike. 
In the British case, as illustrated in the previous UK-focused chapter and in 
2.1, trade unions have traditionally sought to keep collective bargaining 
away from the reach of the state given the historic hostility of courts and the 
UK common law towards union action and collective bargaining. As the neo-
liberal policy agendas of the 1980s and 1990s began to challenge trade union 
and workers’ rights, European courts became a new litigation avenue to 
enforce workers’ rights and interests. This is evident in the case of the ARD 
which provided an on-going source of case law for both UK and European 
courts.  
This sees the relationship between bargaining and law in Britain as a 
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rather distant one and therefore led by workers and employers, although 
with employers being much more dominant in a post-1980s period with 
unions being weaker or even non-existent. In this ARD case, EU law forces 
them together; initially giving collective agreements legal character (in the 
case of transfer of undertakings only) where they did not have this before. 
Then the European Court sought to reorder the rights of action and rights of 
association, in Alemo-Herron, later on in favour of employers.  
The first of these produced a clear breach of the doctrinal position of 
UK labour law by making collective agreements legally binding (again, only 
for the purposes of transfers of undertakings only). This applied only to the 
question as to whether collective agreements applied to a transfer at the point 
of transfer, but successor agreements will not be binding unless the new 
employer agrees to it. The phrase ‘doctrinal position’ is used purposefully as 
there is a meaningful question as to whether this point of law actually results 
in practical effects. It is argued here that it does, up to a point. If unions 
cannot ensure that employers will enforce a collective agreement (either 
honestly, on time, or only partially, or at all) then, in the abstract, they have 
a number of options: strike and or blockade, lobby for governmental 
assistance, or litigate in the courts. If union membership or organisational 
power is weak and assistance from government is thought unlikely, litigation 
is the only option remaining if this is deemed viable. If unions know that in 
those instances covered by the ARD they can ask for collective agreements to 
be enforced by the courts, they are more likely to use this option. This 
introduces an important feature of juridification into collective bargaining 
concerns where before this would not exist.  
As it stands in Britain, the legal enforcement of collective agreements 
only applies to ‘transfer of undertakings’ cases and not elsewhere in British 
labour relations. Given that the expansive and common use of such transfers
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however, as caught by the directive, the relevance of this point to British 
labour relations is not limited, but relevant to plenty of British labour 
relations. The relationship between law and collective bargaining therefore 
is much closer and intimate, even if complex as a result of European demands 
for legal change, but was complicated by renewed interventions coming from 
Europe that came later. 
Section III offers some important comparisons on this last point above 
but is outlined briefly here. In the case of German unions, that also had 
legally enforceable collective agreements both within and outside of ‘transfer 
of undertakings’ cases, litigation was not reached for. The answer points to 
the role of neo-liberal reform agendas in Germany, consensual labour 
relations traditions (as supposed to more conflictual relations in Britain), and 
the role of works councils in Germany as a critical venue for unions to exert 
influence. Both of these comparisons sit next to the other British chapter (on 
posted workers) where unions used strike action to impose new collectively 
agreed rules, exploiting power resources unique to the circumstances of this 
corner of the construction sector rather than of high union membership. This 
is continued and developed further in Section III.  
 
2.6.3.ii.  A clash of legal systems and complex problems of direct  
and indirect  legal influences 
As with the German-Posted Workers case study, this chapter presents a very 
prominent role for a direct law-based disruption, but does so with both a 
court-inspired disruption and a disruptive legislative intervention. In this case 
however, two different examples present themselves. In the Süzen case, the 
CJEU had the intent to produce a decision that aligned with neo-liberal goals, 
market-making goals. The terms ‘neo-liberal’ or even ‘liberal’ are not used in 
the decision, but do not have to identify (an albeit messy) coming together of  
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judicialisation and neo-liberalisation trends. The coming together of these in 
this case study served to create legal uncertainty that inspired a legislative 
response represented by the SPC. This produced an outcome almost 
completely contrary to the liberal implications of the Süzen case. This is a 
legislative example of the kind of unintended consequences that can result from 
disruptive legal intervention that take outcomes away from their intended 
normative destinations. This points to an interesting comparison with those 
unintended consequences in the British-Posted Workers chapter (2.4) where 
collective action and collective bargaining were the principal drivers of those 
outcomes nullifying the intentions of EU law.  
         Unlike the previous UK-based case study, courts were every much 
central here, as employers did often feel the need to action their perceived 
legal rights in the courts. Here, British courts were caught between a) 
adherence to a traditional doctrinal approach to labour law questions, b) the 
social policy approach of the old ARD (pre-Süzen), c) the new but 
underdeveloped and unsettled Süzen approach of the CJEU. The CJEU 
settled this dispute in the 2013 Alemo-Herron case. The process that 
culminated in the final judgement in this case (of the CJEU) however was 
complicated and disorderly, and says much about the conflict of rules 
problems that can arise when hyper-liberal interpretations of competing 
social and economic rights are used to generate legal change. Despite the 
finality of the Court’s Alemo-Herron decision, this process underlines the 
prominence of conflict, complexity and uncertainty rather than 
complementarity or functionalism in explaining this example, in 
institutionalist CPE parlance, of ‘institutional change’. 
 For this chapter, and as indicated immediately above, the complex 
layering of different existing legal rules presents the sorts of conflict of laws 
problems addressed below. We are in essence talking about two legal systems 
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trying to co-exist. But under the hierarchical system of EU law, national law 
must conform to EU law (in the abstract). This has been made remarkably 
difficult for Britain in this case given the contrary normative logics operating 
in European legal rules vis-à-vis UK law, and then the disruptive form of 
change to these legal rules pursued at the European level.  
 
2.6.3.iii. Conflict of rules, laws, complexity and incoherence 
The concept of conflict of rules, and in particular conflict of laws, have been 
especially useful for organising the complex and competing sets of legal rules 
found in this chapter. There are two sets of conflict of rules problems in this 
case study. One sees two temporal and one normative conflict of rules issues, 
the other is found in the three conflicts raised at the end of the last (empirical) 
section concerning collective bargaining.  
The first set of temporal and normative conflict of rules is examined 
here. The normative comes in two parts: the first sees a conflict of rules 
between legal rights providing social protection for workers and those legal 
rights for employers to reorganise their businesses and workforces and their 
‘right to contract’. The second sees a UK position, represented in legislation 
and public policy preferences, being set in opposition to the intentions of the 
ARD as provided by European institutions. The ARD, as initially written, 
was very clearly directed toward social protection logic and was enforced by 
European institutions (the Commission, the Court).  
The temporal conflict, following from the above, sees this initial social 
protection interpretation reversed in favour of the antithetical employer 
rights-centred approach. This reversal itself, concerning the ARD’s scope, 
created a conflict between an interpretation that UK courts and legislators 
had grown obedient too, albeit only recently before the 1997 Süzen shift, and 
the new employer rights-centric approach delivered by this same 1997 case. 
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The choice of laws decision was ultimately made by legislators through the SPC 
clause in the 2006 TUPE regulations; a ‘choice’ that in fact extended the social 
protection force of the directive and in fact reversed the logic of the CJEU’s 
Süzen decision. This was not done to assuage the then Labour government’s 
trade union allies, although a consideration, but was done to provide legal 
certainty to this area law. This conflict of laws problem and resulting choice of 
laws solution was based on a principle of legal certainty for employers, 
workers as well as for courts who had also been complaining about the 
CJEU’s Süzen decision. 
The conflict of rules scenario presented by the collective bargaining 
problems is in fact murkier, but only because the CJEU did not have much 
case law on this subject compared to those questions of the ARD’s scope.  
Given UK courts’ acceptance of the European interpretation in the 
1980s and 90s, some judicial actors chose, in the absence of explicit guidance 
in the directive or by the CJEU, to interpret and enforce the social protection 
principles of the directive and impose successive collective agreements onto 
post-transfer employers, despite them not being party to these agreements. 
Other UK courts disagreed with this interpretation and instead of being 
deferential to EU law in this case (as interpreted in the 80s and 90s) were 
instead deferential to the traditions of the ‘law of contract’ found in Britain 
that were more friendly to employers. The CJEU eventually settled this 
conflict of laws problem by enforcing the static rather than dynamic approach, 
thus enabling employers the ability to use multi-stage transfer processes to 
subvert the demands of collective bargaining and unions.  
Where courts were caught between a) an adherence to traditional 
doctrinal approach, b) the extended social policy approach of the old ARD, c) 
the new approach, it is important to note the CJEU settled this dispute in the 
2013 Alemo-Herron case. The process that culminated in the final judgement 
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in this case (of the CJEU) however was complicated and disorderly, and says 
much about the conflict of rules problems that can arise when hyper-liberal 
approached to competing social and economic rights are used to generate 
legal change (by prioristing the latter). Despite the finality of the Court’s 
Alemo-Herron decision, this process underlines the prominence of conflict, 
complexity and uncertainty rather than complementarity or functionalism in 
explaining this example, in institutionalist CPE parlance, of ‘institutional 
change’ mentioned earlier in this chapter and developed more in chapter 3.2. 
The legal uncertainty present on this occasion, created by an absence 
of European level guidance rather than a reversal of some kind, was instead 
met by domestic courts, although without any coherence or commitment to 
a common doctrinal cause. In this chapter, competing legal logic based on 
judicial interpretation are more likely to explain these outcomes than those 
arguments that align with neo-liberal determinism or institutional 
complementarity found in CPE.  This point underlines an important 
realisation about pursuing CPE research in a still-dominant era of neo-
liberalism. Courts may behave in any number of ways to conform and 
reinforce the imperatives of neo-liberalism, but they could also act in 
contradiction in favour of other principles of doctrine, justice or 
jurisprudential respect for the facts of the case. The governmental state is easier 
to wrap into theories of the neo-liberal state given its ability to be seized by 
powerful political ideas and circumstances. Courts, at the very least, cannot 
be looked upon theoretically in the same way. In the German ARD case, 
courts were not committed to doctrinaire neo-liberalism either, but their 
consistent and passive referrals of cases to a European Court that was merely 
served the use of legal principles that aided neo-liberal goals to employers 
weaken institutions of German Tarifautonomie. In Britain, courts were more 
active, but were still more committed to legal principles such as legal 
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certainty (for courts and practitioners) and deference to EU law, only their 
deference was manifested in an attempt to apply EU law rather than simply 
refer the case to Europe.  
In short, courts are an increasingly prominent actor in events marked 
by processes of economic reorganisation, processes that see employers given 
greater rights to operate either by circumstance or in law. This does create 
counter claims by workers to frame or halt these processes. This creates a 
classic class-based conflict of laws scenario on which the rule of the neo-
liberal order is clear in the ordering of rights, only courts are not. The CJEU’s 
position, and across all four cases of this thesis, is very clear. Neo-liberalism 
as legal as well as market and political imperative is part of a European 
constitutional order that national legal and labour relations systems have had 
to reconcile themselves to. The concurrent and often overlapping advance of 
neo-liberalism and Europeanisation poses serious questions for the 
comparison of labour relations and possesses serious legal as well as politico-
economic parts. 
  
2.6.4 Conclusion 
This was a case study of a particular sort of law-based disruption and legal 
change; its specificities defined, in the main, by the perverse results it created 
when viewed against the very intentions of the initial disruption. In simpler 
language, this was a case study in the ‘messy reversal’, the sort that created 
the ‘roundabout’ journey that British legislators and practitioners were 
subject to. What is theoretically most interesting, looking forward to the third 
section that follows this chapter, is the response to it. The reasons for the 
selections of posted workers and acquired rights as areas of law is not simply 
what these legal rules themselves do, but what they provoke and inspire in 
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legislators, political interests, trade unions and employers. This response in 
this case study was very law-based, and came through both legislative and 
judicial action, unlike the first case study chapter (Germany-PWD) which is 
offered only a legislation form of response to a judicial intervention. This 
response, more specifically in regards to CPE, also did not conform to the 
varieties of ‘liberal’ label attached to Britain. This is particularly remarkable 
given that the disruptive legal change, on both the ARD’s scope and on 
collective agreements, pointed to the sort of outcome that would conform to 
the ‘liberal’ or market-orientated outcome that characterises Britain. Why did 
Britain not revert to politico-economic type as CPE theories would suggest? 
The reason is found in law, and concerns of legal certainty and regulatory 
stability and how these are addressed by courts and legislators; these factors 
are not addressed in CPE schools. 
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Chapter 3.1.  
Comparisons and findings from four case studies   
 
3.1.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this first chapter of this final section is to bring together the 
empirical findings of the four case study chapters for the purposes of 
analytical comparison. These comparisons, a fundamental part of CPE and 
all comparative social science, produce a number of important empirical 
findings and observations. These findings and observations are then used, in 
chapter 3.2 that follows, to generate claims about broader phenomena 
including the future of labour relations under European integration, the 
continuance of the neo-liberal order and, importantly, how CPE can address 
these.  
This chapter has three main sections. The first (3.1.2) provides a brief 
mapping of the four case studies and some preliminary four-way 
comparisons. The second section (3.1.3) builds upon this and produces those 
key empirical observations from the four chapters but does so according to 
selected themes. The final section of this chapter (3.1.4.) examines the 
alternative framework put forward in this thesis and offers some 
modifications to this framework based upon the findings drawn from the 
four case study chapters. 
 
3.1.2. Preliminary comparisons  
As articulated by Peter Hall in his paper Systematic Process Analysis (2006), 
detailing the benefits of small-n comparative case study research models, the 
in-depth analysis of compared cases is particularly beneficial for theory 
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development. This includes extending theoretical arguments to broader 
phenomena from these discrete cases.  In using the four case studies in this 
thesis, and the wealth of empirical material these brought, it is important to 
acknowledge both the empirical as well as theoretical uses these cases have for 
this thesis. This means that these cases have provided direct empirical 
findings as well as purely abstract theoretical ones.  
The two German case studies for example, despite concerning specific 
and discrete areas of the German economy and labour market, do 
nonetheless tell us something about the empirical realities of German labour 
relations more broadly, namely the demise of Tarifautonomie’s centrally 
important collective bargaining component. In the two British case studies 
however, the broader conclusions made for broader British labour relations 
are more limited (although still present), but do present two important 
abstract and theoretical findings that are relevant for all labour relations 
concerns as well as Britain. To identify these briefly, the Britain-Posted 
Workers chapter (2.4) presented an abstract and classic example of a collective 
action-prompts-collective bargaining relationship that, relying on market 
context and power resources of labour, completely nullified attempted 
changes in legal rules and legal rights. In the second Britain-focused chapter 
(2.6, acquired rights), the abstract theoretical picture that was painted 
concerned a disruptive reversal made through law prompting an adjustment 
response which again nullified an attempt to alter the legal framework and 
legal rights of one actor (employers) over another (labour). This again, is an 
abstract scenario but is one not unusual in a European labour relations 
context where courts and legislators often pursue disruptive and unwelcome 
legal change, and has in fact become more commonplace.  
From this broader comparison and contextualisation these case 
studies and what they have been used for, more pointed and specific 
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comparisons in this section are addressed. There are a number of possible 
avenues to mapping and then comparing these four case studies. In this 
section, two comparative schemes are outlined organising the four cases and 
those central themes used for comparative theory building. A simple 
comparative scheme is provided below with basic descriptive comparisons 
of the four cases. 
 
   Table 3.1.a. Four cases 
Germany – Posted Workers 
An initial and disruptive 
intervention from a court that 
targeted both collective bargaining 
and legal rules that reinforced them. 
This saw an innovative legislative 
adjustment strategy on the part of 
German policy-makers that pushed 
labour relations matters further into 
the realm of law and formalising a 
relationship with public procurement, 
a form of economic law. 
Britain – Acquired Rights 
The CJEU sought to impose a 
narrower, market-orientated, 
employer-friendly re-interpretation 
of the ARD’s scope (the Süzen case) 
and on collective agreements’ post-
transfer role. The re-interpretation of 
the ARD’s scope caused such legal 
uncertainty that legislators sought to 
create a legislative fix that served, in-
effect, to reverse the normative intent 
of Süzen, also giving the British 
version of the ARD stronger social 
policy character than Süzen implied. 
Germany – Acquired Rights 
Instead of CJEU decisions seeing 
their liberal, market rights-based 
intentions negated or nullified, a 
piece of European legislation 
providing social rights for workers 
was instead nullified by a mix of 
negotiated settlements (in German 
works councils), a legislative tweak in 
the German legislation transposing 
the ARD, and CJEU decisions having 
to affirm the policy intentions of 
German and European policy-makers. 
Britain – Posted Workers 
The Rüffert and Laval cases 
provoked (alongside UK labour law) 
a much more radical departure from 
the intentions of the CJEU to expand 
the market access rights of 
employers. Here, the regulatory and 
governance regime, already 
dominated by collective bargaining, 
was pulled away from both EU free 
movement law and UK labour law 
that offered powerful rights for 
employers to a) have collective 
agreements ignored by foreign 
contractors, and b) end the strike 
action used to respond to a shift in 
legal rights. 
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As a first step, these four case studies are separated by a simple and 
broad categorisation where 1) substantive change took place (C) or 2) substantive 
change did not occur (nC).  This simple two-way classification is made given 
that the primary area of law that defined each case study (posted workers or 
acquired rights) either was nullified and massaged into existing practice (nC) or, 
was successfully generated changes in labour relations practice (C). The Germany-
Acquired Rights and Britain-Posted Workers provided the two examples of the 
attempts at legal change being blunted and massaged into existing labour 
relations norms and practice (nC), with the Britain-Acquired Rights and 
Germany-Posted Workers the example of legal change successfully performed 
its intended purpose (or at least to a large extent) (C).  
This simple dichotomy however does not illustrate the degree of 
disruption caused by these attempts at legal change. The Britain-Posted 
Workers chapter for example did see the attempt at legal change (represented 
by CJEU engineered shifts in posted workers law) in-part inspire very 
disruptive strike action (‘in-part’ because changes in market dynamics (more 
foreign contractors entering the market) also contributed to these strikes). 
When drawing a neat causal line from the beginning of this dispute to its 
outcome however, this shift in the legal rights does not produce the changes in 
Britain that it did in Sweden (as in Laval) nor in Germany (as in Rüffert). One 
obvious difference is presented by the presence of a CJEU decision in the 
Laval and Rüffert examples, hence the name of these cases, but in Britain did 
not reach the European (or any other) court. An important point from this 
chapter (2.4) is repeated however: it is far from guaranteed that a CJEU 
decision like that in Rüffert (Germany-Posted Workers) or Laval in the British 
case would have ended the dispute Britain. In fact, given the extent and 
ferocity of this strike action, and the fact that it was already taking place 
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illegally, it is highly unlikely that a Laval or Rüffert-like decision would have 
ended.  
The Britain-Acquired Rights, as with the Germany Acquired Rights 
chapter, featured two sets of issues: scope and collective bargaining concerns. 
With this, the basic C-nC dichotomy would seemingly be split across these 
two sub-areas. In the Germany Acquired Rights chapter no discernible legal 
change occurred in either the areas of scope nor collective bargaining, even 
with the existence of several Landmark CJEU cases concerning Germany 
(Süzen, Werhof, Asklepios). In Britain, substantive change was inspired in the 
area of the ARD’s scope at both ends of the ARD’s 40-year life-time. At the 
back end of this time-line however, the legal change inspired by the 1997 
Süzen case inspired a response that nullified the effects of Süzen. This 
response itself constituted substantive legal change (LC), as did the 
consternation among Britain’s courts in regards to collective bargaining 
issues that were shrouded in murk at the EU level. 
Why these cases produced these particular kinds of outcome however 
is not only determined by the nature of the legal intervention (whether it was 
legislative or judicial or a mix of the two) but also the manner it was delivered 
(a disruptive court decision for example) and the nature of legal and labour 
relations regime it sought to change. Importantly it is the responses to this 
intervention which were examined. These responses to the regulatory and 
governance problems themselves reveal much about the state of labour 
relations systems, whether defined in national or industrial level terms, the 
nature of the legal systems in these cases and, importantly, informal aspects 
such as labour actors’ approach to legal rules. From these empirical 
examples, and the simple C-nC scheme, three abstracted categories of response 
to attempted legal change are identified and drawn from the four case studies. 
These are Collective Institutional, Political-legislative and Juridified.  
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Table 3.1.b.  Three forms of response 
Germany – Posted Workers 
An initial and disruptive intervention 
from a court that targeted both collective 
bargaining and legal rules that reinforced 
them. This saw an innovative 
legislative-political form of response 
that pushed labour relations matters 
further into the realm of law and 
juridified form of regulation, formalising 
labour relations’ relationship with other 
forms of economic law (public 
procurement). 
   Germany – Acquired Rights 
Negotiated settlements in works 
councils mitigated the impact of 
restructuring, some legislative 
tweaks and judicial decisions 
contribute to nullifying the ARD, 
making it entirely non-disruptive. 
A Collective institutional form 
of response, supplemented by 
legislative-political and judicial 
reinforcement). 
 
Britain – Acquired Rights 
Disruption from judicial and legislative 
interventions at different ends of a 40-
year time-line. Domestic legislative and 
judicial responses to this disruption were, 
in their own way, expansive. Courts were 
left in a muddle before a final judicial 
decision settled matters (on collective 
agreements). Legislation was retained 
and corrected some of the damage caused. 
Legislative-Political, judicial 
influences in the response. 
 
       Britain – Posted Workers 
Law’s influence more indirect, but 
present in shifting legal rights in a 
transnational market. Collective 
action and collective bargaining 
combined to pull labour relations 
away from the threat of unfriendly, 
and multi-faceted, legal 
interventions. A far purer form of 
Collective Institutional form of 
response that reasserted the pre-
existed role of collective bargaining.  
 
These abstracted Collective Institutional, Political-legislative and a 
Juridified types of response each take more complex forms across the four 
chapters. These three categories denote the type of dynamic relationship 
between law and collective institutions and include roles for labour, 
employers and the governmental and judicial state. In the thematic terms 
provided by each point of the socio-legal political economy framework of this 
thesis, these different forms of response are predicated by the manner in 
which conflict of rules problems are addressed and settled, and are themselves 
determined by the relative power resources of key actors.  
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In both the Germany-based case studies, the power resources of 
labour were too weak to impose themselves and their interests upon 
employers in the very direct manner found in the Britain-Posted Workers 
chapter. In fact, in the Germany-Posted Workers case, trade unions did have 
some influence on a legislation-based response although this did only 
produce an incomplete and very limited outcome in attempting to defend an 
existing labour relations regime. A key finding when viewing the two 
Germany-based case studies together also produces a paradox. These 
demonstrated both collective bargaining’s on-going reliance upon law-based 
supports as well as its heightened sensitivity to law-based threats as collective 
bargaining and its trade union actors weaken.  
Each of these case studies exhibit some distinctive and unique 
characteristics in terms of the outcomes they produced. The Germany-Posted 
Workers chapter above for examples stands out from the other three as it 
produces a wholly incomplete ‘outcome’ (at the time of writing) where the 
legislative response has not yet had its validity, using EU public procurement 
‘special conditions’ provisions to defend collectively agreed and legislation-
provided minimum wages, confirmed by the CJEU. This may happen in time, 
but had not ten years after the initial Rüffert case. Five main observations are 
identified in the following section, but this emergence of public procurement 
presents a more specific but important observation of the sorts of juridified 
contractual forms that the regulation and governance of labour relations are 
increasingly being placed within. 
The British Posted Workers chapter stands out given that the prominent 
role for strike action in this chapter does not appear in any significant form 
in the other three case study chapters. This feature places this case study an 
important comparative position in this third section when understanding 
how power resources operate against different legal rules and economic 
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contexts. It also points to those prospects and requirements for unions to use 
more aggressive means of challenging neo-liberal legal change. As indicated 
at the top of this section, the abstracted collective action-collective bargaining 
relationship is an undeniably relevant feature of labour relations in capitalist 
systems whether it occurs as a regular event or the threat of it this sort of 
interaction informs the employment relationship that takes place to avoid it.  
The British-Acquired Rights chapter also presented a form of ‘final 
outcome’ in regards to both the ARD’s scope (an outcome provided by 
legislation) and the collective bargaining issues in the ARD (provided by the 
CJEU in its 2013 Alemo-Herron decision). The finality provided in of both 
these thematic parts of the ARD discussion in Britain is belied by the presence 
of very messy regulatory problems created by the uncertainty surrounding 
European acquired rights law. Legal uncertainty was present in some form in 
all of the other chapters, but was masked up to a point by particular actors 
taking advantage of the uncertainty by imposing their own interpretation of 
shifts in legal rights and attempting to exercise them, thus removing (up to a 
point) any uncertainty. This ordering process can sometimes occur relatively 
seamlessly, even if over time (e.g. Germany-Acquired Rights), and in other 
scenarios not. The British-Acquired Rights chapter therefore stands out versus 
the other three case studies as an extreme example of legal uncertainty and 
the perverse outcomes it can produce. In this case, these perverse responses 
are defined by those of British legislative and judicial actors that broke quite 
radically from approaches that would conform to a British ‘liberal’ politico-
economic model anticipated by most CPE scholars.  
The Germany-Acquired Rights chapter marked itself out from the other 
two as it produced a collective institutional-led response, courtesy of the rules 
of works councils, as well as the paradoxical presence of collective 
institutional decline in the form of collective bargaining’s on-going erosion.  
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3.1.3.  Five observations 
This chapter could have been organised by a rigid process of going through 
the five points of the alternative socio-legal political economy framework, 
outlined in chapter 1.1, one-by-one. Instead, it was thought more useful to 
create two sections following the section above: one with those observations 
and findings drawn from the four case studies (examined on their own merits 
and not organised and structured according to any framework), and to then 
direct these observations and findings toward another section where these 
findings and observations are used to modify the alternative framework. This 
section therefore provides the function of presenting core observations from 
the four case study chapters using direct comparisons of the four cases. There 
are five main, and interconnected and overlapping, observations drawn from 
the previous section and the four case studies. 
 
1) The relationships between legal and collective institutions of labour relations are 
becoming unsettled due to influence of neo-liberal ideas. 
2) The role of labour law is being heavily framed and determined by areas of law 
and legal change, principally found in economic law  
3) The responses to increased legal interventions into labour relations takes several 
forms, to which relative power resources of key actors are central to defining. 
4) Differences between legislative and judicial expressions of these ‘legal 
interventions’ are important, but the interaction between these are unsettled, 
disrupting how legal systems and labour relations interact. 
5) The roles for different forms of mediation and conflict are important in defining 
these responses to legal interventions and for settling conflict of rules problems. 
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1. The relationships between legal and collective institutions of labour 
relations are becoming unsettled due to disruptive influence of neo-
liberalism  
As stated in chapter 1.1, the rise of neo-liberalism and the emergence of new 
forms of legal interventions and influence in collective bargaining are 
inextricably related. This directs us to developing a renewed understanding 
of neo-liberalism, that appreciates its legal character as well its political and 
economic facets.  Tying the emergence of neo-liberalism on the one hand 
together with those new legal influences and characteristics of labour 
relations on the other, is the central theoretical insight of this thesis (derived 
from the socio-legal political economy approach). It is however addressed in 
more detail in the following chapter (3.2) alongside other theoretical findings 
as it is a broad-based observation. Here, the concrete empirical findings from 
the four case study chapters are raised to demonstrate the claim.   
The connection between the law and neo-liberalism’s emergence in 
the last 40 years of labour relations in Europe leads to another important 
claim: That this dual emergence has also made labour relations more unsettled, 
simply because the nexus between law and collective institutions has become 
disrupted by 1) attempts at reorganising existing collective institutions of labour 
relations and 2) the responses these provoke among key stakeholder actors. Put 
another way, collective bargaining regimes and neo-liberalism have been 
engaged in a form of contest; a contest that is on-going and has not as yet 
produced ‘a winner’, as the intrusions of neo-liberal legal change produce 
responses, some of which muddy and misdirect the initial intentions behind 
that intrusion.  
Theories found in Comparative Political Economy (CPE) have 
addressed some of the political and economic aspects of these responses to 
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neo-liberalism’s challenge (naturally, given the term ‘political economy’ in 
CPE). These have not however grasped a) the legal character of neo-
liberalism, nor the legal characteristics of the responses to neo-liberalism. 
With political and economic factors being addressed without acknowledging 
the role of law, both the standalone subject of law itself and its interaction with 
these political and economic factors are neglected.  These legal factors are formal 
as well as informal, or in other terms, doctrinal as well cultural. Together these 
are both important aspects of legal systems and how legal systems interact 
with labour relations, and, crucially, these how the actors involved in labour 
relations respond to those interventions a given national, industrial or local 
labour relations regime.  
Each of the four case studies in the preceding section provided 
meaningful examples of both and are addressed here thematically. These 
three themes include how strike action, litigation, negotiation and legislation are 
used and the conditions that determine what mixture of these define the 
response.  
The role of negotiation is addressed more further on in this chapter, but 
is the centrally defining feature of all collective bargaining (even if conflict 
and the threat of it revolves around bargaining).  In Germany, the traditions 
of Tarifautonomie highlight the role of negotiation over state-led mediation or 
intervention, given that ‘autonomous’ collective bargaining can not exist 
unless parties successfully negotiate rather than engage in conflict. What is 
notable in the Germany-based chapters is the emerging roles for legislation in 
intervening in labour relations and, crucially, to undermine those collective 
bargaining institutions that defined Tarifautonomie.  
This Germany-Acquired Rights chapter demonstrated courtesy of 
Germany’s adoption of the ARD provision 3(2) that would severely curtail 
(in terms of time-line) the use of collective agreements as a source of workers’ 
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acquired rights. Something similar was also present in the Germany-Posted 
Workers chapter, but in an importantly different way as the (Land-based, not 
federal) legislation in question was initially to support and reinforce collective 
bargaining. The legislative response in this case study also attempted to prop 
up collective bargaining after the CJEU’s Rüffert decision undermining it. 
This presents a complex and incoherent set of legal rules, some demanding 
changes in the image of neo-liberalism, whilst others do the opposite. This is 
partly a result of Germany’s federal structure where states can diverge from 
federal policy, but still produces a complex set of regulatory and governance 
arrangements which partly comes from attempts at neo-liberal change and 
partly from the responses to these. This presents an interesting finding about 
German labour relations that produces a ‘old regime versus new regime’ 
contest where  neo-liberal order seeks to remove or weaken collective 
bargaining institutions but does not completely succeed. Instead, an uneasy 
and incongruent and conflictual form of co-existence is the result.   
Traditions of negotiation found in German Tarifautonomie also 
produced norms of interaction between social partners that were meant to 
preclude both strike action and litigation as means of exercising power or 
rights. These sorts of traditions are evident in the examples of litigation in the 
Germany-Acquired Rights case for example as these pursued by individual 
workers, not trade unions who had already reached negotiated settlements 
with employers as was at hand in the 2006 Werhof case. This aversion to both 
litigation and to strike action are both important cultural aspects of German 
Tarifautonomie and appear to still exist to a degree, even if the rest of the 
regime slowly erodes. More comment is made below in the fourth 
‘observation’ of this sub-section concerning courts and the heightened role of 
judicial action in German labour relations.  
	 -	326	-	
In Britain, approaches to both litigation and strike action are 
traditionally more prominent than in Germany. The examples raised by the 
two UK case studies should not be extrapolated as ‘proof’ of these traditions, 
as the use of the UK case studies is to produce more abstract demonstrations 
rather than concrete empirical examples of British labour relations as a 
whole. These two cases do illustrate these traditions in British labour 
relations however. In regards to litigation,  it is usually employers who are 
more willing to exercise legal rights through the courts, although the 
employment tribunal system in Britain has become an important venue for 
workers and trade unions to exercise their legal rights as well in particular 
instances. As an aside, the creation of the UK Supreme Court has also, in its 
short life, provided remedies to disputes on the side of workers104.  Strike 
action was the important causal factor in the British-Posted Workers case study 
and was the result of those power resources that unions possessed as a result 
of strong union organisation and specific aspects of the industry they 
operated within. Again, this is the one chapter out of the four where the 
activation of new rights by employers, provided by highly liberal 
interpretations of European free movement law by the CJEU (Laval, Rüffert), 
was challenged and reversed. This therefore resulted in an outcome than ran 
completely counter to the intention and thrust of decisions by the CJEU. This 
only has a partial similarity with the Germany-Posted Workers case, where an 
expansive response (through legislation) was produced, but did not 
substantively correct the damage of a judicial decision. 
                                               
104 The UK Supreme Court was created in 2009, so has not developed an extensive jurisprudence 
on many areas of law. Decisions such as Autoclenz v. Belcher however were more pro-worker in 
approach than that considered traditional in Britain’s higher courts. 
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Across the four case study chapters, the effects of neo-liberalism’s 
legal, political and industrial105 drivers appear to have successfully weakened 
collective bargaining and its attached trade union actor in all four but one of 
the cases. The British-Posted Workers chapter is the one exception. This one 
case is again therefore notable as the lessons for the labour relations and trade 
unions in Europe are significant. If litigation does not provide the remedies 
required, and the legislative route is cut off or ineffective, increased collective 
action by unions may be the result of ever-increasing legal re-ordering of 
legal and non-legal rights in favour of employers.  
Collective bargaining’s relationship with the neo-liberal European 
order is addressed more in the following chapter, but the claim about the 
relationships between law and collective institutions is hugely important as a 
theoretical concern. Legal interventions may disrupt institutions like 
collective bargaining, but these relationships are most certainly two-way in 
causal terms as the responses to defend collective institutions can direct these 
to places not originally intended. 
 
2) The role of labour law is being heavily framed and determined by areas 
of law and legal change, principally found in economic law  
This observation concerning labour law flows logically from that above 
concerning collective bargaining, particularly given the traditional role of 
labour law to act to materially aid the interests of workers.  This observation 
produces the  claim that labour law’s role has increasingly been couched within 
the context of neo-liberal reform agendas as the neo-liberal vision of legal change has 
promoted individual economic rights over collective social rights. This has meant 
that when these economic and social (labour) rights have come into conflict, 
                                               
105 Again, what is meant by this concerned corporate practices such as outsourcing, restructuring, 
and ‘HRM’ policies that sees employers manage labour matters (‘Human Resources’) rather than 
engage in parity negotiations. This is addressed in the next chapter (3.2). 
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it is the former that has been promoted over the latter. This highlights to use 
of a conflict of rules concept that conceptualises this conflict between social 
and economic legal rights as a reordering process that is often done in legal 
terms (by courts, legislation) and often pursued between labour actors 
(workers, employers) at the industrial/workplace level.  
Labour law’s relationship with collective bargaining is critical to 
defining labour relations systems. If this nexus is altered or disrupted, the 
character of the labour relations regime itself is undermined. The four case 
studies in section two produce some analytically important findings with 
implications for broader phenomena. The two posted chapters, when 
compared together in a two-way comparison, offer important lessons for 
these ‘broader phenomena’, namely European labour relations more 
generally.  
A key claim outlined in the first chapter of this thesis (1.1), argued 
that despite the apparent social protection character of legal minimum 
wages, they are in fact a demonstration, or symptom, of the neo-liberal vision 
of legal change. This does not mean legal minimum wages lose their right to 
be labelled as ‘labour law’, only that the creation of legal and nationally-
encompassing minimum wages is a mere compensatory measure for weakening 
or removing minimum wages created by collective bargaining. Materially, from the 
standpoint of labour, this is important for the simple reason that legal 
minimum wages are usually much lower than those minimum wages created 
within collective agreements.  
This sees legal change re-order wage-setting so that employers have 
more power of the process of setting wages above this legal pay minimum. 
The effect of this was particularly clear in the Germany-Posted Workers case 
study (2.3). Here, a court (the CJEU) struck down both the imposition of 
collectively agreed minimum wages (as it did in Laval) and a labour law 
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provision in a state-level statute legally imposing these collectively agreed 
pay minima. The thrust of the CJEU’s decision left only legal minimum wage 
rates as the acceptable form of minimum wage rule that could be imposed on 
foreign contractors. This was confirmed in its later (and also German) 2015 
RegioPost decision. Again, this form of legal change aids the position of 
employers by promoting their economic rights found in EU free movement 
law (the CJEU’s recent interpretation of it) over the social rights for workers 
found in the German labour law statutes (Tarifklausel, Tariftreuegesetze).  
In Germany, as noted in chapter 2.1, a national minimum wage was 
finally created in Germany after decades of collective bargaining decline. Its 
creation arose amidst tensions within the German trade union movement, 
many of whom had traditionally saw such a development of  a legal 
minimum wage as a distraction from efforts to reinforce and rebuild 
collectively bargained wage-setting. In truth, the creation of the national 
minimum wage (Mindestlohn) does act as a symbol of collective bargaining’s 
decline. In 2018, collective bargaining in Germany stands at 54%, as noted in 
chapter 2.1106, may not appear particularly nor comparatively low. The rate 
of decline however, at this time of writing, is steep and progressive. Plus, this 
coverage rate does not say anything about the quality of those collective 
agreements that still remain. As described in the both Germany-focused 
chapters, existing collective bargaining arrangements were not completely 
destroyed thus leaving a vacuum, but were replaced or supplemented by weaker 
collective agreements. In the posted workers chapter, the creation of new 
‘minimum wage only’ collective agreements have become commonplace. In 
the acquired rights chapter, it was supplementary or replacement 
agreements that were the result.  
                                               
106 This is sourced from the ICTWSS dataset on labour institutions created by Jelle Visser at the 
University of Amsterdam 
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The way labour law interacts with collective bargaining, again, is the 
centrally defining part of the relationship between the legal and collective 
institutions of labour relations. The comparison of the Germany-Posted 
Workers case study with the Britain-Posted Workers illustrates the significance 
of these changes as they provide very different forms of labour law-collective 
bargaining relationship. Labour law rules in Britain were relatively weak in 
regards to a) the legal character of collective bargaining (or lack thereof), b) 
the rights of workers to strike and c) a legal minimum wage that was made 
irrelevant by its relatively low level vis-à-vis minimum rate of pay in the 
collective agreement at issue in the Britain-Posted Workers case. The distance 
of the political or judicial state from the process and outcome in the British 
case bears closer resemblance to German Tarifautonomie than the German 
case, minus the role for collective action (which is an important difference) 
This sort of reordering process has seen shifts in legal rights in favour 
of employers, but, as noted immediately above, the couching of labour law 
within neo-liberal legal change also includes the creation of legal frameworks, not 
just legal rights, such as regimes of privatisation or compulsory contracting-
out, that have fundamentally altered the economic context within which 
labour relations operates. Examples of this are presented in each of the four 
of case studies, producing different examples of the industrial contexts 
altered by engineered changes to the legal frameworks have regulate them. 
For example, the posted workers chapters are set around a public 
contracting-based construction sector. Here, the connection between these 
legal framework and legal rights aspects is evident as shifts in legal rights (in 
favour of contractors) threatened a form of work-wage bargain, formed 
under the public procurement framework, that workers still wanted and 
defined the industry previously. Despite the specificities of the construction 
sector’s mode of production (temporary project and contract based), the use 
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of public procurement-style contracting as a legal framework exists in plenty 
of other sectors. This means that this complex interaction between labour law and 
public procurement law will exist in other sectors, posing questions on the role 
of trade union and industrial action in those sectors given the apparent success 
of the industrial action (from the trade union’s perspective) in the Britain-
Posted Workers chapter and the lack of success in the Germany-Posted Workers 
chapter (which relied on legislative fixes rather than strike action). 
The spread of industrial examples in the two acquired rights chapters 
was much larger. With this, these presented a number of different forms of 
structural change to industries that threatened the role of labour law and 
collective bargaining to operate to aid the position of workers. Privatisations, 
contracting-out, and various kinds of mergers were all used to alter the 
industrial basis and context that collective bargaining took place. The ARD 
was essentially a legislative piece of labour law directed to protect workers’ 
jobs and pay when these sorts of restructurings took place. In the German-
Acquired Rights case study, we saw this attempt at providing labour law 
protections for workers blunted in the hospital, manufacturing and 
privatised public sectors (telecommunications) examples. This blunting 
effect also saw any prospect for the ARD to operate alongside and with collective 
bargaining to perform and reinforce their worker protection functions. This 
came as a result of an optional provision with the ARD itself, which German 
legislators adopted, that weakened this collective bargaining role in transfers 
if undertakings regulation. This is specific example of the ARD’s 
nullification. More broadly, this piece of legislative labour law, that intended 
to furnish workers with legal ‘acquired rights’, was merged into a pre-
existing but developing neo-liberal order and context inclusive of new legal 
rights and frameworks demanding flexible labour markets and an 
enhancement employer prerogatives. This in effect saw the legal rights for 
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workers contained in labour law submerged beneath the emergence of new 
economic rights, in German and European law, for employers. This presents 
a neat abstract demonstration of the ‘neo-liberal reordering process’ to which 
law and a particular vision of ‘legal change’ is central. 
 
3) The responses to legal interventions into labour relations take several 
forms, and are defined by relative power resources of key actors  
Law and legal change can be imposed in very forceful and disruptive ways, 
as two case studies in the preceding section (Germany-Posted Workers, Britain-
Acquired Rights) demonstrated. The responses to these however are crucially 
important in determining the outcome of these law-based interventions and 
influences.  
These responses to the ‘regulatory and governance problems’ caused 
by legal change have provided the principal analytical venue in each of the 
case study chapters and present meaningful opportunities for analytical 
comparisons here. Two main propositions are made: 1) these responses are 
framed by relative power resources of key actors and frame not only how legal rules 
are perceived and interpreted, by workers or employers, but also how these are 
activated. 2) understanding the role of relative power resources in regards to 
the activation of different legal and non-legal rights, is achieved when 
combined with the conflict of rules concept.  
Conflict of rules scenarios in labour relations often stems from the 
conflict of interests that lace the relations between workers and employers. 
This conflict of interests therefore produces questions of relative power 
resources between labour relations actors. The case studies in this thesis all 
represented the same kind of conflict of rules problem whereby an attempt at 
legal change was pursued by a legislator or a court or an actor exercising legal 
rights, shifting the legal rights in favour of either workers or employers. Some 
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of these cases for example, placed a legal right at the feet of a particular actor, 
but this actor may or may not activate this legal right in their favour if their 
power resources relative to other actors is weak.  
In the Britain-Posted Workers chapter, employers had considerable legal 
rights enshrined in EU law (to ignore collective agreements) and in UK law 
(to end illegal strike action) but were stopped from activating these legal 
rights courtesy of workers exercising their considerable (and autonomously 
created) power resources. In the Germany-Acquired Rights chapter, the balance 
of power resources was firmly on the side of employers. Employers were able 
to take advantage of a weakened trade union partner that were not in a 
position to action the rights contained within the ARD (and then reorganised 
collective bargaining regimes in their (employers’) favour).  
A similar balance of power existed in the first Germany-based (Posted 
Workers) case study (2.3). Here, one subset of employers, meaning either a 
single subcontractor (Rüffert) or a managing contractor (RegioPost), had no 
problem exercising the powerful sets of legal rights afforded to them in EU 
law (CJEU decisions in Laval specifically) that allowed them to ignore wage 
terms of a collective agreement that had been signed or were otherwise 
bound to. In the Britain-Acquired Rights chapter, these power resources in 
question were less clear as the highly complicated regulatory context created 
by disruptive interventions from EU law into UK law did not enable courts 
to enforce legal rights, except in a culminating CJEU decision (Alemo-Herron). 
Power resources dynamics here did not place either employers nor unions in 
a such a dominant relative position vis-à-vis the other until the Alemo-Herron 
decision that settled the issue. The availability of rights for employers was 
not clear in terms of the conflicting decisions that British courts produced on 
the ARD’s collective agreement issues. The fact that employers kept reaching 
for the courts to enforce these legal rights, however, does speak to an 
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important feature of perceived rights, which itself has both power resources 
and cultural implications. This use of courts is a more prominent feature in 
British labour relations than German, and is likely only going to be pushed 
away from settling conflict of rules if the power resources of one actor 
(labour, employers) make this possible. 
This explicit connection of conflict of rules and power resources provides 
one of the modifications addressed in the following section modifying the 
socio-legal political economy framework. The power resources concept also is 
the one notable conceptual introduction adopted from existing CPE, in 
modified form, in this thesis. 
 
4) Differences between legislative and judicial expressions of these ‘legal 
interventions’ are important, but the interaction between these are 
unsettled, disrupting how legal systems and labour relations interact. 
The difference between judicial and legislative legal form and legal change is that 
judicial action is not subject to pressures of social interests in the same way 
as legislators are. If, therefore, the legal change pursued by courts conforms 
to the political ambitions of neo-liberalism then these are less likely to be 
subject to the politically motivated repeal of legal rules as if they were made 
in legislation.  
Connecting this with the third observation above, the power resources 
demands placed on labour, and the other counterforces to neo-liberalism (i.e. 
left political parties in government), are therefore that much higher. The 
Britain-Posted Workers case illustrates the sorts of power resources labour 
must develop for itself when workers and unions are placed in a context where 
legal change is attempting to impose upon them weaker material conditions 
and existing legal rights were not much assistance to begin with. Labour is 
also able to pressure legislators through lobbying, campaigning and even 
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(political rather than industrial107) strike action. Employers can clearly do the 
same. In the Germany-Acquired Rights chapter, employer interests heavily 
influenced the reform agendas adopted by both parties (at the federal level in 
Germany). In the Germany-Posted Workers, unions had influence over Land-
level (state-level) governments where their SPD allies where in power to 
pursue legislative fixes to the problems caused by Rüffert. They could not 
however in those Länder where the partisan coalitions were centre-right 
orientated.  
 CPE addresses these sort of the political interactions extensively offering 
competing accounts over different political alignments created either by the 
meeting of common economic interests between labour and capital (VoC), or 
by more conflictual relations as prescribed by power resources-based CWC 
theories. These sorts of interactions cannot occur with courts. This prompts 
the following claim:  
Whereas governments and broadly-defined political actors may or may not be 
committed, as a matter of political trends, to a neo-liberal view of legal change, the 
approach of courts is very different as their commitments are based upon doctrine 
and constitutional principles. This means that the relationship between political 
neo-liberalism and neo-liberal legal change is looser and concurrent, rather 
firmly interlinked.  
There is, admittedly, something unsatisfactory about this claim. The 
ambitions of theory development is to make positive and discernible 
connections between different phenomena. This does however point to a 
central problem raised by this meeting of politics and law: in the contested 
labour relations context it is not defined by complementarity nor 
functionalism, but by incoherence and complexity. Courts may conform to 
                                               
107  ‘political strike action’ would be, as suggested in this sentence, a strike concerning government 
policy rather than a specific dispute with the union’s employers (industry-based strike). 
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the decisions of the political realm, but if they do not the legislative realm 
only has a certain amount of scope to challenge it. Courts will be committed 
to lofty normative principles on some occasions, but not on others as other 
competing legal principles may be important as dictated by the given 
specifics of the case, the court’s constitutional mandate and its position in a 
judicial hierarchy.  
The CJEU has become very clearly driven by interpretations based 
around principles of individual economic rights instead of collective group 
rights found in various forms of social law and labour law. In Britain, as 
demonstrated in the acquired rights chapter, courts will often make decisions 
driven by principles of practicality and to reduce legal uncertainty rather 
than celebrated constitutional principles found in UK or EU law. This means 
that judicial decisions may conform to the goals of political neo-liberalism, 
reordering legal rights in favour of employers for example, but this 
‘conformism’ is not the same as being permanently and formally tied to it. The 
relationship between political and legal aspects of the neo-liberal order 
therefore is dynamic but neither functionalist nor mutually complementary. 
If courts are to become more active in labour matters, and they have 
done, this separation between the legal and political aspects of neo-liberalism 
requires understanding the relationship of legislative and judicial forms of 
law-making. This is true both within the context of national legal systems in 
Europe, but also the place of these within a broader European legislative and 
judicial system.  
 
5) The roles for different forms of negotiation, mediation and contest are 
important in defining these responses to legal interventions and for 
settling conflict of rules problems. 
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This observation is addressed more directly in the following section of this 
chapter that examines and modifies the socio-legal political economy 
framework that guides this thesis. A more limited treatment is provided here.  
Tendencies and traditions of negotiation, mediation and contestation108 co-
exist in many areas of capitalist societies and often interact in tension or in 
combination. In labour relations, this is perhaps particularly true given the 
inherent conflict of interests that exist between capital and labour. 
Contestation and conflict are represented chiefly by disputes between labour 
and capital and often result in collective action or the threat of collective 
action. Negotiation refers to either collective bargaining or a similar forum 
involving a mediating actor presented by the governmental or judicial state. 
When disputes occur, the of power particular actors may lead to either 
of these three outcomes. As neo-liberal policy agendas have thrown down 
deeper roots in European economies, new and different forms of dispute 
settlement have developed through legal and non-legal institutional means. 
Some look like arms-length governmental agencies and some see court actors 
becoming more active in labour matters. Some of these impose settlements 
upon actors whilst others, indicating that the differences between these three 
themes become blurred. Some however attempt to mediate without forcing 
a settlement, but rely on these actors to reach a settlement. Courts also have 
an important mediation role in capitalist societies, but again, court-imposed 
outcomes will not satisfy the interests of all parties, a statement that is 
particularly true in a labour conflict circumstance. Indeed, judicial mediation 
may in fact create those conditions for new or further conflict if commitment 
to lop-sided doctrinal principles guides such ‘mediating’ decisions and acts. 
                                               
108 Point of Etymology: the term ‘contestation’ although not in the Oxford dictionary, has its place 
in social studies including in some labour relations studies. For example, Colin Crouch’s Industrial 
Relations and European State traditions (1993, p.31).  
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Again, the role of relative power resources is important in determining 
that which either mediation or negotiation produces. Not all actors will 
benefit from the results of mediation or negotiation, as demonstrated from 
several examples in this thesis, leaving the conditions for later conflict to 
remain.  
Chapter 2.1 illustrated the highly contestative relations that existed in 
Germany and Britain in the 19th Century and the approach made toward 
mediated conciliation and industrial peace in most of the first half of the 20th 
century in both countries. The centrally defining feature of the post-1970s 
period is that new of legal frameworks and regimes of legal rights have been 
imposed on labour relations forcing new forms of contestation rather than 
mediation. This has not been a uniform nor clean process, as many of the ‘old’ 
forms of mediation found in collective bargaining, works councils (in 
Germany), National Joint Councils (NJCs) (in Britain) still remained, albeit 
often being in a weaker position.  
Forms of mediation and dispute resolution do exist at the company 
level, but are usually formed by employers and for employers where the 
presence and strength of trade unions at that workplace is weak or non-
existent. At the national level, new legal frameworks have also sought to 
create new forms of mediation. The tribunal system in Britain, although 
technically is part of the court system, focused upon around mediation. 
Britain’s conciliation agency ACAS is also specifically designed as a 
mediation body to intervene in disputes and mediate an end to strike actions.  
The role of strike action is clearly central to the theme of conflict in 
labour relations, not least as its role has a direct causal relationship with 
collective bargaining as bargaining is the desired form of mediation from the 
standpoint of labour.  
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In the Britain-Posted Workers case study, strike action was central to 
forcing employers to preserve and improve a collective agreement. This case 
study represents a classic case of what strike action is designed to do from 
the standpoint of unions. Moreover, it provides the expected response from 
labour to employer attempts to change existing means of wage-setting and 
work organisation. It is important to draw the right lessons from this sort of 
example. It should not be claimed that these sorts of strikes have or will 
necessarily become more commonplace. The Britain-Posted Workers case 
study presented a clear example of how neo-liberalism inspired shifts in legal 
rights can forge those conditions of conflict. The conditions will emerge in 
certain contexts but, and as the German case study examples make clear, 
strike action will usually always be reached for and depends in large part on 
the power labour wields over employers based on factors like union 
membership and organisational strength. It is claimed however that it is not 
uncontroversial to expect industrial action to become more commonplace, at 
least as the principal form of contestation in a neo-liberal order where other 
forms of mediation and negotiation offer labour very little. This can even 
become true in Germany despite not having strong traditions of industrial 
action, if relative power resources allow it. It is noted that such examples are 
not present in the two German case studies of this thesis, minus some 
instances referred to in the Germany-Acquired Rights chapter concerning 
hospital privatisation (Greer et al. 2013).  
This therefore constitutes the principal claim concerning negoatiation, 
mediation and conflict. Strike action or other forms of conflict-based response 
will result if power resources are available for the actors in question.  
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3.1.4  Examining the socio-legal political economy approach 
The five points of the socio-legal political economy framework are outlined 
below for reference.  
 
1. Labour relations is defined by two principal forms of regulation and 
governance: legal sources and collective institutional sources;  
2. A dynamic relationship exists between legal and collective 
institutions of labour relations;  
3. A conflict of rules approach to understand the complex interaction between 
legal and non-legal sources of rules;  
4. A holistic understanding of legal systems An assessment of both the 
direct and indirect forms these legal and non-legal rules (‘degrees of 
directness’), 
5. A combination of two methodological innovations found in qualitative 
comparative political economy and legal studies.  
 
The alternative framework outlined and developed in chapters 1.1. and 
1.4 provided a number of tools and concepts that guided the examination of 
the four case studies and produced the ‘observations’ in the previous section. 
These are not addressed key aspect in developing new theory, particularly 
within the comparative empirical method, is to test and modify new these 
approaches once exposed to empirical examination (Hall 2006; King et al. 
1994, p.20-21; Janoski and Hicks 1994, p.7-9). Moreover, as described by J.R. 
Commons in chapter 1.1, the use of theory and theoretical concepts should 
offer an operational quality in order to unearth and then organise empirical 
material so it can be directed to developing explanations and broader theory. 
Some of the five parts of this framework were more useful than others in this 
regard. Some concepts provided more in the way of this operational quality 
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in the process of producing and organising empirical material whilst others 
did a better job of pointing to broader theoretical conclusions.  
This section will not proceed by going through each point of the socio-
legal political economy framework one-by-one, but instead will address 
selected themes and concepts as appropriate as well as pinpointing those 
aspects of the framework, such as conflict of rules, that demand particular 
discussion.  
 
1) The legal and collective institutions of labour relations and their 
interaction 
The first two parts of the framework, concerning the identification of and relating 
both of the legal and collective institutions of labour relations, are given some 
treatment first given their importance, but are addressed more fully in the 
following chapter and have unavoidably been addressed in this chapter. 
Three points are raised in regards to this leading and centrally important 
aspect of the socio-legal political economy framework. 
The first concerns the prospect of modification. In each of the four 
chapters however, the themes of mediation, negotiation and contestation already 
addressed above provide important context and content to the role of 
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining over wages and employment 
terms is the leading form of negotiation in European labour relations, even 
after three decades of neo-liberal reforms seeking to weaken or destroy it. It 
operates in conflict however with employer interests that want more control 
over labour matters. As neo-liberal reforms advance this same cause, the 
responses of labour resisting these produce different conditions and forms of 
negotiation or contestation or mediation and, usually, in a process or time-
line mixtures of two or three of these.  
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In the four chapters of this thesis, these concepts of became a feature 
as descriptive devices to organise these different and often overlapping 
dynamics. The Britain-Posted Workers case saw contestation and conflict 
resolved by collective bargaining-based negotiation; a classic example again 
of what strike action is designed for. In the Germany-Acquired Rights chapter, 
works councils acted as the leading negotiation venue that acted, in essence, 
to aid employer interests with few concessions to labour. The mediation role 
is almost always provided by the state, either through its governmental arm 
or its judicial arm. As evidenced in this thesis, both can ‘mediate’ in ways 
that still aid one side of the labour-capital relationship. As descriptive 
devices, these themes became a useful supplement to the two leading parts 
of this alternative framework.  
The second point of the three raised in this sub-section concerns the 
success of this core definition (labour relations consisting of legal and collective 
institutional parts). This definition provided a benefit over existing CPE 
theories as it demanded from the outset that a researcher observe those legal 
aspects that were either clearly or not so clearly present in a given case. This 
is importantly tested in the four case studies as these offer opportunities for 
existing CPE to offer explanations as to outcomes. Only in Germany-Acquired 
Rights was there scope for CPE theories like the VoC approach to offer any 
meaningful rebuttal. Even in those cases where an institutional resilience or 
institutional complementarity argument (from existing CPE) may have 
provided some explanation (Germany-Acquired Rights), the conjoined 
presence of disruptive legal rules, neo-liberal ideas and power resources 
completely defeated any prospect of these explanations being useful. There 
might be some prospect for a reformed institutionalist account to emerge 
from CWC and RT, but much less so from a very functionalist VoC school.  
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The third, and most important, point concerns the dynamic relationship 
between law and collective institutions must be understood as a causal two-way 
relationship where legal influence and legal change will promote or provoke 
responses from non-legal actors such as unions and employers (either 
individually or collectively). As evidenced in the Germany-Posted Workers and 
Britain-Acquired Rights chapters, the governmental state will also produce its 
own responses to legal interventions that it itself did not produce. In a neo-
liberal context, these interactions are neither clean nor complementary as a 
general rule.  The role of bargaining is placed under clear threat by neo-
liberal reforms and legal change. This is not a controversial nor certainly an 
original statement. Bargaining is not destined for complete destruction and 
will exist in conflict with neo-liberal pressures, often being undermined, but 
in many cases not. Again, these themes are continued in the next chapter. 
 
 
2)  Conflict of rules and power resources 
The conflict of rules concept was hugely important across all four case studies, 
albeit in different ways in each. It also provides the principal influence of 
legal studies and legal theory given that it includes within it a conflict of laws 
concept. Its use was not just as malleable operational concept that was easy 
to apply to empirical subjects, but also offered important insights for broader 
theoretical conclusions. 
As the case studies were developed and concepts employed, conflict 
of rules problems were addressed by governmental and judicial actors and 
social partners in. The role of competing and relative sets of power resources 
were centrally important to determining how conflict of rules were resolved. 
More specifically, the responses to legal change were determined by the relative 
and competing power resources of labour and employers. When used within 
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the conflict of rules concept, it became possible to separate out legal rules and 
non-legal rules, particularly those non-legal rules found in collective 
bargaining.  
The concept became all the more useful when combined with other 
parts of the broader socio-legal political economy framework, particularly the 
‘degrees of directness’ concept109 where different sets of legal influences 
within legal systems were identified, mapped and examined. In the two 
posted workers chapters, it was important to understand the interactions 
between rules contained in labour law and collective agreements on the one 
hand and those legal rules found in EU free movement law and public 
procurement law on the other. Sometimes conflicts were resolved by the 
introduction of legal rules not previously central to the mode of regulation 
and governance at hand (Germany-Posted Workers). In the British-Posted 
Workers example however, labour law was not helpful to aiding trade union 
intentions with regards to collective agreements and in fact joined EU free 
movement law in the threat posed to unions interests (on regulating strikes).  
The proposed modification here therefore sees the concept of power 
resources couched within the conflict of rules concept. This represents the one 
notable introduction from existing CPE into the framework offered with this 
thesis. It was noted in chapter 1.2 that the power resources approach has an 
important place within CWC studies, and to an extent in RT, and had the 
potential to be developed into a concept that could approach and theorise the 
contested and social nature of law, especially in a labour relations context.  
A straightforward claim offers support for this. Understanding the 
power resources of key actors, not just labour and employers, enables the 
researcher to understand how rights of action provided in law or other sources 
                                               
109 Contained within the fourth point of the framework demanding ‘a holistic understanding of 
legal systems’  
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(like collective agreements) can be activated by particular actors. Power 
resources, in a labour relations context, are unavoidably relative and this 
context is inherently contestative given the inherent conflict of interest 
between capital and labour. This means actors with strong relative power 
resources to other actors will view their own legal rights differently than the 
legal rights of other actors and will seek to advance these over that of the 
other actor. This comes with the intention to have their own legal rights of 
action imposed over that of other actors where they came into conflict.  
The conflict of rules problems presented by the imposition of legal 
change took several forms: Normative conflicts and incongruence, 
complexity, uncertainty, and radical and disruptive change in relative legal 
rights. Across the four case studies, these different sorts of conflict of rules 
existed often in overlapping forms.  
In the German-Acquired Rights chapter, legal rights provided in the 
acquired rights directive afforded to workers were blunted by formidable 
power resources for employers that included critical influence over 
government labour market reforms. Power resources dynamics favouring 
employers therefore addressed this conflict of rules problem where the ARD 
could have interfered with these labour market reforms and industrial 
restructuring. 
The Britain-Posted Workers case is again notable as the only example 
where trade union power resources were sufficient to alter the outcomes of 
attempted changes to their desired labour relations context. These shifts came 
as a result in perceived shifts legal rights of employers and not imposed shifts 
as demanded directly by a court, but were potent enough for unions to 
exercise power resources effectively given to labour itself by their own 
actions, rather than by law (which did not afford these rights of collective 
action).  
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In every other case study, attempts at neo-liberal legal change was at 
least partly successful as a court imposed strong legal rights on the side of 
employers, thus enhancing their power resources relative to labour. In the 
Britain-Acquired Rights and Germany-Posted Workers chapters, legislators did 
act in ways to minimise the damage done to existing labour relations, but for 
different reasons. In the Britain-Acquired Rights chapter, on the issue of the 
ARD’s scope, the greater social protection outcome was not, in fact, the result 
of trade union influence or power resources, but of a desire to provide legal 
certainty to both labour and employers amidst legal uncertainty created by 
legal change. In this instance, incongruence and uncertainty defined the 
conflict of rules problem. The attempts to correct it were not the result power 
resource dynamics seeing either labour nor employers ‘win’. Such 
explanations in the Britain-Acquired Rights case were at play with the 
collective bargaining issues of the ARD, where a court decided decisively in 
employers’ favour, in effect rewarding them for exercising their legally 
supported rights of action to absolve themselves of rules provided in (future) 
collective agreements. 
In the Germany-Posted Workers chapter, ambitious legislative 
adjustments to the CJEU’s aggressive altering of legal rights (in favour of 
employers) was pursued in those German Länder where the partisan allies of 
labour were in power.  The power resources of unions here were a factor, but 
some consideration must also be given to the interests of legislators to 
preserve existing regulatory and governance practices. Having said this, this 
Germany-Posted Workers chapter did use the work of Detlev Sack (2012) to 
show that the prominence of union-backed SPD was the defining variable 
between Länder that pursued these legislative adjustments and those that did 
not. 
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As noted earlier, courts cannot be lobbied like legislators and 
governments. How judicial decisions are responded to are framed by power 
resources of labour actors and the fact that decisions reach a court also 
depends on the perception of rights that actors believe they possess over 
other actors. Here there is an important cultural difference between Germany 
and Britain as in the latter legal rights for employers are stronger. These were 
on display far more in the Britain-Acquired Rights case as evidenced by this 
case study’s numerous domestic court cases. The ample legal rights afforded 
to employers in the Britain-Posted Workers chapter however were not 
exercised, again, due to the power resources that labour possessed courtesy 
of their own actions (rather than through law providing them). This example 
again speaks directly to the pertinent subject of strike action as a credible 
mode of resistance to Neo-liberalism and Neo-liberal legal change of labour 
relations. It’s credibility relies, in large part on the power resources of unions, 
their membership, organisational sources, and political support. 
 
3) Methodological advances 
There are two principal methodological strengths of the approach employed 
in this thesis. The first is outlined in the first chapter and eluded to at the 
beginning of the 3.1.1. section in this chapter, and concerns the use of Peter 
A. Hall’s lessons from his 2006 article, Systematic Process Analysis.  
 Hall’s Systematic Process Analysis highlights the tracing of causal processes 
through qualitative examination and the identification of key empirical 
finding to use for theory development. In the four case study chapters, the 
regulatory and governance problems identified in each chapter operated as the 
central venue to examine threatened changes and the responses to it. In some 
chapters, notably the Germany-Acquired Rights and Britain-Posted Workers 
chapters, these ‘problems’ were on-going events or series of events rather 
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than specific moments of blunt change found in legislative change or court 
cases. In one chapter in particular, Britain-Acquired Rights, a number of events 
were present and over a long time-period and thus presented a series of 
‘problems’. These problems were often found from a particular viewpoint 
based on an actor’s interests (i.e. unions), but also problems from a simple 
incongruence between different rules and law. (conflict of rules). This 
adaption of Hall’s Systematic Process Analysis, and its incorporation of data 
from legal factors such as court cases, is an original innovation for CPE and 
comparative social science. 
The second concerns the ‘operational quality’, as referred to above, of the 
individual concepts of the socio-legal political economy framework. Some of 
these have already had their strengths addressed above. It is felt important, 
again referring to J.R. Commons’ instructions for theoretical concepts (to ‘dig 
up’ data to organise into an ‘organised system’), to underline this important 
purpose of theory: the way in which data is dug up, and how it is dug up, 
has implications for how broader theoretical claims are made. This is 
particularly true of the demands of this framework to understand ‘labour 
relations’ as comprising of legal and collective institutional parts, and the 
conflict of rules that exists between and around labour relations. The 
combination of Commons’ lessons and Halls Systematic Process Analysis has 
operated here as an appropriate two-part inspiration for the approach to this 
thesis. Institutionalism is a rich varied theoretical subject and has different 
disciplinary representations that need to be appraised differently. Some 
aspects of institutionalism still have some very promising uses and is 
addressed more in the next chapter. 
 The alternative framework provided important improvements versus 
existing CPE theory. This is true not only in J.R. Commons’ terms, by 
identifying those variables and phenomena and organising them according 
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to defined conceptual rules, but also that so that these can be addressed in 
causal terms, as demanded by Hall’s Systematic Process Analysis approach 
(Hall 2006). Again, the irony is noted that is this same Peter A. Hall who co-
authored the Varieties of Capitalism volume that received the firmest rebuke 
in chapter 1.2. Examining the causal mechanics of a given case however, as 
demanded by Hall (2006), requires that all the relevant phenomena and 
material is addressed. A socio-legal approach to the political economy of 
labour relations introduces those aspects of law and how they relate to non-
law. This is the broader improvement this alternative framework provides.  
 
  3.1.4.iv. Concluding comment 
The four case studies of this thesis were selected for their prospects of 
producing theoretically useful findings, not to make new empirical 
revelations. Some important empirical revelations were however made in 
regards theoretically understanding change in German labour relations, 
whilst the findings from the British case studies were more abstract in their 
theoretical use. When these four cases are viewed alongside the first chapter 
of the second section (2.1) that looked more broadly at Germany and Britain, 
important findings are produced about these two archetypes of modern CPE 
and expose considerable problems with how CPE has addressed these. How 
labour relations is approached as a subject determines how one understands 
how these change and how they will evolve.  
 With this, more direct and highly specific observations and findings were 
the focus of this chapter. The next chapter puts these in a broader context to 
make such broader theoretical findings for CPE and for labour relations. 
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Chapter 3.2.  
European Labour Relations, the role of law                                         
and neo-liberal legal change 
 
This final chapter directs the socio-legal political economy framework and the 
key parts from the previous chapter, towards the broader arguments 
outlined in section one110.  The leading argument developed from this 
framework is that the heightened influence of law and legal rules within 
European labour relations is inextricably connected with the rise of neo-
liberal politics, policies and practice. As the four cases illustrate, these 
impositions do not however always produce the outcomes that doctrinaire 
neo-liberalism intends. These comparative differences pose serious 
challenges to CPE, challenges made more complex by the spectre of 
European integration and the role of European law within this. An analysis 
of European labour relations under neo-liberalism is developed but is preceded 
by the presentation of two sub-themes: neo-liberalism and the state, and 
complexity and national models.   
 
3.2.1. Neo-liberalism, the state & juridification 
This section addresses the core argument of this thesis re-outlined above. 
From chapter 1.3, the following passage is highlighted:   
 
“Neo-liberalism does not merely concern its political ideational features and the 
industrial practices and reforms these prompt, but it includes a fundamentally legal 
                                               
110 1.1.3 of Chapter 1.1 and section 1.3.2 in Chapter 1.3 
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character; a character that provides for distinct forms of legal change and reform, 
legal rights, legal frameworks and contractual relationships.” 
 
As a subject, as mapped in chapter 1.2,  neo-liberalism has received ample, 
varied but generally unsatisfactory treatment within CPE studies. RT is 
elevated as having provided the more realistic and comprehensive approach 
to neo-liberalism (Heino 2015; Peck and Tickell 2007; Lipietz 2013). There are 
however important contributions from CWC and VoC work, although of the 
latter it is only Thelen that has produced a meaningful assessment of the 
effect of neo-liberalism upon labour relations ‘institutions’(although still 
problematic). As argued in Chapter 1.2, Heino from RT offers the most 
promising and comprehensive CPE approach to law, legal rules and legal 
systems in the context of labour relations. Heino understood the inherently 
political content of law through a simple concept of neo-liberal legal change that, 
in this labour relations context, explicitly and directly seeks to re-order 
labour relations and labour market functions in favour of capital and 
employer interests. This view of neo-liberal legal change, reinforced by the 
arguments of lawyers Grewal and Purdy (2014), is therefore theorised in 
simple terms as consisting of overlapping political, industrial and legal facets 
and drivers of change in capitalist systems and labour relations systems. 
Importantly, following Heino and ‘critical’ assessments of neo-liberalism, its 
destructive effects are highlighted and emphasised rather than ‘institutional 
resilience’ accounts of the VoC and institutionalist VoC kind. 
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Figure 3.2. Overlapping political, industrial and legal drivers of neo-
liberalism 
 
As argued by Peck and Tickell, Grewal and Purdy and Heino, albeit in 
slightly different ways, neo-liberal change and practice produces the 
conditions for incoherence and contradiction through its inherent 
complexity.  
Not only are attempts at neo-liberal legal change made in a context 
that sees other legal and non-legal rules contradict them (conflict of rules), 
but the responses to neo-liberal legal change will often reverse, challenge or 
complicate the end result. When comparing the political to the legal two areas 
of contradiction stand out. First, the objectives of de-regulation are in fact 
given life by neo-liberal legal change by re-regulation: a raft of new 
overlapping rules which complicate the process of economic activity and 
economic relations and produces various conflict of laws problems. Re-
regulation comes with new and additional bodies of economic law and 
modes of enforcement designed to create and regulate market frameworks 
and empower market rights. These must be imposed however, but rather 
than impose market relations and rights regimes to foster ex ante the 
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conditions for markets and then withdraw to allow these to as genuinely ‘free 
markets’, this reregulation is permanent as these formal legal frameworks and 
rights remain. This challenges a central rhetorical tenet (de-regulated free 
markets) of neo-liberal political commitments and rhetoric. In academic 
terms this blurs the lines between definitions of ostensibly separate theories 
of ordo-liberalism, the ‘regulatory state’ and the neo-liberalism. The first two 
of these three contend a substantial role for formal regulation as the principal 
means of market-making and market-perfecting. 
The four case studies illustrate these points. In Germany, collective 
bargaining has not been completely destroyed but has clearly been 
weakened, so its own capacity to impose rules on wages and wage-setting 
has been challenged not just by shifts in legal rights in favour of employers, 
but also complicated by new formal legal rules affecting bargaining (e.g. 
Tariftreuegesetze) and legal minimum wage laws. In the two British examples, 
the interventions from law that aligned with neo-liberal goals provoked 
responses then directed the outcomes away from that desired by the legal 
intervention delivered (but only partially in the Germany-Posted Workers case 
and the collective bargaining segment of the Britain-Acquired Rights case). 
The specific labour relations part of this discussion is continued later. 
Firstly, the relationship between neo-liberalism and the modern state is 
theorised as it forms a hugely important aspect of context for labour relations 
and broader CPE. 
 
3.2.1.i The state and juridification 
A version of neo-liberal view of legal change is evident in each case study 
chapter, albeit delivered and dealt with differently. In each case presented 
both juridification and judicialisation characteristics, both of which are 
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essential to establishing neo-liberalism’s legal character. The difference between 
juridification and judicialisation is identified. The former concerns a broader 
system of law and legal change or, as described by Aasen et al. (2014, p.2), “a 
diverse set of processes involving shifts towards more detailed legal 
regulation, regulations of new areas, and conflicts and problems increasingly 
being framed in legal and rights-oriented terms”. Judicialisation however 
refers specifically to the role of courts and judicial actors within this same broad 
juridification process. Statutory and court-made law have cut across each 
other in different ways in the four case studies of this thesis, sometimes with 
legislative codes being modified or nullified by judicial decisions and 
sometimes the opposite. Juridification is addressed first. 
The imposition of legal forms of regulation and governance upon legal 
rules has been driven by two interrelated processes of ‘neo-liberalisation’ 
(Brenner et al. 2010). In labour relations terms, this has seen the creation of 
new economic law that constitutes the legal expression of neo-liberalism to 
empower employers and endow them rights of action to organise their 
businesses, labour and pay systems. Reorganising a system of legal rights, 
often termed ‘property rights’ in ‘law and economics’ studies (Coase 1936, 
Williamson 1985), so as to enhance the rights of employers is one of two 
defining parts of neo-liberal legal change. With the emergence of post-1970s 
neo-liberalism, the attempts to de-politicise the regulation and governance of 
various forms of economic activity have seen the role of courts pushed 
further into these regulatory and governance questions of labour relations 
and work. The notions of a ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1993, Moran 2003) offer 
normative support, based on economic theories that highlight the efficacy of 
functioning markets, for these processes of de-politicisation. As evidenced in 
this thesis, de-politicisation has not meant de-regulation, but instead has 
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ushered new forms of law-creation and law enforcement, pointing again to 
the de-regulation–re-regulation paradox of neo-liberalism.  
This  paradoxical de-regulation-re-regulation character of neo-liberalism 
identified with labour relations is exhibited in those agendas to reform public 
sectors, welfare states and labour markets in Europe. These shifts here do not 
simply hinge on creating new legal rights but also upon creating new 
competition and market-based frameworks (like compulsory tendering, 
outsourcing and privatisation) that serve to prise open non-market spaces to 
non-market actors (ACL Davies 2013111).  This process has been labelled by 
ACL Davies, in regards to post-2012 British healthcare marketisation, as 
‘juridification’, as it has entailed the creation of just new forms of rules but 
more rules than existed previously. In the public sector, New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms more directly seek to replicate market-type 
relations upon public sector labour matters such work organisation and 
wage-setting. This, conceptually, is tied to a ‘Human Resource Management’ 
(HRM) reforms introduced to impose new hierarchies upon labour matters. 
The emphasis with HRM is on ‘management’ rather than ‘relations’ as the 
objective is to create or enhance ‘employer prerogative’ and the 
rationalisation of labour processes to turn such relations into ‘market 
relations’ (Sisson and Purcell 2010; p.84-85, Barbash 1987).  
The diagram above identified political, industrial and political 
characteristics of neo-liberalism. The NPM and HRM concepts are 
themselves key practice features of neo-liberalism’s industrial character. 
These are important non-legal rules-based systems but do conform and 
cohere to both the political and legal facets of neo-liberalism that seek to 
reorder the rights and contexts of economic activity in favour of capital. 
                                               
111 ACL Davies, a lawyer who also is referenced earlier for her contribution on EU labour law 
questions in fact used the term ‘juridification to describe this process of neo-liberal law-making. 
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Theoretically, the task of understanding and placing the role of courts 
within a neo-liberal model of legal change is difficult for the reasons raised 
in the previous chapter. Legislators, typically political figures pushing 
political agendas through legislation, can clearly be directly tied to the 
political aspects and goals of neo-liberalism. In short, legislators can be 
lobbied and subject to political pressure. For courts this is, usually, not the 
case; or at least cannot be subjected to these interests in the same way. This is 
examined below under the label ‘judicialisation’ as it forms a key part of two 
entwined developments in European labour relations: the advance of neo-
liberalism, and its specific form of legal change, and Europeanisation, with 
its own growing legal order. 
 
3.2.1.ii Judicialisation  
The concept of judicialisation is understood here as ‘the insertion of courts into 
a process of labour relations’. The insertion of court-made law into the 
regulation and governance of labour relations is contextualised by the 
presence of legislative and statutory legal influences and those responses to 
court-made law. As demonstrated in the four case study chapters, these 
responses are just as important given the powerful effect on outcomes these 
have.  
These responses of social (non-legal) actors create the conditions and 
prospects for considerable diversions in the intent behind legal change and 
intervention. Such diversions themselves therefore can forge outcomes of 
incoherence and complexity. The interventions from law themselves however 
can also create the grounds for such incoherence and complexity before 
actors have the chance to respond to these, as demonstrated in the Britain-
Acquired Rights case. In this British case study, courts will look for those 
jurisprudential approaches and logics that will assist them with a case met 
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with serious legal and practical uncertainty for litigants and the courts 
themselves (not knowing what law to apply). A central feature of law-based 
incongruence is represented by the frequently disorderly relationship 
between European and national law and how legal change happens through 
this relationship (and what responses are inspired at the national, and indeed 
sub-national, level). As EU institutions, namely the Commission and the 
Court of Justice, have shifted from a social protection to market rights 
approach to various areas of EU law, these issues of incoherence in labour 
relations have only increased; a point underlined by both the posted workers 
case studies but far less so in the Germany-Acquired Rights case.  
The commitments of courts to competing and highly political 
principles are challenged by those legal principles found in ‘concerns for 
justice’ (i.e. legal certainty), judicial hierarchies, a ‘doctrine of precedent’ or 
literal or purposive approaches to legislation (Slapper 2003; p.173). How 
courts balance these will vary in different cases. British courts of an 
ostensibly common law system are traditionally supposed to adhere to a 
doctrine of precedent, although this does not apply to Employment Tribunals 
and Appeals Tribunals (raised in Britain-Acquired Rights chapter). The CJEU 
however is often described as a ‘teleological’ or ‘activist’ court (Alter 2009; 
p.35, Saurugger and Terpan 2017; p.217), meaning it is guided strongly by 
overarching normative or political goals rather the intricacies of individual cases. 
This final point raises a central concern of lawyers regarding the true 
meaning of ‘jurisprudence’: to give the facts of the case their due and balance 
these against broader doctrinal concerns.   
These competing ‘interests’ of courts are not governed by doctrinaire 
neo-liberalism in the same way a government’s policy agenda might be. Even 
the contemporary CJEU, whose broader approach has been increasingly 
aligned with the goals of political neo-liberalism, will not always apply a 
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‘purist’ liberal interpretation of EU free movement in the cases brought 
before it, due to the eccentricities. This makes the judicialisation aspect of the 
neo-liberal view of legal change far less neat and orderly because it cannot, 
again, be tied cleanly and directly to the political agendas associated with 
neo-liberalism. 
In the four case study chapters however, encompassing two national 
legal systems and a transnational one, three main forms of judicialisation 
under neo-liberalism are evident: teleological, active facilitation, passive acceptance, 
and jurisprudential.  
Again, the choice of words is important. ‘judicialisation under neo-
liberalism’ is used instead of ‘neo-liberal judicialisation’, due to this point 
concerning court actors not always adhering and enforcing neo-liberal 
objectives. This makes judicial insertion into labour relations’ regulation and 
governance a complex and indeed murky one.  
Active facilitation is presented by those courts that sought to reach for 
and apply the CJEU’s rulings (Werhof) even though they did not concern 
British litigants directly. ‘Jurisprudential’ in this British case also could be 
described as a form of interpretive disobedience, given that other courts in the 
judicial hierarchy chose to ignore CJEU case law112 in reaching conclusions in 
judging these CJEU decisions as uncertain and not applicable to their case. In 
regards to collective agreements where this sort of dissension among British 
courts took place, the CJEU was eventually invited to pass a final judgement 
(in Alemo-Herron). The two German cases saw domestic courts, instead of 
making an attempt to pass judgement themselves as the British courts did, 
very quickly referred cases to the CJEU with attached questions. The treaty 
makes clear that this is allowed, but it is a clear case of passive acceptance of 
                                               
112 Which it could do if the case did not directly concern Britain and was not met by the CJEU being 
invited to do so. 
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judicial hierarchies. The German courts in question, usually state level 
(Landesarbeitsgericht) or federal level labour courts (Bundesarbeitsgericht), were 
not formally committed to any doctrinal rule akin to a neo-liberal 
interpretation of legal rights nor in fact to historically-honoured principles of 
Tarifautonomie. Their actions however, by implication, conformed to a regime 
of neo-liberal legal change by acquiescing to a European court that was 
committed to doctrines that aligned with neo-liberal ‘doctrine’. 
       The comparison of legislative actors, representing the political-
governmental arm of the state, and judicial actors is simple but important. Not 
being in a position to define courts as committed deliverers of the neo-liberal 
mission complicates an attempt to develop theoretical explanations of labour 
relations under neo-liberalism inclusive of court actors. With courts’ 
permanent insertion into European labour relations, this problem concerning 
its relationship with advancing neo-liberal legal change creates its own 
conditions for complexity and incoherence addressed below. This 
complexity is made up of part-institutional erosion with part-institutional 
resilience with pockets of successful recombination and resilience (as 
contended by institutionalist CPE), resulting in mongrelised forms of 
regulatory and governance that increasingly define regimes of capitalism 
and labour relations. 
 
3.2.2. European labour relations under Neo-liberalism  
This section directs the above discussion to the core subject of this thesis: 
European labour relations and a context where neo-liberal politics and legal 
change is seeking to reorganise the capitalist system labour relations operates 
within.  
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As noted repeatedly, the intention of neo-liberal legal change is to re-
order legal rights and legal frameworks of the labour market so as to weaken 
collective bargaining and trade unions and aid employer prerogative. This 
forms a simple, stylised and general neo-liberal model of labour relations. 
This relies on a fundamental truth about the balance of power in any 
employment relationship: “The power of employers is structurally superior 
to that of employees” (Traxler et al. 2001, p. ; Offe 1985). Intuitively, 
employers clearly have an enhanced bargaining position when dealing with 
their employees on an individual basis than when dealing with them 
collectively. Therefore, enhancing the status of economic rights over collective 
social rights aids employers and their ability to individualise their relations 
with their workers, or at least weaken the collective organisation of their 
workers as much as possible. This is an uncontroversial truth concerning the 
nature of the capitalist employment relationship. Neo-liberalism is about the 
advance and extension of this more adversarial and extractive (on the part 
capital) model, and has political, industrial and legal facets. In its ‘pure’ form, 
a HRM-style form of total employer control over labour matters is the desired 
model for the interests of capital. With rationalised and hierarchical 
structures within a company, aided by legal rights of action that favour 
employers and individual (not collective) employment relationship. 
This stylised model of the neo-liberal labour relations however has not 
materialised in any ‘pure’ form in any European country, with the more 
comprehensive manifestations of this ‘pure’ model appearing in isolated 
industries within countries. Some aspects of the modern economy, particularly 
low wage service sectors, are marked by a total absence of unions and even 
formal employment contracts, meaning very few labour rights for employees 
are present besides in contractual rules and thus only provided in statute law. 
Even in Britain, the one large European country with which neo-liberal 
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labour market design is most associated, the role of collective bargaining and 
unions has remained prominent enough to complicate this ‘pure’ neo-liberal 
picture and affect outcomes. Both of the British case study chapters 
demonstrate this as well as those conditions for complexity created by 
aggressive attempts at legal change. In the Britain-Posted Workers chapter a 
form of highly organised and disruptive strike action successfully challenged 
attempts to undercut workers and aid the profit intentions of employers. In 
the Britain-Acquired Rights chapter a judicial decision did eventually impose 
an outcome that affirmed employer rights and interests in regards one aspect 
of the ARD (collective agreements), but only occurred after being challenged 
by workers making successful cases and appeals in British courts before the 
CJEU settled the issue in Alemo-Herron (2013). In regards to the ARD’s scope 
however, the second of these two concerns raised by the ARD, in this same 
case the British government produced a legislative innovation to adjust to 
aggressive legal change that did not conform to neither the country’s ‘liberal’, 
‘market rights’ labels nor either to the CJEU decision in Süzen (1997).  
 The combined lessons of these two British chapters conforms to a 
rough kind of Polanyian pattern: workers will still seek to respond to 
attempts and processes stemming from for-profit actors that seek to extract 
more from labour or minimise the rights and material resources that come 
with this labour. This is contingent however upon workers’ power resources to 
provide for this response being sufficient. A key point developed below is that 
neo-liberalism not as defined by ‘markets’ any more than it is about 
extraction and control and increasing the rights and resources of capital and 
employers, even if market function and ‘perfect competition’ is ostensibly 
represented as the objective. These often overlap, but again must not be 
conflated. Neo-liberalism has entailed the creation of complex sets of legal 
rules that often conflict and produce conflicts between key actors that do not 
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aid market function. In this way, these assertions sit closer to radical/Marxist 
views of control and class power rather than those of economic rationality, 
efficiency and market functionalism. 
This complicates this abstracted model of neo-liberalism considerably, 
and there are several avenues through which workers can challenge. 
Collective action (Britain-Posted Workers), collective bargaining where it 
exists, works councils (Germany-Acquired Rights) where it exists (Germany)) 
lobbying for legislative reform (Germany-Posted Workers, Britain-Acquired 
Rights) and litigation in the courts (Britain-Acquired Rights). Increasingly 
campaigning through a trade union civil society role is becoming 
increasingly prominent (Germany-Acquired Rights), whereas in others 
traditional strike action has been employed (Britain-Posted Workers and in the 
Swedish Laval case).  
The Britain-Acquired Rights case is compared to the Britain-Posted 
Workers case in regards to this theme of ‘worker response’. In some cases like 
the Britain-Acquired Rights case, workers (in individual or collective (union) 
capacities) will feel required to reach for judicial remedy as a result of neo-
liberal regimes of legal change. In those examples like the Britain-Posted 
Workers, the response, however chaotic, made sure the solution to the 
‘regulation and governance problem’ at hand was pulled firmly into 
collective bargaining mode of regulation and governed and away from a 
multiple sets of unfriendly legal rules (British, European) that were hostile to 
their interests.  
Attempts to forge a model of neo-liberal labour market, comprised of 
a dual law and employer prerogative form of workplace regulation and 
governance, also emerged in Germany, despite claims of the VoC that this 
was not taking place (due to institutional resilience of institutions of ‘non-
liberal’ capitalism). Neo-liberal reforms undermined Germany’s long-
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standing model of labour relations. In both the Germany-based chapters, the 
dynamic between law and collective institutions was heavily influenced by 
legislation-based legal interventions, some aiding a broader neo-liberal 
agenda and others not. Given Germany’s federal structure and the 
dominance of different political interests at the federal and sub-federal levels, 
legislative action in labour relations in the posted workers case study was 
used to prop up collective bargaining systems being progressively weakened 
by receding union power.  
The German labour relations experience of neo-liberalism is different 
to Britain. The decline of collective bargaining and trade union power has 
been steadier and slower (less dramatic). The posted workers chapter (2.3) 
provided evidence of the substantial changes in German wage-setting as 
collective bargaining has receded across Germany’s economy. The advent of 
a formal legal minimum wage, and the creation of minimum wage only 
collective agreements113, only serve to complicate a wage-setting system that 
used to be dominated by collective bargaining (and works councils). The 
fragmentation and recession of collective bargaining and the creation of 
supplementary collective agreements, that undermine core collective 
agreements, seen in the Germany-Acquired Rights all present themselves as 
symptoms of how neo-liberal changes have slowly crushed German 
Tarifautonomie. This has, again, however, not created a ‘pure’ neo-liberal form 
of labour relations, as collective bargaining still exist as do trade unions 
(however weaker). Importantly much of the statutory law that supported 
their creation after World War II remains intact, alongside those legislative 
changes, such as opening clauses, that have undermined bargaining. Plus, it 
is worth considering the prospects of Germany of emergent use of collective 
                                               
113 Meaning that all the other features of traditional collective agreements such as working time, 
sick pay, grievance procedures, holiday pay etc. are not included and it provides only for 
minimum rates of pay. 
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action. This is not a feature in the case studies in this thesis, but is raised as a 
future reference point. The result is a half-breed, mongrelized form of labour 
relations that can barely be afforded the label of ‘system’ given the 
complexity that now defines it. 
 
3.2.3. Complexity, incoherence and the ‘institutions’ of national 
models 
 
This final section builds on those themes raised above and is directed to two 
specific and related critiques of existing CPE. The difficulty in theorising 
clean and comparable ‘national models’ in an era of neo-liberalisation is 
examined in a first sub-section, whilst some related arguments and 
recommendations concerning the role and nature of institutionalism are 
developed in the second sub-section. 
 
  3.2.3.i Complexity, neo-liberalism and national models 
Most CPE studies, as chapter 1.2 details, has spent a lot of time and effort 
crafting “national models” of capitalism and has placed labour relations 
‘models’ in a central position with these. Many such theories are based upon 
conceptions of functionalist complementarity where ‘national institutional 
arrangements’ dynamically form and adjust in the face of external pressures 
to change. It is the argument here that these conceptions are not an accurate 
comparative basis from which to understand nor compare European labour 
relations nor the broader forms of capitalism they are based within. Instead, 
there is far too much complexity and resulting incoherence for these complementary 
notions of coherence to hold water. Instead of holistic and functionalist national 
models, we have different mongrelised institutional forms of labour relations marked 
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by paradoxical patterns of institutional dissolution that co-exist alongside those 
examples of institutional resilience.   
       At the centre of this argument is a neo-liberal view of legal change that has 
been imposed upon labour relations in different ways and, crucially, has 
produced different kinds of response to these interventions. Aggressive 
attempts to re-order legal rights in favour of capital and employers has 
provoked those collective-institutional, judicial and political legislative responses 
outlined in the previous chapter. Importantly, these have often produced 
outcomes that do not follow either the intentions of the original intervention 
or the institutional pattern of a ‘Variety of Capitalism’ or ‘SSIP’ in question. 
Without engaging in another wordy description of the four cases, the British-
Posted Workers case presented a sharp revolt from workers in a well organised 
industrial sector. In the German-Posted Workers and Britain-Acquired Rights 
cases, legislative responses rather than that of unions, had differing levels of 
success in nullifying a disruptive intervention from a judicial decision.  
The Germany-Acquired Rights case certainly saw a more successful joint 
German and European attempt at imposing a neo-liberal re-ordering of 
rights. This however did not set a path for a smooth journey toward a neo-
liberal order as the role for negotiated settlement (in works councils) was still 
very prominent even if the decline of collective bargaining continued 
unabated.  
       Again, there are two sets of pre-conditions for the complexity and 
incoherence described: one is the different nature of legal impositions, and 
complex sets of legal rules existing and the conflict of rules attached, and the 
other is the responses these inspire. The role of courts, as described earlier, is 
especially difficult to theorise. Even if one court pursues its jurisprudence in 
a manner that aligns neatly with neo-liberal goals (i.e. the CJEU), it cannot be 
claimed to be a committed part of the neo-liberal order. Other doctrinal 
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considerations will weigh on it decisions in particular cases and, in regards 
to this particular European court, is capable of reversing or modifying its 
approach bases in different doctrinal principles. For example, despite the 
CJEU pursuing an approach to posted workers and acquired rights that 
would ostensibly align with Britain’s liberal, pro-market legal and political 
traditions and preferences, these two British cases do not see the ‘neo-liberal 
vision of legal change’ emerge; instead, something more complex is the end 
result with neo-liberal objectives left unmet. 
         This provides a neat segue to questions of the two national models 
contained in this thesis. Germany has not seen its vaunted coordinated 
institutions of Tarifautonomie perform in the way VoC nor (some) RT 
typologies would predict. In fact, the on-going dissolution of Tarifautonomie’s 
collective bargaining component has been on full display in this thesis. What 
this thesis also presented was the importance of legal factors. One, the 
intention and, in fact need, of legislators (at the state level) to actively assist 
in providing legal supports for wage bargaining and provide legal minimum 
wages; something though unthinkable during Tarifautonomie’s height. (1945-
1980). Two, the role of courts has shifted to these acting as transmission belts 
for the CJEU to adjudicate on German labour disputes. This means that 
German courts are now deferring to the European legal order rather than to 
the principle of Tarifautonomie as they used to. These constitute new legal 
institutions that further the insertion of the European legal order and 
‘regulatory state’ into German labour relations and German capitalism. 
      Perhaps appropriately given Britain’s anticipated exit from the 
European Union, an event that occurred during the production of this thesis, 
Britain had not been subject to the same degree or form of integration into 
the European legal order. Indeed, the Britain-Acquired Rights case 
demonstrated considerable diversion from EU legal norms rather than the 
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easy deference exhibited by German courts. In the British-Posted Workers case, 
this ‘diversion’ was particularly pronounced, but came from social actors not 
legal actors.  
The implications for Britain’s ‘model’ of labour relations point to 
incoherence, not a neat, discernible ‘liberal’ or market-based model. 
Described throughout the CPE literature as the archetype of a liberal or 
market-orientated market economy, Britain has still possessed many of the 
conditions for conflict based labour relations. This certainly appeared in the 
posted workers case, but not in the other (acquired rights). This sort of 
militant response seen in this case is contingent upon a high level of power 
resources and the nature of the industry in question. With much weaker 
unions in most of the British economy in comparison with this posted 
workers example in chapter 2.4, it is worth examining the value of this case 
study. Power resources and industrial context were hugely important to the 
strike action seen in this case study. Some can be replicated for other sectors, 
whilst others cannot.  
The conditions for resistance were made by a sudden shift in the 
system of legal rights. This can occur elsewhere and logical process of 
theoretical extension can take us to a number of sectors with enclosed labour 
markets based upon temporary work. In fact, Britain has used changes to the 
law of employment contract to foster precisely this. This missing factor is the 
power resources element that predicates worker organisation and 
mobilisation. This is very weak or non-existent in much of the UK economy 
therefore allowing for something far closer to the ‘pure’ neo-liberal model to 
emerge, but as noted above still providing enough of those ingredients to 
resist and challenge it. As ‘national’ models are considered however, the 
diversity across the industry level realities in terms of union power resources 
forges a very complex and uneven picture, one that does not contradict the 
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‘liberal’ label often attached to Britain, but one that does not emphatically 
reinforce it either.  
        With incoherence and complexity on the one hand, and the varied 
insertion of a European legal order into ‘national’ labour relations on the 
other, there are questions as to the efficacy of formulating ‘national models’ 
and attaching typological labels to them.  Comparative political economy 
must concern itself with the inherently interdisciplinary nature of its subject 
and incorporate all those approaches and empirical aspects this demands. 
Here, the role of law has been added crucially to other factors of politics, 
economy, society. If neat and tidy typological models and labels cannot 
incorporate all that is important then they lack purpose.  A focus on 
understanding the complex processes of erosion, response and 
recombination is where CPE should go from these lessons. 
 
  3.2.3.ii CPE and institutionalism: new directions 
The claim made immediately above in the preceding sub-section poses a 
serious challenge to CPE. This challenge is more specifically aimed at 
‘institutionalist CPE’ and those areas of CPE that lean more toward the 
parsimonious and functionalist theorizing found in complementary-like 
concepts.  
Despite the criticisms raised in this chapter, and at length in chapter 
1.2, these challenges do also present some opportunities for renewal. This 
final sub-section outlines those potential areas for renewal. The main 
argument that leads this final sub-section, following on from the rest of this 
chapter, is that institutions must be understood as much as venues of erosion, 
dissolution, conflict and incoherence as well as paradoxical tendencies of 
functionalism and complementarity. Institutionalist and neo-institutionalist 
	 -	370	-	
approaches are of central definitive importance to the VoC approach as well 
as playing an important (but more limited role) in CWC and RT (Amable 
2003, Boyer 2005). Of the three schools, CWC and RT pursue versions of 
institutionalism that can more easily conform to this more turbulent, 
disrupted and contested form of institutional dynamics. Further prospect for 
their renewal is found in literatures that have already had an influence on 
CPE or operate not too far from them (e.g. institutional economics, new 
economic sociology). 
   The VoC approach made clear reference to the influence of new 
institutional economics (NIE) within its distinctly economistic and business 
actor-centred approach to CPE (North 1990, Williamson 1985). Despite this, 
NIE offers further untapped potential to modify a VoC approach with which 
it has already had strong influence. This potential is expressed through a 
combination between the work of Deakin (2009, with Ahlering 2007, Sarkar 
2008) and Oliver Williamson’s work upon the concept of contracts and 
contracting.  
Contractual arrangements, both formal and informal, connect 
institutional formations surrounding things like collective bargaining, firms 
and employer organisations with the legal realm and bodies of legal rules. 
This takes place in two formal ways in regards to labour relations: the 
collectively bargained agreement (or ‘contract’) and the individual 
employment contract. Deakin’s work again is elevated as important 
demonstration of the promise this has. Deakin however still favours a 
complementarity and path dependency-based view of these contractual 
forms’ historical development. Deakin pursues this however without 
employing the rigid business actor-centrism of the VoC approach. This is 
important, because if Deakin’s approach is to place forms of contracting as 
the central unit of analysis for institutional formation, which it should, this 
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must inevitably displace the firm as that micro-analytic base for an 
institutionalist approach as contracts are inherently relational devices that 
encapsulate (in labour relations terms) labour and the state as well as the 
employer in a relational, interactive setting. This would call into question the 
very basis of the VoC approach, which again is a key argument made in 
regards to the VoC approach in chapter 1.2.  
 Contracts can be conceived as central venues of labour relations both 
when unions are and are not present to represent workers, as the concept 
addresses both the individual employment contract and the collective contract 
represented by a collective agreement. Contracts are venues for the 
conditions for conflict and their resolution with codified rules being agreed 
upon and enforced to remove or reduce conflict of rules problems and their 
effects. This concept of the contract however provides an analytical venue for 
both institutional settlements as well as seeds of conflict and  institutional 
collapse can be identified analytically. Both of these are difficult to 
encompass in the same notion of contract if the a firm’s profit-interest is the 
overriding focus. 
 
“We should not forget that societal dynamics are usually not explained by way of 
institutional theories, but with theories of power, conflict, action, stratification, and 
so on. Contemporary approaches to institutional change, however, attempt to explain 
social dynamics from within institutionalism (emphasis in original) at any cost, 
which results in overly descriptive and hermetically closed models.” 
              May and Nölke (2015, p.90) 
 
This passage is taken from chapter within the important edited volume of 
Ebenau, Bruff and May (2015) that seeks to introduce a renewed critical 
approach to CPE and acts as an illustration and support for those assertions 
made in this final sub-section. It firstly elevates the potential for ‘critical’ 
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approaches, more broadly found in CWC and the regulationist and (neo-
)Marxist approaches as it highlights the role of power, conflict, stratification 
(and by implication hierarchy) and those more turbulent and destructive 
institutional tendencies of modern capitalism and particularly neo-liberal 
capitalism. The second part of the quote is also highlighted because it 
describes the tendencies and problems from within CPE institutionalism. 
Institutionalism, as May and Nölke note, is useful for building theoretical 
links between broader a social order and empirical realities (2015, p.84). It 
cannot therefore be overextended in an attempt to pull all within it so as to 
explain all things. This is a tendency found in a lot if not most institutionalist 
scholarship that is more committed to the seductive intricacies of pretty 
theoretical stories rather than to the empirical realities of the subject they are 
analysing. This is not a tendency found only with institutionalists of course, 
but many of those who have become overly fixated upon complementarity 
type theories are the principal example of this problem found within CPE 
(and in each of the three schools). In this way, contractual analysis is a good 
device to understand the social relations of labour relations with 
institutionalism rather than within it, as this would produce the same 
problem.  
 The socio-legal political economy framework of this thesis purposefully did 
not afford a central role for institutionalist language or concepts as it was not 
the intention to reform institutionalism, as a theoretical programme, itself. 
This is not to be interpreted as a rejection of all institutionalism, not least 
given the explicit influences of renowned institutionalists John R. Commons 
and Peter. A. Hall in constructing the alternative framework of this thesis and 
the other institutionalist influences (Williamson 1985; North 1990; Thelen 
2001, 2014; Deakin 2009, Hodgson 2004, 2014, 2015). The term ‘institution’ has 
been used throughout this thesis in looser and mostly formal terms, for 
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instance referring to collective bargaining ‘institutions’ on a number of 
occasions. In order to correct the way ‘labour relations’ is viewed before 
research is conducted (the literal meaning of the word ‘approach’) as well as 
how any examination is conducted, it was necessary to reach for new 
concepts and theoretical innovations outside of existing theoretical 
approaches within CPE (and from legal studies, namely). Again, a 
commitment to the empirical realities of a subject must dictate the theory 
employed to study it, not the other way around.  
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3.3. Conclusion 
Comparative Political Economy, labour relations and future 
research agendas 
 
This thesis set out to make a contribution to comparative political economy 
and its approach to studying and comparing labour relations regimes in 
Europe. In doing so, some important empirical revelations of labour relations 
in Europe were made, and introduced some important introductions from 
the realm of legal studies and prospects for fruitful collaborations.  
The theoretical development as the overriding purpose and 
motivation for this study, but the observations about the concrete empirical 
subject matter of labour relations in Europe were also important and clearly 
tied to these theoretical goals. Namely, the German model of labour relations 
and its core operational parts have been subject to serious erosion and 
substantive change. This is just one empirical observation that concerns a key 
national archetype of a labour relations ‘model’ that poses important 
implications and questions for labour relations for the rest of Europe. The 
implications for collective bargaining in Europe are serious, and with 
different sets of legal rules presenting contradictory sets of influences, the 
manner of those responses by actors seeking to defend and protect collective 
wage bargaining is a critically important analytical problem.   
      The concepts used in this thesis have included those drawn from legal 
studies as well as from CPE and broader social science. Concepts such as 
conflict of rules or power resources may not the only viable conceptual 
innovations made to correct CPE’s problems analysing labour relations. It is 
claimed again however that the alternative approach of this thesis is the only 
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substantive offering addressing this, minus perhaps the macro-theoretical 
work of Brett Heino (addressed in chapter 1.2).  
Rather than make a claim that the socio-legal political economy approach 
here is the only possible route to correcting CPE’s problems identified in 
chapter 1.2, it is more credible to ask those within CPE and political economy-
minded legal studies to produce their modifications or reasoned critique of 
this or some of its parts. The role of a conflict of rules concept has been 
especially useful for mapping and understanding complex and interacting 
sets of legal and non-legal rules. If others from within CPE reject this claim, 
or how the conflict of laws concept has been adapted for this thesis, they will 
still have to produce their own alternatives to theorising relationships 
between law and factors of politics, economy and social relations. Existing 
CPE has made, again, few meaningful attempts to do this. 
       This concluding chapter consists of two short further sections: a 
mapping of those research agendas and the possible publication 
opportunities to arise from this thesis, followed by reflections and suggested 
possible improvements and lessons.   
 
3.3.1.  Reflections: improvements and lessons 
A number of reflections and lessons are outlined first in this concluding 
chapter. 
Grappling with different sorts of incomplete and sometimes 
unsatisfactory data is paradoxically an intellectually stimulating yet also a 
serious challenge. At times for instance, failing to get desired interview 
respondents left me thinking about the holes that would be left in a particular 
chapter and its content. When a process of acceptance directs you to using 
other data and sources results in pursuing an enjoyable process of piecing 
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them together, a researcher can take some satisfaction in finding solutions, 
however imperfect, to these typical academic problems.  
       Another challenge presented was adapting to new developments that 
occurred during the course producing this thesis. Two were in fact 
particularly useful and concerned the delivery of the 2017 Asklepios and 2015 
RegioPost cases of the CJEU. These helped develop the Germany-Acquired 
Rights and Germany-Posted Workers (respectively) case studies 
considerably. Many have also asked about the impact of Brexit on this thesis. 
The honest answer is that it was of little concern, as the time-line of this thesis’ 
case studies did not make any Brexit issues relevant. In fact, some of the 
issues that arise out of the thesis concerning Britain present some possible 
publication opportunities in the coming years (as noted above). 
More broadly, there were times when personal confidence to produce 
a written thesis of 100’000 words to the required standard became was hard 
to come by. The issues of writing were probably the biggest on-going concern 
and challenge. In regards to producing one’s own theory however, the socio-
political economy framework was developed in its form seen here only in the 
final year of this thesis. Enough confidence in it is manifested by the belief 
that it will be employed again in later work and probably modified and 
developed if the collaborations above warrant. 
 
3.3.2.  Future research agendas and publications 
If an alternative to the socio-legal political economy framework of thesis is 
proposed elsewhere, it will have to form a meaningful collaboration between 
legal studies and comparative political economy.  This sort of collaboration 
has some history, as noted in section one, with institutional economics, new 
economic sociology and law and politics being among the best examples of 
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this. These discrete literatures however have only had an occasional and 
limited influence on CPE. New economic sociology has had some role in 
CWC, with both being dominated by neo-institutionalist scholarship, and 
institutional economics has had an important influence upon VoC studies. 
Labour lawyer Simon Deakin has produced some important work that sees 
exactly this kind of legal studies-CPE combination forged in the VoC-type 
study (Deakin and Sarkar 2008; Deakin 2007; Ahlering and Deakin 2007). 
This work however has not been meaningfully engaged with by those 
identified VoC scholars. Maybe this is a result of the decline of VoC 
scholarship, or simply due to problems of disciplinary bias described in 
chapter 1.2. Such a bias is not as evident in CWC nor RT. It is not for this 
reason however that these both represent the more promising options for 
CPE to reform its approach to labour relations.  
    There are several other fruitful potential research agendas outside of 
CPE. The study of labour relations in Europe inevitably introduces the subject 
of European integration and European countries’ political and economic 
‘integration’ in to a European legal, market and political order. This thesis 
demonstrated those issues presented by the lack of European level 
coordination on wages and collective bargaining, yet an increasing amount 
of legal rules demanding changes to national wage-setting despite this lack 
of European-level coordination; more specifically, did so in the context of the 
single market and four freedoms law. This broad development can be 
described as one of an imbalance between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ 
integration, where the destructive effects of legislative and judicial 
interventions on national law are not compensated by the creation of new 
rules and coordination at the European level. This is a key feature of 
European ‘regulatory state’ that sees the EU produce masses of hard rules 
demanding changes of things like welfare states and collective bargaining, 
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but does not have the capacity to replace these features of national social 
models at the European level. This problem of the European regulatory state 
is also seen with the emerging economic governance regime of the Eurozone, 
where another supranational European actor (the European Central Bank) 
has joined the Commission and the Court of Justice in demanding sweeping 
changes to labour market institutions but without any form of ‘European 
collective bargaining’ framework or coordination existing. This European 
regulatory state is very much one built in the image of those goals of neo-
liberalism, but is also inherently law-based with strong juridification and 
judicialisation parts. This Eurozone case, and other non EMU-based case 
studies, represents fertile terrain for further research of European labour 
relations.  
This represents a very pertinent line of future research, particularly to 
understand how European labour relations, and collective bargaining in 
particular, can survive in a context of conjoined Europeanisation and neo-
liberalisation. It will involve collaborations between European integration 
studies, CPE and those committed to the study of neo-liberalism.  
In regards to potential and specific publication possibilities there are 
two broad categories outlined: one broader and theoretical, and the other 
focused and more empirical.  
In regards to more empirically-focused journal article-based 
publications, a number of opportunities are presented by the chapters in this 
thesis. Cross-national comparative papers can be produced comparing the 
German and British experiences with both the acquired rights and posted 
workers subjects. These can be directed to a number of purposes and research 
streams, with a European Union public policy interest as well as those more 
focused on labour matters. On the latter, there is an unfortunate and 
unwelcome disciplinary divide, made largely by the Research Excellence 
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Framework (REF), between business school-type labour relations studies and 
a political science-focused ‘labour market policy’ focus. European integration 
studies journals are less likely to be so weighed down by these problems of 
disciplinary division in the REF, so constitute perhaps the more promising 
publication outlet. Also, political economy-based journals, such as New 
Political Economy, offer a similarly promising possible publication outlets for 
political economists based in political science schools.  
One non-comparative posted workers-focused paper focusing on 
changes to wage-setting in Europe is already in draft form and will be 
directed to journals concerned with European integration or political 
economy journals with a politics ranking in the REF. Another proposed 
paper sees Britain’s experience with the acquired rights directive used as a 
case study of Britain’s tumultuous relationship with European social policy 
in the context of Britain’s requested exit from the European Union. A 1997 
paper in the Journal of European Social Policy with Nick Adnett and Stephen 
Hardy represents an interesting model for such a paper in terms of approach 
and its potential publication. Another paper focusing on Britain’s posted 
workers experience sees the disputes of 2009, that dominated this case study 
in chapter 2.4, produce an interesting theoretical paper on the rule of law in 
Europe in light of militant strike action by trade unions when faced with neo-
liberal legal change. The ten-year anniversary of the 2009 disputes comes in 
2019, offering a potential opportunity for a journal article in a European or 
political economy focused journal. 
Publications in regards theory development in CPE are the most 
exciting. There is a promising and broad research agenda of the CPE kind on 
neo-liberalism and its legal character that can include subjects beyond those 
of labour relations. The prospects of turning this thesis into a book project 
focused on European labour relations under European neo-liberalism however is 
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serious prospect as the subject remain highly relevant to European 
integration, European-focused CPE and labour studies. Potential papers 
along this comparative political economy of neo-liberalism also offer 
opportunities to act as a venue for collaborations between lawyers such as 
Grewal and Purdy (2014) and critical political economists found in the CWC 
and neo-Marxist corners of CPE (Ebenau et al. 2015, Dannreuther 2007) and 
economic geography (Peck and Theodore 2007; Peck and Tickell 2007; 
Brenner et al. 2010). There is also the prospect of key comparative themes 
from the literature review chapter (1.2) being directed to publications. This 
includes comparisons of the VoC and CWC approaches, VoC and RT 
approaches, and a focused paper on the critical political economy approaches 
found in broader neo-Marxism (i.e. not just RT) and some CWC.  
Theory development, the central motivation and theme of this thesis, 
cannot take place in a vacuum or simply through one single study or thesis. 
The collaborations outlined above between disciplines such as law, political 
economy and other social sciences, are exactly new, but in many cases need 
to be renewed. Even if subject to critique, the socio-legal political economy 
framework has done this more than current and contemporary CPE 
approaches. 
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Legislation and Case law 
European and national level statutes and court cases 
 
Legislation 
European and national level statutes listed below in chronological order. 
 
European statutes (directives and regulations) 
1. Posting of Workers directive (96/71) (1996) 
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10. Public Procurement (utilities) directive (2004/17) (2004) 
11. Public Procurement (utilities) directive (2014/22) (2014) 
12. Public Procurement (Concessions) directive (2014/23/EU) (2014) 
13. Relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
service contracts Directive (92/50) (1992) 
 
UK Statutes 
Ordered with primary legislation first, followed by secondary legislation and 
in chronological order. 
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1. The Employment Act (1982) (primary legislation) 
2. The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (TULRCA)  
(1992) (primary legislation) 
3. The Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act (TURERA) 
(1993)  
4. The National Minimum Wage Act (1998) (primary legislation) 
5. The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (TUPE) 
regulations (1981) (secondary legislation)  
6. The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (TUPE) 
regulations (2006) (secondary legislation)  
7. The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (TUPE) 
regulations (2014) (secondary legislation) 
8. The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings regulations 
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German statutes and core legal texts 
1. Section 613.a Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) ‘The Federal Civil Code’ 
2. Krankenversicherungsgesetz (1883) (‘Health Insurance Act’) 
3. Arbeiterschutzgesetz (1891) (Worker Protection Act)  
4. Betriebsrätsgesetz (1920) (Works Councils Act)  
5. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG) (1949) (‘Works Constitution Act’)  
6. Tarifvertragsgesetze (TöVG) (1949) (‘Collective Bargaining Act’)  
7. ‘Tariftreuegesetze’ Landesgesetz zur Gewährleistung von Tariftreue und 
Mindestentgelt bei öffentlichen Auftragsvergaben’ (LTTG) 
8. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB)  (‘Act against Restraints 
on Competition’) 
9. Gesetz zur Regelung eines allgemeinen Mindestlohns (‘Law regulating a 
general minimum wage’) 
10. Verordnung über die Vergabe öffentlicher. Aufträge (VgV), (‘Award Rules for 
Public Contracts’) 
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11. Vergabe-und Vertragsordnungen für Bauleistungen, (‘Building Work Award 
and Contract Code’) 
12. Vergabe-und Vertragsordnungen für Leistungen (’Award and Contract Code 
for Supplies and Services’) 
13. Vergabe- und Vertragsordnungen für freiberufliche Leistungen, VOF (’Award 
Rules for Professional Services’)  
14. Aktiengesellschaftgesetz (‘AG’) (Stock Corporation Act) 
15. Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz (‘ArbGG’)- Labour Court Act 
16. Tarifvertragsgesetz (TöVG)- Collective Bargaining Agreement Act 
17. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG) - Works Constitution Act  
18. Mitbestimmungsgesetz (MitbestG) - Co-Determination Act 
19. Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz (AEntG)- Posted Workers Act 
 
Court cases 
Abbreviated case name, as used in the text in core chapters, is in bold as is 
the year of the decision. Cases listed chronologically. 
 
Single Market (Foundational cases) 
1. NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration (1962) c-26-62. 
2. Flamino Costa v. ENEL. (1964). c-6-64. 
3. Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville - c-8/74 (1974) 
4. Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis 
de Dijon). c-120/78 (1979) 
5. Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd. c-76/90 (1991) 
6. Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori 
di Milano. c- 55/93 (1995)   
7. Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën. c- 384/93 (1995)  
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8. Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department. c- 60/00 
(2001) 
 
European Posted workers law 
1. Société anonyme de droit français Seco and Société anonyme de droit 
français Desquenne & Giral v Etablissement d'assurance contre la 
vieillesse et l'invalidité (Evi) Joined cases 62 and 63/81. Evi v Seco (1981) 
2. Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Office national d'immigration - c-113/89 (1990)  
3. Raymond Vander Elst v Office des Migrations Internationales - c-43/93 
(1994) 
4. Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils 
SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL - 
c-369/96 (1999) 
5. Criminal proceedings against André Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance 
Assistance SARL (2001)  
6. Finalarte Sociedade de Construção Civil Ldª (C-49/98) (2001) 
7. Portugaia Construções Ldª (C-70/98) (2001) 
8. Wolff & Muller GmbH & Co KG v Pereira Felix (C-60/03) (2004) 
9. Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet c-341/05 (2007) 
10. Rechtanswalt Dr Dirk Ru ̈ffert v Land Niedersachsen (C-346/06) (2008) 
11. Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg (2008) 
12. RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG v Stadt Landau in der Pfalz (2015) 
 
 
Other CJEU cases relevant to Labour relations and free 
movement 
1. Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie (C-67/96) (1999) (competition law) 
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2. International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) and Finnish Seamen's 
Union (FSU) v Viking Line (Viking) (C-438/05) c-438/05 (2007) 
3. Bundesdruckerei GmbH v Stadt Dortmund C-549/13 (2014) 
 
 
Company law and free movement 
1. Centros Ltd v Erhvervsog Selskabsstyrelsen case c-212/97 (1999) 
2. Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement 
GmbH (c-208/00 (2002) 
3. Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd 
c- 167/01 (2003) 
 
 
Acquired Rights (transfer of undertakings) 
1. Jozef Maria Antonius Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abattoir CV and 
Alfred Benedik en Zonen BV (1986) c-24/85 
2. Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy's Dance Hall A/S. 
(1988) c-324/86 
3. Dr. Sophie Redmond Stichting v Hendrikus Bartol and others. (1992) c-
29/91 
4. Anne Watson Rask and Kirsten Christensen v Iss Kantineservice A/S 
(1992) c-209/91 
5. Christel Schmidt v Spar- und Leihkasse der früheren Ämter Bordesholm, 
Kiel und Cronshagen (1994) c-392/92 
6. Commission vs. the UK (1994) c- 382-92 
7. Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH 
Krankenhausservice (1997) c-13/95 
8. Allen and others v Amalgamated Construction Co Ltd case (1999) c-234/98 c-
172/99, c-74/97 
9. Collino and Chiappero v Telecom Italia SpA. (2000) c-343/98 
10. Hans Werhof vs.  Freeway Traffic Systems GmbH & Co. KG (2006) c.499-04 
11. Ivana Scattalon v. Ministero dell’istruzione, dell’ Universita e della Ricera 
(2010) c-108/10 
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12. Kainuun Liikenne Oy and Oy Pohjolan Liikenne Ab (1998) C-412/96 
13. Francisca Sánchez Hidalgo and Others v Asociación de Servicios Aser 
and Sociedad Cooperativa Minerva (C-173/96), and Horst Ziemann v 
Ziemann Sicherheit GmbH and Horst Bohn Sicherheitsdienst (C-247/96). 
(1998) 
14. Francisco Hernández Vidal SA v Prudencia Gómez Pérez, María Gómez 
Pérez and Contratas y Limpiezas SL (C-127/96), Friedrich Santner v 
Hoechst AG (C-229/96), and Mercedes Gómez Montaña v Claro Sol SA 
and Red Nacional de Ferrocarriles Españoles (Renfe) (C-74/97). (1998) 
15. Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd. (2013) (c-426/11) 
16. Asklepios Kliniken Langen-Seligenstadt GmbH v Ivan Felja and 
Asklepios Dienstleistungsgesellschaft mbH v Vittoria Graf (2017) Joined 
Cases C-680/15 and C-681/15 
 
UK cases (that did not reach the CJEU) 
1. Astle v (1) Cheshire County Council (2) Ominisure Property Management Ltd. 
[EAT, 2004] 
2. Complete Clean Ltd v Savage [2002, EAT] 
3. RCO Support Services v UNISON [2002, CA Civil div 464] 
4. ADI (UK) Ltd v Firm Security Group Ltd [2001, CA Civil div] 
5. ECM (Vehicle Delivery Systems) Ltd v Cox [1998, EAT] 
6. Dines and others v. Initial Health care services Ltd and Pall Mall services group 
Ltd. [IRLR 336, CA] 
7. Glendale Managed Services v Graham [IRLR 465, Court of Appeal] 
8. Whent v T Cartledge Ltd [1997] IRLR 153 (EAT) 
 
 
*  German cases in these case studies have been referred immediately to 
the CJEU if they were referred to German Labour court or other courts. 
** No UK level cases for posted workers cases 
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Documentary and Media Sources 
 
1. BBC news online (24/9/2007) ' Gordon Brown's speech in full' [accessed 
on January 2015] available online:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7010664.stm 
2. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 2013 consultation 
document on 2006 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations.   
3. Eurofound 1998. New collective agreement for Siemens AG outsourced 
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Transcribed Interview text 
 
The transcribed text of five interviews is below.  
GPWD1, BPWD1, BPWD2, GARD1, GARD2 
----- 
Interview GPWD1 
November 16th 2016 
 
Time: 24 minutes, 21 seconds. 
 
This interview took place with a lawyer who had ties to trade unions and had 
published work for the European Parliament and the European Commission on 
posted workers. The initials of this official are ‘EV’. 
 
The questions of this interview concerned the regulatory options pursued and not 
pursued by German policy-makers (federal and state) and the preferences of trade 
unions and other actors. 
 
AM: I have a time-line from the Rüffert case (2008) and the RegioPost case 
(2015), the question I have concerns how the German states (and excuse me 
if I use the English names for these) like Rhineland-Palatinate how the 
responses of German länder differed… 
 
EV: …Rhineland-Pflaz 
 
AM: Yes, right. 
 
Now, in the RegioPost case it looked like some German states looked to public 
procurement directives, and what was article 26 that stated that special 
conditions could be put into contracts. I want to ask you, were there 
differences in how the German states responded and if so how these came 
about? 
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EV: Andrew first of all, I would like to highlight that I’m not a labour lawyer, 
but I had [to adjust] to as in working with the posting of workers directive 
and I produced a report for the European Parliament. I’m now doing a 
complicated study, but a smaller study, for the European Commission on 
remuneration on rates of pay.  
 
It is very very complicated because the remuneration for posted workers is 
complicated [sic} and the cases of the European Court of Justice, and you 
mean mentioned the Rüffert and RegioPost case, there are different signals out 
of them. So regarding this balance of social protection and minimum rates of 
pay on the one hand and on the other the aim of guaranteeing the free 
movement so not to limit companies going to the UK or to Germany. In that 
light, the two cases sent…perhaps should be seen as a changing in the views 
of the ECJ. 
 
Rüffert has been perceived by labour lawyers in Germany was seen very 
much in the light of the Laval and Viking cases, about protection based on the 
provision as in Ruffert in public procurement that the basic wages stipulated 
in collective agreements they should be respected [sic] and in Laval and 
Viking the company was asked to join the employer associated and collective 
agreement and this was of course rejected by the ECJ. 
 
In Germany the logic was quite similar, because the Lower Saxony regulation 
stipulated that posting companies must pay their workers according to the 
collective agreement and again the ECJ didn’t think this went beyond the 
minimum demanded by the PWD. The logic being this would hinder the 
service provision [sic] 
 
Note: I know all this. S/he is just repeating stuff I have read myself in the cases and 
other literature. 
 
EV: The main reaction that I’m not sure about the practice that all, but maybe 
all, all western states (in Germany) had a similar 
practice…of…using…aligning public procurement to guarantee collective 
agreement arrangements. 
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And the main reaction, and not just in Lower Saxony but also North-Rhein 
Westphalia, was that they introduced…or at least began to orient themselves 
towards minimum wages (legal) at the federal state level.  
 
AM: You mentioned the minimum wages and particularly the state-level 
minimum wages. For me this is one of the main differences between 
RegioPost and Rüffert. In Rüffert it was a minimum wage contained in a 
collective agreement, in RegioPost there was not a collective agreement in 
place for the postal sector, so it concerned a legal minimum wage instead. 
 
EV: at the federal state level we have a minimum wage now, there is a term 
and I can’t remember it, but it is a general and specific clause across all 
sectors. In the RegioPost case this was a public authority that aligned with the 
general practice in other länder. 
 
We are reminded that the ECJ confirmed that defining a minimum wage as 
the base level minimum does fall in line with its own interpretation.  
 
AM: That bit is interesting. Has there been any legislative reaction since 
RegioPost amongst the other länder?  
 
EV: I guess, but I have to check. But there are differences in eastern Germany. 
When the RegioPost case came up we were having this debate about low level 
wages and this talk about a statutory minimum wage was being discussed. I 
think all western states had some kind of minimum wage regulation in public 
procurement.  
 
 Note: the work of Detlev Sack and Thorsten Schulten looks at this. 
 
EV: there were some slight differences in the rate. I think public procurement 
is based on a minimum wage rate regulation (rather than collective 
bargaining). 
 
AM: this seems to be the important bit that they’re using public procurement 
directives to nail down legal minimum wages, rather than those in a collective 
agreement. 
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EV: Yes, that is the important message in these two judgements RegioPost and 
Rüffert. In Germany there is certainly a shift to legal minimum wages given 
the erosion of coverage from collective agreements and at the same time the 
provisions based on public procurement since 2015 based on the national 
minimum wage was the response to that.  
 
And our minimum wage was strongly based on the UK experience! 
 
EV: You should bear in mind that in the postal sector and some other sectors 
like construction and meat processing slaughter houses posted workers is a 
big topic. The other part of the discussion with these is the (legal) extension 
mechanism, but there’s a big difference between a normal collective 
agreement and these minimum wage agreements. 
 
So you will have in some sectors two minimum wages. In some sectors the 
general one and the collectively agreed minimum and both are significantly 
lower than the respective wage groups in the ‘normal’ collective agreement 
where you have all sorts of provisions like working time and overtime. 
 
Note: this is very pertinent. It is not only that there is a legal minimum wage 
alongside collective agreements in the wage-setting landscape, but also collective 
agreements just for minimum wages. Complicating this further.  
 
 
AM: that is interesting as I hadn’t come across this at all. 
 
EV: this is one of the topics I am studying. There are all these other provisions 
that are not included in the minimum wage agreement in the construction 
sector. And this is a question for the Commission as to whether these should 
be allowed [in the reformed posted workers directive]. 
 
AM: In Britain it is unlikely that temporary workers will get things like bonus 
pay or sometimes even sick pay. Is this the case in Germany?  
 
EV: yes definitely. Even the employers in the construction sector… that even 
with overtime pay…there is often a manipulating or creative practice with 
calculating working hours. So we have this system of ‘social holiday pay 
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fund’ which works in practice with supplements. And employers agree that 
the directive looks good, but in practice it is different and the labour 
inspectorate is not able to [AM interjects: ‘police it’] EV: yeah. 
 
EV: but Andrew one further comment of the RegioPost case. Perhaps you 
have heard of a judgement of the Court in 2014 on…erm… Bundesdruckerei. 
The federal printing issues. 
 
AM: from Dortmund,, is that right? 
 
EV: Yes. 
 
That also addressed the question whether it is possible to use public service 
provisions [sic} (public procurement provisions) to set the obligations to 
respect the minimum wage of €8.70 also for subcontractors. Even if the 
subcontractors, the subcontractor was based in Poland. There the decision 
was not allowed [because they were based on Poland). This does raise 
questions what would be allowed in other constellations (scenarios) where 
perhaps the contractor is not located in Poland but in Germany. 
 
AM: that would fall in line with Court of Justice’s company law case law 
wouldn’t it., there was a case called Centros and there was a German case law 
called Überseering, I don’t know what the phrase is in German but it is the 
idea of ‘letter boxing’.  
 
EV: Ah OK what is this case you mention? 
 
AM: I can send these to you. An there’s another one called Inspire Art, and 
Cartesio which is less interesting. 
 
This line of case law pushes what in German I think is called Sittheorie, 
follows the logic of the country of origin principle pushed in posted workers. 
So if these two appear coherent and do line up together, if the court is 
changing its mind, and based on what the Court decided in RegioPost it’s not 
clear that it’s doing that yet, but it might be.  
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There’s one interesting thing about the Bundesdruckerei case. Is there not a 
federal statute that got changed? I think there were provisions where you 
could prioritise small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Is this 
something that has been looked at. 
 
EV: I don’t know.  
 
End.  
 
 
 
Interview BPWD1  
 
Official from the intermediary body the governs the NAECI (NJCECI) 
 
Time: 22 minutes.  
 
 
AM: I’ll be giving some specific sets of questions but most of them will be 
follow up questions. The key questions that I have are broader and concern 
how much of these issues were dealt with in the NAECI after the events at 
Lindsey, and the influence of EU in this. 
 
AM: Were you or the NAECI partners aware of the some of the 
controversial developments in EU law that occurred before 2009, 
particularly the cases Laval and Rüffert? 
 
JS: we’ve never discussed them in the NJC but the trade unions were 
certainly aware of them and the employers would have been aware of 
them.  
 
AM: so these weren’t discussed in the collective agreement negotiations?  
 
JS: No no, but this isn’t the place the discuss it is it?! 
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AM: no, but not having prior knowledge of the these things and reading the 
NAECI Appendix G and knowing the in NJC’s elsewhere like for 
government services a lot of these issues were raised in light of CJEU 
decisions, obviously a big year to be talking about the CJEU (an aside, a glib 
point) 
 
JS: In terms of the application of the European statutes, government bodies 
have a different position to private sector. So they definitely would have 
discussed them because the public procurement people would have to take 
notice of that, but the private sector don’t in the same way. Because they’re 
an emanation of state. 
 
Note: true, the different public procurement directives do apply to services and 
works contracts differently, but the latter do apply to the private companies in 
construction. It’s not clear JS recognises that. 
 
AM: the one thing I’ve come across in regards to UK law is that UK didn’t 
transpose the PWD as they didn’t feel the need to as collective agreements 
are not legally binding in this country. So, even though the CJEU said in the 
Rüffert case which looks like to be the nearest example of what happened at 
Lindsey… 
 
JS: (interjects) let me just say Andrew, I can see where you’re going or 
maybe I’m misreading it, but these issues in a sense, what we see at the end 
of it is [sic] is a labour relations issue, so what really causes it is not the 
PWD and all that stuff, what causes it is the legislation for letting contracts. 
The procurement legislation where contracts have to be openly tendered to 
the whole of Europe. So people are able to bid for the work and win the 
work [sic]. That’s what causes all this in the first place. 
 
Note: this is interesting as he unprompted redirects the regulatory issue toward a 
problem with public procurement and away from posted workers.  
 
JS:...(continues from above) if we weren’t in the EU, and I’m not making a 
political point, we wouldn’t have to do that, and companies could decide 
whether to give the work to a UK contractor or abroad. But they don’t have 
that same freedom and have to advertise in the European gazette [sic] and 
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anyone can apply and bid for the work and if they win the work we have 
all these issues.  
 
And by the way that’s what happened at Lindsey. The Lindsey thing and 
what we saw at the end and the furore and all the problems we had that 
was a subsequent event to a contract being let. And the Italians were able to 
bid for it. 
 
AM: This is IREM, is that right?!  
 
JS: Yes.  
 
AM: The particular issues as to whether wage rates were adhered to or 
not…(JS interjects) 
 
JS: yeah well that’s another thing…and, well we have problems with 
bloody UK companies not adhering to rates and stuff like that. 
 
AM: right. 
 
JS: Yes and we’ve gone through a whole gamut of things in the last year of 
UK companies being accused of paying the correct holiday pay. And that’s 
nothing to do with the posted workers directive that’s (laughs) to do with 
companies.. 
 
AM: that’s an enforcement issue. Right. I was going to ask about public 
procurement specifically as it appears to be the more important item of 
legislation and another CJEU case decided recently called RegioPost, have 
you come across this? 
 
JS: no. 
 
AM: it actually concerned the postal sector but it concerned the provisions 
in the old PP directives, although it’s in the new ones as well, they are 
basically called ‘special conditions’ can be put it into contracts. I wanted to 
ask about this in regards to Appendix G, although maybe I’m not reading it 
right, but it (Appendix G) does indicate that all contractors are meant to 
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incorporate or adhere to the NAECI rules. Are these formally put into 
tenders? 
 
JS: generally what happens with the NAECI is that when work is identified 
as NAECI work [sic] so if a client is going to build a power station and he 
decides it’s to be done under NAECI then the contractors need to bid using 
the NAECI rates… 
 
Note: this is hugely important. If the NAECI rates must be used in making bids, we 
immediately have a Laval-Rüffert problem. 
 
JS: because generally they’re higher than other rates [sic] what will happen 
is that they’ll be enforced [sic] to use them and if they bid with a lower rate 
they’ll end up losing money. 
 
AM: right. 
 
JS: so all the contractors, and they’re pretty cute note, they know that, 
although I’m always getting phone calls from abroad from Spain from all 
over the place from people wanting to bid for work in the UK, and we spell 
it out to them as we want them to know at the beginning as we don’t want 
them bidding at the wrong amount and then suffering as a consequence.  
Because when it comes to a NAECI site, they have to pay the NAECI rates. 
 
AM: right. 
 
JS: They have to pay it. So if they bid using something else. They’ll be in 
serious trouble. 
 
AM: So they could lose their contract? 
 
JS: well that’s between them and the client? 
 
AM: and the managing contractor?  
 
JS: or the client.  
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Note: the diagram in both PWD chapters sees a clear hierarchy between managing 
the client (top) the contractor and subcontractors. Does he mean that 
subcontractors would have to answer directly to the client? He answers this 
partially below. 
 
JS: Some clients will let the work in packages themselves. Some will 
appoint a managing contractor or an EPC contractor. 
 
AM: EPC? sorry tell me what that is. 
 
JS: Right well if we go back a few years in the electrical power sector, CGB 
(central electricity generating board), what they would do is that they 
would have a big department down in Barnwood every time someone 
would build a power station, they would let all the contracts themselves. So 
they’d let the boiler contract, the turbine contract, and all the rest of it and 
they would procure a lot of the equipment themselves they’d ask people 
saw to it and so on. But when the electricity sector got privatised in 1990 all 
the new electrical companies, so that was PowerGen, national power, 
Nuclear and Electric, Scottish Nuclear and all the rest of it, they did away 
with all their engineering and procurement departments. 
 
AM: I see. 
 
JS: and they started using EPC (Engineering Procurement and 
Construction) contractors. So this manifested itself in the first place in what 
was known as the ‘dash for gas’, so during the 90s we built a lot, probably 
20-odd, combine-cycle gas power stations. And the way this was done was 
on what was called ‘turn key’ contracts. Have you heard them term? 
 
AM: no answer. The answer would have been no. 
 
JS: A turn key contract is where the client, in other words the person who 
owns the site, and wants to build and says to a contractor: “look, you go 
away, you identify the kit, you get it all together, you get to be delivered, 
you do the engineering and we’ll agree contractually when you hand it over 
to us…” 
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 Note: this history lesson is still useful for context. 
 
JS: “…so in other words: you’re going to start in 1st of May this year and 
you hand it over to us 30th April two years later.” Now that’s called a turn 
key contract. Meaning in two years time you’ll turn over the key to the site 
and it’s all working. 
 
JS: but happens is that they have a system of liquidated damages. So the 
client will have in that [sic] they’ll agree in that contract the hand over date, 
and if the hand over date is missed there’ll be damages paid on a daily basis 
until the plant is handed over.  
 
JS: so most of this was done under EPC, that’s ‘Engineering Procurement 
and Construction’. So whoever was going to do it was going to build it for 
the client, we’ll do all the engineering, we’ll procure all the kit and we’ll 
construct it. And then we’ll hand it over to you on this date. 
 
AM: so it sounds like this turn key is ‘you go away and you just deal with it 
and then come back when its done’ 
 
JS: yes that’s right 
 
AM: so there sounds like a great deal of autonomy and little in the way of 
managing contractor enforcement? 
 
JS: Well there in a sense because, whether it’s an EPC or managing 
contractor is that they don’t want to miss the date. Because if they miss the 
handover date they have to pay liquidated damages. 
 
JS: this actually causes a much higher level of enforcement.  
 
AM: OK that is interesting. 
 
 
Note: this is no longer just a history lesson but now very pertinent to the case 
study in terms of contextual information about the nature of construction industry 
mode of production. The interests of contractors and subcontractors to finish a 
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contract on time is so overwhelming that they do not want to waste time litigating 
as it would take too much time. This is why contractors in the BJBW case wanted to 
negotiate with unions rather than litigate against them to end their strike action. 
 
JS: so they can get themselves into serious difficulty. And the other thing is 
that most of these contracts have a performance related liquidated damages 
(clause) too. So in other words if I say to you, uhh I don’t know, I suppose 
[sic] take Scottish Power and I agree to build a new gas-fired power station 
for you…now the way these work is so important to the cost of the project, 
so the difference in the efficiency in the boiler and the turbine [sic], so if I 
saw to you build this for 300 million pounds, and when it starts running it 
only has an efficient of 55% now I would then look a see what I can sell the 
power for, what did it cost me to get it built and the contract would be built 
on that basis. 
 
Note: the point I took from this was clearer on the recording: if the efficiency of the 
plant was 55% and the contract demanded higher, performance related damages 
could be brought against the builder. 
 
JS: if it runs at only 50%, or even 54 or 53 the owner is going to lose money. 
So what they do they have two forms of damages usually. One is liquated 
damages at the beginning, so there are damages handed over for every day 
it goes over late, there is usually performance related damages. So, in other 
words, the kit doesn’t perform to the contractual efficiency agreed before it 
was started to be construction [sic]. 
 
AM: I realise that some of this chimes with Hinckley point C, on of the 
other things relevant to this, although I’m not too familiar with that other 
than the EU state aid bit.  
 
It would be interesting to look at the previous NAECI’s to see how some of 
these issues can be plotted [in a timeline of labour relations issues] 
 
JS: now I can go and have a look now and see…when we actually put it in 
there. Because Appendix G was actually a guidance thing. 
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AM: well if you like you can just send them to me rather than research it 
yourself and I can look for it. 
 
JS: OK sure. 
 
AM: so if I’m right with the period, its 2012-14, 2009-2011 
 
JS: what year is Lindsey again? 
 
AM: 2009. 
 
JS: 2009 So it would be the one after that. 
 
AM: it’s just getting an picture of when it was…(put in) 
 
JS: well I can certainly get you a date when Appendix G was inserted. 
 
AM: well that would be good. 
 
JS: alright well let me, say this to you: if you read Appendix G you’ll see 
that it’s very aspirational, and advisory. So it’s not a part of the collective 
agreement in that its contractual within the agreement. 
 
Note: this is difficult to square with earlier statements about companies not 
applying the NAECI rates being in ‘serious trouble’. 
 
AM: this is one of the reasons I was asking as it indicates that is more 
guidelines as supposed to rules 
 
JS: well it has to be because it can’t cut across companies’ right to bid for 
work. 
 
Note: more of a problem. On the one hand this is right as the procurement 
directives demand precisely this. But on the hand, and again, he has already said 
that NAECI rates must be adhered to. The problem is that paragraph one of 
Appendix G says that ‘UK employees must be paid the same rates of pay as  foreign 
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workers’. If this is aspirational, then why would a contractor using foreign labour 
be in “serious trouble” for not paying NAECI rates? 
 
 
AM: the question originates back to EU law 
 
JS: well that’s what I’m saying to you because you can’t look at the labour 
bit without looking at that. The labour bit is a response to how contracts are 
let. 
 
JS: what happened at Lindsey did make some changes to our agreement 
(the NAECI) and people are more sensitive about it, so people who bid 
from Europe about it seek our advice so they can bid for the work, 
sometimes it goes wrong, most of the time it works much better. But the UK 
trade unions still don’t accept […], because they want local people to have 
the work. So that’s just an emotional thing. Although perhaps it’s not just 
emotional as it is their jobs and their livelihoods. 
 
AM: yes their members asking for it. 
 
JS: that’s it, yeah. 
 
AM: In EU law there is very little space to allow local hiring (over European 
workers) 
 
JS: well, I’ve not read appendix G for some time now, but we’ve got 
arrangements now for even if a foreign contractor comes in they have to try 
and recruit local people and go to the local job centres and all that sort of 
stuff. So all the advice is there to assist. And most foreign contractors who 
come in will be sensitive to that and will try and recruit local labour…to 
head off the posse at the pass! 
 
Note: what he describes is in fact what is asked in Appendix G. He earlier notes 
that this is advisory and comports with his stipulations that the ‘arrangements we 
have now’ are ‘advice’ based and that foreign companies will be ‘sensitive’ to it, 
rather than being forced to do this. This looks like an attempt to keep these sorts of 
rules very informal so as to keep unions happy but not run foul of the law. 
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AM: this is really interesting. So the new agreement for 2016, I have a 
communique of that, is that available? 
 
JS: that’s currently at the printers. In fact the first draft is due back next 
week. But there’s not changes to Appendix G. Most of the changes are to 
the rates. 
 
AM: if I can get hold of the previous versions of the NAECI. 
 
JS: Well let me just see if I have any earlier versions. 
 
AM: Ok thanks very much. 
 
One minute passes. 
 
JS: there was no Appendix G before 2010. 
 
Interview ends. 
 
 
 
Interview note B_PWD2 
 
Interview with Unite the Union official (BM) in Leeds, and Sheffield, 
7.30am to 2pm. April 18th 2016. And follow up meeting 10th June 2016.  
 
Andrew Morton referred to in text as AM 
 
This official (BM) was a senior union organiser for the energy section of the 
construction sector and collective agreement negotiator with the NJC. He had first-
hand experience with the disputes in 2009. There were some set questions for the 
interview, but the trade union official came well prepared with some hugely 
important hard copy material to give me. This material concerned the pay audits used 
to check that foreign contractors were paying the rates of the collective agreement. 
We ended up pursuing a conversation over several hours in the Unite offices in Leeds 
and in a car ride to Sheffield. At the Unite offices in Sheffield, he allowed me to sit in 
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on a meeting of trade union organisers from Unite and the GMB trade union for the 
Energy sector. 
 
The questions I was going to ask are outlined for transparency’s sake.  
1. What effect the events of 2009 have on the collective agreement in the sector 
(NAECI), the bargaining process and with pay issues concerning posted workers?  
2. Have posted workers become more of a feature in subcontracting in the last 10 
years or so? Has the use of posted workers increased? Has a notable change in 
recruitment patterns occurred for native (non-posted workers) employees? (NJC, 
unions) 
3. Have unions tried to organise posted workers? 
4. Has unions’ ability to enforce terms from the NAECI in and around public works 
contracts changed as a result of the use of posted workers? 
5. Has a greater awareness of EU law and key CJEU decisions been a feature in 
collective bargaining issues? (NJC) 
 
Notes of interview 
Upon BM giving AM several folders and papers of material he identified the 
pay audits as of particular interest and described them in the context of the 
Lindsey dispute (BPWDdocC1, BPWDdocC2, BPWDdocC3, BPWDdocB1).  
 
The first question above concerning the effect of the 2009 disputes on the 
collective agreement and upon the enforcement of wages onto foreign posted 
workers was therefore pre-empted. The pay audits were presented as at least 
as important as the changes to the NAECI, ‘Appendix G’, that specifically 
concerned posted workers.  
 
BM described how successful these pay audits have been since 2009 in 
policing contractor pay compliance, but did also provide some examples of 
conflict and jurisdictional problems in how these foreign contractors treated 
their posted workers’ pay when they returned to the home country. These 
pay audits were pursued using freedom of information requests if initial 
requests were denied. This meant that the NJC that governed the NAECI  
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BM confirmed that the Appendix G was created in light of the 2009 dispute 
alongside the pay audits. His focus however, again, was on the pay audits 
rather than Appendix G.  
 
BM stated that the public procurement process itself did not have any union 
presence involved.  
 
BM confirmed that no hard data existed on the numbers of posted workers 
coming in the sector. (the government doesn’t collect this either). 
 
Organising posted workers was not something unions had success with as 
their employers not only tried to keep these workers separate but put the fear 
of god into them so to dissuade them from even talking to native (UK) 
workers. 
 
In a broader discussion about the history of industrial action in Britain, BM 
spoke about the role of the state and legal sanctioning for bargaining. He 
referred, unprompted, to the proposed reforms of Barbara Castle of 1968 (see 
chapter 2.1) titled In place of strife and its proposal to give collective 
agreements legal character. He expressed an opinion that this, in hindsight, 
was a missed opportunity for the trade union movement that rejected the 
proposals. This was interesting in a contextual sense given the broader 
interests of the thesis of the relationship between law and collective 
bargaining.  
 
EWAC meeting (Sheffield, April 18th 2016) 
- NAECI undermined frequently. The alternative CGIC agreement often 
favoured which is not as good. Some projects are kept away from NAECI 
(like Hinkley point C). 
- Unions can’t get close enough to the tendering process and contracts have 
been awarded long before unions can impose any terms on them.  
- IREM said their pay rates were adhering to Italian minimum wage. There 
wasn’t one in Italy!. This is evidence of a) IREM not paying NAECI rates and 
b) possibly that they thought they had the right to pay Italians rates (although 
bogus) rather than UK rates. (try and corroborate)  
 
Main Takeaways: 
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1) NAECI Appendix G was, as stated by BPWD1 interview, put into the 
NAECI after and a result of Lindsey according to BM. This might have been 
put in anyway because of events that occurred prior to Lindsey, but the 
events and tumult of Lindsey made sure. 
2) Pay Audits: This was a major new initiative to occur from the Lindsey 
dispute. The auditing of foreign contractors to confirm they honoured the 
NAECI rates. One example was given where a Croatian company had to 
cough up unpaid wages after the audit, but simply used the courts back in 
Croatia to get that money back. (one claim, not substantiated). Several 
documentary examples given where audits did their job (i.e. spotted unpaid 
pay and demanded payment). 
3) Posted Workers numbers: no data available. 
 
 
G-ARD1 
Specialist lawyer whom works for trade unions in Germany and has 
produced reports for EU institutions 
Interview conducted on Skype 
Date:  6/6/2015 
Time: 26 minutes 
 
 
How have German trade unions challenged restructuring programmes in 
German industry? 
EV: It is difficult to talk about ‘challenge’ as you say it, as the way things were 
going with economic policy in Germany in the 1990s it was extremely 
problematic for trade unions to do very much. Unemployment was a serious 
problem for a long time and trade unions were weak because of some unions 
not being strong enough to do anything…umm…how would say… 
AM: …more aggressive? 
EV: …yes right, to attack this agenda.  
AM: Were strikes ever considered by unions? 
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EV: probably but I cannot tell you an example (sic), but union organisation 
was not going to be strong enough for this to be too effective. 
AM: Were litigations in court ever considered? 
EV: No not that I remember. 
 
Did works councils not provide unions a way to challenge outsourcing and 
other restructuring strategies? 
EV: I think it is important to differentiate two separate situations: 1) where 
works councils were strong or present and 2) where they are not strong. 
Where works councils were involved in restructuring existing practice was 
often consolidated in part whilst some changes (like new wage agreements 
for some workers and divisions). But it is important to note the purposes of 
the works council and how their role changes in different companies. Their 
role is also not to address wage matters  
AM: This role varies depending on, union strength in the sector or the nature 
of the company, you mean? 
EV: Yes correct, it is perhaps attractive to think that the worker 
representatives in works councils are union members and therefore follow 
union wishes, but it is not always the case and particularly if the union is not 
too strong in that company.  
AM: If a restructuring took place that entailed a change in the type of works 
council that would exist, would the works council, before a transfer, not 
object to this? 
EV: They might do, Andrew. But they would not if the works council rule 
that applies to that type of new company was better than previously.  
AM: Even if agreeing to this might incur job losses and new pay conditions 
that were worse?  
EV: Yes, as sometimes this could not be avoided, the employer might have 
(as was often the case) simply be in too strong a position. So works councils 
preferred to accept a lot and unions also in many cases. 
 
AM: So, there were consequences for collective bargaining regimes and 
pay and terms and conditions? 
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EV: The effects were mainly job cuts and restructuring of collective 
bargaining systems, yes. Unions had to make a lot of concessions on things 
like collective bargaining to control the level of job cuts. This was very often 
the big consideration. 
AM: Were collective agreements seriously undermined by the strategic use 
of outsourcing?  
Yes, very often. The use of outsourcing and off-shoring became dominant 
strategies by companies in the airbus (sic) and automotive industries and 
what this did is create new collective wage bargaining that were different 
and separate from the main collective agreement. 
AM: Were these usually weaker, or became weaker later in terms of pay? 
EV: Yes of course, and often entailed cuts of workers (sic) (job cuts).  
AM: I have seen reports about the company Siemens using this sort of 
strategy and creating   precisely this sort of ancillary collective agreement 
arrangement. Have you come across this? 
EV: Yes of course Siemens is a very large powerful company in many sectors 
and they used these strategies, but given their global power could use off-
shoring as a very powerful tool to encourage reforms from unions and from 
government.  
AM: IG Metall is a powerful union in the manufacturing sector. What was 
their response to Siemens’ efforts? 
EV: I do not know too much, but I know it was not positive but their.. how 
do say…hands were tied by a number of factors. Their membership was not 
as well organised across the company, their was some (inter-) union 
competition also… 
AM: with which unions? 
EV: ahh… I cannot name all, but IG BAU and Ver.di probably as well I think. 
AM: IG BAU?? the construction sector union? 
EV: Yes. I know it may seem strange. 
AM: A little, but the inter-union competition point is interesting. Particularly 
given that we’re talking historically about Germany’s most powerful union 
(IG Metall) having their strategic position look rather weak. 
EV: Yes, but Andrew it is a problem for all unions and the problems of union 
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weakness and unemployment and politics ecetera were…a very powerful 
force. 
AM: Yes I see that. Right, I would like to ask you about law and legal 
remedies. You have mentioned already that court cases were rare. Which 
key areas of law have been important in how these processes have been 
regulated? Are there any statutes that are important? 
EV: Well in European law the transfer of undertakings directive is of course 
relevant as is the European Works Councils directive for global companies.  
 
 
AM: Federal law: Have the Nachwirkung provisions in the Tarifvertragesetz 
(TvG) assisted the ability of unions/firms to pursue/affect transfer processes? 
European law: How have these nachwirkung provisions been interpreted in 
light of EU law presented by the Acquired Rights Directive (Ubergang von 
Unternehmen)? 
 
 
 
 
Interview G-ARD 2 (AH) 
 
Senior research official at the European Trade Union Institution (ETUI) with 
expertise in German labour matters and restructuring. Initial AH. Questions 
concerned broader issues of restructuring in Germany as well as specific questions 
of the ARD examples such as that of Siemens. The ARD is used as shorthand for 
phrases like ‘the Transfer of Undertakings directive’ or ‘the directive’. The interview 
started by my giving the interviewee an example of German restructuring from 
Siemens: https://bit.ly/2Oz0q2B.  
 
 
AM: most of these questions concern the effect of restructuring on collective 
agreements, their fragmentation and how these are dealt with by unions. I 
have some examples such as that of Siemens… (AH interjects) 
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AH: The question comes with individual companies and why they need to 
reorganise. Sometimes you will have questions of special benefits, so let’s say 
a premium (on a worker’s pay) if you’ve worked for a company for 15 years 
or if you get a day off, but you may not get a premiums applied to newer 
employees but it doesn’t really matter because they won’t work for the 
company that long anyway. So there are mismatches [between different 
employees’ terms] that are completely OK to carry on [with]. 
 
In a way this is what the ARD in effect actually makes possible, that maintain 
your status quo until there’s a reason to renegotiate.  
 
Now in other countries its done differently. In France for example, the ARD 
is transposed that they can keep collective agreements for a certain amount 
of time but at the same time trade unions can start to negotiate from day one, 
or after 12 months or 15 months, and there’s weird complicated manoeuvres 
that they can do. But the essential purpose of the ARD is that you may lose 
your employers, but you won’t lose your rights. And that’s why ‘acquired 
rights’ is quite a good name for it; 
 
AM: Yes. Interestingly we tend not to use it here. 
 
AH: Ah that’s another story. Why the Brits don’t use what they have is 
another story. 
 
(AH indicates she’s looking for something relevant to our discussion) 
 
AH: We do have examples from different countries of worker participation 
in this. I have moved onto company law since all this you see [sic]… 
 
AM: Ah well this is another angle of this chapter I’m doing, and I was talking 
to a guy at IG Metall (a German trade union) he gave an example of a Danish 
company where workers had to agree to unpalatable consequences like a 
new collective agreement otherwise this company would simply outsource 
this (production) to another firm in another country. And he described this 
very scenario and is happening quite a lot.  
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I ask whether this is commonplace in your experience? 
 
AH: I’m going to send this draft report, basically it’s a report covering all 
countries. Are you covering just Germany or Britain as well or is it 
comparative? 
 
AM: Comparative I’m doing Britain as well.  
 
AH: Ah ok, I can’t find it right now so ask your next question. 
 
AM: I have another question about this point on company law and how 
unions and workers are pressured to accept restructuring with worse 
conditions. The idea that they have to accept certain deals other companies 
will take things overseas. 
 
AH: That’s true but this is more of a problem under the posting of workers 
directive. The Commission is trying to reform the directive but they’re not 
sure what they’re trying to do. It’s a big east-west conflict between newer 
member states and the countries in the west. I think the right to form of works 
council, it was there under Belgian law, it’s none of the Germans’ business if 
they’re forming a works council in Belgium, but if they’re working to all these 
different conditions then this is what they’re trying to sort out. 
 
Note: the reference to Belgium here is unclear, although the broader point about 
works councils is relevant. 
 
AH: I know more about the German situation. In the German case, there is 
more conservative view, and long-term view, which states that if collective 
agreements are in place they will remain in place. Some employers might 
change the rules but others will be like ‘if it works don’t fix it’. So this is what 
you’ll see. 
 
But with the works councils you have what is probably the key difference. 
These have a great deal of influence about what shaping what happens at the 
work place via ‘works agreements’. Trade unions have influence over pay 
overall [meaning at the overarching sectoral level]. Do you know about the 
different competences of the trade unions versus the works council? 
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AM: Yes. 
 
AH: the trade union negotiates the overall rates of pay and pay scale, the 
works council works out who goes into what place on the scale. The trade 
union negotiates the working week, how many working hours are worked 
per week. The works council calculates the allocation of working time per 
week. How overtime works, weekend work, the works council does that not 
the trade union.  
 
In the event that there’s a transfer of undertaking, this means that the 
collective agreement stays the same anyway provided that the new employer 
is a member of the same sector (membership agreement). In some countries 
[that have both works council and trade unions] these roles are quite mixed, 
but in Germany this differentiation is important to the ‘who does what 
around here’ [sic]. 
 
Now, I don’t know what happened in the Siemens example I don’t know 
what collective agreement they applied because normally there would be one 
collective agreement that would be valid. They may have applied one from 
another trade union. So in this example, what was that these transferred 
workers do, what did they do? 
 
AM: The jobs were much more core task jobs, but the one source I have for 
this that I’ve shown you doesn’t specify. But Siemens did produce this 
auxiliary collective agreement, which the union agreed to, that sort of bled 
off the core agreement. It was however a new separate agreement that wasn’t 
there before. 
 
AH: Are you sure it wasn’t a works agreement (agreed by works councils) not 
a collective agreement?  
 
AM: here (https://bit.ly/2Oz0q2B) it translates into a collective agreement. 
 
AH: That might be your solution. As far I’m aware that Siemens is subject to 
the main agreement for the metal sector.  
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Note: this is now interesting, but the interviewee doesn’t seem to know more than 
the traditional state of play for the German metal sector and doesn’t know about these 
changes being described in the source https://bit.ly/2Oz0q2B regarding Siemens. 
 
AH: if the employer had changed there would have been reason to create a 
new works agreement.  
 
AM: Yes this bit I understand, I have been trying to get hold of this guy 
Thorsten Schulten who wrote it.  
 
The reason I ask this as this is only one example of privatisation and 
restructuring in Germany. I have others also written by Schulten with Ian 
Greer, whom I know, and in each case erosion of workers’ pay and rights 
have been changed, despite the ARD, so it’s strange how Germany has these 
institutions that would aid the ARD in protecting workers rights but this is 
not what is happening.  
 
AH: It is curious to be sure. I’d like to see more of these examples and I’ll 
send you some things about works councils and restructuring. Because one 
thing is that if the works council agrees to the shift in production then this 
will weaken the union’s ability to stop it. 
 
AM: yes this is what appears to be happening in this Siemens and other cases 
in Germany. 
 
Note. Although this interviewee couldn’t speak to the details of the examples 
provided, some of the contextual information was very useful and the general picture 
of how restructuring is dealt with in Germany. 
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End. 
